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The ritual gesture of laying on of hands in Scripture has generated significant 
interest among theologians from rabbinic times until now. Still today, scholars assign 
various meanings to the ritual. In the second half of the 20th century, the fresh interest 
that put forward new meanings for this gesture came primarily through the introduction 
of the new sub-discipline of Ritualistics within Old Testament studies. This relatively 
new discipline is not founded upon premises found in biblical texts, but rather, upon 
those found in various secular social, philosophical sciences, and other disciplines such as 
sociology, philosophy, anthropology, literary criticism, and the study of religion. These 
disciplines often reject major presuppositions found in biblical texts, and scholarly 
studies based on these approaches have produced multiple proposals regarding the 
 
 
meaning of this gesture. Such proposals generally offer incomplete, limited insights into 
the biblical meaning conveyed by laying on of hands. I have sought to avoid this 
interpretative misstep in the context of identifying the meaning of laying on of hands by 
(1) adopting premises found in the biblical text, especially concerning the nature of 
human beings and the concepts of sin and atonement, and (2) conducting a reading of the 
biblical text that applies a terminological/contextual/intertextual approach. 
This study is divided into three sections. In the first section, I explore the concept 
of sin in the Pentateuch (ch. two) and establish terminology to express the nature of sin 
(ch. three). I utilize simple legal terminology based upon my reading of Lev 4-6. In the 
second section, I conduct an in-depth study of the Hebrew ר פֶּ  to establish the concept of כִּ
atonement (ch. four) and critically evaluate the commonly-accepted automatic defilement 
hypothesis (ch. five). In the third section, I present the ritual theory created by biblical 
scholars that coincides with the theoretical framework that I identified in the course of 
this study, which assisted in achieving the main and initial goal of this study, namely, to 
identify the meaning of laying on of hands in cultic contexts in the Pentateuch. The 
resulting data of this study enables me to expose limitations and errors included in 
various scholarly proposals concerning the meaning of the laying on of hands. 
The traditional meaning of laying on of hands in cultic contexts has been that of 
transfer, with various qualities transferred such as sin, guilt, authority, general human 
sinfulness, and others. Very often the idea of substitution is included in the meaning of 
the ritual. Through a fresh study of the concepts of sin and atonement, and building upon 
biblical premises concerning the nature of human beings, I conclude that the meaning of 
 
 
transfer emerges from the biblical texts more than any other, and constitutes the 
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TBü Theologische Bücherei 
 
TDNT Theological Dictionary of the New Testament 
 
TDOT Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament 
 
THAT Theologisches Handwörterbuch zum Alten Testamen 
 
THeth Texte Der Hethiter 
 
ThTo Theology Today 
 
TLOT Theological Lexicon of the Old Testament 
 
TOTC Tyndale Old Testament Commentaries 
 
TSR Toronto Studies in Religion 
 
TWAT Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Alten Testament 
 
TWOT Theological Wordbook of the Old Testament 
 
UBCS Understand the Bible Commentary Series 
 
VT Vetus Testamentum 
 
VTSupp Vetus Testamentum Supplements 
 
WAWS Writings from the Ancient World Supplements 
 
WBC Word Biblical Commentary 
 
WDCE The Westminster Dictionary of Christian Ethics 
 
WEC The Wycliffe Exegetical Commentary 
 
WLJ Widener Law Journal 
 




WUNT Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 
 
ZABR Zeitschrift für altorientalische und biblische Rechtsgeschichte 
 
ZAW Zeitschrift für die Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft 
 
ZIBBCOT Zondervan Illustrated Bible Backgrounds Commentary: Old Testament 
 
ZPEB The Zondervan Pictorial Encyclopedia of the Bible 
 













First and foremost, I am thankful to God, who has been a faithful Provider, 
Helper, Protector, Sustainer, and Guide at all times and in all things. 
I am immeasurably grateful to God for my dear wife Maria and my children, 
Jakov, Ruta Maria, and Aron, who have constantly been by my side through this complex 
process. Thank you for your patience and sacrifice as I often invested the time that 
belonged to you in order to complete this work. 
I would like to thank my dissertation committee in particular: Drs. Davidson, 
Moskala, and Rodriguez. My dissertation advisor, Dr. Davidson, especially, showed 
immeasurable trust in me when I was at the beginning of my research, and this trust has 
continued to encourage me to the end of the journey. His support, guidance, and 
intentionality to avoid interfering with my independent reasoning created just the right 
environment for me to do my best. I am grateful that, during the process, he never 
compromised his well-known high standards of biblical interpretation, which elevated the 
quality of my work. 
Andrews University administration, specifically the Seminary PhD/ThD Office 
and the International Student Office supported me financially during my doctoral journey 
at Andrews University. Thank you very much.  
I would also like to thank the James White Library and its staff. They have been 
nothing but excellent in providing resources and a pleasant space to research. Your 
service is much appreciated. 
There are many individuals whom God has drawn into my life. Their time, effort, 
influence, and encouragement are reflected in this dissertation, and I am wholeheartedly 















Background of the Problem 
The initial goal of the present study was to identify the particular ritual gesture of 
the laying on of hands. The study of rituals1 significantly increased in the second half of 
the 19th century and continues to flourish until the present. The growing interest in ritual 
studies resulted in the introduction in the 1960s of a new sub-discipline within Old 
Testament (OT) studies called Ritualistics.2 The laying on of hands in the OT is one of   
 
1This study refrains from assigning any of the numerous definitions suggested by the ritual or 
biblical scholars studying ritual because they are informed by various scientific disciplines which focus on 
certain aspects of ritual and because of the diversity of philosophical presuppositions involved in their 
production. Jan Plavoet listed twenty-four different definitions produced since 1909, starting with van 
Gennep, through 1991 with David Parkin. Jan Platvoet, “Ritual in Plural and Pluralistic Societies,” in 
Pluralism and Identity: Studies in Ritual Behaviour, eds. Jan Platvoet and Karel van der Toorn, SHR 67 
(Leiden: Brill, 1995), 42–45; Gerald A. Klingbeil, Bridging the Gap: Ritual and Ritual Texts in the Bible 
(Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2007), 14. The biblical text demonstrates that ritual consists of certain 
dimensions/characteristics which are discussed in ch. 6 of the present study. Klingbeil, Bridging the Gap, 
208–24. Biblical ritual and non-ritual texts contain certain premises that can provide grounds to form a 
conceptual framework and theoretical principles for the study of ritual which is also discussed in ch. 6 of 
the current work. 
2Gerald A. Klingbeil, A Comparative Study of the Ritual of Ordination as Found in Leviticus 8 
and Emar 369 (Lewiston, NY: Mellen Press, 1998); Klingbeil, Bridging the Gap, 26–69; Patrick D. Miller, 
“Israelite Religion,” in The Hebrew Bible and Its Modern Interpreters, eds. Douglas A. Knight and Gene 
M. Tucker, BMI 1 (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), 201–37; J. P. Sørensen, “Ritualistics: A New 
Discipline in the History of Religion,” in The Problem of Ritual: Based on Papers Read at the Symposium 
on Religious Rites held at Åbo, Finland, on the 13th-16th of August 1991, ed. Tore Ahlbäck (Åbo, Finland: 
The Donner Institute for Research in Religious and Cultural History, 1993), 9–24. 
 
2 
the most studied ritual gestures.3 Interest in this topic was already noted in rabbinic 
literature, wherein the rabbis argued that this ritual gesture meant the transfer of sin from 
the offerer onto the sacrificial animal. As a consequence, the animal died, instead of the 
offerer. This conclusion was reached by taking Lev 16:21 as the model for interpreting 
the ritual gesture of laying on of hands in the sacrificial context.4 The same understanding 
of the ritual gesture was accepted by the Church Fathers, as well,5 and transfer in various 
contexts was the prevailing interpretation until the end of 19th and the beginning of the 
20th century.6 In scholarly parlance, this theory is labeled the transfer/substitution theory.   
 
3Roy E. Gane, Cult and Character: Purification Offerings, Day of Atonement, and Theodicy 
(Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2005), 53–54, 176, 224; B. J. van der Merwe, “The Laying on of Hands in 
the Old Testament,” OTWSA 5 (1962): 38–40; Ángel Manuel Rodríguez, “Substitution in the Hebrew 
Cultus and in Cultic-Related Texts” (PhD diss., Andrews University, 1979), 201–8; David P. Wright, “The 
Gesture of Hand Placement in the Hebrew Bible and Hittite Literature,” JAOS 106 (1986): 433–46. 
4The Mishnah Tractate Yoma, 3:8, 6:2 in The Mishnah: A New Translation, trans. Jacob Neusner 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); Bernd Janowski, Sühne als Heilsgeschehen: Studien zur 
Sühnetheologie der Priesterschrift und zur Wurzel KPR im Alten Orient und im Alten Testament, WMANT 
55 (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 2000), 205; Nobuyoshi Kiuchi, The Purification Offering in the 
Priestly Literature: Its Meaning and Function, JSOTSup 56 (Sheffield: Academic Press, 1987), 113; J. H. 
Kurtz, Offerings, Sacrifices, and Worship in the Old Testament, trans. James Martin (Peabody, MA: 
Hendrickson, 1998), 85; Solomon Zeitlin, “The Semikah Controversy Between the School of Shammai and 
Hillel,” JQR 56 (1966): 242–43. 
5Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 113; Kurtz, Offerings, 85. 
6Significant studies that affirmed the transfer meaning of laying on of hands in the New Testament 
were done by Johannes Behm, Die Handauflegung im Urchristentum: Nach Verwendung, Herkunft und 
Bedeutung in Religionsgeschichtlichem Zusammenhang Untersucht (Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1911); Joseph 
Coppens, “L'imposition des mains et les rites connexes dans le Nouveau Testament et dans l'église 
ancienne: Etude de theologie positive” (diss.es ad gradum magistri, Universitas Catholica Lovaniensis, 
1925); John Fleter Tipei, The Laying on of Hands in the New Testament: Its Significance, Techniques, and 
Effects (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2009). The understanding that this ritual gesture means 
transfer, among others, was also established by scholars who studied it in the context of ordination. 
Johannes Neumann, “Salbung und Handauflegung als Heilszeichen und Rechtsakt,” in Wahrheit und 
Verkündigung: Michael Schmaus zum 70. Geburtstag, eds. Leo Scheffczyk, Werner Dettloff, and Richard 
Heinzmann (München: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1967), 2:2; Eduard Lohse, Die Ordination im Spätjudentum 
und im Neuen Testament (Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1951); W. Everett Ferguson, “Ordination in 
the Ancient Church: An Examination of the Theological and Constitutional Motifs in the Light of Biblical 
and Gentile Sources” (PhD diss., Harvard University, 1959); Allen Podet, “Morenu Harabh: Elements in 
the Development of Rabbinical Ordination in the Codes” (PhD diss., Hebrew Union College-Jewish 
Institute of Religion, 1964); Keith Edward Krieghoff Mattingly, “The Laying on of Hands on Joshua: An 
Exegetical Study of Numbers 27:12–23 and Deuteronomy 34:9” (PhD diss., Andrews University, 1997). 
 
3 
At the beginning of the 21st century, some scholars still consider it defensible.7 
The first opposition to this theory appeared, if not prior to, then certainly in the 
19th century. Johann K. von Kurtz has listed the main proponents and opponents of this 
theory between 1859 and 1890.8 Significant among the theologians at the beginning of 
the 19th century who opposed the transfer/substitution theory was Karl Bähr. He held that 
laying on of hands was “nothing but a formal and solemn declaration, on the one hand, 
that this gift was his [the offerer’s] actual property and, on the other hand, that he was 
ready to give up this property of his entirely to death—to devote it to death for Jehovah.”9   
 
7Paul Volz, “Die Handauflegung bein Opfer,” ZAW 21 (1901): 93–100; William P. Paterson, 
“Sacrifice,” DBDL 4:340; H. G. Schütz, “ἐπιτίθημι,” NIDNTT 2:152; SDABD, s.v. “Laying on of Hands”; 
Zeitlin, “The Semikah Controversy,” 242; P. R. Akroyd, “ יד,” TDOT 5:423–24; J. C. Lambert and M. H. 
Shepherd, “Laying on of Hands,” DB 572; Nicholaus Adler, “Laying-on of Hands,” BEBT 2:495–96; 
CBTEL s.v. “Imposition of Hands”; TBD, s.v. “Hand”; David W. Baker, “Leviticus,” in Leviticus, 
Numbers, Deuteronomy, ed. Philip W. Comfort, CBC 2 (Carol Stream, IL: Tyndale House, 2008), 22; 
Michael Fink, “Laying on of Hands,” HCBD 413; Allan M. Hartman, “סמך,” NIDOTTE 3:270–71; F. 
Stolz, “סמך,” TLOT 2:805; New International Dictionary of the Bible, s.v. “Laying on of Hands”; Alexis 
Médebielle, “Le symbolisme du sacrifice expiatoire en Israel,” Bib 2 (1921): 141–69, 273–302; Mark F. 
Rooker, Leviticus, NAC 3A (Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 2000), 87–88; John E. Hartley, Leviticus, 
WBC 4 (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1992), 233; Gordon J. Wenham, The Book of Leviticus, NICOT 3 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1979), 233; BEB 2, s.v. “Laying on of Hands”; NNIBD s.v. “Laying on of 
Hands”; Jacob Milgrom, “Sacrifices and Offerings, OT,” IDBSup 765. Later on in his work, Milgrom 
switched from identification/transfer theory to ownership/transfer theory. David Daube, The New 
Testament and Rabbinic Judaism (New York: Arno Press, 1973), 225; J. R. Porter, Leviticus, CBC 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 19, 38; A. Noordtzij, Leviticus, trans. Raymond Togtman, 
BSC (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1982), 57; Noam Zohar, “Repentance and Purification: The 
Significance and Semantics of חטאת in the Pentateuch,” JBL 107 (1988): 612–13; Erhard S. Gerstenberger, 
Leviticus: A Commentary, OTL 3 (Louisville: Westminister John Knox Press, 1996), 26, 30; Derek Tidball, 
The Message of Leviticus, BST (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2005), 39–40. 
8He noted that scholars understood the laying on of hands differently, depending on which 
sacrifice it was related to. Starting from Kurtz’s time, several scholars advocated that transfer occurred with 
regard to the sacrificial animal when laying on of hands took place on the animal of the burnt offering (Lev 
1), peace-offering (Lev 3), sin-offering (Lev 4), and trespass offering (Lev 5). Opposing this interpretation 
was another group of scholars who held that transfer took place only in regards to the sin and trespass 
offering, and they attributed a different meaning when the rite was related to the burnt and peace offerings. 
Kurtz, Offerings, 86–87. 
9Karl Christian Wilhelm Felix Bähr, Symbolik des Mosaischen Cultus, 2 vols. (Heidelberg: J. C. B. 
Mohr, 1839), 2:341. 
 
4 
It seems that in Bähr’s opinion, the meaning of the ritual activity consisted of two 
components: declaration of ownership by the offerer over the sacrifice which is 
considered as a gift, and giving up of that ownership so that the sacrifice can be devoted 
to God. 
Johann K. von Hoffman, on the other hand, held that the rite meant that “what the 
person offering the sacrifice inwardly purposed to do, when bringing the animal to the 
Holy Place, was to render a payment to God; and he had full power to appropriate the life 
of the animal for the rendering of this payment.”10 Later, in the second edition of his 
book, he modified his position and said that “an appointment of the animal for a 
slaughter, the object of which (as Delitzsch admits) was twofold, viz., to obtain the blood 
for the altar, and the flesh for the fire-food of Jehovah, whether the intention was to 
supplicate the mercy of God toward sinner, i.e., to make expiation, or (as in the case of 
the thank-offering) to present thanksgiving and prayer for the blessing of life.”11 It seems 
that Hoffman held that the ritual meant an appropriation or appointment of the animal for 
slaughter, which would eventually bring expiation for the offerer’s sins. 
Opposition toward the transfer/substitution theory continued in the 20th century, 
as well; George F. Moore proposed a very similar conclusion to the one presented by 
Bähr. Moore summarized his position as follows: “The prevailing conception of sacrifice 
in the OT is that of the gift or present to God.”12 As a gift, the sacrifice was a means of 
 
10Johann C. K. von Hofmann, Der Schriftbeweis: Ein Theologischer Versuch (Nördlingen: C. H. 
Beck, 1857), 2:153–54.  
11Kurtz, Offerings, 84. 
12George. F. Moore, “Sacrifice,” EncyBib 4:4216. 
 
5 
gaining God’s favor. He strengthened his argument with the claim that the sacrificial 
substitution was neither present in biblical times, nor in post-biblical Judaism.13 
In his paper from 1913, Henry P. Smith recognized that this ritual cross-culturally 
conveys transfer. This same understanding was effected in Ancient Israel in Lev 16:21 
and Deut 21.14 However, he proposed a totally unique understanding of this ritual in Lev 
8 and regular sacrifices—that laying on of hands transfers the sanctity from the sacrifice 
to the offerer.15 This understanding never received noteworthy attention by other 
scholars. 
Six years after Moore published his article, William P. Paterson argued 
conversely that sacrificial substitution was indeed present in post-biblical Judaism.16 
Paterson collected five arguments established by different scholars who wanted to 
dispute the transfer/substitution theory at the beginning of the 19th century, the time 
when Paterson wrote his article. 
In the judgment of most modern scholars, the theory in question is untenable, and for 
the following reasons: (a) the death of the victim cannot have been vicarious, since 
sacrifice was not allowed for sins which merited death (Nu 15:30), only for venial 
transgressions; (b) a cereal offering might also atone (Lv 5:11–13), and in this case 
there could be no idea of a penal substitution; (c) the victim was slain by the offerer, 
but on the theory in question should have been put to death by the priest as God’s 
representative; (d) the assumption that the imposition of hands involved a 
transmission of guilt is inconsistent, not only with other references to this practice, 
but with the fact that the sacrificial flesh was treated as most holy, and might be eaten 
 
13Moore, “Sacrifice,” 4:4226. 
14In texts from Greece, Egypt, and India, laying on of hands was practiced to convey transfer. 
Henry Preserved Smith, “The Laying-on of Hands,” AJT 17 (1913): 48–50, 55. 
15Smith, “The Laying-on of Hands,” 53, 55–57. 
16Paterson, “Sacrifice,” DBDL 4:339–41. 
 
6 
by the priest; (e) the central act of the sacrifice was, not the act of slaughtering, but 
the manipulation of the blood, which was presented to God.17 
 
While some scholars rejected the transfer/substitution theory, others favored it 
and sought to prove its correctness. Thus, between 1921 and 1923, Alexis Medebielle 
published three articles and eventually a book as an attempt to defend the sacrificial 
substitution theory.18 Summarizing Medebielle’s position, Rodríguez identified his four 
basic principles: “(1) Sacrificial substitution was a well-known practice in the ancient 
Near Eastern religions; (2) the basic meaning of the sacrifices is found in Lev 17:11; (3) 
the laying on of hands means transfer and substitution; and (4) the immolation of the 
victim represents the death of the sinner.”19 
However, Medebielle’s arguments for the transfer/substitution theory did not 
change growing negative attitudes towards this theory, and soon after his articles and 
book appeared in print, Dionys Schötz published his study of expiatory sacrifices in 
1930. Schötz concluded that the idea of sacrificial substitution cannot be found in 
expiatory sacrifices. His argument is that slaughter was not the essential act in the animal 
sacrifice, but rather, blood manipulation, which he held was an act of consecration, not 
transfer.20 He found support for his claim in the fact that Gen 22:1–19 and Deut 21:1–9 
cannot be used to support the transfer/substitution theory because the sacrifices 
 
17Paterson, “Sacrifice,” DBDL 4:340. 
18Alexis Médebielle, L'expiation dans l'Ancien et le Nouveau Testament (Rome: Institut Biblique 
Pontifical, 1923); Alexis Médebielle, “Expiation,” DBSup 3:1–262; Médebielle, “Le symbolisme du 
sacrifice expiatoire en Israel,” 141–69, 273–302. 
19Rodríguez, “Substitution in the Hebrew Cultus,” 9. 




mentioned in these verses were not expiatory sacrifices.21 He also noted the difficulty of 
finding grounds for sacrificial substitution in the case of the peace sacrifice which, in his 
opinion, was probably the most common one. Thus, for Schötz, the sacrifice was 
essentially a gift to the deity and did not contain the idea of substitutionary atonement.22 
Schötz agreed that the LXX translation of Lev 17:11 gives the notion of sacrificial 
substitution, but claimed that it is not present in the MT.23 
In 1980 Angel M. Rodríguez defended his dissertation entitled, “Substitution in 
the Hebrew Cultus and in Cultic-Related Texts,” which is the most comprehensive 
defense of the transfer/substitution theory up to the present time.24 Resistance towards 
this theory has continued, however. In 1985, David P. Wright collected five additional 
objections to this theory, adding to the list provided by Moore: 
1. It is informed by the substitution theory of sacrifice which is untenable. 
2. The main support of the transfer/substitution theory is the hand placement rite 
in Lev 16:21. Wright assumes that hand placement in Lev 16:21, performed with two 
hands, is different from hand placement with one hand, which is the procedure for other 
offerings. Hence, a difference in form suggests, a priori, a possible different meaning. He 
also claims that the scapegoat is not a sacrifice; it is merely a rite of elimination and 
therefore, cannot be used to interpret the gesture of hand placement in sacrifices. 
 
21Schötz, Schuld- und Sündopfer im Alten Testament, 109. 
22Schötz, Schuld- und Sündopfer im Alten Testament, 113. See also Rodríguez, “Substitution in the 
Hebrew Cultus,” 10. 
23Schötz, Schuld- und Sündopfer im Alten Testament, 114. See also Rodríguez, “Substitution in the 
Hebrew Cultus,” 11. 
24Rodríguez, “Substitution in the Hebrew Cultus,” 11. 
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3. It is difficult to apply the idea of transfer to guilt in the case of the well-being 
offering since it is not an expiatory offering like the purification and reparation offerings, 
and, to a certain extent, the burnt offering. 
4. If the laying on of hands means transfer of guilt, then it is difficult to 
understand why it was not practiced on the purification or burnt offering commuted to a 
bird (Lev 1:14–17; 5:7–11). 
5. The view of transfer of sin or penalty by hand placement is usually 
accompanied by the view that confession of guilt took place at the time of the hand 
placement There is no evidence, however, that confession took place at that time. The 
few examples of confession with a sacrifice place the confession before the sacrifice is 
even brought (Lev 5:5; Num 5:7).25 
At the beginning of the 21st century, five distinct theories were maintained as a 
possible explanation for the meaning of the ritual gesture of laying on of hands: (1) 
transfer/substitution theory, (2) identification theory, (3) 
consecration/dedication/presentation theory, (4) appropriation-ownership/designation 
theory, and (5) manumission theory. The last four theories will be summarized below and 
compared with the transfer/substitution theory. 
The majority of the proponents of the identification theory claim that by placing 
one hand on the sacrificial animal, the offerer identified him-/herself with the animal, and 
by offering the animal, was offering him-/herself through it.26 However, when the ritual 
 
25Wright, “The Gesture of Hand Placement,” 437–38. 
26Everett Fox, The Five Books of Moses: Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, Deuteronomy, SB 
1 (New York: Schocken Books, 1995), 511; René Péter-Contesse and John Ellington, A Translator's 
Handbook on Leviticus, UBS Helps for Translators (New York: United Bible Societies, 1990), 14. 
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gestures included placing both hands as in the scapegoat ritual, then it meant transfer.27 
M. C. Sansom seemed to accept this theory as his initial understanding of the gesture, but 
he also allowed for the possible meaning of the victim’s being the property of a particular 
individual and that it is presented in his behalf. Consequently, the ritual gesture signified 
“attestation (as much to the priest as to God) that the victim comes from this particular 
individual or group, that it is offered in his or their name, and that the fruit shall be his.”28 
In order to encompass all these nuances of meanings, Sansom stated that the gesture 
signified that the sacrifice has a representative nature.29 
The advocates of the consecration/dedication/presentation theory claim that the 
laying on of hands on the sacrificial animal signified the act of separation or setting apart 
from the larger group for a special purpose. By placing the hands on the animal’s head, 
the offerer was dedicating the sacrifice to God and making it his/her own representative 
and substitute.30 
Advocates of the appropriation/ownership/designation theory hold that placing 
hand/s upon the sacrificial animal was a demonstration of the offerer’s ownership over 
 
27René Péter, “L'imposition des mains dans l'Ancien Testament,” VT 27 (1977): 52. Péter holds 
that identification occurs only when the ritual is performed with one hand. J. A. MacCulloch, “Laying on of 
Hands,” ERE 6:493–94; I. H. Marshal, “Laying on of Hands,” NBD (1962), 724; I. H. Marshal, “Laying on 
of Hands,” IBD 2:889; D. W. Wead, “Hands, Laying on of,” ISBE 2:611; Henry Barclay Swete, “Laying on 
of Hands,” DBDL 3:85; R. D. Parkins, “סמך,” TWOT 2:628; RBD s.v. “Laying on of Hands”; Porter, 
Leviticus, 19. Even though Martin Noth used a term that would point to the transfer, he essentially thought 
of identification: “The ’laying’ of the hand on the animal brought to the holy place for sacrifice is hard to 
explain. It may have its origin in special sacrificial rites, as in Lev 16:31, in the sense of the transference of 
the offerer’s own person to the animal thus making the latter his substitute.” Martin Noth, Leviticus: A 
Commentary, OTL (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1965), 22.  
28M. C. Sansom, “Laying on of Hands in the Old Testament,” ET 94 (1983): 325. 
29Sansom, “Laying on of Hands in the Old Testament,” 325. 
30DDB s.v. “Laying on of Hands”; Frank Thielman, “Laying on of Hands,” BTDB 473; NWDB, 
s.v. “Laying on of Hands.”  
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the animal which he/she offers to God. In addition, the gesture meant that the benefit of 
that sacrifice belongs to the offerer.31 However, some proponents of this theory also see 
transfer of guilt as a meaning of the ritual gestures in some cases where the gestures 
occur, mainly in the case of the scapegoat.32 Roy Gane proposed a hybrid theory that 
encompasses the meanings of several theories.33 Basically, the ritual gesture expresses 
ownership of the offerer over the animal. Gane accepts Péter’s distinction between the 
form of the gesture, one-hand and two-hand, but for him both forms “have a common 
denominator: each signifies a (different) kind of identification that is involved in 
transfer.”34 Transfer is accomplished through other required actions. Thus, the use of one 
hand signifies the transfer of the animal from the offerer to God, while the use of two 
hands, as in the case of scapegoat (with simultaneous confession), transfers moral sins to 
the goat.35 Gane’s understanding of the ritual gesture seems to be identical to the position 
of Bähr.36 However, Gane’s application of OT offerings to the sacrifice of Jesus Christ in 
 
31Porter, Leviticus, 20; Wright, “The Gesture of Hand Placement,” 437–39; Fox, The Five Books 
of Moses, 511. Followed by Tipei, The Laying on of Hands in the New Testament, 28–9. 
32Norman H. Snaith, Leviticus and Numbers, CB 3 (London: Nelson, 1967), 30; Clyde M. Woods 
and Justin Rogers, Leviticus-Numbers, CPNCOTS (Joplin, MO: College Press, 2006), 42–43; Gane, Cult 
and Character, 245; Adrianus van den Born and Louis Hartman, “Imposition of Hands,” EncDB 1044–45. 
33“When hand-leaning is performed, it identifies the offerer/owner of the victim, to whom the 
benefits of the sacrifice accrue, within the context of transferring the offering material from the offerer to 
the deity.” Gane, Cult and Character, 64. 
34Gane, Cult and Character, 245. 
35Gane, Cult and Character, 245. 
36Page 4 in this study. Also, Rolf P. Knierim, Text and Concept in Leviticus 1:1–9: A Case in 
Exegetical Method, FAT 2 (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1992), 37–40. 
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the NT reveals that he goes beyond Bähr’s position by including the idea of transfer of 
sin and substitution.37 
Supporters of the manumission theory propose that the laying on of hand/s on the 
animal’s head meant “renunciation of personal possession” of the offerer. The emphasis 
in this theory is not on the fact that the animal is owned by the offerer, but rather, the 
offerer’s willingness to give up his property. Most proponents of this theory do not deny 
the idea of substitution, but also do not hold it as the dominant one.38  
Contrary to the proponents of other theories who include the idea of 
transfer/substitution, there are some who totally deny it. Some advocates of 
consecration/dedication/presentation claim that the ritual gestures “[meant] nothing more 
than a setting apart of the victim in consecration to its sacred purpose.”39 For others, the 
ownership theory is an important component of the consecration/dedication/presentation 
theory since the presentation of the animal, marked by the laying on of hands, signifies 
transfer of ownership from the offerer to God.40 
At least two proponents of the identification theory do not see any transfer in the 
gesture of laying on of hands. They claim that the gesture signifies only identification.41 
 
37Roy E. Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, NIVAC 3 (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2004), 68–9. 
38Walther Eichrodt, Theology of the Old Testament, trans. J. A. Baker, 2 vols. (Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1967), 2:165; E. Kautzsch, “Religion of Israel,” DBDL Extra:720; Theodore C. 
Vriezen, An Outline of Old Testament Theology, 2nd ed., rev. and enl. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1970), 263. 
39M. H. Shepherd Jr., “Laying on of Hands,” IDB 3:521; R. K. Harrison, “Hands, Impositions of 
(Laying on of),” ZPEB 3:29; Philip J. Budd, Leviticus: Based on the New Revised Standard Version, NCBC 
(London: M. Pickering, 1996), 47. 
40Baruch J. Schwartz, “Leviticus,” in The New Interpreter's Bible: One-Volume Commentary, eds. 
Beverly Roberts Gaventa and David L. Petersen (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2010), 59–60.  
41W. H. Bellinger, Leviticus and Numbers, NIBCOTS 3 (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2001), 20; 
Edward E. Nourse, “Laying on of Hands,” FWNSBD 510. 
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Most proponents of the appropriation/ownership/designation theory do not see 
any idea of transfer/substitution in this ritual gesture. Some hold that transfer is the 
correct meaning in the scapegoat ritual, but the scapegoat is not a sacrifice and therefore, 
the offerer’s ownership of the animal remains the only correct meaning of the gestures in 
sacrificial contexts.42 
At least one proponent of the manumission theory rejects the idea of 
transfer/substitution. His arguments are as follows: (1) transfer of sin/guilt would make 
sacrificial animals unclean and unsuitable to be brought to the altar, and (2) transfer is 
certain only in the case of the scapegoat which is not a sacrifice.43 
Even though the initial and final goal of the present study was to identify the 
meaning/function of laying on of hands, it became clear in the course of the research of 
this topic and even in this short literature review that the meaning of this ritual gesture 
greatly depends on the understanding of the two other concepts, that is sin and atonement.  
 
Statement of the Problem 
Although the ritual gesture of laying on of hands has generated significant interest 
and extensive scholarly research from the beginning of the 19th century until the present, 
which underscores its importance in OT studies, no unified position has been reached. 
 
42Wright, “The Gesture of Hand Placement,” 437–38; David P. Wright, “Hands, Laying of,” ABD 
3:47; Jacob Milgrom and David P. Wright, “סמך,” TDOT 10:282–84. Wright holds that attributive 
identification, which assumes ownership, is the meaning when the ritual is performed with one hand. When 
the ritual is performed with two hands, then its meaning is designation. See also Wright, “The Gesture of 
Hand Placement,” 436–38; Born and Hartman, “Imposition of Hands,” 1044–45; Joseph Coppens, 
“Handauflegung,” BHH 2:632; Samuel E. Balentine, Leviticus, IBCTP (Louisville, KY: John Knox Press, 
2002), 23; Lloyd R. Bailey, Leviticus-Numbers, SHBC 3 (Macon, GA: Smyth & Helwys, 2005), 48; Cecilia 
Wassen, “Laying on of Hands,” NIDB 3:615; Frank H. Gorman, Leviticus, HCBC (San Francisco: Harper, 
2000), 148. 
43Merwe, “The Laying on of Hands in the Old Testament,” 39–40. 
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The fact that no biblical texts explicitly state the meaning of this ritual gesture further 
complicates identifying its meaning. Due to the absence of any explicit statement 
regarding the meaning of this gesture, a crucial factor that made the identifying its 
meaning even more difficult is the lack of a proper hermeneutical interpretative 
framework. The lack of clarity regarding the meaning/function of this ritual and the lack 
of a proper hermeneutical interpretative framework that includes a comprehensive 
exegetical analysis of relevant Pentateuchal passages and a broader interpretative 
framework suggests that further research is needed. 
 
Statement of Purpose 
The purpose of this dissertation is to form a hermeneutical interpretative 
framework based on the biblical texts, mainly those from the Pentateuch, in order to 
facilitate clarifying the theological meaning/function of the ritual gesture of laying on of 
hand/s. This hermeneutical interpretative framework includes an exegetical, contextual, 
and conceptual analysis of the key Pentateuchal texts in cultic44 contexts. The analysis 
includes passages where this ritual gesture is not found, even though it seems that it 
should be present. Inasmuch as they are foundational for the present study, and due to 
their interrelatedness, the concepts of sin and atonement in the OT are thoroughly 
researched and, as a result, redefined. Research on sin and atonement can provide a 
hermeneutical interpretative framework that facilitates identifying the meaning/   
 
44Cultic text or contexts in the present study refer to biblical texts and contexts related to the cult. 
“Cult describes the entirety of religious actions and must be seen against the backdrop of the world view of 
a specific group.” Klingbeil, Bridging the Gap, 11. It “… consists of a specific number of rituals 
comprising subrites and distinct symbols.” Klingbeil, Bridging the Gap, 8. 
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function of this ritual gesture. These two concepts, sin and atonement, form the 
immediate literary and conceptual context of laying on of hands. From the exegetical, 
contextual, and conceptual findings, the proposed theories regarding laying on of hand/s 
is evaluated and a meaning of the ritual gestures is suggested. 
 
Justification of the Research 
Throughout the last two centuries, no unified position has been reached on the 
meaning of laying on of hands in cultic contexts of the Pentateuch. The reason for this 
lies partly in the presuppositions accepted by scholars who studied this ritual gesture. 
Some scholars have been significantly influenced in their interpretations by the NT 
understanding of atonement. Others have reacted against this methodology and have 
wanted to propose explanations free of NT influences. In the process of identifying the 
meaning of this ritual, major scholars have skipped or performed limited study of the 
concept of sin and at the same time understood the concept of atonement based on the 
ANE texts and the Bible.45 Ultimately, many scholars used phenomenological, textual, 
cultural-anthropological, socio-cultural, or comparative studies perspectives for 
understanding this ritual gesture. The conceptual import from the ANE texts is most 
frequent among biblical scholars who deal with ritual texts.46 
 
45These unsound hermeneutical tendencies are exposed throughout the present dissertation. 
46I will use as an example two prominent Pentateuchal scholars, David P. Wright and Bruce Wells 
as they propose meaning to two different ritual texts/concepts in the Pentateuch. Examining laying on of 
hands, Wright stated: “We now turn our attention to examples of a hand gesture from ancient Anatolia 
which has a meaning almost identical to that of sacrificial hand placement in the Bible. The Hittite literary 
corpus contains numerous examples of this gesture. But despite this fact, to my knowledge, very little has 
been written about it, either by itself or as it might relate to the biblical rite. Because of this lack of 
treatment and so that we will be able to perceive fully the similarity of the meaning of the Hittite gesture to 
that in the Bible, we need to enter a somewhat detailed discussion regarding the form and meaning of the 




Although the meaning of the laying on of hands in cultic Pentateuchal contexts 
has been the subject of significant interest and intensive study over the last two centuries, 
no comprehensive exegetical analysis of the passages or dissertation research dealing 
directly with this topic has yet been undertaken. The present dissertation attempts to 
provide a hermeneutical interpretative framework for laying on of hands. It first 
undertakes exploring the concepts of sin and atonement inasmuch as they are the key 
elements of the immediate literary and conceptual context within which laying on of 
hands is found. It also includes exegeting the key passages where this ritual gesture is 
found in the Pentateuch with the insights acquired through the study of sin and 
atonement. The ultimate goal is to form a system that rests on the data found in the 
Pentateuchal texts, but without imposing any system or interpretation based on extra-
biblical sources. ANE texts will be sporadically consulted as a secondary tool, never as 
the primary. 
 
Scope and Delimitations of the Study 
This study will be exegetical, contextual, terminological, and conceptual in its   
 
6.5 pages of an essay without any mention of method how to compare two texts originating from two 
significantly different historical eras and geographical locations. Wright himself stated that these two sets 
of texts are not necessarily coming from the same historical era. This study suggests that such a brief study 
is insufficient to establish the connection and the impact between these two sets of texts. In addition, the 
ANE texts corpus is unstable in the sense that it continues to grow, while the biblical corpus is completed. 
Attempting to give meaning to Lev 5:1 Wells suggested: “There are a number of Neo-Babylonian texts, 
however, that do not derive from law codes but that shed light on the use of this expression. These are 
records from trials and other legal contexts and prove helpful in understanding the function of the 
expression in Lev 5:1.” Bruce Wells, The Law of Testimony in the Pentateuchal Codes (Wiesbaden: 
Harrassowitz, 2004), 72. 
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scope and does not intend to extend into the areas of systematic theology, ritual studies,47 
or ethics. The exegetical process will consist of a close reading of the biblical text on the 
following levels: historical context, grammar, semantics, syntax, historical and cultural 
background, genre, biblical context, text, structure, and theology.48 Texts in which the 
laying on of hands is found (Exod 29; Lev 1, 3, 4, 8, 16, 24; and Num 8) and where it is 
not found, but expected (Lev 1:10–11, 5, 6, 12, 14, 15 and 9, 16, 23; Num 6, 15, 28–29) 
will be exegeted in order to bring out as much data as possible from the texts themselves 
that will help to determine the biblical meaning/function of this ritual gesture. The 
exegesis of these texts is not exhaustive, but rather, focuses on the aspects of the analysis 
that will inform the meaning/function of the ritual gesture. Exegesis is not needed in 
cases of the multiple tables that are supplied in the present work, especially tables dealing   
 
47For ritual theories based upon these disciplines see Wesley J. Bergen, Reading Ritual: Leviticus 
in Postmodern Culture, JSOTSupp 417 (London: T & T Clark International, 2005), 1–12; David P. Wright, 
“Ritual Theory, Ritual Texts, and the Priestly-Holiness Writings of the Pentateuch,” in Social Theory and 
the Study of Israelite Religion: Essays in Retrospect and Prospect, ed. Saul M. Olyan, RBS 71 (Atlanta: 
Society of Biblical Literature, 2012), 195–216; Ithamar Gruenwald, Rituals and Ritual Theory in Ancient 
Israel (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 1–39; Bryan C. Babcock, Sacred Ritual: A Study of the West Semitic Ritual 
Calendars in Leviticus 23 and the Akkadian Text Emar 446, BBRS 9 (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 
2014), 1–78; Gane, Cult and Character; William K. Gilders, Blood Ritual in the Hebrew Bible: Meaning 
and Power (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004); Jonathan Klawans, Purity, Sacrifice, and 
the Temple: Symbolism and Supersessionism in the Study of Ancient Judaism (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006); and Jay Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement: The Priestly Conceptions, HBM 2 
(Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2005). These sources contain references to the previous generation of 
ritual scholars. 
48For more details on exegetical analysis, see Walter C. Kaiser, Toward an Exegetical Theology: 
Biblical Exegesis for Preaching and Teaching (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1981), 24–36; Grant 
R. Osborne, The Hermeneutical Spiral: A Comprehensive Introduction to Biblical Interpretation (Downers 
Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2006), 35–344; John H. Hayes and Carl R. Holladay, Biblical Exegesis: A 
Beginner's Handbook (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2007), 35–212; Otto Kaiser and Werner 
Georg Kümmel, Exegetical Method: A Student's Handbook (New York: Seabury Press, 1981), 1–41; 
Gordon D. Fee and Douglas K. Stuart, How to Read the Bible for All Its Worth (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Zondervan, 2003), 5–32; John Barton, Reading the Old Testament: Method in Biblical Study (Louisville, 
KY: John Knox Press, 1996), 20–236; W. Randolph Tate, Biblical Interpretation: An Integrated Approach 
(Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2008), 11–244; Mary H. Schertz and Perry B. Yoder, Seeing the Text: 
Exegesis for Students of Greek and Hebrew (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2001), 19–148. 
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with sin classifications. The reasoning behind these classifications is not stated since the 
questions pursued in them are very simple and in the majority of cases does not require 
extensive study. 
The gesture of laying on of hands is embedded in the sacrificial offering process 
when the latter includes offering of an animal. Sin and/or general human sinfulness 
(GHS) stand in the background of multiple reasons that initiate offering of a sacrifice, 
such as acceptance, forgiveness, sanctification, and sin removal. The focus of the present 
research is not the sacrificial process itself, with its multiple reference points for potential 
research, even though attention is given to various elements in the analysis of certain 
ritual texts. Rather, it seeks to establish a broader hermeneutical interpretative framework 
to understand the meaning/function of the laying on of hand/s by studying the concept of 
sin in the Pentateuch, as one of its major triggers, along with the GHS, and atonement as 
a key sub-process of a broader process resulting from sacrificial offering. The present 
study follows mainstream OT atonement scholars who claim that, based on Lev 16:16, it 
is possible for the sin, both ritual impurity and moral, to be accumulated in the 
sanctuary.49 The two phase atonement is also accepted in this dissertation as a biblically 
sound concept.50 
Besides basic theological concepts that connect the books of Exodus and 
Leviticus, the organic unity of the Pentateuch will play an important role throughout the 
 
49Gane, Cult and Character, 158, 161, 178, 231, 279, 314, 352, 380; Maccoby, Ritual and 
Morality, 186; Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 260; Johann C. K. von Hofmann, Der Schriftbeweis, 2nd ed. 
(Nördlingen: C. H. Beck, 1859), 2/1:257–58; J. H. Kurtz, Sacrificial Worship of the Old Testament (trans. 
James Martin; 1863; repr., Minneapolis, MA: Klock & Klock, 1980), 142. 
50See the scholarly sources for this theory and details about it in the subheading: Gane’s Theory of 
Atonement and Understanding of ן  .in the present study מִּ
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exegesis of the selected passages in order to determine the meaning of laying on of 
hand/s. This means that the Pentateuch is considered as an account of a continuous 
history and a literary whole written by a single author, Moses, in great part.51 The final 
form of the OT text is accepted as primary material for deriving conclusions in the 
present dissertation. The MT will be accepted as a basic source for the texts cited above 
and others used in the process.  
 
Methodology 
The introductory chapter includes a survey of the literature relevant to the 
meaning/function of the laying on of hands and classification of the main theories 
proposed by biblical scholars. Due to its scope, delimitations, and goal, the present study 
is divided into 3 major sections. The research in the first section is distributed in the 
second and third chapters and focuses on the concept of sin in the OT, specifically in the 
Pentateuch. The second chapter specifically deals with OT hamartiology, establishing a 
proper method to study sin in the OT and specifically, moral sin in the Pentateuch. The 
third chapter defines terminology that is used to express the nature of sin and the insights 
from the Modern Legal System (MLS) and biblical law (BL). Special attention was given 
to Lev 4–6. 
The second section is spread over the fourth and fifth chapters and includes a re-
examination of atonement in the Pentateuch. The study of  ֶּפ רכִּ  and other ways of 
atonement is studied in chapter four, which includes an in-depth analysis of Lev 17:11 
and 10:17. Chapter five analyzes the automatic defilement hypothesis (ADH) that is 
 
51Charles Elliott, “The Unity of the Pentateuch,” HSt 2 (1883): 305, 308. 
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embedded in the concept of sin and atonement by the majority of biblical scholars of the 
Ancient Israel cult. 
The third section is covered in chapter six which presents the ritual theory 
adopted in this study52 and evaluates arguments biblical scholars have proposed against 
the transfer/substitution theory as the meaning of laying on of hands. Most of the 
attention is given to the transfer/substitution and ownership theories since these two are 
most debated in present scholarly dialogue. The present study proposes the 
meaning/function of the laying on of hand/s based on the understanding of the concepts 
of sin and atonement as its interpretative framework and evaluation of the arguments 
proposed against it. 
The seventh chapter will provide a conclusion of the entire study. It presents the 
findings of the study in a coherent system where the details support the main goal of the 
study: the meaning/function of the laying on of hands in cultic contexts. 
 
 














The first part of the first section covered in this chapter is divided into two major 
parts. In the first part, I identify certain elements embedded in the study of sin in the OT, 
such as obstacles, weaknesses, and various approaches that biblical scholars utilized to 
define sin. I also review developments of the understanding of this concept in the OT. 
Finally, having reviewed the major approaches and their weaknesses, I develop my own 
approach to counter the weaknesses detected in previous approaches, and ultimately, 
suggest a more solid and comprehensive understanding of sin. 
With the knowledge acquired in the first part of this chapter, I undertake a more 
focused study of the terms ֶּפַׁשע ,ָחָטא , and ָעֹון in the second part of this chapter. These 
terms play a key role in the overall understanding of atonement in the Pentateuch since 
they are used in crucial passages such as Lev 4 and 16. The study of these terms reflects a 
rigorous application of the approach developed in the first part of this chapter. The goal is 
to define the sins that these terms refer to and establish whether they are intentional or 
unintentional and expiable or inexpiable.1 
 
1Two basic components in defining sin are sin’s expiability and the sinner’s intent. In terms of 
sin’s expiability, intentional sin refers to both non-brazen and brazen sin which differ by the fact that the 
former is expiable and the latter is not expiable through the cult. In terms of the sinner’s intent, the term 
intentional sin refers to the sin that is done with the sinner’s full awareness and intent to perform activity 




OT Hamartiology: Obstacles, Weaknesses and Approaches 
This chapter deals with certain elements of OT hamartiology such as major 
obstacles, key approaches, insights from previous and research presented in the present 
study, and a terminological study of the three most relevant Hebrew terms for sin ֶּפַׁשע, 
 Scholars have recognized for a long time that in the history of Western .ָעֹון and ,ָחָטא
theological research, sin is one of the central, yet most complex concepts2 in the OT.3  
 
Obstacles to OT Hamartiology 
There is at least one literary (metaphorically) and two linguistically informed 
reasons for the difficulty related to the study of sin. 
First, the concept of sin has been expressed through several sets of different   
 
In terms of sin’s expiability, unintentional sin refers to the sin that is expiable if God’s regulations 
to handle it are followed. In terms of the sinner’s intent, the term unintentional sin refers to the sin that is 
done with the sinner’s full awareness to perform activity that accidently or unknowingly turned into 
committing a sin. The intent to act was not to perform sin, but the act accidentally or unknowingly turned to 
be sin. 
The use of terminology intentional/unintentional and expiable/inexpiable, along with their 
meaning in this study are fully defined and explained in the subheading “Intentional and Unintentional Sins 
in the Old Testament” on pp. 354–58 of the present study.  
2In the present study, the term concept refers to units of thought without a firm position on their 
ontological status, that is, whether they are mental representations, abstract objects, or both. Joseph Ching 
Po Lam, “The Metaphorical Patterning of the Sin-Concept in Biblical Hebrew” (PhD diss., University of 
Chicago, 2012), 5. As will become obvious from the data derived from OT texts, the concept of sin is 
variously portrayed—sometimes as a mental representation, sometimes as an abstract object, and 
sometimes as both. However, since the core of this study does not examine the ontology of concepts, this 
will not be explored here. For a more elaborate study on the ontology of concepts, see Eric Margolis and 
Stephen Laurence, “The Ontology of Concepts-Abstract Objects or Mental Representations?,” NOÛS 41 
(2007): 561–93. 
3Gnana Robinson, “A Terminological Study of the Idea of Sin in the Old Testament,” IJT 18 
(1969): 112; Robin C. Cover, “Sin, Sinners,” ABD 6:31–40; Edward J. Young, The Study of Old Testament 
Theology Today (Westwood, NJ: F. H. Revell, 1959), 18, 20, 44, 70, 74, 82. 
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metaphors in the OT.4 Some of the most frequent ones used to portray sin against God are 
rebellion (Ezek 2:3), forsaking and despising God (Isa 1:4), breaking the covenant (Deut 
31:16), and so on.5 Based on the basic or literal meaning of the root ָחָטא, Ryder Smith 
noted that sin is metaphorically expressed as missing the target (Judg 20:16), losing the 
path (Prov 19:2), and bearing the burden (Lev 20:20).6 The metaphors which focus on the 
effect of the sin on the people convey that sin: it defiles the people along with the land 
(Ezek 14:11; Lev 18:24–27), ensnares and rules over the people (Ps 119:133), causes the 
people to stumble (Ezek 7:19), separates the people from God (Isa 59:2), and causes the 
people to rot (Ezek 24:23).7 
Second, the plethora of Hebrew terms was used to express this concept.8 The 
statistics of the terms employed vary from at least 10,9 28,10 and 3111 to over 50.12 A high 
 
4Jay Sklar, “Sin,” OEBT 2:298; Charles Ryder Smith, The Bible Doctrine of Sin and of the Ways of 
God with Sinners (London: Epworth Press, 1953), 16–22; Phillip P. Jenson, “Sin,” DOTHB 901. It has to 
be recognized that Smith’s use of metaphors is usually closely related to the etymology of the Hebrew 
terms for sin. 
5Sklar, “Sin,” 2:298–99. 
6Smith, The Bible Doctrine of Sin and of the Ways of God with Sinners, 19. 
7Sklar, “Sin,” 2:298–99. 
8Cover, “Sin, Sinners,” ABD 6:31; Robinson, “Terminological Study,” 112; Sklar, “Sin,” 2:298; 
Mark J. Boda, A Severe Mercy: Sin and Its Remedy in the Old Testament (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 
2009), 6n6; Quell, “ἁμαρτάνω, ἁμάρτημα, ἁμαρτία,” TDNT 1:267–68; Alex Luc, “חטא,” NIDOTTE 2:87; 
Ronald Youngblood, “A New Look at Three Old Testament Roots for ‘Sin,’” in Biblical and Near Eastern 
Studies: Essays in Honor of William Sanford LaSor, ed. Gary E. Tuttle (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 
1978), 201; Gerhard von Rad, Old Testament Theology, trans. D. M. G. Stalker (Louisville: Westminster 
John Knox Press, 2001), 1:263. 
9Luc, “חטא,” NIDOTTE 2:87. 
10Cover, “Sin, Sinners,” ABD 6:31–40. 
11E. Beaucamp, “Péché,” DBSup 7:407–71; Cover, “Sin, Sinners,” ABD 6:31–40. 
12Sklar, “Sin,” 2:298; Boda, A Severe Mercy, 6n16; Cover, “Sin, Sinners,” ABD 6:31–40. 
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number of terms with a variety of contexts in which they are used and nuances they 
emphasize are the primary reason why some purely terminological studies are not 
rewarding in their treatment of the subject. In addition, some terms are used very 
infrequently, which reduces the data base upon which one can establish the potential 
meaning of that particular term. 
Third, in observing the irregularity and inconsistency of the LXX’s use of Greek 
terms to translate the Hebrew terminology employed for the concept of sin, Gottfried 
Quell pointed to another issue related to the concept of sin: 
The reasons for these defects in translation are not to be sought only in the methods of 
the translators, but also in the peculiar difficulty of the Hebrew usage. It is obvious 
that among the many words to be considered, none was exclusively devoted to 
religious and theological use and therefore, none constitutes an exact equivalent to the 
English “sin.” All the Heb. words in question had a secular, as well as a religious 
sense, and, disparate though the relation often is, the very fact of this twofold usage 
constitutes a warning not to overestimate the purely religious content of the term. On 
closer inspection, all seem to be more or clearly the results of rational reflection 
which is religious in content. They are theologoumena rather than original terms of 
spontaneous experience, and the meaning falls into different groups.13 
 
These are some of the difficulties which contributed to the complexity of studying 
and understanding sin. In Quell’s understanding, the terminology in the first place was 
not strictly related to the specific activities, but rather was to convey the occurrence of a 
concept. He observed that six Greek terms were used to translate about 26 Hebrew 
expressions for sin,14 which further confirms his claim that the terms for sin refer to the 
 
13Quell, “ἁμαρτάνω, ἁμάρτημα, ἁμαρτία,” TDNT, 1:269. 
14There is no consensus among scholars on the definite number of terms used to refer to the 
concept of sin in the OT. Thus, this study will use the statistics used in the leading works on the topics. It 
does not intend to resolve this issue since determining the exact number of terms for sin is not crucial for 
the resolution of the problem as laid out in the introduction. 
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concepts, rather than to the specific activities, the understanding that was also transferred 
into the Greek-speaking world.15 
This conceptual understanding of sin was also endorsed by other scholars. Ghana 
Robinson noted that “the Old Testament writers were not interested in a theoretical or 
philosophical discussion of sin.”16 Rather, as S. J. de Vries has pointed out, they only 
“strove to reflect in their rich and vivid terminology the profundity and the widespread 
effects of sin as they experienced it.”17 
 
Major Weakness of the OT Hamartiology 
To arrive at the conceptual understanding of sin, the above-mentioned scholars 
analyzed all or most of the OT texts. The method they used to arrive at this conclusion is 
based on the etymology of certain verbal and nominal terms for sin which, itself, has 
weaknesses.18 This approach of over-relying on the basic meaning of certain terms was 
correctly criticized by James Barr in his seminal work Semantic of Biblical Language.19 
The essence of his critique is found in the following quotation: 
Nevertheless there is a normative strain in the thought of many people about 
language, and they feel that in some sense the “original,” the “etymological 
meaning,” should be a guide to the usage of words, that the words are used ‘properly’ 
when they coincide in sense with the sense of the earliest known form from which 
their derivation can be traced; and that when a word becomes in some way difficult or 
 
15Rolf P. Knierim, “חטא,” TLOT 1:411; Quell, “ἁμαρτάνω, ἁμάρτημα, ἁμαρτία,” TDNT, 1:268f. 
16Robinson, “Terminological Study,” 112. 
17Robinson, “Terminological Study,” 112. 
18Lam, “Metaphorical Patterning,” 64–68. 
19James Barr, The Semantics of Biblical Language (London: Oxford University Press, 1961). 
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ambiguous an appeal to the etymology will lead to a “proper meaning” from which at 
any rate to begin.20 
 
Based on the previous quotation, etymology is not a reliable guide in determining 
the meaning of words in all the contexts they are found in due to the fact that, as Barr 
continued, “the etymology of a word is not a statement about its meaning but about its 
history; it is only as a historical statement that it can be responsibly asserted, and it is 
quite wrong to suppose that the etymology of a word is necessarily a guide either to its 
‘proper’ meaning in a later period or to its actual meaning in that period.”21 While 
etymology is helpful in shedding light on the usages of a given word, context22 seems to 
be a substantially more reliable guide than the historical meaning that was once 
associated with that particular word. Especially relevant for the Hebrew terms is the 
concept Barr labelled as “root fallacy:” 
It seems to be commonly believed that in Hebrew there is a “root meaning” which is 
effective throughout all the variations given to the root by affixes and formative 
elements, and that therefore the “root meaning” can confidently be taken to be part of 
the actual semantic value of any word or form which can be assigned to an 
identifiable root; and likewise that any word may be taken to give some kind of 
suggestion of other words formed from the same root. This belief I shall for the sake 
of brevity call “the root fallacy.”23 
 
 
20Barr, The Semantics of Biblical Language, 107. 
21Barr, The Semantics of Biblical Language, 109. 
22Context has been recognized as one of the crucial and the most important elements in biblical 
hermeneutics, at least since the 1980s and on, especially in the process of selecting the most appropriate 
meaning to Hebrew/Greek/Aramaic words. Context consists of multiple levels of which the basic ones are 
literary, historical, and logical. For a more in-depth analysis on the context in biblical hermeneutics, see 
Osborne, The Hermeneutical Spiral, 35–56, 97–99; Moisés Silva, Biblical Words and Their Meaning: An 
Introduction to Lexical Semantics (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1983), 138–69; Walter C. Kaiser and 
Moisés Silva, Introduction to Biblical Hermeneutics: The Search for Meaning, rev. and exp. ed. (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2007), 61–65; Lam, “Metaphorical Patterning,” 66. Moises Silva went as far as to 
state that “the context does not merely help us understand meaning—it virtually makes meaning.” Silva, 
Biblical Words and Their Meaning, 139. 
23Barr, Semantics, 100. 
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The weakness of the root fallacy is that it does not notice the potential semantic 
shift of given lexical items derived from a common root. In other words, the meaning of 
various root derivatives and roots themselves expand/change over time. Thus, once more, 
context is crucial to determining the most appropriate meaning in a given usage. 
 
Key Approaches to the OT Hamartiology and Their Weaknesses 
There are 3 basic types of analyses that scholars used in researching this 
concept,24 but nonetheless, it has to be stated here that these types of approaches are not 
mutually exclusive as the reading of the works that utilize them shows. Even more, a 
slight or a greater overlap of two or even all three of them can be detected as one reviews 
the studies on hamartiology mentioned below. Thus, the taxonomy of the approaches 
rather indicates the emphasis each author placed on their analysis, rather than the totally 
unique and independent approach. 
 
Terminological Approach 
The first analysis is labelled terminological, in which the emphasis is placed on 
the meanings of certain, or a majority, or even all of the verbal or nominal derivatives of 
the Hebrew roots that are associated with sin. Most of the analysis of this type includes 
an examination of ֶּפַׁשע, ָחָטא ַׁשע, and ָעֹון, and sometimes 25.ֶרַׁשע Some of the key 
representatives of this approach are R. C. Cover,26 R. Y. Youngblood,27 S. Lyonnet and 
 
24Lam, “Metaphorical Patterning,” 64–139. 
25Lam, “Metaphorical Patterning,” 64–65. 
26Cover, “Sin, Sinners,” ABD 6:31–40. 
27Youngblood, “A New Look,” 201–5. 
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L. Sabourin,28 Štefan Porúbcan,29 and Rolf Knierim.30 The findings of some of these 
studies are considered later in the study and thus will not be presented here but it has to 
be noted that scholars of this approach noticed them. 
Undeniably, this type of analysis is inescapable since it provides a basic step to 
gain understanding about a concept. However, the review of the studies in which this 
approach was utilized reveals some serious weaknesses. First, by dealing with so many 
terms that are associated with sin in the OT in its entirety, one is forced to be superficial 
in his/her analysis and insensitive to all the linguistic possibilities and literary particulars 
in regards to the terms in question due to the comprehensiveness of the scope of his/her 
study.31 Second, the context in which the term is used and all usages of a term have to be 
taken into consideration in order to gain a complete understanding.32 Finally, what lacks 
in some studies that were limited in scope to ָחָטא ,ֶּפַׁשע , and ָעֹון is the absence of or 
limited ability of a researcher to observe linguistic patterns that were utilized in regards to 
the uses of all the terms.33  
 
28Stanislas Lyonnet and Leopold Sabourin, Sin, Redemption, and Sacrifice: A Biblical and 
Patristic Study, AB 48 (Rome: Biblical Institute, 1970), 12–16. 
29Štefan Porùbčan, Sin in the Old Testament (Rome: Herder Roma, 1963), 4–107. 
30Rolf Knierim, Die Hauptbegriffe für Sünde im Alten Testament (Gütersloh: Gütersloher 
Verlagshaus, 1965). 
31Lam, “Metaphorical Patterning,” 70–72. 
32Rolf P. Knierim, “The Problem of an Old Testament Hamartiology: Considerations to the Book 
of Štefan Porúbcan, Sin in the Old Testament: Soteriological Study, Roma, 1963,” VT 16.3 (1966): 384, 
doi:10.2307/1516567. 




The second analysis is identified as biblical-theological and actually refers to the 
pool of approaches which emphasize broader, over-arching ideas and themes which come 
out of the historical-literal reading of the biblical texts. This approach assumes a solid 
philological interpretation which, in part, overlaps with the previous, terminological 
approach. As already mentioned above, a degree of emphasis and the organization of 
biblical texts are two points of difference between this and the previous approach. 
This approach inclines toward merging the biblical material into an all-
encompassing view of a topic or a historical development of a concept during the biblical 
period. Works utilizing this approach do not offer fresh lexicographical or philological 
aspects of terms under question and the concept is described in relation to other biblical 
notions.34 The interrelatedness or organic relationship between some biblical concepts, in 
the opinion of the proponent of this approach, is so important that examining them in 
isolation “would destroy the organic texture of the texts and distort the results.”35 
Representative scholars who employed this approach in their research on the 
concept of sin include Yehezkel Kaufmann,36 Walter Eichrodt,37 Gerhard von Rad,38 
 
34Lam, “Metaphorical Patterning,” 82–84. 
35Jože Krašovec, Reward, Punishment, and Forgiveness: The Thinking and Beliefs of Ancient 
Israel in the Light of Greek and Modern Views, VTSupp 78 (Leiden: Brill, 1999), xvii; Boda, A Severe 
Mercy. 
36Yehezkel Kaufmann, The Religion of Israel: From its Beginnings to the Babylonian Exile, trans. 
Moshe Greenberg (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 292–95. 
37Walther Eichrodt, Theologie des Alten Testament, trans. J. A. Baker, 3 vols. (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1961), 2/3:264–345. 
38Rad, Old Testament Theology, 1:154–60, 262–72. 
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Brevard Childs,39 C. Ryder Smith,40 Jože Krašovec,41 and Mark Boda.42 Scholars 
following this approach usually linked the concept of sin to the topics of forgiveness, 
retribution/punishment, reward, confession, mercy, atonement, and so on.43 The intention 
in these studies was to integrate various insights about the concept of sin found 
throughout the entire canon into a general definition of it. 
Thus, Eichrodt defined sin as “Verletzung des Gebots,” or “die Sünde als 
Verletzung des Gebots.”44 Von Rad, limiting material he examined to P and Ezekiel, 
suggested the conceptual understanding of sin as “any grave breach of this divine law 
which Israel knew both in the shape of the series of cultic commandments and in the 
shape of general ‘unwritten’ laws,”45 which, based on the terminological study which he 
also included, also includes its penalty.46 Kauffmann defined sin as rebelliousness: “The 
idea of man’s rebelliousness, by which Genesis explains the origins of the human 
condition, is a fundamental idea of biblical literature and of Israelite religion in general. 
One might call the Bible a chronicle of human rebellion.”47 
 
39Brevard S. Childs, Old Testament Theology in a Canonical Context (Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1986). 
40Smith, The Bible Doctrine of Sin and of the Ways of God with Sinners, 15–22. 
41Krašovec, Reward, Punishment, and Forgiveness. 
42Boda, A Severe Mercy. 
43Lam, “Metaphorical Patterning,” 82–96. 
44“Action contrary to the norm,” or “transgression of the commandment.” Eichrodt, Theology of 
the Old Testament, 2:265, 266. 
45Rad, Old Testament Theology, 1:264. 
46Rad, Old Testament Theology, 1:266. 
47Kaufmann, The Religion of Israel, 295. 
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The change that Childs contributed to this approach was his introduction of the 
canonical-theological element in which he claimed “that the object theological reflection 
is the canonical writing of the Old Testament, that is, the Hebrew scriptures which are the 
received traditions of Israel.”48 He defined sin as “the offence against the God of the 
covenant.”49 Applying Child’s extensions to the biblical-theological approach, Boda 
came up with the already seen definition of sin as “as a violation of God’s command.”50 
However, Boda’s conclusions on his findings on sin of each of the three parts of the OT 
are descriptive, rather than conceptual ranging from 2 to even 7 pages. His example, as 
well as those of the previous scholars associated with this approach, present the main 
weakness of this approach as verbalized by Lam:  
Perhaps this is one of the weaknesses of the “canonical-thematic” approach: while it 
encourages the construction of theology based on exegesis of the individual literary 
portions of the Hebrew Bible, it encounters a greater obstacle at the level of synthesis, 
for there is no theoretical basis for synthesis beyond the historical principle of canon 
itself, which is by definition imposed on the material from the outside.51 
 
The final results of this approach are always partially accurate with embedded 
incompleteness of their assessment of the concept of sin along with descriptiveness, 
rather than a precise definition of it. In addition to Lam’s criticism, Barr noticed that 
“canonical criticism as it now stands, far from being the genuinely theological approach, 
lies in an uneasy balance between the historical, the literary and the theological, unable to 
 
48Childs, Old Testament Theology, 6. 
49Childs, Old Testament Theology, 87. 
50Boda, A Severe Mercy, 517. 
51Lam, “Metaphorical Patterning,” 92. 
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The third analysis is metaphorical in its scope. Scholars using this approach 
attempted to explore specific themes relevant to sin, rather than endeavoring to describe 
sin in its entirety. The review of studies that utilized this approach shows that the concept 
of sin is mainly related to retribution, suffering, and impurity.53 A basic review of the 
association of sin with retribution and suffering is presented below. The relation of sin 
and impurity is not presented for multiple reasons, some of which follow. 
First, impurity is just another term used by some key scholars, to which Lam 
referred under the subheading “Studies on Sin and Impurity” in his dissertation to denote 
sin in the OT. A review of some studies that use the term impurity undeniably refer to sin 
which is a concept rather than a metaphor. Lam himself recognized that.54 Second, a 
scholar’s treatment of impurity as a metaphor is essentially minimal. One type of 
impurity, ritual impurity, is perceived by all scholars as a literal entity, while they are 
divided on the use of moral impurity. Third, none of the scholars who used the noun 
metaphor or more often, the adjective metaphorical proposed a valid explanation as to 
where to draw a line between the majority of literal uses and the few metaphorical uses of 
 
52James Barr, Holy Scripture: Canon, Authority, Criticism (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 
1983), 104; Krašovec, Reward, Punishment, and Forgiveness, 10. 
53Lam, “Metaphorical Patterning,” 96. 
54Lam, “Metaphorical Patterning,” 128. 
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impurity in the OT.55 Also, by rule, the definition of the metaphor is missing in those 
studies. Lam himself noticed that the studies on sin in the OT were closely related to the 
etymologies of certain terms for sin.56 Some totally or almost always avoided metaphor in 
their studies.57 The concept of metaphor was important for Neusner,58 but Lam also 
noticed significant weaknesses of his use of metaphor.59 Milgrom and Wright used the 
terms metaphorical and metaphor, but in an inconsistent way.60 Klawans rejected 
metaphor as an option for expressing sin and proposed that sin/impurity, both ritual and 
moral, are real.61 Lam omitted reference to some significant scholars who tried to utilize 
metaphor in their studies on sin, but none of them offered what metaphor or metaphorical 
represented in their studies.62 Fourth, all these scholars were interested in delineating the 
nature of sin that is expressed in the OT texts, which is an attempt in the present study, 
rather than finding metaphors associated with sin. These are just some, but not all, of the 
significant reasons why considering impurity as a metaphor for sin seems to be an 
 
55Lam, “Metaphorical Patterning,” 128, 115. 
56Lam, “Metaphorical Patterning,” 65, 75, 89. 
57Lam, “Metaphorical Patterning,” 116–17, 123. 
58Jacob Neusner, The Idea of Purity in Ancient Judaism (Leiden: Brill, 1973), 11. 
59Lam, “Metaphorical Patterning,” 114. 
60Lam, “Metaphorical Patterning,” 122, 125. 
61Lam, “Metaphorical Patterning,” 127. 
62See Jonathan Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), 32–33. For treatments of Helmer Ringgren, see Helmer Ringgren, “טהר,” TDOT 5:291–95; 
G. André and Helmer Ringgren, “טמא,” TDOT 5:331–40; Baruch A. Levine, Leviticus = [Ṿa-yiḳra]: The 
Traditional Hebrew Text with the New JPS Translation, JPSTC 3 (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication 
Society, 1989), 134; Baruch A. Levine, Numbers 1–20, AB 4 (New York: Doubleday, 1993), 207; Baruch 
J. Schwartz, “Selected Chapters of the Holiness Code: A Literary Study of Leviticus 17–19” (PhD diss., 
Hebrew University, 1987), xii. 
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unjustifiable endeavor. One should, rather, look at it as the term some scholars used to 
refer to the concept of sin. 
Among those scholars who studied sin in relation to retribution is Klaus Koch in 
his extensive article “Gibt es ein Vergeltungsdogma im Alten Testament?”63 His response 
to the question is that retribution is misleading when applied to biblical texts. Instead, 
Koch claimed that there is a link between a deed and its consequence. The latter is a fated 
result (good or bad) bound up with a deed in nascent form, the way a seed produces a 
plant.64 The change Koch brought to the discussion on the relationship between sin and 
retribution was a major alternative to the juridical view of divine retribution in the OT. 
This view generated a lot of criticism, even though it was accepted by many other 
scholars.65 
As regards the question of the relationship between sin and suffering, scholars 
traditionally claimed that it is either literal-causal (sin causes suffering, either by the 
imposition of God or by some intrinsic effect of sin) or metaphorical (i.e., sin is being 
portrayed as physical suffering or sickness). Still, the predominant response is the former 
one and it is based on attempts to synthesize insights from biblical material.66 The views   
 
63Klaus Koch, “Gibt es ein Vergeltungsdogma im Alten Testament?,” ZThK 52 (1955): 1–45. 
64Koch, “Gibt es ein Vergeltungsdogma im Alten Testament?,” 31. 
65For a fuller discussion and critique of this view, see Lam, “Metaphorical Patterning,” 97–100. 
66Lam, “Metaphorical Patterning,” 100–101. 
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of Klaus Seybold,67 Michael Brown,68 Frederick Lindström,69 Karel van der Toorn,70 and 
Günter Röhser are some of the key studies in this regard. However, due to in-depth 
analysis devoted to these studies, along with critiques presented in Lam’s work, it will 
not be replicated here.71 
 
Terminological/Contextual/Intertextual Approach 
Review of the findings of all these approaches makes it obvious that there is a 
tendency, or even necessity to portray sin as a concept. The terminology for sin is 
immense. Terms are associated with a variety of settings and contexts. All these facts 
related to sin add so many facets to it that treating it as a concept, as the research on the 
topic shows, seems to be a necessity and the correct way to approach the term. Thus, the 
conceptual understanding of sin is accepted in the present study. The present study seeks 
to explore the concept of sin in two steps. 
The first step will be to derive the data about sin from texts. The focus of this step 
is to gather elements of the concept of sin from Pentateuchal texts and establish the 
meaning of the concept. This step consists in presenting and evaluating previous research 
on the concept and evaluating of the understandings of the key representatives of various   
 
67K. Seybold and U. B. Mueller, Sickness and Healing, trans. D. W. Stott (Nashville: Abingdon, 
1981). 
68Michael L. Brown, Israel’s Divine Healer, SOTBT (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1995). 
69Fredrik Lindström, Suffering and Sin: Interpretations of Illness in the Individual Complaint 
Psalms, ConBOT 37 (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1994). 
70K. van der Toorn, Sin and Sanction in Israel and Mesopotamia: A Comparative Study, SSN 22 
(Assen: Van Gorcum, 1985). 
71See Lam, “Metaphorical Patterning,” 101–9. 
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schools of interpretations against the texts of the Pentateuch. This step will finally 
propose an understanding of the concept of sin based on the findings gained during the 
process. 
The second step is reviewing the terminology used for sin. In order to avoid the 
fallacy of “defaulting” to the etymology, the present study will establish certain pattern 
that will consider certain elements of the literary context. This pattern will provide a 
more complete understanding of sin where context plays a key role in the process of 
determining the meaning of terms and the concept itself. The higher awareness of the 
literary and linguistic specifics found in the texts where terms are used is provided by 
limitations to the texts of the Pentateuch and to the terms ֶּפַׁשע ,ָחָטא , and ָעֹון. In addition, 
this will prevent this terminological study from the inadequacies noted in the previous 
terminological studies. This linguistic limitation to the terms ֶּפַׁשע ,ָחָטא , and ָעֹון is 
particularly relevant for the present study since its overall goal is linked to the removal of 
sin from the sanctuary and consequently, from the people on the Day of Atonement. The 
terms ַׁשע  are used in Lev 16:16 to articulate the sins ָטֵמא along with ָחָטא and פֶּ
accumulated in the sanctuary while the list is modified in Lev 16:21 where ֶּפַׁשע ,ָחָטא , 
and ָעֹון are used to denote sins that were taken away from the camp by the scapegoat. 
Notable scholars in the area of atonement and ritual studies in the OT have suggested that 
these three terms refer to very specific and particular types of sins.72 This step will 
examine whether the uses of these terms in the Pentateuch texts confirm such a claim. 
 
72Gane, Cult and Character, 285–88; Jacob Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, AB 3 (New York: 
Doubleday, 1991), 1034, 1044ff; Jacob Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27, AB 3B (New York: Doubleday, 2001), 
3: 2460.  
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Remarks on Sin and Impurity: Insights from the Previous Research 
A survey of scholarly attempts to define the concept of impurity in the OT shows 
that there are two major schools. One school recognizes that there are two distinct types 
of impurity,73 while the other school studies impurity as an organic whole.74 In regards to 
the former proposal, one type is referred to as ritual and the other as moral impurity. Two 
questions permeated scholarly dialogue on the topic of impurity: (1) Is the division of 
impurity to ritual and moral plausible or it should be considered as a whole? and (2) What 
is the relationship between the two types of impurity? The goal of this section is based on 
the up-to-date scholarly findings and additional research provided in the present study 
and to suggest proposals on both of these questions. 
The existence of one or two types of impurity and the relationship between 
possibly two types was considerably debated in the last century,75 and delineating the 
 
73D. Hoffmann, Das Buch Leviticus (Berlin: Poppelauer, 1905), 1:301–8; Adolf Büchler, Studies 
in Sin and Atonement in the Rabbinic Literature of the First Century (London: Oxford University Press, 
1928); Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo (New York: 
Routledge, 2002); Hyam Maccoby, Ritual and Morality: The Ritual Purity System and Its Place in Judaism 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16; Jacob Milgrom, Leviticus 17–
22, AB 3A (New York: Doubleday, 2000); Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27; Tikva Frymer-Kensky, “Pollution, 
Purification, and Purgation in Biblical Israel,” in The Word of the Lord Shall Go Forth: Essays in Honor of 
David Noel Freedman in Celebration of His Sixtieth Birthday, eds. Carol L. Meyers and Michael Patrick 
O’Connor (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1983); David P. Wright, “The Spectrum of Priestly Impurity,” 
in Priesthood and Cult in Ancient Israel, eds. Gary A. Anderson and Saul M. Olyan, JSOTSup 125, eds. 
Gary A. Anderson and Saul M. Olyan (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1991); Klawans, Purity, Sacrifice, and the 
Temple. 
74Neusner, The Idea of Purity in Ancient Judaism; Thomas Kazen, “Dirt and Disgust: Body and 
Morality in Biblical Purity Laws,” in Perspectives on Purity and Purification in the Bible, eds. Baruch J. 
Schwartz, et al. LHBOTS 474 (New York: T & T Clark, 2008). 
75Kazen, “Dirt and Disgust,” 43; Maccoby, Ritual and Morality; Neusner, The Idea of Purity in 
Ancient Judaism; Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism. The works of Jacob Milgrom, Tikva 
Frymer-Kensky, and David P. Wright can be added to the works listed in this footnote due to the 
considerable contribution of each author to the topic. 
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types of this concept and their potential interrelatedness is a complex task.76 It seems that 
there are multiple reference points of the research on this concept in the OT which 
heavily influence the final outcome.77 The chronological development of this debate will 
be presented below, along with the arguments of the key representatives. The topic is still 
unsettled in scholarly debates regardless of massive attempts by biblical scholars to 
resolve it.78 This disagreement is more related to the question of the relationship of the 
two natures than to the number of natures. 
 
Impurity in the OT in Modern Studies 
David Hoffmann 
The earliest attempt to define the relationship between two natures of impurity in 
the OT in modern times is that of David Hoffmann.79 In his significant commentary on 
Leviticus he divided impurities into two groups following a division accepted in various 
traditional Jewish sources. The first type of impurity, the ritual one, stands in opposition 
to purity, while the second type, the moral one, stands in opposition to holiness.80 
The bipartite division to ritual and moral impurity was not an innovation 
developed by Hoffmann himself. Terminologically and conceptually, this division   
 
76Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 140. 
77Wright, “The Spectrum of Priestly Impurity,” 151–52. 
78Susan Haber, “They Shall Purify Themselves:” Essays on Purity in Early Judaism, ed. Adele 
Reinhartz, EJL 24 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2008), 10. 
79Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 140–41; Kazen, “Dirt and Disgust,” 42; Klawans, 
Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 5–6.13. 
80Hoffmann, Das Buch Leviticus, 1:303–4. 
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originated from Talmudic and medieval rabbinic literature down to Philo and the early 
rabbinic sages (the Tannaim) wherein this distinction of ritual bodily impurity and 
impurity resulting from sinful behavior was also debated.81 
Hoffman categorized the sources of ritual defilement into three groups: (1) 
impurity contracted from a dead human (Num 19) or dead animal (Lev 11:24–40; 
22:5);(2), impurity obtained from natural or unnatural genital discharges (Lev 15), 
childbirth (Lev 12), and leprosy (Lev 14); and (3) impurity attained via contact through 
ritual objects that rendered one impure like a scapegoat (Lev 16:26), a burnt sin offering 
(Lev 16:27–28), and the ashes for the water of cleansing (Num 19:7–10). These sources 
of impurity are discussed basically in Lev 11–15 and Num 19.82 Ritual defilement, 
contrary to moral defilement, is symbolic and symbolizes sin.83 Hoffmann noted that 
ritual impurity can be transferred to other humans and objects, but its effect is temporary 
and can be altered through a purification ritual.84 
The second type of impurity originates from sinful behavior including eating 
forbidden foods, performing idolatrous acts, and various sexual sins.85 There is no means 
of purification for this type of impurity except for the sacrificial ritual on the Day of 
Atonement (Lev 16).86 Based on Lev 18:24–25, Hoffmann concluded that this impurity 
 
81Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 6. 
82Hoffmann, Das Buch Leviticus, 1:303. 
83Hoffmann, Das Buch Leviticus, 1:315, 340; D. Hoffmann, Das Buch Leviticus (Berlin: 
Poppelauer, 1906), 2:59. 
84Haber, “They Shall Purify Themselves,” 10–11. 
85Hoffmann, Das Buch Leviticus, 1:303; Hoffmann, Das Buch Leviticus, 2:22. 
86Hoffmann, Das Buch Leviticus, 1:315. 
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defiled the land and caused the exile of its inhabitants.87 In addition, based on Leviticus 
11:43 and 19:31, this impurity affected the sinner’s well-being.88 For this reason, 
Hoffmann also referred to this defilement as defilement pertaining to the soul.89 Although 
emphasizing that this defilement affected the soul of the sinner, he believed that it also 
defiled their body.90 However, the defilement by sin which was the concern of Lev 18 
was of a different kind than the ritual defilement which was delineated in Lev 15. The 
latter one was temporal and could be removed by ablution, while the former one affected 
both body and soul and could not be removed by ablution.91 Commenting on the 
commandment against necromancy in Lev 19:31, Hoffmann concluded that this 
defilement, being moral in nature, affected both sinner’s body and soul and, as a result, 
the sinner was rejected by God.92 In his understanding, this defilement was concrete 
rather than symbolic.93  
Hoffmann’s division portrays two basic natures of the concept of impurity/sin. 
Sklar has correctly noted that this division does not differentiate defilement that 
originates from intentional and unintentional sins. In addition, symbolic correspondence 
between the three sources of ritual impurity and three different types of sin is 
 
87Hoffmann, Das Buch Leviticus, 2:22. 
88Hoffmann, Das Buch Leviticus, 1:303. 
89Hoffmann does not provide his own conception nor that of Ancient Israel of the term soul in his 
commentary. The present study will also avoid this since it is not directly relevant to the current research.  
90Hoffmann, Das Buch Leviticus, 1:340; Hoffmann, Das Buch Leviticus, 2:22.  
91Hoffmann, Das Buch Leviticus, 2:22. 
92Hoffmann, Das Buch Leviticus, 2:59. 
93Hoffmann, Das Buch Leviticus, 1:340; Hoffmann, Das Buch Leviticus, 2:59. 
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unconvincing due to the lack of objective criteria to support it.94 Susan Haber added more 
substantial criticism of Hoffmann’s work by noting that his division of impurity to ritual 
and moral was driven by his dualistic view of humans to body and soul. The first was 
affected by ritual and the latter was affected by moral impurity. However, texts of the OT 
do not give support for the concept of human dualism.95 
 
Alfred Büchler 
Alfred Büchler followed Hoffmann in adopting a bipartite division of impurity, 
but used different terms for each impurity. However, Klawans noted that Büchler never 
settled on a fixed terminology regarding these two defilements which, beside other issues 
related to his work,96 seems to confuse the readers.97 However, instead of Hoffmann’s 
ritual defilement, Büchler frequently used the term levitical defilement to refer to the 
defilement that originates in certain natural conditions.98 These defilements are outlined 
in the regulations found in Leviticus 11–15 and Numbers 19. He claimed that this 
defilement was impermanent contagion.99 For acts resulting from sinful behavior, he used 
multiple terms such as moral, spiritual, and religious, instead of Hoffmann’s term moral 
defilement.100 Sklar noted that Büchler established four points of difference between these 
 
94Both these two types of sin produce defilement. See Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 
86–88. 
95Haber, “They Shall Purify Themselves,” 11. 
96For a critique of Büchler’s work see Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 6. 
97Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 6; Haber, “They Shall Purify Themselves,” 12. 
98Büchler, Studies in Sin and Atonement (1928), 214. 
99Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 5. 
100Büchler, Studies in Sin and Atonement (1928), 229. 
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two defilements.101 First, moral defilements are the result of some moral lapse.102 Second, 
moral defilements are cleansed via punishment, while levitical are cleansed by prescribed 
rituals.103 Third, moral defilements are not contagious, while levitical ones can be.104 
Fourth, the biblical use of defilement language to discuss moral defilements is symbolic 
or figurative, while that is not the case with levitical defilements.105 Sklar’s criticism of 
Hoffmann’s work also applies to Büchler’s. That is, Büchler does not differentiate 
between defilement that originates from intentional and unintentional sinful behavior.106 
Both the works of Hoffmann and Büchler were neglected by subsequent scholars 
on purity/impurity due to their weaknesses and the style in which they were written. 
Klawans pointed out that Büchler’s work is outdated in terms of methodology and the 
discovery of Qumran corpus.107 Sklar noted that neither of these two authors made a 
difference between the defilement that arises from unintentional and intentional sins and 
they did not discuss the difference between minor and major ritual/levitical 
defilements.108  
 
101Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 142–43. 
102Büchler, Studies in Sin and Atonement (1928), 220. 
103Büchler, Studies in Sin and Atonement (1928), 225. 
104Büchler, Studies in Sin and Atonement (1928), 235. 
105Büchler, Studies in Sin and Atonement (1928), 237. 
106Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 144. 
107Jonathan Klawans, “The Impurity of Immorality in Ancient Israel,” JJS 48 (1997): 1; Klawans, 
Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 5–14. 




Just two years before Büchler’s death, Gedalyahu Alon published his first essay 
wherein he pioneered the thesis that the major impurity debate among ancient Jews 
concerned geographical boundaries of the realm of purity.109 Alon claimed that in the 
Second Temple period, two conflicting trends established themselves among Jews. One 
insisted on restrictions and limiting the laws of purity to the sphere of the Temple and 
priests, and the other one insisted on enlargement and extending these laws to be 
applicable to all of Israel.110 Based on this model, the Pharisees were maximalists, 
expanding the realm of purity beyond the temple limits, while the Sadducees were 
minimalists, restricting the realm of purity to the temple confines only.111 Alon’s thesis 
was criticized in details by Sanders112 and proven to be problematic in terms of method 
and the interpretation of the evidence;113 nevertheless, along with Jacob Neusner’s, 
Alon’s works became the most influential treatments of the topic.114 Klawans correctly 
criticized Alon’s proposal on the fact that the defiling force of impurity cannot be   
 
109Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 6. 
110Gedalyahu Alon, Jews, Judaism and the Classical World: Studies in Jewish History in the 
Times of the Second Temple and Talmud (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 1977), 232. 
111Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 7. 
112E. P. Sanders, Jewish Law from Jesus to the Mishnah: Five Studies (Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 2016), 183–353. 
113Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 7. 
114Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 6. 
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exclusively in spatial/geographic terms only.115 
 
Jacob Neusner 
Jacob Neusner is an important scholar who evidently eliminated the distinction 
between ritual and moral impurity. That is especially obvious in his monumental work 
The Idea of Purity in Ancient Judaism.116 He suggested that “the notion of ‘an ethical 
offense, a sin’ evolved from the general class of ‘acts that make you unfit for the holy 
community.’”117 Neusner’s work covers various corpuses such as (1) Hebrew Bible, (2) 
Qumran texts, (3) Second Temple Literature, and (4) Rabbinic literature. In regard to the 
Hebrew Bible, he stated that “the biblical corpus of ideas about purity may be divided 
into two distinct parts, the interpretation of purity and impurity as a metaphor of morality, 
on the one hand, and the specific laws about purity and impurity in connection with the 
Temple cult, on the other.”118 
This statement is virtually identical to his conclusion on the purity/impurity in 
ancient Israel as the following quotation shows: “Two important ideas about purity and 
impurity come down from ancient Israel: first, purity and impurity are cultic matters; 
second, they may serve as metaphors for moral and religious behavior, primarily in 
regard to matters of sex, idolatry, and unethical action.”119 
Neusner understood that purity/impurity is a single-nature concept but it can be 
 
115Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 6. 
116Neusner, The Idea of Purity in Ancient Judaism, 1–2. 
117Neusner, The Idea of Purity in Ancient Judaism, 25. 
118Neusner, The Idea of Purity in Ancient Judaism, 11. 
119Neusner, The Idea of Purity in Ancient Judaism, 108. 
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interpreted in two different ways. In his opinion, the texts in the so called Priestly Law 
Code which are related to the cult120 are to be understood literally. On the other hand, 
texts from the rest of the Hebrew Bible are to be understood metaphorically121 and are 
related to moral behavior.122 These behaviors involve idolatry, illicit sexual relationships, 
which includes marital fidelity, and they all defile the land.123 
However, Neusner was not able to uphold this distinction to the literal and 
metaphorical interpretation of the purity/impurity in his own work. Neusner equated his 
two distinct ways of interpreting purity/impurity laws by equating defilement of the 
people and the land through the land’s connection to the cult in texts such as Lev 18:24–
25, Lev 20:25–26, and Num 35:34.124 In doing that, Neusner related both of his 
interpretations of impurity to the temple, and this association of impurity and the temple 
became fundamental to his understanding of impurity.125 The following quotation 
demonstrates that: 
The Temple supplied to purity its importance in the religious life. As the Temple 
signified divine favour, and as the cult supplied the nexus between Israel and God, so 
purity, associated so closely with both, could readily serve as an image either of 
divine favor or of man’s loyalty to god. From that fact followed the assignment of 
impurity to all that stood against the Temple, the cult, and God: idolatry above all. 
 
 
120Neusner, The Idea of Purity in Ancient Judaism, 15. 
121“When we compare the references to purity in prophetic, sapiential, and historical literature with 
those presented in the priestly code of laws, we find a remarkable correspondence... the one represents in 
the context of concrete cultic ritual what the other describes in the setting of ethics, morality, or theology.” 
Neusner, The Idea of Purity in Ancient Judaism, 24. 
122Neusner, The Idea of Purity in Ancient Judaism, 13–15. 
123Haber, “They Shall Purify Themselves,” 16. 
124Lam, “Metaphorical Patterning,” 113; Neusner, The Idea of Purity in Ancient Judaism, 20–21. 
125Haber, “They Shall Purify Themselves,” 16. 
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Neusner abandoned this dichotomy between literal and metaphorical 
understanding of purity/impurity as he studied this concept in two corpuses of literature, 
Qumran texts, and Rabbinic literature. In regards to Qumran texts, he stated: “One cannot 
distinguish between cultic and moral impurity. In themselves and in their consequences, 
they are identical.”126 In regard to Rabbinic literature, Neusner noted that 
the variety and character of the rabbis’ list of social evils yielding leprosy-gossiping, 
selfishness, and the rest-are routine and unexceptional. Such commonplace social 
vices will characterize any sort of society. What is striking is not the catalogue of 
sins, therefore, but the imputation of leprosy as the result of those sins. This extreme 
interpretation begins with nothing more than the biblical use of impurity as a 
metaphor for sin. The metaphor is, however, shattered. Instead of maintaining 
impurity is like gossip of fornication, or gossip or fornication is like impurity, the 
rabbis held gossip or fornication produces impurity.127 
 
The critique of Neusner’s position on impurity/purity written by Mary Douglas is 
found in the appendix of his The Idea of Purity in the Ancient Judaism. The main thrust 
of her critique was directed towards Neusner’s dichotomy between literal and 
metaphorical understanding of purity laws concerning the temple. In the Priestly texts, 
these laws are understood literally, while in the rest of the Bible, they are interpreted 
metaphorically suggested: “Since it is clear that the temple rules and sex rules and food 
rules are a single system of analogies, they do not converge on any one point but sustain 
the whole moral and physical universe simultaneously in their systematic 
interrelatedness.”128 
 
126Neusner, The Idea of Purity in Ancient Judaism, 54. 
127Another way is to use metaphor transformed into allegory. Neusner, The Idea of Purity in 
Ancient Judaism, 117. 
128Neusner, The Idea of Purity in Ancient Judaism, 140. 
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Klawans took a further step in critiquing Neusner’s work directly, and Douglas’s 
critique indirectly, by stating that neither Neusner’s nor Douglas’s positions adequately 
make sense of the biblical impurity system. The question left unanswered is whether the 
defiling force of sin is merely a metaphor and whether the adulterer is considered to be 
ritually impure. Neusner would say “yes” to the first question, contrary to Douglas, while 
Douglas would say “yes” to the second question, contrary to Neusner.129 
 
Mary Douglas 
Some consider Mary Douglas as a proponent of one nature of impurity,130 but this 
is a too simplified portrayal of how she understood this concept. Douglas’ Purity and 
Danger, published in 1966, has been recognized to advance the theoretical foundation for 
all subsequent works on ritual impurity in the OT. Some of her ideas were refuted and 
shown to be mistaken,131 but the basic claims of her work are still widely accepted. For 
the purpose of the present study, four of them will be summarized here.132 
First, Douglas proposed that defilement is not a primitive concept. She challenged 
a conceptual barrier common for anthropologists and scholars of religion that the notions 
of defilement were totally absent from the categorization known to contemporary man. 
As a result, many scholars today recognize that all people in all times have concepts of 
 
129Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 11. 
130Lam, “Metaphorical Patterning,” 110. 
131Especially see Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 720–21.  
132Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 8. 
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dirt and pollution which are structurally similar and can be compared in spite of their 
significant differences.133 
Douglas’s second suggestion is the claim that the conception of defilement is 
systematic in its nature in any given culture. Referring to pollution by analogy, she said 
that “where there is a dirt there is a system.” Dirt, in any given system, is “matter out of 
place.”134 Douglas claimed that defilement is a structure and as such, all its components 
should be studied in the context of the system rather than as separate entities.135 For 
instance, the menstrual taboo cannot be properly understood by collecting examples from 
various cultures that shun this substance and then comparing the results. Rather, the 
systems of defilement should be studied, such as the way defilement is conveyed, the 
totalities of things that pollute, and so on. Her definition of pollution as “matter out of 
place” has not convinced all,136 but seeing systems of defilement still remains essentially 
unchallenged until the present.137  
Third, building on the concept of purity/defilement as systematic was Douglas’s 
next step in claiming that this system is symbolic. She saw a symbolic system at work in 
the fact that some animals are shunned, some body fluids are to be avoided, and so on. To 
Douglas, body symbolism was central in understanding the defilement system. Since the 
body symbolizes society, there is a correspondence between the attitudes toward societal 
 
133Douglas, Purity and Danger, 35, 50. The entirety of both chapters, “Ritual Uncleanness” and 
“Secular Defilement” in Purity and Danger, point to this claim. 
134Douglas, Purity and Danger, 44, 50. 
135Douglas, Purity and Danger, 35. 
136Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 721. 
137Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 8. 
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and bodily boundaries.138 As a result, she also set forth a symbolic interpretation of the 
Israelite dietary laws. Here, symbolism is not found in the correspondence between the 
body and society, but between diet and the categories of creation. However, her symbolic 
interpretations of Leviticus 11 in light of Genesis 1139 are not universally recognized.140 
Some notable theorists still believe that the ancient Israelite impurity system is 
arbitrary.141  
Fourth, Douglas also claimed that symbolic systems have social functions; they 
influence and control human behavior and interaction. They influence all social classes 
and control undesired social and sexual behavior.142 It is ironic, as Douglas noted, that 
such systems are likely to flourish in the absence of desired effective forms of social 
control rather than when the society has them. Note Douglas’s statement: 
When male dominance is accepted as a central principle of social organization and 
applied without inhibition and with full rights of physical coercion, beliefs in sex 
pollution are not likely to be highly developed. On the other hand, when the principle 
of male dominance is applied to the ordering of social life but is contradicted by other 
principles such as that of female independence, or the inherent right of women as the 
weaker sex to be more protected from violence than men, then sex pollution is likely 
to flourish.143 
 
Keeping in mind these key claims of what Douglas’ system consists of and of   
 
138Douglas, Purity and Danger, 141–59. 
139Douglas, Purity and Danger, 51–71. 
140Howard Eilberg-Schwartz, The Savage in Judaism: An Anthropology of Israelite Religion and 
Ancient Judaism (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1990), 177–79, 189–90, 218–19; Milgrom, 
Leviticus 1–16, 704–42. 
141Jonathan Z. Smith, To Take Place: Toward Theory in Ritual (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1987), 108. 
142Douglas, Purity and Danger, 3–4, 139–40. 
143Douglas, Purity and Danger, 176. 
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remarks she wrote particularly in the chapter “Internal Lines of her Purity and Danger,” it 
can be inferred that her understanding of impurity is complex and cautious. There are 
statements that lead a person to conclude undoubtedly that Douglas saw defilement and 
sin as a single category, having one nature like the following one: “Pollution has indeed 
much to do with morals.”144 On the other hand, there are statements which point to the 
fact that she saw two natures of this concept, such as the following: “Pollution rule only 
highlights a small aspect of morally disapproved behavior.”145 Therefore, Klawans seems 
to be right in stating that Douglas’s understanding on this phenomenon was rather more 
nuanced than that of scholars who made such claims based on her work.146 
 
Hyam Maccoby 
Hyam Maccoby believed that there is a basic distinction between ritual and moral 
in the OT, as well as in rabbinic literature. Ritual impurity originates from various actions 
and physical conditions, many of which are not sinful. Being ritually impure was never a 
sin and was limited to Israelites only. He claimed that “ritual purity forms part of the 
code of holiness, by which the Israelites were set apart as a ‘kingdom of priests.’ Other 
parts of this holiness code are the rules about permitted and forbidden foods, the rules 
about the Sabbath and the festivals, the rules about the performance of sacrifice in the 
 
144Douglas, Purity and Danger, 160. 
145The following statements and others in this chapter also point in the direction of two natures: “It 
is true that pollution rules do not correspond closely to moral rules.” Douglas, Purity and Danger, 160. 
“Pollution rules, by contrast with moral rules, are unequivocal.” Douglas, Purity and Danger, 162. 
146Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 9. For claiming Douglas’s understanding of one 
nature of impurity, see Lam, “Metaphorical Patterning,” 110–12. 
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Temple. All these rules are laid down for Israelites alone.”147 
On the other hand, “the laws of morality, which Israelites share with the rest of 
humanity, take precedence over them. In every case where there is a conflict between 
ritual and morality, ritual gives way to morality.”148 
Maccoby denied that morality stands behind ritual laws and claimed that they are 
rather dedicatory in their nature and function. He followed the proposal of previous 
scholars149 in accepting that the cycle of birth and death is the rationale behind ritual laws 
in the OT.150 Observing that ritual impurity results from physical states and conditions 
related to birth (genital fluxes, childbirth) and death (corpses, scale-disease), he 
concluded that the ritual purity laws guarded the Temple/tabernacle not just from death, 
but from the entire cycle of mortality. In Maccoby’s view, there is a significant gap 
between moral and ritual laws. For him, ritual laws are related to the Temple/tabernacle, 
while moral laws are applicable to both Jews and non-Jews. Even though Maccoby’s 
work encountered dispute and critique on some points, especially the metaphorical use of   
 
147Maccoby, Ritual and Morality, 193. 
148Maccoby, Ritual and Morality, 193. 
149Milgrom traced this proposal to Rachel Adler, whose quotation states: “Begetting and birth are 
the nexus points at which life and death are coupled. … The nexus points are those in which there appears 
to be a departure or a transfer of vital force.” Rachel Adler, “Tumah and Taharah: Ends and Beginnings,” in 
The Jewish Woman: New Perspectives, ed. Elizabeth Koltun (New York: Schocken, 1976), 65–66. Even 
before R. Adler, Walter Kornfeld also recognized that the threat to life is a rationale for impurity in Lev 
11–15. Walter Kornfeld, “Die Unreinen Tiere im Alten Testament,” in Wissenschaft im Dienste des 
Glaubens: Festschrift für Abt Dr. Hermann Peichl, O.S.B., Präsident der Wiener Katholischen Akademie, 
dargeboten zum 35. Abtjubiläum, eds. Josef Kisser, et al., Studien der Wiener Katholischen Akademie 4 
(Wien: Wiener Katholische Akademie, 1965), 11–17. This same position was subsequently accepted by 
Paschen and Wenham. For further discussion, see Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 767–68. 
150Wilfried Paschen, Rein und Unrein: Untersuchung zur Biblischen Wortgeschichte, SANT 24 




impurity terminology in Lev 18 and 20 and insistence on the total separation between 
moral and ritual laws,151 his fresh emphasis on mortality as a rationale for the ritual laws, 
along with the division of moral and ritual impurity, were welcomed among scholars. 
 
Jacob Milgrom 
The understanding of impurity in the works of Jacob Milgrom152 is informed by 
his application of critical approaches of redaction criticism153 and source criticism to the 
OT texts.154 He believed that Leviticus comprises two sources—the so-called P 
source/tradition, which is mostly found in Lev 1–16, and the H source, which is found in 
Lev 17–27. However, P source is also found in H texts and vice versa, but in a rather 
small number of texts.155 In Milgrom’s system, impurities in these two sources in 
Leviticus differ greatly. In P, ָטֵמא strictly means ritual impurity, referring to three sources 
of impurity: (1) corpse, (2) scale disease, and (3) genital discharges. In H, to the contrary, 
it is used metaphorically in non-ritualistic contexts such as the law against adultery (Lev 
18:20) and other sexual violations (Lev 18:24), and Israel’s land (Lev 18:25–28).156 
Klawans noted that three of the four claims of Douglas’s ritual theory mentioned above   
 
151Christine Hayes, “Ritual and Morality: The Ritual Purity System and Its Place in Judaism: A 
Review Article,” JQR 93 (2002): 287–92; Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 32–36. 
152The analysis of impurity in Milgrom’s works presented in the current research is based on 
Jonathan Klawans’ article “Ritual Purity, Moral Purity, and Sacrifice in Milgrom’s Leviticus” which will be 
cited below. 
153Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 2. 
154Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 2, 61–63. 
155Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 1, 3–25. 
156Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 37. 
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greatly impacted Milgrom’s understanding of ritual impurity. First, avoidance behaviors 
are not inherently or distinctively primitive. Second, avoidance rules in any culture as a 
system form a coherent definition of things which are permitted or forbidden, and things 
that are sacred and defiled. Third, a system as such is symbolic in its nature. As a result 
of adopting these claims, Milgrom treated ritual impurity as a system wherein rules for 
certain ritual impurities apply to other impurities similar to them, even though they are 
not stated in the latter, but only the former texts.157 
He also endorsed the fact that the entire system of ritual impurities has death as a 
common denominator, admitting that this rationale was suggested by many other 
scholars158 first by A. Dillmann and V. Ryssel in 1897,159 and later by Feldman,160 and 
Füglister in 1977.161 
Klawans traced the first-time occurrence of this suggestion even earlier, namely to 
the work of Edersheim162 in 1874.163 This systematic and symbolic understanding of 
ritual impurity is thoroughly developed in the first volume of Milgrom’s Anchor Bible 
 
157Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 45–46. To see how this is an accurate assessment of Milgrom’s 
systematic understanding of ritual, see Jonathan Klawans, “Ritual Purity, Moral Purity, and Sacrifice in 
Jacob Milgrom’s Leviticus,” RSR 29.1 (2003): 20. To see Milgrom’s symbolic interpretation of ritual, see  
Klawans, “Ritual Purity,” 20–21. 
158Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 1001–2. 
159A. Dillmann and V. Ryssel, Die Bücher Exodus and Leviticus (Lepizig: Hirzel, 1897), 523. 
160Emanuel Feldman, Biblical and Post-Biblical Defilement and Mourning: Law as Theology 
(New York: Yeshiva University Press, 1977), 13–30. 
161Notker Füglister, “Sühne durch Blut: Zur Bedeutung von Leviticus 17, 11,” in Studien zum 
Pentateuch: Walter Kornfeld zum 60. Geburtstag, ed. Georg Braulik (Wien: Herder, 1977). 
162Alfred Edersheim, The Temple: Its Ministry and Services as They Were at the Time of Jesus 
Christ (London: Religious Tract Society, 1908), 348–50. 
163Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 1002. 
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Commentary, Leviticus 1–16 which was published in 1990.164 
Besides ritual impurity, Milgrom endorsed the existence of moral impurity, which 
works very differently than ritual impurity. Milgrom has done this by studying the 
defiling force of these two impurities. Agreeing with previous scholars who adopted two 
natures of impurity, Milgrom noted that contrary to ritual impurity defilement that 
originates from various sources of defilement and refers to the state, moral impurity 
originates from sinful actions165 and does not defile the sinner in any distinct way.166 The 
defining power of moral impurity is directed towards the sanctuary, not the sinner, and, in 
Milgrom’s view, cleansing of the sanctuary from this impurity is achieved via a sin, or as 
he renamed it, a purification offering.167 Being informed by Milgrom’s theory of the 
 
164Klawans, “Ritual Purity,” 21. 
165Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 256. 
166Klawans, “Ritual Purity,” 21. 
167The first attempts to establish purification offering translation for ַחָּטאת sacrifice appeared in 
the first half of the twentieth century. James Barr and A. R. S. Kennedy, “Sacrifice and Offering,” DB 874. 
However, Milgrom was the most influential proponent of this translation in modern times. He claimed that 
the translation “sin offering” for ַחָּטאת “is inaccurate on all grounds: contextually, morphologically, and 
etymologically” Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 253. This is an overstatement, and it is more accurate to say that 
this translation is partially inaccurate. All the arguments he cited to support this claim are informed by the 
notion that ר פֶּ  refers to cleansing in cultic ritual texts. First, in order to prove that this translation was not כִּ
contextually supported, he cited Lev 8; Exod 29:36–37; Lev 12, and Num 6 and concluded that “the ḥaṭṭāʾt 
is prescribed for persons and objects who cannot have sinned.” Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 253. It is 
impossible to suppose that the persons involved in the events these texts record would not sin during 
periods of different lengths after which they were required to offer a sin offering (Lev 12, Num 8) or were 
offering sin offerings on a daily basis (Lev 8; Exod 29:36–37). For instance, a new mother is prohibited 
from coming to the sanctuary and subsequently offering any kind of sacrifice forty or eighty days, 
depending on the child’s gender. Failing to include in his atonement theory GHS as a constant disadvantage 
of human beings before God and the necessity that actual sin could have been committed by the participant 
of the events described in these texts, caused him not to see that ַחָּטאת, the sacrifice involved in mending 
those experiences, actually deals with sin or GHS. Consequently, the texts Milgrom selected to support his 
contextual argument do not support it if GHS and actual sin are considered. Second, Milgrom’s 
morphological argument was anticipated by James Barr already in 1963. Barr and Kennedy, “Sacrifice and 
Offering,” 874.That is, morphologically, ַחָּטאת appears to be piel rather than qal derivative, and so it refers 
to cleansing or decontaminating. Milgrom added that “water of ַחָּטאת” serves exclusively for purifying 




sacrifice in Lev 4–5, some scholars concluded that passages like Lev 18:24–31, Lev 
20:1–3, and Num 35:33–34, which are associated with moral impurity and use purity 
terminology, represent a metaphorical use of purity language. However, a number of 
others, to the contrary, concluded that these texts use purity language literally as the ritual 
texts do. The land is defiled in some way by the grave sins listed in these texts.168 The 
same line of interpretation was suggested by Hoffmann and Büchler almost a century 
ago, as shown above, and it was taken up by some modern scholars as well,169 whose 
systems will be presented below. 
Thus, the works on moral defilement by other scholars in the 90s170 were   
 
most cases, ַחָּטאת atones individuals/groups because of their sin or GHS based on ransom as established in 
the present study. Lev 4 is a prime example. Richard E. Averbeck, “ַחָּטאת,” NIDOTTE 2:95. Third, 
Milgrom’s etymological argument is unconvincing since the sources he cited—LXX, Philo (Laws 1. 226), 
Josephus (Ant. 3.230), and Rabbi Eliezer (m. Zebaḥ. 1:1)—all follow sin offering translation. Milgrom did 
cite two other rabbinic references (b. Šebu. 8a; Ker. 26a) which are insufficient to prove that ַחָּטאת is 
unrelated to sin, as he stated. Milgrom concluded his about 590 word-long study on the change of ַחָּטאת 
translation from sin offering to purification offering with the following statement: “The advantage of 
freeing the ḥaṭṭāʾt from the theologically foreign notion of sin and restoring to it its pristine meaning of 
purification is that now it is possible to see this sacrifice in its true ancient Near Eastern setting. Israel was 
part of a cultic continuum which abounded in purifications both of persons and of buildings, especially 
sanctuaries. The ḥaṭṭāʾt, I aver, is the key that opens the door to this world (for details see Milgrom 
1971a).” Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 254. Based on the study of hamartiology and atonement presented in the 
current study, Milgrom’s freeing ַחָּטאת from its relations to sin by suggesting its name of purification 
offering instead of sin offering is not advantageous in discovering its correct meaning/function, but rather a 
disregard of explicit statements in biblical texts, as well as an overall biblical portrayal of human nature and 
the complexity of divine-human interaction due to human nature. Removing sin or, in Milgrom’s words 
“cleansing,” is a very limited function of  ַָּטאתח  while atonement of human beings because of their sin or 
GHS is much more frequent. Therefore, sin offering remains better, even though not the best translation, of 
 .It is certainly significantly more accurate than purification offering .ַחָּטאת
168The three main impurities outlined in these texts are sexual immorality, idolatry, and murder, 
respectively. Other texts, outside of the Pentateuch, also speak about these three sins: Jer 2:4–7; Ezek 22:1–
4; Ps 106:34–42. 
169See below works of Frymer-Kensky, “Pollution, Purification”; Wright, “The Spectrum of 
Priestly Impurity”; Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism. 
170Frymer-Kensky, “Pollution, Purification”; Wright, “The Spectrum of Priestly Impurity”; 
Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 26–31. 
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informed by Milgrom’s two claims: (1) a systematic look at ritual defilement which 
paved the way for also considering moral defilement as a set of regulations that operates 
in a coherent fashion and (2) like ritual impurity, moral impurity is also symbolic and 
forms a background of his understanding of the sacrifice outlined in Lev 4–5. However, 
Klawans noted that Milgrom’s own work on moral impurity in the second volume of his 
Anchor Bible Commentary, Leviticus 17–22, published in 2000,171 was not systematic. 
While Milgrom included multiple excursuses or digressions in Leviticus 1–16 to develop 
his systematic approach to ritual impurity, such an approach on moral impurity is absent 
from the subsequent volume on Leviticus 17–22. He uses other terms such as 
metaphorical impurity172 and non-ritual impurity173 to refer to moral impurity. Klawans 
claimed that “in these cases [referring to the references from Milgrom’s Leviticus 17–22], 
the adjectives are not the additional ones qualifying a description of moral impurity; 
rather these adjectives are used instead of the referent ‘moral.’”174 Milgrom was also 
inconsistent in using the term “impure” because, in a number of instances, he used it 
metaphorically,175 while in a number of other instances, he used it literally.176 The lack of 
a terminological consistency along with the absence of tables to map out moral impurity, 
which are noticeable in great numbers in Leviticus 1–16 in relation to ritual impurity, 
 
171Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22. 
172Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1353. 
173Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1404, 1572. 
174Klawans, “Ritual Purity,” 22. 
175Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1326–27, 1353, 1438, 1702. 
176Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1578–79. 
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shows a deficiency of a developed system of moral impurity in Milgrom’s work.177 
Milgrom’s approach to all 3 main sources of moral impurity is different. He 
claimed that the act of murder defiles the land (Num 35:33–34) as an age-old notion 
based on texts such as Gen 4:10–12 and Deut 21:1–9.178 He affirmed that the defilement 
in this case is literal.179 
However, Milgrom claimed that the sexual prohibitions of Lev 18 and their 
defiling effect on the land involve a metaphorization of the earlier idea that murder 
defiles the land in a literal way. This metaphorization takes place at two levels: (1) In Lev 
 is used metaphorically, contrary to its literal use in ritual impurity texts, so-called ָטֵמא ,18
P,180 and (2) Lev 18 developed and applied to sex the earlier ideas applicable to murder 
only.181 The latter level is based on the following quotation: “Thus whereas homicide 
literally pollutes the area where the blood is spilled, in H, sexual violations 
metaphorically pollute the entire land.”182 
Milgrom’s treatment of the defiling force of idolatry is the most complex one. His 
treatment of idolatry is actually limited to Molech worship (Lev 20:1–3), and he claimed 
that its defiling force is limited to the sanctuary only.183 This mode of sanctuary 
 
177Klawans, “Ritual Purity,” 22. 
178Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1573, 1579. 
179Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1438. 
180Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1326–27. 
181Klawans, “Ritual Purity,” 22. 
182Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1579, 1438. 
183Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1729–38, especially 1730 and 1734. This is also claimed in his 
comment on Lev 19:31. Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1702. 
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defilement is based on Milgrom’s proposal postulated in his article “Israel’s Sanctuary: 
The Priestly ‘Picture of Dorian Gray’” wherein he proposed that the impurity defiles the 
sanctuary without any threat to the land.184 
In order to maintain this claim, Milgrom had to propose two additional claims. 
First, idolatry is not morally defiling in H.185 He did so by stating that the defiling force 
of idolatry is evident in H, but it is limited to Molech worship.186 In general, idolatry is 
not defiling.187 Encountering the fact that the defiling force of idolatry is evident and well 
established among seventh-century prophets, Milgrom claimed that based on the defiling 
effect of Molech worship, they adopted the view that all forms of idolatry are defiling.188 
Second, since Molech worship is mentioned in Lev 18:21, Milgrom had to 
address this text, since in this text, Molech worship, like other sins enumerated in this 
chapter, defiles not just the sanctuary, as stated Lev 20:1–3, but based on Lev 18:24–30, 
also defiles the land. His comments on Lev 18:21 seem to assume that the prohibition 
against Molech worship essentially does not belong with the sexual sins of Lev 18 at all. 
It was placed there because child sacrifice destroys human seed and thus interferes with 
procreation, even though the defiling effects of Molech worship, which defiles the 
sanctuary only, is different from the defiling force of sexual sins, which defile the land.189 
 
184Jacob Milgrom, “Israel’s Sanctuary: The Priestly ‘Picture of Dorian Gray,’” RB 83 (1976). 
185Klawans, “Ritual Purity,” 22. 
186Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1374, 1397. 
187Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22. 
188Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1384–85. 
189Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1374, 1558–59.  
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However, Milgrom showed inconsistency regarding this claim when he discussed 
the Holiness topic in one of his Leviticus 17–22 excursuses where he stated that Molech 
worship does defile both sanctuary and the land.190 Regardless of the inconsistency of his 
view on the defiling force of Molech worship, Milgrom generally believed that this 
activity defiles the sanctuary only. Klawans correctly countered Milgrom’s position on 
two grounds.191 First, the act of Molech worship itself includes the act of bloodshed 
associated with murder, which would undeniably defile the land (Num 35:33–34). 
Milgrom did endorse the defiling force of bloodshed and murder.192 
Second, it is well established in the prophetic books and writings that idolatry, 
along with sexual and murderous sins, was morally defiling in Ancient Israel.193 For these 
two reasons, the claim that sexual sins and murder defile the land and that only one form 
of idolatry, worship to Molech, defiles the sanctuary but not the land, is highly 
questionable.194 
Idolatry, presented in the Pentateuch and the rest of the OT, is combined with 
both sexual sins and murder and, as such, it does morally defile all: the participants of 
such activity, the sanctuary and the land. It would be possible to imagine idolatry that 
would not include any sexual sins or murder and, as such, could have been non-defiling 
 
190Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1397. 
191Klawans, “Ritual Purity,” 22. 
192Jacob Milgrom, Numbers = [Ba-midbar]: The Traditional Hebrew Text with the New JPS 
Translation, JPSTC 4 (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1990), 295. 
193Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 15. 
194Klawans, “Ritual Purity,” 23. 
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in its nature, but that is not the sort of idolatry that the Pentateuch and the rest of the OT 
portray. 195 
Milgrom’s distinction between sanctuary defilement and land defilement is also 
problematic because in some places he maintained this concept,196 while in other places, 
he mitigated it.197 The distinction between sanctuary defilement and land defilement 
seems to be indefensible based on the texts from the Pentateuch and prophetic books 
listed above. These texts show that Molech worship defiles both the sanctuary and the 
land, which leads to the conclusion that the separation Milgrom suggested is rather non-
existent in the OT. Klawans suggested that defiling the land would automatically render 
the sanctuary defiled since it is situated on that land.198 Thus, after reviewing Milgrom’s 
view on impurity, it can be said that he saw two natures of impurity, ritual and moral, but 
his approaches to them were different and, at times, conflicting.199 
 
Tikva Frymer-Kensky 
The article by Tikva Frymer-Kensky, “Pollution, Purification, and Purgation in 
Biblical Israel” in The Word of the Lord Shall Go Forth: Essays in Honor of David Noel 
Freedman in Celebration of His Sixtieth Birthday, presents one of the most systematic 
 
195Klawans, “Ritual Purity,” 23. 
196Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1346, 1353, 1373, 1583. 
197Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1396, 1578, 1734. 
198Klawans, “Ritual Purity,” 23. 
199For a more detailed analysis of conflicting parts of Milgrom’s understanding and relationship 
between ritual and moral impurity, see Haber, “They Shall Purify Themselves,” 20–21. 
 
60 
approaches to impurity in the OT.200 She opened up her exposition on the topic by 
confronting two forms of impurity and their effects:  
Pollution, the lack of purity, could affect individuals, the temple, the collectivity of 
Israel, and the land of Israel itself. Some forms of pollution could be eradicated by 
rituals; the performance of these purifications and expiations was a major function of 
the priesthood. The pollution caused by the performance of certain deeds, however, 
could not be eradicated by rituals; Israel believed that the person intentionally 
committing these acts would suffer catastrophic retribution. Wrongful acts could 
cause the pollution of the nation and of the land of Israel, which could also not be 
“cured” by ritual. There was therefore an ultimate expectation of catastrophic results 
for the whole people, the “purging” of the land by destruction and exile.201 
 
All essential characteristics of Frymer-Kensky’s understanding of impurity are 
contained in the quotation above. First, impurity can defile individuals, the temple, and 
the entire land of Israel. Second, similarly to what Büchler and Hoffmann claimed, 
Frymer-Kensky noted that there are two types of impurities that defile in different ways. 
Third, the way these impurities were to be handled also differs. Ritual impurity is handled 
through various rituals, while wrongful acts, which pollute the land, are handled through 
catastrophic retribution, that is, exile. 
Later in her article, she called the first type of impurity “simple impurity,” the 
impure state of the Levitical202 or priestly laws. She also mentioned that these impurities 
are called pollution beliefs,203 but also frequently used the term ritual impurity. The other 
impurity, she termed dangerous beliefs.204 
 
200Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 15. 
201Frymer-Kensky, “Pollution, Purification,” 399. 
202Frymer-Kensky, “Pollution, Purification,” 399. 
203Frymer-Kensky, “Pollution, Purification,” 404. 
204Frymer-Kensky, “Pollution, Purification,” 404. 
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Frymer-Kensky found that ritual impurities are comprised of major and minor 
ones. Concerning major impurities, she found (1) that death-related pollution, originating 
from the human corpse is the most contagious pollution (Num 19:11, 14, 16),205 (2) the 
disease of leprosy (Lev 13–14), and (3) impurities deriving from the human body, such 
and childbirth (Lev 12) and menstruation and genital discharges (Lev 15).206 As minor 
impurities, Frymer-Kensky listed (1) contact with impure things, such as carcass of 
impure animal, (2) contact with something that has become impure through contact with 
someone under a major impurity, (3) contact with someone who is under major 
pollution.207 
The first feature Frymer-Kensky endorsed is that these impurities are contagious. 
Individuals who contract them can defile others, making them defiled for the duration of 
one day. They can also defile an entity, which in turn can defile other persons for a 
day.208 
Second, the profound observation is that even though these impurities are 
contagious they are only potentially dangerous. There is no harm to an impure person 
except that he/she needs to be isolated from other people and holy things. Association 
between the impure and the holy is fatal for the impure party. In addition, since they are 
contagious, the contagion can spread, separating the entire community from God. There 
is no guilt associated with the impure condition of an individual. Even more, some of 
 
205Frymer-Kensky, “Pollution, Purification,” 399–400. 
206Frymer-Kensky, “Pollution, Purification,” 400–401. 
207Frymer-Kensky, “Pollution, Purification,” 401. 
208Frymer-Kensky, “Pollution, Purification,” 401–3. 
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these impurities originate from God’s explicit command, such as the one to procreate. 
Furthermore, contact with the human corpse is unavoidable during the burial of a family 
member.209 
The only potential connection between an instance of an impure state and some 
kind of harm is the case of leprosy. There are some instances of leprosy being imposed 
on individuals as punishment for moral impurity. However, it was the impure state that 
was imposed on the individual as a sort of punishment for moral impurity210 and thus, 
ritual impurity does not originate from any form of moral wrongdoing. 
Frymer-Kensky’s moral impurity refers to the performance of forbidden activities. 
These activities bring about divine punishment.211 She focused on the kārēt punishment 
as the main mechanism to prevent intermingling of sacred and profane. Another 
punishment that is also frequently found in the Pentateuch for moral impurity is that “he 
shall bear his penalty.” Frymer-Kensky saw the separation between sacred and profane as 
fundamental aspect of Israelite cosmology. God is holy and the people must be holy (Lev 
11:44, 45; 19:2; 20:7, 26) and must not defile the camp, the temple, or the land. Violation 
of this distinction would disrupt the entire system.212 She listed many examples of direct 
contamination of the sacred by the impure from the Pentateuch to prove this claim.213 
She generally held that pollution of the sanctuary takes place via direct contact,   
 
209Frymer-Kensky, “Pollution, Purification,” 403. 
210Frymer-Kensky, “Pollution, Purification,” 403–4. 
211Frymer-Kensky, “Pollution, Purification,” 404. 
212Frymer-Kensky, “Pollution, Purification,” 404–5. 
213Frymer-Kensky, “Pollution, Purification,” 405. 
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that is, an impure person coming to the sanctuary, but she also accepted Milgrom’s 
hypothesis that the sanctuary can be defiled aerially. In regard to defilement of the land 
and the people, Frymer-Kensky listed a number of moral impurities that defile the land 
and the people, such as idolatry, Molech worship, necromancy (Lev 20:1–5), improper 
sexual acts (Lev 18), and murder (Num 35:33–34). All of these, because they assault the 
very basis of Israel—its relationship with God—pollute both the land and the people. The 
whole community is encouraged to stand actively against these moral impurities by 
punishing doers, and thus exterminate evil among them.214 The progressing pollution 
finally brings catastrophic punishment in the form of exile.215 
Frymer-Kensky’s understanding of impurity is conceptually very clear and is 
heavily based on a careful study of the Pentateuch and general in its scope. For these 
reasons, it did not receive much critique. However, it is not clear whether Frymer-Kensky 
understood that ritual impurity has any defiling impact on the land or that only moral 
impurity can defile the land. The terminological search conducted later in the present 
study proved that the land was always and only defiled by moral impurity. 
 
David P. Wright 
Wright’s work on the topic is a seminal one. He also divides impurity into two 
major types and uses fresh terminology to label them. Wright labeled the first type, which 
is referred to as ritual, or cultic, or levitical impurity in the previous research,216 with the 
 
214Frymer-Kensky, “Pollution, Purification,” 406–7. 
215Frymer-Kensky, “Pollution, Purification,” 408. 
216Wright, “The Spectrum of Priestly Impurity,” 151n3. 
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adjective tolerated. This defilement is discussed in Lev 11–16 and Num 19.217 Wright 
sorted them out into four classes, listing the potential sources of defilement with biblical 
references for each class: (1) death-related impurities (human and animal carcasses), (2) 
sexual impurities (menstrual blood, a lochial discharge after birth, an abnormal genital 
discharge in a male, or an irregular blood flow in a female), (3) disease related impurities 
(leprosy as diagnosed or suspected in a person, cloth, leather, or house), and (4) cultic 
impurities (ַחָּטאֹות sacrifice carcasses and blood, the scapegoat, the Red Cow, its ashes, 
the water of purification of leprosy purification made from ashes, and possibly the birds 
and blood used in purification of leprosy impurity).218 In addition to these which are 
considered major or fathers of impurities, Wright listed another 6 impurities: (1) a corpse-
contaminated person, (2) a person suffering a menstrual, lochial, or abnormal sexual 
discharge, (3) a person who has had intercourse with one of these sexually impure 
persons, (4) an object on which any of these sexually impure people (including one who 
has had intercourse with the severely impure) have sat or lain, (5) a person or object 
suspected or diagnosed as having ṣāraʿat, and (6) a person in her/his seven-day period of 
purification from ṣāraʿat. All these impurities are contagious. They can defile other 
objects and persons.219 
Wright’s analysis was led by three criteria when he graded these impurities. First, 
the means required for cleansing them are different. Sacrifice is not needed for lesser   
 
217Wright, “The Spectrum of Priestly Impurity,” 152. 
218Wright, “The Spectrum of Priestly Impurity,” 154. 
219Wright, “The Spectrum of Priestly Impurity,” 155. 
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grades, while it is for higher grades. Second, the extent of pollutions varies. A higher 
grade of these impurities defiles the sanctuary, while a lesser grade does not. Third, the 
communicability of these pollutions is different. Some were communicable to the profane 
sphere and were prohibited from both the sanctuary and, in some instances, the camp, 
while some were non-communicable to the profane sphere and thus allowed within the 
camp, but not the sanctuary.220 
Wright himself acknowledged that the label tolerated is an oxymoron due to the 
fact that an impurity is a negative quality and a threat to what is holy. However, these 
impurities are “tolerated” due to necessity. Many of these impurities are unavoidable 
natural conditions or particulars of Israelites religion such as menstruation, contraction of 
diseases, or death. Some of them, such as childbirth and seminal emissions, cannot be 
prohibited since they are an essential part of Israelite religion.221 These impurities are 
thus allowed, but not encouraged in Wright’s opinion. Even more, he claimed that this 
kind of impurity should be generated as infrequently as possible.222 No sinful notion is 
related to these impurities in Wright’s analysis.223 
Wright labeled the other category, called “moral” or “religious” by previous 
scholars,224 by the adjective prohibited impurities which arise from sinful situations225 
 
220Wright, “The Spectrum of Priestly Impurity,” 155–56. 
221Wright, “The Spectrum of Priestly Impurity,” 157–58. 
222Wright, “The Spectrum of Priestly Impurity,” 158. 
223Wright, “The Spectrum of Priestly Impurity,” 150–81. 
224Klawans, Purity, Sacrifice, and the Temple, 55; Wright, “The Spectrum of Priestly Impurity,” 
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and he identified two types of this impurity: (1) intentional and (2) unintentional. 
Following Milgrom’s ADH of the sanctuary, Wright claimed that unintentional sins 
defile the sanctuary. Lev 5:2–3 states that one’s inadvertent delay to perform purification 
from tolerated impurity defiles the sanctuary. The parts of the sanctuary that are defiled 
are the outer altar and the shrine, depending on the sinner’s social status.226 The same 
principle of sanctuary defilement is also found in Num 6:9, 10–12 which discusses 
defilement of the Nazirite, and Lev 4:1–5 and Num 15:22–29 which explain the 
procedure when one errs unintentionally.227 
The effects of intentional sins, most likely considered high-handed since the 
punishment for them was capital, on both the sanctuary and the sinner are more severe. 
That is, the most holy place is defiled by these sins and the sinner suffers kārēt, 
premature death of the sinner, and no personal sacrifice is allowed for these sins. The 
sanctuary is cleansed from these sins on the Day of Atonement. Some of these sins are 
(1) intentional delay or refusal of purification, Num 19:13, 20,228 (2) sacrifice to Molech, 
Lev 20:1–5, (3) intentionally defiling holy things, Lev 7:19–21; 12:4; 22:3–7, Num 
18:11, 13, (4) sexual sins, Lev 18:6–23,229 and (5) other general intentional sins, Num 
15:30–31.230 Wright produced the following (Table 1) to present these two impurities.231  
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Table 1. Two impurities 
 
Tolerated232 Prohibited 
(no distinction between 
unintentional and intentional) 
Unintentional Intentional 
No sacrifice Individual ad hoc 
sacrifice 
Individual, sometimes 
communal, ad hoc 
sacrifice 






altar] and person 
Pollution of sanctuary 
[outer altar or shrine]; 
ritual personal 





shrine, outer altar], 
sometimes land; 
‘moral’ pollution of 
persons’; ‘ritual’ 












the sanctuary and 
other sacred 
matters and 





from life; restriction 
from sanctuary and 
sacred, and sometimes 
from habitation [if 
communicable to 
profane] if the sin 
derives from a 
tolerated impurity 
Removal from life; 
kārēt or capital 






habitation if sin 
derives from a 
permitted impurity 




232Wright singled out the prohibitions regarding eating impure meats and touching the carcasses of 
a camel, hyrax, rabbit, or pig as exceptions not belonging to this group. Wright, “The Spectrum of Priestly 
Impurity,” 153. 
233Wright’s position when sins of this category are cleansed is not accepted in this study, but since 
it is not crucially relevant to this paper, it is not analyzed here. 
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Wright affirmed Milgrom’s “Dorian Gray” hypothesis that states that 
unintentional prohibited impurities defile the outer altar and the shrine of the sanctuary 
and require offering a sacrifice, while intentional prohibited impurities defile the most 
holy place and the sinner’s life is forfeited. The sanctuary is cleansed from these 
impurities through the sacrifice of the Day of Atonement.234 He also noted that these two 
impurities are not connected just by the metaphorical use of language originally used for 
tolerated impurity, which is also used related to prohibited impurity, but also by the 
object of pollution (the sanctuary) and similar ways of removing the pollution (mainly 
ḥaṭāʾṯ sacrifice).235 Based on these three points, Wright deduced that the two types of 
impurity with their two subdivisions are of the same conceptual family and system so 
instead of looking at them as two separate types of impurity, he preferred looking at 
impurity as a single phenomenon, a spectrum of impurity.236 He placed the prohibitions 
against eating and touching certain animals in Lev 11:4–8, 10–12, 13–20, 41–45; 22:8 
among the tolerated impurities.237 
The fundamental difference between the two kinds of impurity is the issue of 
intention. Emphasizing more numerous points of connectedness led Wright to view the 
entire spectrum of impurity as a symbolic system with a moral foundation.238 Klawans 
eloquently and correctly countered all of the points that led Wright to his conclusion.   
 
234Wright, “The Spectrum of Priestly Impurity,”, 163. 
235Wright, “The Spectrum of Priestly Impurity,” 164. 
236Wright, “The Spectrum of Priestly Impurity,” 165, 170–73. 
237Wright, “The Spectrum of Priestly Impurity,” 165. 
238Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 37.  
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First, the similarities singled out by Wright are overdrawn. In terms of terminological 
use, the term ָטֵמא is used in both ritual and moral contexts, but the verb ָחֵנף and the noun 
 are used exclusively in moral contexts. Second, the loci of defilement are ּתֹוֵעָבה
different. That is, certain moral impurities can defile the land, while no ritual impurity 
does so. In addition, ritual impurities, in Wright’s system, defile the sanctuary via 
contact, while the prohibited ones defile it from a distance. Third, in terms of methods of 
removal, the ַחָּטאת sacrifice is the point of similarity between the two impurities. 
However, ablution does not remove moral impurity. In fact, there is no method for 
removing of the defilement of land by sin.239 Fourth, restrictions and exclusions also 
differ. For instance, those involved in moral impurity are not declared ritually impure and 
are not excluded from the sanctuary. Each of these differences demonstrates that the 
points of difference are more numerous than the points of similarity when the defiling 
force of these two impurities are compared.240 These obvious differences lead to the 
conclusion that it is better to emphasize and recognize the distinctive nature of the 
defiling effects of the two impurities regardless of the minor overlaps between them. 
Wright’s innovation in comparison to the previous research on impurity is that 
prohibited, or in traditional language, moral impurity can be unintentional and 
intentional. Previous research did recognize that there are two basic types of impurity—
ritual and moral. Wright expanded the classification of ritual impurity by stating that 
among tolerated impurities, there are those that do not require sacrifice, do pollute the 
 
239One could refer to the law of intentional homicide in Num 35:33–34, but this text talks about 
moral impurity, not ritual. 
240Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 37.  
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person, but are not communicable to the profane, contrasted with those that do require a 
sacrifice, do pollute both the sanctuary and the person, and are communicable to profane. 
Frymer-Kensky documented the fact that ritual impurity may be divided into minor and 
major. Wright elaborated more on moral impurity, observing that among prohibited 
impurities, there are those that are unintentional and require sacrifice, pollute the 
sanctuary, and require more severe punishments (potential capital punishment and 
others), contrasted with the intentional that require communal sacrifice; pollute the 




The most recent and also thorough study on impurity was carried out by Jonathan 
Klawans in several of his works.242 He followed the division into ritual and moral 
impurity that was well established by previous research.243 Ritual impurity results from 
direct or indirect contact with multiple natural sources/events such as childbirth (Lev 
12:1–8), scale disease (Lev 13:1–14:32), genital discharges (Lev 15:1–33), the carcasses 
of certain impure animals (Lev 11:11–47), and human corpses (Num 19:10–22) or is a 
consequence of particular purifications (Lev 16:28; Num 19:8). There are three basic 
characteristics of this impurity. The first characteristic points to the fact that they arise 
from generally natural and more or less unavoidable sources including birth, death, sex, 
 
241Wright, “The Spectrum of Priestly Impurity,” 153. 
242Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism; Klawans, Purity, Sacrifice, and the Temple; 
Klawans, “The Impurity of Immorality in Ancient Israel”; Klawans, “Ritual Purity.” 
243Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 21–31.  
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disease, and discharges.244 This kind of defilement is transmitted through various direct 
or indirect contacts with any of a number of natural processes.245 The only exception to 
this characteristic is the impurity that happens when priests perform the purification ritual 
(Lev 16; Num 19). Klawans also considered this impurity to be natural since he saw the 
temple, along with the cult and all cultic procedures which involved all natural things like 
animals, blood, and death, as an essential part of ancient Israel’s life.246 In addition to 
this, it may be claimed that the Day of Atonement ritual was an unavoidable event of 
Israelite religion. 
Ritual impurity is both avoidable (not touching impure animals, not having sex 
with a menstruant) and unavoidable (discharges, disease, death). Even more, some 
impurities were obligatory (burial), except for priests who were allowed to touch a corpse 
only in certain circumstances (Lev 21:1–4). However, even priests, including the high 
priest, were obliged to defile themselves by being involved in reproduction (Gen 1:28; 
9:7) or to perform cultic rituals that rendered them impure (Lev 16; Num 19).247 
A second characteristic of ritual impurity is that contracting a ritual impurity is 
not sin. Milgrom, Frymer-Kensky, Sanders, and Wright have already noted that it would 
 
244Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 23. As noted by Frymer-Kensky, Sanders, and 
Wright, it would be impossible and absurd to consider these processes as prohibited. Frymer-Kensky, 
“Pollution, Purification,” 403; Sanders, Jewish Law from Jesus to the Mishnah, 140–42; Wright, “The 
Spectrum of Priestly Impurity,” 157.  
245Klawans, Purity, Sacrifice, and the Temple, 53.  
246Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 23–24.  
247Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 24. 
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be impossible to consider natural processes as something to be prohibited.248 Conversely, 
Sanders and Wright claimed that some or all of these defilements were discouraged.249 
However, there is no indication that permitted sex, physical contact between an Israelite 
father and the mother of his newborn child, or contact with the dead was discouraged at 
all. Many of these events were proper and even obligatory. The texts do not have any 
warning against contact with ritual impurity in general. Priests had to limit their contact 
with corpse impurity (Lev 21:1–4), but were allowed to contact other impurities (Lev 4–
7). The key concern necessary for priests was to maintain a separation between ritual 
impurity and purity (Lev 10:10). They were also prohibited from eating sacred food or 
entering the holy precincts in a ritually impure state (Lev 7:20–21; 22). They were 
technically not prohibited from touching any ritual impurity, but had to be aware of it. 
Thus, both the priests and the Israelites were to be aware of their impure state so that they 
did not accidentally contact the sacred in their impure state (Lev 7:20–21; cf. 15:31, 
etc.).250 Regardless of the fact that ritual impurity is not sinful, there are several OT 
narratives that view one form of ritual impurity as punishment for moral wrongs (Num 
12; 2 Kings 5; 2 Chr 26). Again, both Frymer-Kensky and Wright have noted that the 
legal texts provided no basis to view the one stricken with scale disease as being a 
 
248Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 758–63; Wright, “The Spectrum of Priestly Impurity,” 157; Frymer-
Kensky, “Pollution, Purification,” 403; Sanders, Jewish Law from Jesus to the Mishnah, 140–42. 
249Wright, “The Spectrum of Priestly Impurity,” 158; Sanders, Jewish Law from Jesus to the 
Mishnah, 141–42. 
250Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 24–25. 
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transgressor.251 The leper is ritually impure, but is not guilty.252 
Nevertheless, ritual impurity can lead to sin in two ways. First, Num 19:13, 20 
state that the refusal to purify ritual impurity resulting from contact with a corpse is 
punishable by kārēt which could further result in defilement of the sanctuary.253 The 
nature of the punishment points to the nature of the impurity. It is not ritual, but moral, 
that is, disobedience to following divinely prescribed laws of purification. Second, every 
Israelite was warned not to enter the sanctuary or come into direct contact with holy 
foods in the state of impurity (Lev 7:20–21; 15:31; 22:30–7). Disobeying these laws 
could result in defilement of the sanctuary and was sinful since the sinner was subject to 
kārēt. Association of these prohibitions to ritual impurity did not mean that being ritually 
impure was sinful. As long as the prohibitions were observed, the impure Israelite was 
not morally impure.254  
The third characteristic of ritual impurities is that they convey impermanent 
contagion to persons. The Israelites who came in contact with a menstruant or someone 
afflicted with an irregular flux contracted a defilement which lasted until sunset (Lev 
15:5, 21). Contact with a more severe impurity such as corpse impurity prolonged the 
impure status to a week (Num 19). The state of defilement after giving birth lasted, 
depending on the sex, up to 33 days for a son or 66 days for a daughter (Lev 12). Genital   
 
251Frymer-Kensky, “Pollution, Purification,” 403–4; David P. Wright, The Disposal of Impurity: 
Elimination Rites in the Bible and in Hittite and Mesopotamian Literature, SBLDS 101 (Atlanta: Scholars 
Press, 1987), 84–85. 
252Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 822, 857.  
253Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 25.  
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flows, scale disease, and house funguses lasted for an unspecified time, but not 
permanently.255 None of the ritual impurities was permanent. Some lasted for a short 
period of time and some lasted longer, but they were all impermanent. 
Klawans’s definition of moral impurity is as follows: “Moral impurity results 
from what are believed to be immoral acts.”256 The sins that belong to this impurity 
include (1) sexual sins (Lev 18:24–30), idolatry (Lev 19:31; 20:1–3), and bloodshed 
(Num 35:33–34). They defiled the sinner (Lev 18:24), the land (Lev 18:25) and the 
sanctuary (Lev 20:3) morally rather than ritually, and the final result was exile (Lev 
18:28).257 
Klawans’s comparison of these two impurities results in five points of difference 
between them:258 
(1) Whereas ritual impurity is generally not sinful, moral impurity is a direct 
consequence of grave sin.259 (2) Whereas ritual impurity often results in a contagious 
defilement, there is no contact-contagion associated with moral impurity. One need 
not bathe subsequent to direct or indirect contact with an idolater, a murderer, or an 
individual who committed a sexual sin.260 (3) Whereas ritual impurity results in an 
impermanent defilement, moral impurity leads to a long-lasting, if not permanent, 
degradation of the sinner and, eventually, of the land of Israel.261 (4) Whereas ritual 
impurity can be ameliorated by rites of purification, that is not the case for moral 
impurity;262 moral purity is achieved by punishment, atonement, or, at best, by 
 
255Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 25. 
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refraining from committing morally impure acts in the first place. (5) In addition to 
these phenomenological differences, there are also terminological distinctions used in 
the texts themselves. Although the term impure (ָטֵמא) is used in both contexts, the 
term abominations (תועבה) and pollute (חנף) are used with regard to the sources of 
moral impurity, but not with regard to the sources of ritual impurity.263 
 
Klawans noted these differences in Table 2: 
 
 
Table 2. Differences in impurity types 
 
Impurity type Source Effect Resolution 





Moral Sins: idolatry, 
incest, murder 
Defilement of sinners, 
land and sanctuary 
Atonement or punishment, 




Klawans explored the texts that confirm that idolatry, incest, and murder morally 
defiled the sinner, the land, and the sanctuary. The most explicit text that speaks about 
moral defilement through sexual sins is Lev 18:24–30. The sexual sins enumerated in this 
text defiled both the sinner and the land. However, the exact way this defilement took 
place is unknown. It is crucial here that the impurity contracted through these deeds was 
conveyed to the land. Ritual impurity was never conveyed to or contracted from the 
land.264 The defilement of the land in this passage does not threaten the ritual status of 
those who are on it. Rather, the threat to all those living on the earth is exile.265 
The morally defiling effect of sexual sins is also detailed in Num 5:11–31, the law   
 
263Paschen, Rein und Unrein, 28–30, 67–68. 
264Büchler, Studies in Sin and Atonement (1928), 216–17. 
265Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 27. 
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of the suspected adulteress. The impurity referred to in this law seems to be moral and 
not ritual because the ritual ceremony referred to in this chapter could never take place at 
the sanctuary.266 All sexual sins defile ritually, at least for a short time (Lev 15:18), so it 
would be unnecessary to determine that status.267 Rather, the concern is to determine 
whether the woman has been defiled morally by committing adultery.268 
The defiling effect of idolatry is articulated in Lev 19:31 where it is stated that 
necromancy defiles. In addition, the act of sacrificing children to Molech is portrayed as 
defiling in Lev 20:1–3. Klawans adduced a number of OT texts to support his claim that 
idolatry defiled the sinner and the land (Ps 106; Deut 18:9–12; 2 King 16:3; Jer 7:9–15; 
16:18; Ezek 20:30–31; 22:4; 36:18; 37:23) and the sanctuary (Jer 7:30; 32:34; Ezek 5:11; 
8:10; 2 Chr 29:5, 16). However, there is no indication that idolatry defiled ritually. It 
defiled morally, but contact-contagion was not included.269 Klawans’s claim is in 
agreement with the conclusion reached by Büchler270 and Wright.271 
The defiling force of bloodshed is described in Num 35:33–34. Klawans followed 
Büchler’s claim that the verb ḥānēp̱ is a technical term that articulated the defiling force 
of moral impurity.272 This term is also synonymous with the term ṭāmēʾ, but only when it 
 
266Levine, Numbers 1–20, 207. 
267Milgrom, Numbers, 37. 
268Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 27. 
269Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 28. 
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is used in moral contexts, since ḥānēp̱ is never used in ritual contexts.273 In the same way 
as moral impurity originating from idolatry is articulated in many OT texts, so is the case 
with moral impurity resulting from bloodshed (Deut 21:23; 1 Chr 22:8; Ezek 9:7, 9; 
22:1–4; 33:25). Thus, the impurity associated with murder, sexual sins, and idolatry is 
moral in nature and defiles the sinner, the sanctuary, and the land morally, not ritually. To 
further support this claim, Klawans cited the narratives about Dinah (Gen 34:5ff) and the 
legislation regarding the suspected adulteress (Num 5:13ff). Since moral impurity does 
not include ritual defilement of the sinner he or she is not excluded from the sanctuary. 
The case of the suspected adulteress, as well as of the murderers who sought safety of the 
sanctuary confirms this (Exo 21:14). Klawans accepted Milgrom’s ADH of the sanctuary 
from afar, which is moral in nature.274 Klawans also applied his claim of moral 
defilement to the land. The land is never ritually defiled, nor is it ever the source of or a 
means of transmitting ritual defilement. The land thus suffers noncontagious degradation 
with the exile of its inhabitants as the ultimate punishment. The effect of moral impurity 
upon the sinner and the land is degradation in status. The sanctuary, by contrast, is 
cleansed from moral impurity once a year on the Day of Atonement.275 Klawans provided 
the definition of moral impurity as follows: “Moral impurity is best understood as a 
potent force unleashed by certain sinful human actions. The force unleashed defiles the 
sinner, the sanctuary, and the land even though the sinner is not ritually impure and does 
 
273Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 28. 
274Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 29. 
275Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 30. 
 
78 
not ritually defile… As a result of this defilement, the sinner and the land experience a 
degradation in status.”276 
Impurity that the morally impure person suffers is moral in its nature and not 
ritual.277 In sum, Klawans’s understanding of impurity is twofold. First, he kept a sharp 
distinction between ritual and moral impurity. Second, a similarity between these two 
impurities is that they are both real.278 Before expanding on these two points, it is useful 
to notice that Sklar accurately criticized Klawans’s table of impurity for not providing 
more elaborate differences within the realms of these two impurities. That is, Klawans 
listed only three activities as moral sins which are intentional, grave sins, refusing to 
acknowledge unintentional sins which also defile the sanctuary and were discussed at 
length in the Pentateuch (Lev 4:1–5:13)279 and also in Num 15:22–29. Reasoning from 
the assumption that major ritual impurities require sacrifice/s just like unintentional moral 
impurities, Sklar criticized Klawans for not including this similarity and connection 
between the two impurities in his table.280 However, Sklar’s criticism on this point is not 
substantial since the way impurities are resolved does not seem to affect their ontological 
nature. Regardless of the similarity in the way they are resolved, ritual impurity remains 
 
276Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 29. Klawans’s ontological understanding of 
moral impurity resembles Milgrom’s. Aerial miasma is understood by Milgrom as a physical substance, but 
yet aerial that had a magnetic attraction for the realm of sacred. Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 257–58. 
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(Oxford: Clarendon, 1983), 104–43, esp. pp. 120–25. 
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278Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 34–35. 
279Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 148. 
280Sklar seemed to be driven in his analysis by default meaning of the atonement process 
expressed through the verb כפר. Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 149.  
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ritual in its nature and moral impurity also remains moral in its nature. 
The first point Klawans put forward regarding the understanding of moral 
impurity is that scholars usually understand the concept of moral impurity either as 
metaphorical or figurative. Even Milgrom and Wright, who recognized the defiling effect 
of moral impurity, also referred to it as metaphorical.281 Klawans claimed that the 
dichotomy between literal and metaphorical is not helpful when one wants to understand 
the differences between these two impurities. None of the scholars mentioned offered the 
precise meaning of “metaphorical” or “figurative.” This might be due to the fact that 
these terms are very difficult to define and the phenomena to which they refer are 
difficult to isolate282 and the philosophical debate on this continues. For this reason, 
Klawans suggested that they should be dropped from the discussion on this topic. In 
addition, this debate has not yet had a significant effect in biblical and ancient Jewish 
writings.283 
When scholars characterized moral impurity as metaphorical or figurative, they 
used these terms in a traditional way which means that metaphorical language is not to be 
taken literally. In addition, the terms in question are transferable, meaning the term or 
phrase with literal meaning in one context can be transferred into another context in 
which it is not literal. Thus, metaphorical language is secondary and nonliteral, and its 
 
281For the details about the way the following scholars understood moral impurity as a metaphor, 
see André and Ringgren, “טמא,” TDOT, 5:331–40; Ringgren, “טהר,” TDOT, 5:291–95; Levine, Numbers 
1–20, 207; Levine, Leviticus, 134; Schwartz, “Selected Chapters of the Holiness Code,” xii; Milgrom, 
Leviticus 1–16; Wright, “The Spectrum of Priestly Impurity”; Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient 
Judaism, 174nn72–73. 
282See Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 175n75. 
283Eilberg-Schwartz, The Savage in Judaism, 115–40. 
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usage is informed by the literal meaning of the particular language.284 
Klawans responded to both of these claims. First, applied to the purity language 
of the OT, this implies that the metaphorical use of the purity language does not mean 
that the defilement is happening at all. For instance, this is the case with Lev 18:24–25 
that speaks of the land defilement for which many commentators think that it is 
metaphorical.285 If one claims that this passage is metaphorical, it would mean that 
defilement is not literal and the use of the purity language is secondary. However, it is 
explicitly and implicitly stated in the OT that the land of Israel is holy due to God’s 
presence in the midst of it (Num 35:34). If the land can be holy, then it can be defiled. 
Almost a century ago, Hoffmann understood that impurity in the context of grave sins is 
to be understood as an idea opposite to holiness.286 
Defilement of the land in the context of Lev 18:24–30 is not ritual, but rather, 
moral; these impurities defile the land on which they are committed, and the sinner 
literally and, as a result, the land, is permanently degraded in status.287 The ultimate result 
is exile of the people.288 Both types of impurity’s perceived effects result from actual 
physical processes and as such are real. A ritual impurity is perceived as impermanent 
contagion coming out of real, physical processes which affect people and certain objects 
within their reach. A moral impurity is perceived as permanent contagion coming out of 
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81 
real, physical processes that affect people, the land, and the sanctuary. A ritual impurity is 
conveyed by direct and indirect physical contact, while a moral impurity is transmitted to 
the land by the sins that take place on it. All three sins that defile the land morally include 
direct contact with the land.289 
Second, it is implied by scholars that moral impurity involves secondary use of 
purity terminology. Levine termed it, “applied concepts of purity,” Schwartz referred to a 
“transformation,” and Wright spoke of “metaphorization.”290 However, no detailed 
analysis has been provided to establish precisely the nature of the secondary use of purity 
terminology in regard to moral impurity.291 It was commonly assumed that moral 
impurity is a secondary use of purity terminology, but yet, this secondary usage occurs in 
prophetic and so-called Deuteronomistic texts which are considered, in the perspectives 
of these scholars,292 to be chronologically earlier traditions than Priestly sources. As such, 
they should use the primary use of impurity terminology, but yet, they do not. This 
means, then, that it is uncertain which usage came first, and as a result, it cannot be 
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assumed that purity terminology was used metaphorically in Lev 18.293 This is not to say 
that metaphorical and figurative use of purity terminology is nonexistent in the OT, but is 
just an observation that in Lev 18:24–30, purity language was used in a literal way, not 
metaphorically or figuratively. When ritual impurity terminology is used metaphorically 
or figuratively to express the sinfulness of the Israelites or to illustrate righteousness or 
atonement, there is always an explicit or implied comparison between ritual impurity or 
purity on the one hand, and sinfulness and righteousness on the other.294 
Establishing a distinction between the two kinds of impurities leads to the 
question of their inter-relatedness. In other words, is there a single system that 
encompasses both or does each impurity form its own system? Mary Douglas, as an 
anthropologist, claimed that there is a unifying system that encompasses both 
impurities.295 Building on Douglas’s work, Wright suggested that all defilement-creating 
conditions in the priestly legislation have the same conceptual family, and as such, the 
whole purity system, ritual and moral, in his words tolerated and prohibited, has a moral 
basis and rationale.296 Klawans’s critique of Wright’s claim is substantial and well taken. 
To get to the point of claiming that these two impurities belong to the same conceptual 
family with the same morally informed foundation, Wright argued that (1) 
purity/impurity terminology is interchangeable between the two impurities, (2) they share 
the loci of pollution (the sanctuary), (3) there are similar ways of removing that pollution 
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(usually via ַחָּטאת sacrifice), and (4) the restriction and exclusion are similar.297 
Klawans also noted that a search for the single symbolic system is not called for 
by the text itself. He explained that various rituals have the task of reminding Israelites of 
some greater purpose. Certain activities related to the Sabbath remind Israelites either of 
the Exodus from Egypt (Deut 5:14–15) or the creation of the world (Exod 20:10–11). The 
tassels on their garments served to remind the people to obey God’s commandments 
(Num 15:37–41). The Pentateuch had a way to communicate that certain rituals served to 
remind them of some greater purpose, but the texts do not have any indication that 
impurity laws were to serve as behavioral reminders of morally defiling effects of sin.298 
In addition, Klawans also noted that Wright emphasized that the use of impurity 
language associated with sin, moral impurity, involves metaphorization which is a 
secondary application of language originally used in the context of ritual defilement.299 
Subsequently, Wright argued that morality is the foundation of the whole system, and 
that ritual impurity symbolizes sin. This means, then, that ritual defilement serves to 
symbolize its own metaphorization. The circularity present in this proposal is self-
contradictory.300 
The sharp distinction Klawans proposed does not mean that these two impurities 
are totally separate. They are distinct, but yet analogous, conceptions of contagion. They 
overlap, but they do that with other systems in the OT such as the sacrificial system, the 
 
297Wright, “The Spectrum of Priestly Impurity,” 164. 
298Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 37. 
299Wright, “The Spectrum of Priestly Impurity,” 162–64. 
300Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 37. 
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legal system of law and justice, cultic laws, and the calendar. If one were to look for a 
unifying system for all other systems, it might be the entire religion of Israel. Thus, due 
to the fact that the differences between two impurities outweigh the similarities, it is fair 
to take the two impurities on their own terms.301 
When it comes to the terminology, Klawans agreed with Wright that the use of 
adjectives, “ritual” and “moral,” attached to the word “impurity” in order to differentiate 
these two impurities, is problematic. They do not appear in OT texts, nor in post-biblical 
Jewish literature.302 Some scholars simply refused to use any additional terminology than 
just impurity.303 The danger of using ritual and moral is that whatever is associated with 
the latter will always be considered with more attention than with the former. However, 
since the OT uses the same terminology to describe two distinct impurities, researchers 
need to supply descriptive terminology in order to lessen the confusion related to this 
concept.304 Adopting a terminology not used by the biblical authors to explain biblical 
concepts is necessary and unavoidable in regards to many concepts.305 
The terminology that defines these two kinds of impurities does not imply that 
these two types of impurity are opposing or mutually exclusive. Rather, the intention is to 
highlight the fact that there are two distinct impurities, one of which is more associated 
 
301Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 37. 
302Wright, “The Spectrum of Priestly Impurity,” 151–52n3. 
303Sanders, Jewish Law from Jesus to the Mishnah, 192; Neusner, The Idea of Purity in Ancient 
Judaism, 1–2. 
304Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 22. 
305The term Trinity was never used in the Bible even though biblical texts contain many 
statements about this concept. Millard J. Erickson, Christian Theology, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker 
Academic, 2013), 172. 
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with sin (in terms of moral faults) than the other. A ritually impure person is excluded 
from particular rituals and prevented from entering sacred precincts.306 A ritually impure 
person regains his or her ritual purity in part ritually, by the means of sacrifice, 
sprinkling, washings, and bathing, but in some cases, rituals are not sufficient. One may 
remain ritually impure until evening after ritual purification (Lev 15:5). Thus, the 
completion of the process of regaining ritual purity in part is conditioned by the passage 
of time. However, ritual is a useful description, much more so than cultic307 and 
levitical,308 since ritual frequently plays an important role in this process.309 Ritual is also 
an integral part of achieving moral purity, as well as also making this term imperfect for 
reflecting this type of impurity. However, Klawans suggested the use of the adjectives 
“ritual” and “moral” to describe impurity in the best way possible, but not in perfect 
terms. These adjectives attached to the noun “impurity” express both the inter-relatedness 
of the two impurities and also their differences. They refer to the same concept of 
impurity, which consists of two types,310 with two distinctive natures.  
 
306Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 22. 
307Cultic is less suitable simply because the cult plays an important role in both types of impurity. 
Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism. Wright suggested that cultic would be used to refer to the 
impurities that take place as by-products of particular sacrificial procedures. David P. Wright, “Unclean 
and Clean,” ABD 6:732. 
308This term is misleading in two ways: (1) both ritual and moral impurities are articulated not 
only in the book of Leviticus, but in other books, as well, and (2) neither ritual nor moral impurity is 
particularly concerned with Levites, but with all Israelites. Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 
23; Wright, “The Spectrum of Priestly Impurity,” 152–53. 
309Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 22–23. 




Thomas Kazen is a representative of the school that equates ritual and moral 
impurity.311 He noted that “purity is a ritual concept but the purity language is used in the 
OT with reference to sinful behavior.”312 For this and reasons that will be presented 
below, Kazen initially claimed that the unifying factor of ritual and moral impurity is the 
notion of disgust as stated in the following quotation: “All three phenomena for which 
impurity language is used in Leviticus—dietary laws, contact-contagion, and certain 
types of immorality—share common traits that can be related to the primary emotion of 
human disgust at objectionable substances, being applied secondarily to these phenomena 
alike.”313 Kazen arrived at this conclusion by applying a bio-psychological approach to 
the moral and ritual texts. This approach in Kazen’s work, as in all other approaches of 
cognitive science of religion, refers to human cognition. However, he placed the 
emphasis on the emotional aspect of cognition, rather than on rational mental activities.314 
Kazen took Antonio Damasio’s work as a foundation in this process. Contrary to the 
traditional Western paradigm based on Descartes’ famous saying, Cogito, ergo sum, 
which assumed that mind is separate from matter and rationality is opposite to emotion, 
Damasio claimed that bodily sensations and emotions are an integral part of the human 
mind. In conducting neurobiological research, he found that the mind is in constant   
 
311Thomas Kazen, Jesus and Purity Halakhah: Was Jesus Indifferent to Impurity?, ConBNT 38 
(Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2010), 209–14, 216–18. 
312Kazen, Jesus and Purity Halakhah, 200.  
313Kazen, “Dirt and Disgust,” 64.  
314Thomas Kazen, Issues of Impurity in Early Judaism, ConBNT 45 (Winona Lake, IN: 
Eisenbrauns, 2010), 13. 
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interaction with the rest of the organism. He concluded, “It does not seem sensible to 
leave emotions and feelings out of any overall concept of mind.”315 He also said that the 
“mind derives from the entire organism.”316 Therefore, emotions are crucial in human 
reasoning, judgment, and behavior.317 Focusing on the emotions and avoiding the 
division between morality and ritual, Kazen’s latter work shows that he added two more 
major emotions to the emotion of disgust, namely fear and the sense of justice, which 
underlie the concept of impurity.318 Thus, these three emotions form the background for 
all impurities, rituals, and morals. 
Kazen noted that purity language is used in three different groups of laws—clean 
and unclean animals, bodily transferable contact-contagion, and serious immorality.319 In 
scholarly works, clean and unclean animals are placed into either ritual or moral laws.320 
Noting the overlap between these three groups of laws and not acknowledging the 
separation between the last two allowed Kazen to integrate the first and most problematic 
group of texts into a single-nature understanding of impurity in the OT.321 The fact that 
these three groups of laws overlap in the OT and that, in Kazen’s understanding, they 
 
315Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: 
Putnam, 1994), 158.  
316Damasio, Descartes’ Error, 225.  
317Damasio, Descartes’ Error, 245–52.  
318Kazen, Issues of Impurity in Early Judaism, 16–17.  
319Kazen, Issues of Impurity in Early Judaism, 17.  
320Kazen, “Dirt and Disgust,” 44.  
321Kazen, “Dirt and Disgust,” 44.  
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have a common origin enforced Kazen’s claim of a single-nature of impurity.322 
Kazen also excluded the metaphorical interpretation of impurity on two grounds: 
the use of the metaphor in the scholarly works is inconsistent323 and human language 
itself is very prone to be metaphorized. 
The distinction [between literal and metaphorical] often becomes artificial. Although 
“metaphorical” generally refers to the use of language in a secondary or transferred 
sense, while “literal” refers to a primary use, literal expressions can be metaphorized 
and metaphorical language at times literalized. At a deep level, human language and 
thought are metaphorical throughout, including our moral imagination.324 
 
Kazen’s reasons for eliminating metaphor from the discussion on impurity are not 
sound. First, the inconsistent metaphorical and literal use of purity/impurity language by 
scholars does not mean that the distinction between ritual and moral impurity does not 
exit. Rather, the solution can simply be found in defining these two terms than in 
eliminating the possibility of separation between ritual and moral impurity.325 Second, 
Kazen’s understanding of metaphor is based on the works of George Lakoff and Mark 
Johnson,326 whose totalizing claims on metaphor are to be taken with caution.327 Lam’s 
evaluation of Lakoff’s and Johnson’s understanding of metaphor seems to be on point: 
Lakoff and Johnson claim that metaphorical patterning has a deeper cognitive basis—
that “metaphors as linguistic expressions are possible precisely because there are 
 
322Kazen, “Dirt and Disgust,” 47–49. It has to be stressed that the common origin argument is 
heavily dependent on the ANE texts rather than on biblical texts.  
323Kazen, “Dirt and Disgust,” 45.  
324Kazen, “Dirt and Disgust,” 64.  
325Lam, “Metaphorical Patterning,” 117.  
326G. Lakoff and M. Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1980); G. Lakoff and M. Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to 
Western Thought (New York: Basic Books, 1999); Mark Johnson, Moral Imagination: Implications of 
Cognitive Science for Ethics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 32–77. 
327Lam, “Metaphorical Patterning,” 117.  
 
89 
metaphors in a person’s conceptual system.” Thus they posit the existence of 
“metaphorical concepts”--cognitive structures of the form [TARGET DOMAIN] IS 
[SOURCE DOMAIN] that are thought to give rise to linguistic instantiations of the 
metaphor. The assumption is that, since these patterns are so apparent and pervasive 
in language, it must be the pattern that is primary, not the linguistic expressions that 
give evidence of it.328 
 
It seems very arbitrary to single out just one aspect of the human being—the 
emotional,329—and disregard all others, such as the rational and the social, which 
contribute greatly in conceptualizing an idea as complex as morality.330 It also has to be 
emphasized that Kazen’s model is limited in terms of its theoretical foundation to Charles 
Darwin’s evolutionary theory. 
 
Summary of Scholarly Research on Impurity 
The review of the history of interpretation shows certain tendencies and 
developments in the studies of impurity in the OT. The pioneers of this study in modern 
times, David Hoffmann and Adolf Büchler, followed, conceptually and terminologically, 
the classical, bipartite division of impurity to ritual and moral which was already 
articulated in Jewish sources, spanning from Talmudic and medieval rabbinic literature, 
Philo, and the early rabbinic sages. 
Hoffmann recognized that moral impurity originates from sinful behavior such as 
eating forbidden foods, idolatry, and various sexual sins for which atonement is not 
available except on the Day of Atonement. This impurity defiles the sinner’s body and is   
 
328Lam, “Metaphorical Patterning,” 23. For a more thorough critique of Lakoff’s and Johnson’s 
understanding of metaphor, see sources cited in Lam, “Metaphorical Patterning,” 23n33.  
329Kazen, “Dirt and Disgust,” 52. 
330Lam, “Metaphorical Patterning,” 116.  
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not symbolic, but real, implying God's rejection of the one who commits it. Based on Lev 
18:24–30, this defilement also defiles the land and causes the exile of the people. Ritual 
impurity is temporal and can be removed by ablutions. As Lev 11–15 and Num 19 
convey, it originates from human corpses, certain animal carcasses, bodily flows, and 
leprosy. Hofmann perceived this impurity as a symbolic one, symbolizing sin. 
Büchler assigned different terminology to the same two natures of impurity by 
using levitical instead of ritual, and religious or spiritual instead of moral impurity. He 
noted that ritual impurity is impermanent contagion. Except for the different terminology 
he used for these two impurities and the fact that moral impurity is not contagious, his 
work is similar to Hofmann's work. Both Hoffmann’s and Büchler’s works missed 
drawing a distinction between the defilement that arises from unintentional and 
intentional moral impurity and they do not discuss the difference between minor and 
major ritual/levitical defilements. 
Gedalyahu Alon added a new component to the purity studies, namely, the role of 
geographical boundaries to which purity laws were applied. “Minimalists” restricted 
these laws to the sphere of the Temple and priests, while the “maximalists” claimed that 
they are applicable to all of Israel. However, isolating only the geographical element 
related to the purity/impurity laws is insufficient to understand them properly. 
Jacob Neusner proposed the evolutionary development of moral impurity out of 
one’s unfitness in the holy community. Under the influence of Alon, he suggested that 
purity/impurity itself is a single nature concept and can be interpreted in two ways: as a 
metaphor of morality elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible and in the Priestly texts through 
which specific laws are related to the Temple. However, Neusner's interpretation of 
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biblical texts shows that he was not able to preserve these two descriptions on the 
purity/impurity laws. In addition, Douglas correctly noted the inconsistency of taking 
some parts of a single system and ascribing to them different meanings in different 
contexts. Neusner's work has received a lot of substantial criticism. 
The contribution of Mary Douglas to the study of ritual and impurity from a 
theoretical and anthropological standpoint is well known and substantial, but she was not 
concerned about making a clear distinction between ritual and moral impurity; because of 
that, some scholars claimed that she also assumed the single nature of impurity. This is 
strengthened with the statements found throughout her works that would lead one to 
deduce that she understood impurity as a single nature phenomenon, but there are also 
statements in her works which point to the fact that she understood impurity to be a two-
nature phenomenon. Klawans’s remark that she was much more nuanced than scholars 
who make such claims based on her works regarding impurity seems to be correct. 
Hyam Maccoby recognized a basic distinction between ritual and moral impurity 
with ritual purity having limited validity for Israelites only, and moral purity having 
universal validity for all of humanity. In addition, he believed that moral purity has 
precedence over ritual purity in case they conflict. He emphasized the fact that mortality 
through the birth and death cycle, which is related to all ritual impurity, stands as the 
background of ritual laws and that they guard the temple from the entire cycle of 
mortality. 
Jacob Milgrom’s treatment of impurity is not clear as might have been expected. 
Essentially, he endorsed ritual and moral impurity distinction. However, his treatment of 
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ritual impurity is more consistent and systematic than treatment of moral impurity which 
he, at times, interpreted as metaphorical. 
Tikva Frymer-Kensky produced one of the most systematic and complete 
treatments of impurity in modern times. Building from the classical division to ritual and 
moral impurity which both defile individuals, temple, and land, she added subdivisions to 
both of them. She divided ritual impurities into major and minor ones. Major impurities 
are caused by death, leprosy, bodily discharges, and childbirth, while minor impurities 
result in contact with impure things, things that are defiled by the persons having a major 
impurity, and persons themselves under major impurity. This impurity is contagious in its 
nature, not sinful or dangerous by default, but it can lead to sin and danger. Moral 
impurity is related to forbidden activities which provoke God’s punishment of kārēt or 
the punishment expressed by “he shall bear his penalty.” She understood that a distinction 
to the sacred and profane is foundational for Israelite cosmology. First, God is holy and 
his presence made the temple, camp, and land holy, and the latter three must maintain 
their holiness. Frymer-Kensky believed that pollution takes place via direct contact, but 
also aerially. At times, Frymer-Kensky used different terminology to refer to these 
impurities, for example, “pollution beliefs” and “dangerous beliefs,” rather than classical 
terms, but she more frequently used the classic terms ritual and moral impurity. 
Building on the work of the previous scholars mentioned above, in great part 
Frymer-Kensky, David P. Wright accepted the fact that some impurity comes out of 
natural conditions and some results out of sinful situations. In addition, he endorsed two 
classes of ritual impurities, major and minor. He also assigned to them a defiling force 
and approved the fact that this impurity is not sinful. Wright’s systematization is based on 
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the (1) means of cleansing, (2) extent of pollution, and (3) communicability of pollution. 
His division is more detailed and consists of four classes of major and six classes of 
minor impurity. Wright divided impurity that is caused by sinful activities into (1) 
intentional and (2) unintentional. The unintentional impurity defiles the outer altar and 
holy place depending on social status, while intentional sins defile the most holy place 
aerially. The unintentional are expiable via sacrifice, while the intentional are not 
expiable but punishable by kārēt. The idea Wright introduced in comparison to Frymer-
Kensky’s was totally new terminology to refer to these two impurities, tolerated and 
prohibited, but he himself acknowledged that these terms are also problematic. Wright 
can also be credited for being much more detailed in his systematization of impurity. 
Basing his research on the works of the previous scholars mentioned above who 
had already advanced systematization and understanding of impurity, especially in the 
works of Hoffmann and Frymer-Kensky, Jonathan Klawans produced the most elaborate 
and systematic, up-to-date research on impurity. He is currently the most ardent 
proponent of the traditional division of impurity into ritual and moral. Along with the 
previous scholarly research, Klawans agreed that ritual impurity (1) arises from natural 
and unavoidable conditions, (2) is not sin, and (3) conveys impermanent contagion via 
direct contact. Moral impurity on the other hand, (1) arises from grave sin, (2) does not 
defile by direct contact, (3) leads to long-lasting, if not permanent, contagion, and (4) 
unlike ritual impurity which can be addressed and remedied via purification ritual, is 
rectified by atonement, punishment, or by refraining from committing it. 
Klawans noticed that purity/impurity terminology also confirms traditional 
division to ritual and moral impurity since ָטֵמא is used for both impurities, but ּתֹוֵעָבה and 
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 are used exclusively for moral impurity. Moral impurity defiles the one who ָחֵנף
performs it, the sanctuary, and the land. Ritual impurity never defiles the land, nor is 
derived from the land, but defiles the sanctuary and humans. The idea that Klawans 
brought to the discussion on impurity is that both impurities, ritual and moral, are real. In 
addition, he endorsed the metaphorical use of purity/impurity language in biblical texts, 
but not to the extent scholars usually assume. In addition, the use of a metaphorical or 
figurative interpretation of certain texts brings more confusion than clarity to the 
discussion due to various theories on metaphor itself. 
Klawans also stated that besides the fact that these impurities are distinct, they are 
an analogous conception of contagion as a part of the entire system of Israelite religion. 
These two impurities are not mutually exclusive, but rather, the emphasis is on the fact 
that impurity consists of two natures, each of which has unique characteristics and 
features. Aware of the deficiencies of all terminology suggested in the previous research, 
Klawans chose ritual and moral impurity, not as perfect terms to denote these two 
impurities, but as what are the least confusing and misleading. 
Thomas Kazen was a firm proponent of a single nature of impurity. Driven by the 
methods of bio-psychology, he suggested that the notions/emotions of disgust, fear, and 
sense of justice stand in the background of both ritual and moral impurity. Informed by 
research in the area of bio-phycology which proposes the equal role of emotions along 
with reason in the decision-making process, Kazen concluded that these three emotions 
underline the concept of impurity as a single nature phenomenon. 
After review of the development of scholarly opinions on impurity in the OT and 
before proceeding to study moral impurity specifically, the present study seeks to 
 
95 
emphasize some more specific points mentioned in the scholarly dialog on the topic, 
namely, the following subheading examined and expanded some crucial scholarly claims 
regarding impurity. 
 
Remarks on Sin and Impurity: Insights 
from the Present Research 
Some scholars have arrived at profound insights that impact the understanding of 
impurity in the Pentateuch. These statements are cited below and, when needed, refined. 
Following the works of Kurtz,331 Rendtorff,332 and Milgrom,333 Gane brought to attention 
an accurate and helpful point that further strengthens the standpoint of modern 
scholarship on the existence of two distinct impurities: “A חטאת sacrifice providing כפר 
for physical ritual impurity results in physical ritual purity (טהר). Forgiveness (סלח) is 
not needed, because contacting a bodily impurity does not, by itself, constitute a moral 




The verb ָסַלח, “to forgive”335 occurs twenty times in the Pentateuch and was   
 
331Kurtz, Offerings, 416–17, 420. 
332R. Rendtorff, Leviticus, BKAT 3/3 (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchen, 1992), 176, 216–17. 
333Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 255–56, 760. 
334Gane, Cult and Character, 199. 
335Gerhard von Rad, Old Testament Theology, trans. D. M. G. Stalker (Louisville: Westminster 
John Knox Press, 2001), 2:757–58; J. P. J. Olivier, “ָסַלח,” NIDOTTE 3:258–61. 
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never required for contracting ritual impurity. As a search for this verb, provided in the 
following table, proves,336 contracting ritual impurity status does not create moral 
impurity. This point is further strengthened by the way ritual impurity comes into 
existence. That is, ritual impurity is undesirable, but it remains a part of the current 
human nature and the created world since the Fall into sin (Gen 3). In most cases, it is 
unavoidable and cannot be prevented. 
The first two columns of Table 3 provide the biblical reference where ָסַלח is used 
in the context with the terms for sin. The middle two columns show the additional noun/s 
and verb/s that convey the concept of sin found in the same pericope. The last two 
columns demonstrate the nature and expiability of the impurity under consideration. 
In addition to ָסַלח, the verb ָטֵהר, “to be pure, cleansed, to purify,”337 frequently 
occurs in impurity contexts to convey the elimination of the effects of impurity on 
humans.338 The verbal forms of ָטֵהר occur fifty-four times in the Pentateuch.339  
 
336The verbal form of ָסַלח occurs twenty-seven more times in the OT along with four remaining 
derivatives (three nouns, Ps 130:4, Dan 9:9, and Neh 9:17, and one adjective, Ps 86:5). None of these refers 
to ritual, but moral impurity. 
337Richard E. Averbeck, “טהר,” NIDOTTE 2:332; F. Maass, “טהר,” TLOT 3:482. 
338Wright, “Unclean and Clean,” 6:737. 
339Nonverbal forms occur eighty-one times (sixty-nine adjectives and twelve nouns). Adjectives 
can be grouped into four semantic domains: (1) natural (dietary) cleanness: Gen 7:2 (2x), 8 (2x); 8:20 (2x), 
Lev 20:25, Deut 14:11, 20, (2) physical quality of material items (gold): Exod 24:10; 25:11, 17, 24, 29, 31, 
36, 38–39; 28:14, 22, 36; 30:3, 35 (perfume); 31:8; 37:2, 6, 11, 16–17, 22–24, 26, 29; 39:15, 25, 30, 37; 
Lev 24:4, 6, (3) ritual cleanness of humans, things, places, animals: Lev 4:12; 6:11; 7:19; 10:10, 14; 11:36–
37, 47; 12:4. 5. 6; 13:7, 13, 17, 35, 37, 39–41; 14:2, 4, 23, 32, 57; 15:8, 13; 20:25; Num 6:9; 9:13; 18:11, 
13; 19:9, 18–19; Deut 12:15. 22; 15:22; 23:11, and (4) moral cleanness of humans: Num 5:28. Thus, out of 




Table 3. The verb ָסַלח in the Pentateuch 
 
Biblical 






Additional Verb/s Ritual Moral Yes No 
Ex 34:9 
   ֶּפַׁשע 
 X x  
 חטאת 
Lev 4:20 
 v. 13 אׁשם ,עׂשה ,ׁשגה v. 14 חטאת 
 v. 14 חטא
 X x  
Lev 4:26 
 v. 22 ׁשגגה חטאת 
 v. 23 חטאת
 v. 26 חטאת
 v. 22 אׁשם ,עׂשה ,חטא
  v. 23  X x ,חטא
Lev 4:31 
 v. 27 אׁשם ,עׂשה ,חטא v. 28x2 חטאת חטאת 
 v. 28x2 ,חטא
 X x  
Lev 4:35  חטא  חטאת v. 35  X x  
Lev 5:10 
 v. 6x2 חטאת חטאת 
 v. 10 חטאת
 v. 5 חטא
 v. 7 חטא
 v. 10 חטא
 X x  
Lev 5:13 
 v. 11 חטא  חטאת 
 v. 13 חטא
 X x  
Lev 5:16 
א  ת ֲאֶׁש֩ר ָחָטָ֨ ֵ֣  v. 14 חטא ,מעל v. 14 מעל ְוא 
 v. 16 חטא
 X x  
Lev 5:18 
 v. 17 אׁשם ,עׂשה ,חטא  ׁשגגה 
 v. 18 ׁשגג
 X x  
Lev 5:26/6:7 
ל  ת ִמֹּכֹ֥ ַעל־ַאַחַ֛
ה ר־ַיֲעֶׂשֶ֖  ֲאֶׁשֶֽ
 v. 1 מעל
 v. 7 ַאְׁשָמה
אטח ,מעל  v. 1 
 v. 3 חטא
 v. 4 אׁשם ,חטא
    
Lev 19:22 חטאת x2  חטא v. 4x2  X x  
Num 14:19 
 v. 9 מרד  עון 
 v. 22 ׁשמע ,נסה
 X x  
Num 14:20     X x  
Num 15:25 ׁשגגה x2 ׁשגגה v. 24 עׂשה ,עׂשה ,ׁשגה v. 22  X x  
Num 15:26  ׁשגה  ׁשגגה v. 22  X x  
Num 15:28 
 v. 27 ׁשגגה 
 v. 29 ׁשגגה
 v. 27 חטא
 v. 28 חטא ,ׁשגג
 v. 29 עׂשה
 X x  
Num 30:6 חטאת, Lev 5:6  חטא Lev 5:5  X x  
Num 30:9 חטאת, Lev 5:6  חטא Lev 5:5  X x  




 ;Deut 13:5 ,ָרע
17:5, 7 
ָבה  Deut ,ּתֹוע 
13:14; 17:4 
 Negation +  ָסַלח 





However, contrary to ָסַלח which is exclusively used in moral impurity contexts, 
the use of ָטֵהר is not as consistent as the use of ָסַלח. In the Pentateuch, the verb is used in 
the context of both ritual and moral impurity. The following table (Table 4) lists all the 
texts where the verbal form of ָטֵהר refers to the state of the person or object when purity 
is achieved in the Pentateuch. The first column contains the references and the second, 
the number of uses in each of those references. The next two columns in the middle 
divide the references in regard to the impurity they refer to. The last two columns show 
whether an object of the verb is a human being, the sanctuary, or other objects. 
Results of the search on these two verbs shows that the purity/impurity 
terminology that conveys the elimination of the effects of impurity from humans is 
consistent, but still has certain exceptions. That is, the use of ָסַלח decisively shows that 
forgiveness was never needed for ritual impurity, and a ritually impure person never 
received it in the Pentateuch or the rest of the OT. Accordingly, the uses of the verb ָסַלח 
in the Pentateuch and the rest of the OT clearly emphasize a difference between the two 
impurities, moral and ritual. 
The use of ָטֵהר is not as consistent as that of ָסַלח. That is, ָטֵהר refers to the purity 
that is the result of ritual and/or moral impurity being eliminated from humans and 
inanimate objects in the Pentateuch. Statistics show that ָטֵהר deals with ritual impurity 
more frequently. Speaking in numbers, ָטֵהר refers to the purity from the effects of ritual 
impurity in twenty-one out of twenty-five of contexts when it appears with the terms of 
impurity in the Pentateuch. However, three out of four of the remaining four contexts are  
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Nature of Impurity Direct/Indirect Object 
Ritual Moral Sinfulness Human Inanimate 
1 Gen 35:2 X X   x  
2 Lev 11:32 
X X 
   physical 
objects 
3 Lev 12:7 X   X x  




X x  
5 Lev 14:7 2x X   x  
6 Lev 14:8 2x X   x  
7 Lev 14:9 X X   x  




X x  
9 Lev 14:48 X     house 
10 Lev 14:53 X     house 
11 Lev 15:13 2x x+healing   x  
12 Lev 15:28 2x x+healing   x  
13 Lev 16:19 X X x340   altar 
14 Lev 16:30 X X x
341  x  
15 Lev 17:15 X X   x  
16 Lev 22:4 X X   x  
17 Lev 22:7 X X   x  
18 Num 8:6 X X   x  
19 Num 8:7 2x X   x  
20 Num 8:15 X X   X  
21 Num 8:21 X x342  X X  
22 Num 19:12 2x X   X  
23 Num 19:19 X X   X  
24 Num 31:23 
X X 
   physical 
objects 
25 Num 31:24 
X X 




340Gane, Cult and Character, 230. 
341Gane, Cult and Character, 39. 
342Based on the use of the hithpael form of the verb ָחָטא, Milgrom noted that cleansing conveyed 
by this verb and form undeniably refers to the cleansing from ritual impurity. Milgrom, Numbers, 65 and 
see excursus 48. 
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debatable. In Lev 12:7–8 and 14:20, the moral aspect of purity is just potentially present. 
It is not mentioned in the text. In Lev 16:19, ritual and moral impurity are removed from 
the sacrificial altar, which cannot have moral responsibility, but can just be clean or 
unclean. Lev 16:30 remains the only true exception since ָטֵהר refers to the moral purity 
of the Israelites.343 
In the rest of the OT, the use of ָטֵהר is more frequently found in contexts where it 
refers to the cleansing of both ritual and moral impurity. That is, forty verbal forms refer 
to both ritual and moral purity which, contrary to the uses in the Pentateuch, have the 
greater number of occurrences related to moral impurity. There are thirty-two derivatives 
of the root ָטֵהר that are divided into two nonverbal forms, adjectives and nouns. Nouns 
occur five times and in four occurrences, they refer to ritual purity (Ezek 44:26; Neh 
12:45; 1 Chr 23:28; 2 Chr 30:19) while one of them does not belong to purity language 
(Ps 89:44, translated as “splendor”). Adjectives occur twenty-seven times and refer to 
ritual (1 Sam 20:26; Isa 66:20; Ezek 22:26; 36:25; 44:23; Mal 1:11; Job 14:4; 17:9; 
28:19; Eccl 9:2; Ezra 6:20; 2 Chr 30:17) and moral impurity (Hab 1:13; Psa 12:6; Ps 
19:9; 51:10; Job 14:4; 17:9; 28:19; Prov 15:26; Prov 22:11; 30:12). In addition, some 
adjectives refer to ritual purity (Zech 3:5; Job 28:19; 1 Chr 28:17; 2 Chr 3:4; 2 Chr 9:17; 
13:11). These statistics show that the use of the root ָטֵהר is more complex in the rest of 
the OT than in Pentateuch. The meanings that are attached to this term and the conditions 
they refer to are much broader. However, the rationale for this broader meaning of the 
verb in the rest of the OT exceeds the scope of this study and will not be explained here. 
 
343Gane, Cult and Character, 39. 
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It seems that the verb that refers to removal of the negative effects of impurity 
from humans points to the existence of two kinds of impurities. ָסַלח is used exclusively 
to convey the removal effects of moral impurity from humans, while ָטֵהר effects removal 
in the contexts where ritual impurity affected humans or inanimate objects and once 
where both impurities are involved (Lev 16:30). 
 
 ָטֵמא  and ָחֵנף
In the following quotation, Klawans highlighted two terminological points that 
also stress the difference between ritual and moral impurity: “Although the term impure 
א) ) is used in both contexts, the terms abomination (ָטמ  בהעתו ) and pollute (חנף) are used 
with regard to the source of moral impurity, but not with regard to the sources of ritual 
impurity.”344 
First, in surveying the terminology mentioned in this quotation, Klawans noticed 
that when א  have the land as their direct object, they always convey defilement ָחנ ף or ָטמ 
by moral impurity. The land never acquires defilement by ritual impurity. The following 
displays the texts where the verb א  .(conveys moral defilement of the land (Table 5 ָטמ 
The verb ָחֵנף is used only once in the Pentateuch to convey the defilement of the 
land (Num 35:33). The nature of this defilement is moral. 
Thus, 2 out of 3 verbs, ָחֵנף ,ָטֵמא, and ָחַלל, used in the OT to convey defilement 
are employed to express defilement in the Pentateuch. The use of these verbs shows that 
 




Table 5. The verb ָטֵמא in relation to the land in the Pentateuch 
 
Reference Terminology 
Word Type Nature of Impurity 
Various Verb Ritual Moral 
Lev 18:25   x  X 
Lev 18:27   x  X 
Lev 18:28   x  X 
Num 35:34   x  X 




the land never received ritual, but always moral defilement. The reason why Klawans did 
not examine what kind of defilement is conveyed by the third verb that conveys 
defilement, the verb ָחַלל, is because it never has land as a direct object in the Pentateuch. 
The only time ָחַלל conveys defilement of the land is in the prophetic text of Jer 16:18, 
where the verb conveys defilement of the land by moral impurity. 
Neither did Klawans discuss what kind of defilement ָטֵמא and ָחֵנף point to when 
they involve humans or the sanctuary. Those statistics are provided in Table 6. The first 
column indicates references where ָטֵמא is used in the Pentateuch. The second column 
follows the use of the verbs. The third and fourth columns are both divided into two to 
present the nature and direct object of impurity. 
The verb ָטֵמא can apply to either of the impurities, as can be observed in Table 6. 
The majority of direct objects affected by the defilement communicated by ָטֵמא are 
humans rather than the sanctuary. Out of ninety-three uses, humans were affected eighty-






Table 6. The verb ָטֵמא in relation to humans and sanctuary 
 
Reference Terminology 
Nature of Impurity Object of Impurity 
Ritual Moral Human Sanctuary 
Gen 34:5   x X  
Gen 34:13   x X  
Gen 34:27   x X  
Lev 5:3  x  X  
Lev 11:24 2x x  X  
Lev 11:25  x  X  
Lev 11:26  x  X  
Lev 11:27  x  X  
Lev 11:28  x  X  
Lev 11:31  x  X  
Lev 11:39  x  X  
Lev 11:40 2x x  X  
Lev 11:43 2x x  X  
Lev 11:44  x  X  
Lev 12:2 2x x  X  
Lev 12:5  x  X  
Lev 13:3  x  X  
Lev 13:8  x  X  
Lev 13:11  x  X  
Lev 13:14  x  X  
Lev 13:20  x  X  
Lev 13:22  x  X  
Lev 13:25  x  X  
Lev 13:27  x  X  
Lev 13:30  x  X  
Lev 13:44 2x x  X  
Lev 13:46  x  X  
Lev 13:59  x  X  
Lev 14:46  x  X  
Lev 15:5  x  X  
Lev 15:6  x  X  
Lev 15:7  x  X  
Lev 15:8  x  X  
Lev 15:10 2x x  X  
Lev 15:11  x  X  
Lev 15:16  x  X  
Lev 15:18  x  X  
Lev 15:19  x  X  
Lev 15:21  x  X  
Lev 15:22  x  X  
Lev 15:23  x  X  
Lev 15:24 2x x  X  
Lev 15:27 2x x  X  





Lev 15:32  x  X  
Lev 17:15  x  X  
Lev 18:20   x X  
Lev 18:23   x X  
Lev 18:24 2x  x X  
Lev 18:30   x X  
Lev 19:31   x X  
Lev 20:3  x   X 
Lev 21:1  x  X  
Lev 21:3  x  X  
Lev 21:4  x  X  
Lev 21:11  x  X  
Lev 22:5 2x x  X  
Lev 22:6  x  X  
Lev 22:8  x  X  
Num 5:3  x   camp 
Num 5:13 2x  x X  
Num 5:14 2x  x X  
Num 5:20   x X  
Num 5:27   x X  
Num 5:28   x X  
Num 5:29   x X  
Num 6:7  x  X  
Num 6:9  x  X  
Num 6:12  x  X  
Num 19:7  x  X  
Num 19:8  x  X  
Num 19:10  x  X  
Num 19:11  x  X  
Num 19:13  x   X 
Num 19:14  x  X  
Num 19:16  x  X  
Num 19:20 2x x   X 
Num 19:21  x  X  
Num 19:22 2x x  X  




By contrast to ָטֵמא, the verb ָחֵנף is never used in the Pentateuch for defilement 
that affected either humans or the sanctuary. However, the verb ָחַלל is used in nine texts 




While the verb  ָאמֵ ט  remains the key verb to convey the process of defilement in 
the Pentateuch,  ָחַלל is also used, less frequently, to refer to defilement. Milgrom 
explained this semantic domain overlap in terms of confusion in the H texts that use ָטֵמא 
and ָחַלל interchangeably.345 However, the present study understands this semantic 
overlap as a common phenomenon in BH. The following table regarding the defilement 
of the land communicated through ָחַלל, should be understood thus: the first column of the 
table shows references where ָחַלל is used in the Pentateuch. The second column lists the 
use of the verbs. The third and fourth columns are both divided into two to present the 
nature and direct objects of impurity (Table 7). 
 
 
Table 7. The verb ָחַלל in relation to humans and sanctuary 
 
Reference Terminology 
Nature of Impurity  
Ritual Moral Human Sanctuary 
Lev 19:29   x X  
Lev 21:4  x  X  
Lev 21:9 2x  x X  
Lev 21:12  x  X X 
Lev 21:15   x X  
Lev 21:23  x   X 
Lev 22:9  x   X 
Lev 22:15  x x  holy gifts 
Num 18:32  x x  holy gifts 
  
 
345Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 37–38, 229–30. 
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As can be observed, ָחַלל is very similar to ָטֵמא in its preference for transferring 
both ritual and moral defilement to humans and sanctuary. 
Therefore, keeping in mind the results of the search for the verbs ָחֵנף ,ָטֵמא, and 
 presented above, Klawans’s claim that the land never contracts ritual defilement is ָחַלל
correct. The only defilement that the land can be affected with is moral defilement. 
However, the use of these verbs when their direct objects are humans or the sanctuary 
shows that they can refer to either type of defilement. In addition, the search showed that 
humans are more frequently affected with both kinds of defilement than the sanctuary is. 
 
 ּתֹוֵעָבה 
The second claim from Klawans’s quotation is that ּתֹוֵעָבה never refers to ritual 
impurity. The following shows that Klawans’s claim that ָטֵמא is used in both contexts, 
ritual and moral impurity, is correct (Table 8). The noun ּתֹוֵעָבה and the verb ָחֵנף are used 
exclusively for moral impurity. 
It has to be emphasized here that ּתֹוֵעָבה in Gen 43:32, 46:34 and Exod 8:22[26] 
conveys meaning/s that were part of the Egyptian cultural, religious, moral, and social 
context and order, rather than Israelite’s ideological context. Scholars are not certain of 
the exact meaning of ּתֹוֵעָבה in these texts. Most of them claim that the issue was 
essentially related to both ritual and moral contexts.346 However, the most thorough study   
 
346Thomas B. Dozeman, Exodus, ECC (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2009), 228; Kenneth A. 
Mathews, Genesis 11:27–50:26, NAC 1B (Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 2005), 791–92; Michael A. 
Grisanti, “ָּתַעב,” NIDOTTE 4:314–15; Carl Friedrich Keil and Franz Delitzsch, The Pentateuch, BCOT 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1952), 1:361–62. 
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Table 8. The noun ּתֹוֵעָבה in the Pentateuch 
 
Reference Terminology 
Word Type Nature of Impurity 
Noun Verb Ritual Moral 
Gen 43:32     x 
Gen 46:34     x 
Ex 8:22 [26]     x 
Lev 18:22, 26–27, 29–30 illicit sex, sodomy     x 
Lev 20:13 homosexuality    x 
Deut 7:25–26 idolatry    x 
Deut 12:31 child sacrifice    x 
Deut 13:15 illicit worship    x 
Deut 14:3 unclean animals    x 
Deut 17:1 unfit sacrifice    x 
Deut 17: 4 Idolatry    x 
Deut 18:9, 12 Necromancy    x 
Deut 20:18 sins of the nations    x 
Deut 22:5 sexes mixing clothes    x 
Deut 23:18 prostitution money 
in temple 
   
x 
Deut 24:4 remarrying a woman    x 
Deut 25:16 dishonest scales    x 
Deut 27:15 idolatry    x 




on the meaning and origin of ּתֹוֵעָבה has been done by A. S. Yahuda, who noted that the 
word is mainly related to sinful and criminal contexts that are in sharp opposition to 
Egyptian gods.347 
The following statement by Milgrom is partially correct but misleading: “The 
distinction between moral and physical impurity is indicated not only by the terms for the 
causes of the sanctuary’s pollution (ṭumʾā versus ḥēṭʾ) but by the consistent use of the 
 
347A. S. Yahuda, The Language of the Pentateuch in Its Relation to Egyptian (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1933), xxxii, 4, 75, 95. It is also documented that the Egyptian influence on the biblical 
texts is very low. Bernd U. Schipper, “Egyptian Influences on the Biblical Text,” Bible Odyssey, released 8 
Nov 2017, http://www.bibleodyssey.org/places/related-articles/egyptian-influences-on-the-biblical-text.  
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two different verbs that describe the effect of the purgation: physical impurity is purified 
(ṭāhēr); moral impurity is forgiven (nislaḥ).”348 
Based on this statement, one is led to believe that there is a consistent 
terminological usage of two sets of terms for ritual or moral impurity. That is correct for 
the second pair of terms ָטֵהר and ָסַלח as it was demonstrated above,349 with Lev 16:30 
being the only exception. However, consistency of uses cannot be claimed for the first 
pair of terms, ָאה א and ֻטמ  ָאה Even though the majority of uses of .ֵחט   in the ֻטמ 
Pentateuch, nineteen out of twenty,350 refers to ritual impurity, ָאה  in Num 5:19 refers ֻטמ 
to moral impurity. In addition, the nominal derivative of ָחָטא and its derivative א  is not ֵחט 
the only term for moral impurity. Besides א  there are four more nominal derivatives ,ֵחט 
from the same root (ֲחָטָאה ,ַחָּטָאה ,ַחָּטאת, and ָאה ט   that all refer to moral impurity. To (חֶּ
this, one could add other terms that convey moral impurity, such as ַׁשע  to ,ָעֹון and ,פֶּ
which the present study is limited. However, the number of terms, including their verbal 
and nominal derivatives, that refer to moral impurity is even higher, which makes 
Milgrom’s claim highly questionable. 
 
Conclusion 
After having analyzed the findings of scholarly research on impurity compared 
with Pentateuchal texts that deal with impurity and the additional terminological search 
 
348Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 857. 
349See Table 3 on page 97 of the present study. 
350Lev 5:3; 7:20–21; 14:19; 15:3, 25–26, 30–31; 16:16, 19; 18:19; 22:3, 5; Num 19:13. 
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presented here, the present study arrived at the following conclusions. The position of the 
majority of scholars on the topic in regard to the first question that permeates the 
discussion, that is, whether there are one or two types of impurity, seems to be correct. 
The research presented in the present study, comprised of a variety of insights derived 
from Pentateuchal texts and a terminological/contextual/intertextual analysis of the 
passages where certain terms for sin are used, showed that there is a substantial 
difference between two types of impurity, ritual and moral. The key features of these two 
impurities which emphasize the differences between them were recently formulated by 
Klawans. Building his own system on the works of Hoffmann, Büchler, and Frymer-
Kensky, he substantially expanded the understanding of the concept and strengthened the 
weak points of their research to frame the most comprehensive and detailed 
understanding of impurity to the present time. 
However, Klawans’ system also lends room for some modification. Two points in 
which it can be modified were noted in the present study. First, there is no division into 
intentional and unintentional in moral sins in Klawans’s system, but rather, he recognized 
that moral sins are only murder, idolatry, and illicit sex, and they are always intentional. 
The second point coming from this oversight is that by not dividing moral sins into 
intentional and unintentional, he understood that moral impurity is a direct consequence 
of these grave sins, which is in sharp contrast with texts like Lev 4:1–5 and Num 15:22–
29 that speak about unintentional sins which are also moral in nature. 
The second question regarding the relationship between these two types of 
impurity generated a considerable amount of research, but unfortunately did not produce 
a unified position. At this point, I suggest the following descriptions to reflect the 
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relationship between ritual and moral impurity as an attempt to bring more clarity and 
precision to this lengthy discussion. 
(1) Origin of impurity: Both kinds of impurity are sinful because they originate 
from the Fall into sin portrayed as the disobedience of the first couple in Eden (Gen 3). 
This Fall resulting from disobedience that made humanity susceptible to specific 
condition of GHS which is discussed on pp. 399–407 of the present study. This condition 
of humanity is foundational to both ritual and moral impurity. Ritual impurity essentially 
represents the effects of the Fall on the natural world, including humans, while moral 
impurity represents its effect on the human mind (as being a set of cognitive faculties 
including consciousness, perception, thinking, judgement, language and memory, and 
also including the spiritual aspect of it), thus paving the way for potential intentional and 
unintentional activity by humans against God’s laws. Ritual impurity finds its expressions 
in the physical domain of human existence—reproduction, various physical diseases, 
contact with the dead—while moral impurity is exclusively related to the human mind—
performing activities that oppose God’s laws. Kiuchi, following Wenham,351 has 
postulated an understanding of ritual impurity accepted in the present work that it 
symbolizes an “aura of death.”352  
(2) Nature of impurity: (a) Both of these impurities are real. They are perceived 
effects coming out of actual physical processes. Both impurities, as a result of certain 
activities or events, defile humans, physical entities, and the land. There are perceived   
 
351Gordon J. Wenham, “Why Does Sexual Intercourse Defile (Lev 15:18)?,” ZAW 95 (1983): 434. 
352Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 63. Wenham modified Douglas’s theory of normality and 
wholeness as a norm of holiness. Douglas, Purity and Danger, 63–71. 
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effects of a defilement by both impurities, mostly impermanent defilement caused by 
ritual impurities, and more severe defilement caused by moral impurity. Defiled 
individuals, in the case of ritual impurity, must refrain from contacting holy things or, in 
the case of moral defilement, are subject to punishment. Thus, both impurities bring 
effects of legal and social consequences. “Real” is not the same as “physical,” but both of 
these impurities are ontologically abstract realities. Ritual impurity is often represented as 
physical and results from natural sources or events like child birth and human corpses. 
Numerous texts warn against direct contact between the ritually impure and the pure or 
especially the holy (Lev 7:20–21; 15:31; 22:3–7; 21:1–4; 22:3–7), an indication that the 
primary goal of these texts was to maintain and bring awareness of a required separation 
to be kept between ritual impurity and the holy. On the one hand, violating any of God’s 
laws, which were given to prevent direct contact between the impure and the holy, 
constitutes moral rather than ritual impurity. On the other hand, being in or contracting a 
state of ritual impurity never generates moral impurity. Moral impurity is more serious in 
its consequences than ritual impurity since it results from the violation of God’s laws, 
some of which include breaking the laws that are related to ritual impurity, and the rest 
represent guidelines for social and religious relationships within ancient Israel. 
(3) Modes of defilement: Both kinds of impurities are contagious. Ritual impurity 
defiles humans and physical entities including the sanctuary via direct or indirect contact, 
but contracting ritual impurity by humans does not constitute moral impurity or sin as 
long as the divinely prescribed procedures for cleansing various types of ritual impurity 
are followed. Moral impurity defiles humans, the sanctuary, and the land in its entirety, 
but not certain physical entities as ritual impurity does. Humans are defiled by moral 
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impurity by breaking God’s laws. Defilement of the sanctuary by moral impurity takes 
place through the sacrificial blood offered by the sinner that is brought into the sanctuary. 
The land is defiled by moral impurity performed in/on it by covenantal people. 
(4) Effects of impurity: Ritual impurity results in mostly impermanent defilement 
with no punishment. However, if ritual impurity was not dealt with or was brought in 
contact with the holy, it could trigger terminal punishment since that activity represents 
ignoring God-given guidelines regarding ritual impurity, and thus constitutes moral 
impurity or violating God’s laws. Moral impurity brings more severe conditions and 
punishment of and upon the sinner which sometimes includes degradation of status. By 
breaking God’s laws, the sinner is considered guilty, liable for punishment, and in need 
of forgiveness. Some moral impurities make a sinner irrevocably liable to kārēt353 or in 
some instances, he or she is allowed to live, but at a lower status. The remedy for both 
defilements was given by God so that individuals affected by any type of impurity could 
get rid of it, and in most of cases, experience no status degradation. If the remedy is not 
utilized in regards to some ritual and all moral impurity then one faces permanent 
degradation which, in other words, is death or exile if the land is affected. 
(5) Remedy for impurity: Ritual impurity can be lessened by lapse of time and/or 
rites of purification. The remedy for some ritual impurity also requires a sin offering, but 
never forgiveness. Moral impurity always required a sin offering/atonement, prerequisite 
to forgiveness, but in some cases it resulted in the terminal punishment of kārēt. 
Cleansing, which involved a sin offering, took place on the Day of Atonement. The most   
 
353The concept of kārēt is explored in chapter four of the present study. 
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severe remedy was exile and took place in case the land was defiled. In order to maintain 
their moral purity, humans could refrain from committing morally impure acts in the first 
place and follow God’s procedures for private and annual cleansing of the sanctuary. 
Cleansing of the land was uniquely achieved by the shedding of the intentional killer’s 
blood onto it. 
(6) Terminological details: In addition to the previous characteristics derived from 
Pentateuchal texts in totality, the terminology used in purity/impurity contexts confirms 
the existence of two types of impurity. The crucial and most important difference is that 
removal of the effects of ritual impurity never requires ָסַלח, forgiveness, but is always 
used in contexts that involve the effects of moral impurity. This consistent use of ָסַלח 
points to the fact that being ritually impure does not constitute the moral defilement of an 
individual. Another verb used to express removal of the effects of impurity is ָטֵהר; it is 
always used in ritual impurity context. The only exception is its use in Lev 16:19. 30 
which seems to be reasonable in that particular context. The term that always refers to 
moral impurity is the noun ּתֹוֵעָבה. The verb ָטֵמא is used as a general term for defilement 
of humans, sanctuary, and physical entities by impurity in both ritual and moral contexts. 
However, ָטֵמא never conveys ritual impurity to the land; it only conveys moral impurity. 
Of the other two verbs used to express defilement, ָחֵנף and ָחֵנף ,ָחַלל never conveys ritual, 
but always moral defilement of the land; it is never found in the contexts of defilement of 
humans, sanctuary, or other physical entities. The verb ָחַלל, on the contrary, conveys 
both ritual and moral defilement of humans, sanctuary, or other physical entities, but 
never defilement of the land. Thus, the terminology that conveys removal of impurity is 
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consistent where ָסַלח is used in moral and ָטֵהר in ritual contexts with the exception of 
Lev 16:30. The terminology that conveys defilement is not consistent since ָטֵמא conveys 
both ritual and moral impurity, ָחֵנף, only moral impurity to the land, and  ַלָחל , like ָטֵמא, 
conveys ritual and moral defilement, but unlike  ֵָמאט , never conveys defilement of the 
land. 
People who are in a covenantal relationship with God should not take part in 
moral impurity and should follow God’s guidelines to deal with ritual impurity. However, 
since both ritual and moral impurities were impossible to avoid in the state of human 
affairs in ancient times, God prescribed regulations and remedies so the people could 
retain a relationship with him even though they found themselves affected by one, or the 
other, or both types of impurity. 
 
Moral Impurity/Sin in the Pentateuch 
This subheading opens the second part of chapter 2 which focuses on moral 
impurity. With a broad, yet foundational understanding of impurity in the OT, I focus on 
the three specific terms for sin in the Pentateuch in the second part of this chapter. A brief 
introduction of these terms and understanding in the scholarly debates precedes their full 
analysis. These three terms occur in the most relevant passages in the Pentateuch that 
deal exclusively with moral impurity. The importance of these terms is also seen in the 
fact that they are found in crucial texts that scholars refer to as they form their 
understanding of atonement.  
 
Relevant Terms for Moral Impurity in the OT 
Most scholars consider that עֶּפׁשַ  ,ָחָטא ,and ָעֹון are the three key terms for moral 
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impurity in the OT due to the frequency these terms are used in comparison to others. 
Some consider them to be generic terms for sin.354 Some also consider the root 
 with their derivatives are important terms for sin.356 ָרַׁשע and ָרָעה and ָׁשָגה 355/ָׁשַגג
However, the current study is limited to the terms ׁשַ ּפֶ ע ,ָחָטא , and ָעֹון for two reasons. 
First, these three terms were never used to refer to ritual impurity expressed 
through the root ָטֵמא. They were used in certain contexts where derivatives of the root 
 were used (Lev 5:1–13; Num 5:5–31; Num 6, 19; Deut 21:22–23), but they never ָטֵמא
refer to ritual impurity. No pericope of all these provides grounds for claiming that ָחָטא, 
ׁשַ ּפֶ ע  ,ָחָטא .refer to ritual impurity ָעֹון and ,עֶּפׁשַ  , and ָעֹון exclusively refer to moral 
impurity. 
The terms reserved for moral impurity, ָעֹון, and ָחָטא, appear in the same context 
with ָטֵמא,but the act of touching objects that would result in uncleanness in Lev 5:2–3 
was not problematic, but postponing/forgetting the cleansing ritual was. The sin was not 
acquiring defilement, but disregarding the prescribed procedures to deal with it was. 
 
354Knierim, “חטא,” TLOT 1:410. 
355Milgrom noticed that the two verbal forms, ָׁשָגה/ָׁשַגג have coalesced. Jacob Milgrom, “The 
Cultic שגגה and Its Influence in Psalms and Job,” JQR 58 (1967): 116; Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 242. 
Also, “But biconsonantal roots that expanded into geminates and lamed-he are attested frequently” 
Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 242. The root ָׁשָגה/ָׁשַגג is an important term for the current study and is 
thoroughly analyzed in the subheading “ָׁשָגה/ָׁשַגג/ גָ  ָגהׁש   and ָיַדע” of the present study and statistics in this 
chapter rely on the findings presented in that subheading. 
356Sklar, “Sin,” 2:298; Youngblood, “A New Look,” 202; Cover, “Sin, Sinners,” ABD 6:32; 
Lyonnet and Sabourin, Sin, Redemption, and Sacrifice, 12–13; Quell, “ἁμαρτάνω, ἁμάρτημα, ἁμαρτία,” 
TDNT, 1:270–71; Robinson, “Terminological Study,” 112. For additional list of works see Lam, 
“Metaphorical Patterning,” 65n1; Alex Luc, “ָעֹון,” NIDOTTE 3:351. 
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Thus, this sin was moral and not ritual in its nature.357 
Sin in Num 5:5–31, potential adultery, is referred to by ָעֹון in v. 15.358 Though 
Gane presented arguments that this sin could include both ritual and moral defilement by 
the woman,359 he ultimately concluded that “in any case, adultery involves both physical 
ritual impurity that is forbidden and is therefore morally wrong, because it was incurred 
with the wrong party (cf. Lev 18:20 of man defiling himself with his neighbor’s wife).”360 
The emphasis in this case is on moral impurity since the sin in the first place was in 
breaking one of the commandments from the Decalogue. 
Accidental annulment of the Nazirite’s vow in Num 6 is the most challenging 
case. That is, the circumstance that annuls the Nazirite’s vow is introduced in 6:9. The 
Nazirite obtains defilement by corpse contact of a person who suddenly dies in his 
surroundings. Verse 10 uses the verb ָחָטא to refer to the incident, ר ַעל־ַהָּנפֶּׁש ָחָטא ֵמֲאׁשֶּ . 
Thus, it seems that the act of incurring ritual impurity constitutes moral sin. The verb 
ַׁשע along with nominals ,ָחָטא  .are used to refer exclusively to moral impurity ,ָעֹון and פֶּ
However, Gane was correct when he said that this incident has to be treated as 
unintentional moral sin because it represented the violation of God’s commandment 
regarding the Nazirite status: “Here sin is objective: Corpse impurity has simply occurred 
through adverse circumstances, thereby violating the divine prohibition, without any 
 
357Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 119. 
358Philip J. Budd, Numbers, WBC 5 (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1984), 64; Milgrom, Numbers: 
38–39. 
359Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 522–23. 
360Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 523. 
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failure of intention, carelessness, vigilance, or memory on the part of the Nazirite (cf. Lev 
5:2–4).”361 The fact that the person under Nazirite vow was involved in the incident and 
was not in any case responsible for the violation of God’s commandment regarding his 
Nazirite status makes this sin a moral one.362 
The sin in Num 19:13, 20 is moral in nature since it resembles the sin in Lev 5:2–
3. Numbers 19 supplements Lev 5:2–3 by the addition of the sinner’s attitude of not 
wanting to submit himself or herself to the prescribed purification procedure. The sin is 
not referred to as acquiring ritual defilement, but as the neglect of purification 
procedures. It differs from the sin in Lev 5:2–3 because it represents intentional 
disobedience rather than an inadvertent or forgetful act.363 
The sin in Deut 21:22–23 is moral defilement of the land, not ritual. The removal 
of the corpse might also be initiated in order to prevent the community or the land from 
accruing the curse applied to the criminal.364 
Second, ֶּפַׁשע ,ָחָטא , and ָעֹון are found in crucial contexts for the formation of the 
atonement doctrine. All of them are used in Lev 16:21 to describe the sins that were 
cleansed from the most holy place by the blood of the bull for the priests and the Lord’s 
goat, and confessed by the high priest over the head of the scapegoat, thus “loading” it   
 
361Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 534. 
362Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 357. 
363Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 664. 
364Carl Friedrich Keil and Franz Delitzsch, The Pentateuch, BCOT (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 
1952), 3:150–51; Eugene H. Merrill, Deuteronomy: An Exegetical and Theological Exposition of Holy 
Scripture, NAC 4 (Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 1994), 296; John H. Walton, Victor H. Matthews, and 
Mark W. Chavalas, “Deuteronomy,” in IVPBBCOT (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2000), 194. 
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with the sins from the sanctuary, and that goat subsequently takes them away from the 
Israelites’ camp. This part of the ritual of the Day of Atonement is considered the second 
and final phase of the cleansing of Israel’s sins, removing them from the sanctuary and 
the camp itself (Lev 16:21–22).365 The use of ָחָטא ,ֶּפַׁשע, and ָעֹון in this context demands 
research as to their meaning. However, the meaning of ֶּפַׁשע ,ָחָטא , and ָעֹון, Lev 16:21, is 
excluded from separate searches on these terms that follow, but is suggested in the 
subheading “Interpretation of Leviticus 16:21” because it depends on separate findings 
on these terms. 
 is used in ָעֹון .itself is used in Lev 4:3, 14, 23, 26, 28x2, 35, and 16:30, 34 ָחָטא
Exod 28:38,366 Lev 5:1, 17, 10:17 and 16:22. Besides the statistics that demonstrate that 
these three terms are the most frequent terms for sin in the Pentateuch, the fact that they 
are found in crucial atonement contexts separates them from others. 
The aim of this subheading “Relevant Terms for Moral Impurity in the OT” is to 
show that Pentateuchal texts do not provide support for the claim that each of the three 
terms for sin, ֶּפַׁשע ,ָחָטא , and ָעֹון, refers to specific categories of sins, whether 
intentional/unintentional or expiable/inexpiable (forgivable/unforgivable) sins.367 Based 
on the analysis presented in this study, all three terms refer to intentional/unintentional 
and expiable/inexpiable or forgivable/unforgivable sins. 
In order to demonstrate this, I am going to examine two characteristics concerning 
 
365Gane, Cult and Character, 274–77. 
366Rodríguez, “Substitution in the Hebrew Cultus,” 133. 
367Against Gane, Cult and Character, 292–300. 
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ֶּפַׁשע ,ָחָטא , and ָעֹון. First, are the sins expressed by a given term intentional or 
unintentional? In other words, by what extent do biblical texts reveal the mental state of 
the sinner who commits ֶּפַׁשע ,ָחָטא , and ָעֹון? Second, is ר פֶּ  available for the sinner who כִּ
commits a sin articulated by these terms? In other words, are ֶּפַׁשע ,ָחָטא , and ָעֹון expiable 
or inexpiable? 
In order to answer to these two questions, I will study ֶּפַׁשע ,ָחָטא , and ָעֹון by 
applying the terminological/contextual/intertextual approach. This approach extracts the 
data about each sin from its immediate and wider literary context. This approach refers to 
the study of the terms within the context in which a sin was committed. The presence or 
absence of some sort of capital or other punishments368 contributes to the final answers. 
This approach includes the contexts in which respective terms for sins are syntactically or 
conceptually related to verbs/phrases that describe punishment for them. 
The first step of the terminological/contextual/intertextual approach includes a 
basic analysis of the phrase ָנָׂשא ָעֹון 369,ָחָטא. These phrases are associated with three 
contexts and they differ according to the subject of the verb 370.ָנָׁשא In the first context, 
the sinner is the subject of ָנָׁשא. In other words, the sinner ָנָׁשא their own sins. In the 
second context, God is the subject of ָנָׁשא; that is, God ָנָׁשא the sinners’ ָעֹון. In the third 
 
368For a more detailed study on who executes capital punishment, see Sklar, Sin, Impurity, 
Sacrifice, Atonement, 18–20. 
369The term ָחָטא includes all the nominal variations, א  .that refer to sin ,ֲחָטָאה ,ַחָּטאת ,ֵחט 
370Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 20. 
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context, a third party, neither the sinner nor the one wronged, is the subject of the verb.371 
The analysis of the phrases ַׁשע/ָחָטא /פֶּ ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  belongs to the first step of the 
terminological/contextual/intertextual approach since their meaning affects the meaning 
of these terms. This especially applies to the term ָעֹון, because ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  is the most 
frequent form of the phrase when the verb ָנָׂשא takes ַׁשע  .as direct object ָחָטא or ,ָעֹון ,פֶּ
The first step will include occurrences of the phrase within the Pentateuch. 
The second step of the terminological/contextual/intertextual approach is the 
study of ֶּפַׁשע ,ָחָטא , and ָעֹון in contexts of capital punishment. Within the context of cult, 
capital punishment372 points to inexpiable and unforgivable sin373 and is expressed 
through a number of verbs and phrases. The verbs that serve as an umbrella for the 
various modes of execution of capital punishment are 374מּות and 375.ָהַרג 
 
371Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 20. 
372Punishments that do not include death are mutilation (Deut 25:11–12), application of the 
talionic principle (Lev 24:19–20), flogging (Deut 22:18) with restrictions to forty strokes (Deut 25:1–3). 
Intercourse with an aunt by marriage or a sister-in-law makes the culprits י ירִּ  usually interpreted as ,ֲערִּ
childless (20:19–21). Raymond Westbrook, “Punishments and Crimes (OT and NT),” ABD 5:555. 
However, not being a capital punishment hints towards the expiable nature of the sins for which these 
punishments were executed. Gundmundur Olaffson eloquently suggested that the childlessness in Lev 
20:20–21 is another way of saying that the culprits will die, which removes this sin from the list of sins 
punishable by non-capital punishment and treats it as an unforgivable and inexpiable sin. Gudmundur 
Olaffson, “The Use of nśʾ in the Pentateuch and Its Contribution to the Concept of Forgiveness” (PhD diss., 
Andrews University, 1993), 177. 
373Donald J. Wold, “The Meaning of Biblical Penalty Kareth” (PhD diss., University of California, 
1978), 254; Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 13; Gane, Cult and Character, 200–201. 
374It seems that the choice of the verbal stem points to two potential executors of the death 
punishment expressed by the verb מּות. When the covenantal community executed punishment, the texts 
used hophal of  מּות (Exod 31:14, 15; 35:2; Lev 19:20; 20:2, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 27, 24:16, 17, 2; 
27:29; Num 1:51; 3:10, 10, 38; 15:35; 18:7; 35:16, 17, 18, 21, 31) while the texts use qal of מּות when the 
Lord is the executor of it (Exod 28:35, 43; 30:20, 21; Lev 8:35; 10:2, 6, 7, 9; 15:31; 16:2, 12; 22:9; Num 
4:15, 19, 20; 14:37; 17:25 [10], 28 [13]; 18:3, 22, 32. Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 13–14. 
375Gen 20:4; Exod 4:23; 13:15; 22:24; 32:27; Lev 20:16; Num 25:5; Deut 13:9. 
 
121 
There are several modes of execution of capital punishment. The first mode is 
stoning and is expressed via verbs ָרַגם (Lev 20:2, 27; 24:14, 16, 23; Num 15:35–36; Deut 
21:21) and ָסַקל (Exo 19:13; Deut 13:11 [10]; 17:5; 22:21, 24). The second one is 
burning, expressed via the verb ָׂשַרף (Gen 38:24; Ex 10:6; Lev 20:14; 21:9). The third 
mode is execution by the sword (Exod 22:24; 32:27–29; Deut 13:15). The verb ָנָכה also 
refers to the act of killing as a form of capital punishment (Lev 26:21, 24).376 Finally, the 
verb ָיָרה is used once to denote divine destruction in war in Exod 15:4. Even though the 
verb is not mentioned, it is most likely that this sort of capital punishment operates in 
Num 25:7–8. Exodus 15:4 uniquely used ָיָרה most likely as a synonym of  ָרקַ ּד , which is 
the technical verb for killing by piercing with a spear or sword.377 Sin punished by ָיָרה 
was never referred to by the terms ֶּפַׁשע ,ָחָטא , and ָעֹון. Sometimes the mode of execution 
is not articulated (Lev 20:9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 15; 24:17, 21).378 However, the use of the 
verb מּות indicates some form of capital punishment for the cases where it is not 
specified. 
In the third step of the terminological/contextual/intertextual approach, ֶּפַׁשע ,ָחָטא , 
and ָעֹון are associated with the nominal derivative from the verb ָכַרת, kārēt. Due to 
 
376The verb ָנָכה is included in this search due to the fact that it is conceptually, like its synonym, 
linked with the verb ָׁשַפְך that refers to the act of killing. For further explanation see Slaviša Janković, “The 
Rationale behind the Homicide Law in Numbers 35:30–34,” in Searching the Scripture: Andrews 
University Seminary Emerging Scholars Pay Tribute to Their Professors, ed. Slaviša Janković (Berrien 
Springs, MI: Andrews University, Theological Seminary, Old Testament Department, 2017), 84. 
377Gary Alan Long, “ָּדַקר,” NIDOTTE 1:963. 
378Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 14. 
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various understandings of the kārēt punishment, the following subheading presents the 
arguments for the understanding adopted in the present work. 
The fourth step of the terminological/contextual/intertextual approach traces the 
syntactical and conceptual connection between the verb ָאַׁשם and sin expressed by ֶּפַׁשע, 
 describes the sinners’ condition after they commit sin. Most of its ָאַׁשם 379.ָעֹון and ,ָחָטא
51 occurrences within the Pentateuch are found in the book of Leviticus, especially 
chapters 4 and 5 which discuss atonement for intentional and unintentional sins. 
There are four proposals for the meaning of the term nd they are a 380ָאַׁשם
analyzed on pages 288–313 in the present study. At this point, this study accepts that “to 
suffer guilt’s consequences” is the least problematic meaning of ָאַׁשם in the crucial 
context of Leviticus 4 and 5. 
 
Cut Off (Kārēt) Punishment381 
This punishment was frequently prescribed for various sins in the OT.382 
Milgrom383 and Hobson384 offer a list of sins punishable by kārēt, but both of them either 
 
 ,is also considered as a punishment for the sin. Leviticus 1–16, 33; Gane, Leviticus ָאַׁשם379
Numbers, 119; Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 13. 
380The first three are as follows: (1) to be guilty, (2) to realize guilt, and (3) to feel guilt. Sklar, Sin, 
Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 25. 
381This punishment is known as kārēt in Judaism. G. Thomas Hobson, “Cut off (One's) People: 
Punitive Expulsion in the Torah and in the Ancient Near East” (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of 
the Biblical Law of the SBL, San Francisco, CA, 24 November 2011), 1. 
382Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 15. 
383Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 457. 
384Hobson, “Cut off (One's) People.”  
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omit,385 or fail to differentiate between, certain sins.386 Therefore, in the following list, 
which is based on the list suggested by these two scholars, I have made adjustments 
accordingly: 
1. Failure to be circumcised: Gen 17:14. 
2. Eating leavened bread during Passover: Exod 12:15, 19. 
3. Unauthorized production of sacred incense: Exod 30:33. 
4. Unauthorized production of sacred anointing oil: Exod 30:38. 
5. Profaning the Sabbath: Exod 31:14. 
6. Eating sacrificial meat in a state of uncleanness: Lev 7:20–21. 
7. Eating blood: Lev 7:27; 17:10; 17:14. 
8. Eating sacrificial fat: Lev 7:25. 
9. Slaughtering an animal outside of the authorized sanctuary and as a sacrifice 
to God: Lev 17:4. 
10. Sacrificing an animal outside of the authorized sanctuary and as a sacrifice to 
God: Lev 17:9. 
11. Committing “any of these abominations” listed in Lev 18 (according to v. 29), 
including incest, sacrifice to Molech, sex during menstruation, homosexual intercourse, 
and bestiality. 
12. Eating sacrificial meat that has been left over until the third day: Lev 19:8. 
 
385Milgrom missed including the sin of brother-sister incest, (Lev 20:17), sex during menstruation 
(Lev 20:18), and priests’ approaching the holy gifts in the state of uncleanness (Lev 22:3); Milgrom, 
Leviticus 1–16, 242–43. 
386Hobson did not differentiate between slaughtering (Lev 17:4) and sacrificing (Lev 17:8–9) an 
animal outside of the authorized sanctuary, and not afflicting oneself (Lev 23:29) and abstaining from work 
(Lev 23:30) on the Day of Atonement. 
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13. Offering children to Molech: Lev 20:3–5. 
14. Patronizing mediums and wizards: Lev 20:6. 
15. Brother-sister incest: Lev 20:17. 
16. Sex during menstruation: Lev 20:18. 
17. Approaching sacred gifts that have been dedicated to YHWH, while one is in 
a state of uncleanness: Lev 22:3. 
18. Failure to afflict oneself during Yom Kippur: Lev 23:29. 
19. Failure to keep the Passover without an adequate excuse: Num 9:13. 
20. Sinning “with a high hand,” that is, deliberately “despising the word of 
YHWH”: Num 15:30–31. 
21. Failure to cleanse oneself with holy water after defilement due to contact with 
a dead person: Num 19:13, 20. 
Sklar has summed up the debate on the meaning of kārēt by asking two main 
questions: (1) Of what does the penalty consist?, and (2) Who executes the penalty?387 
These two questions are discussed below, respectively. 
 
Of What Does Kārēt Consist? 
In response to the first question, biblical scholars have proposed at least four 
meanings of kārēt: (1) excommunication from the covenantal community,388   
 
387Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 15. 
388Budd, Leviticus, 122; René Péter-Contesse, Lévitique 1–16, CAT 3A (Genève: Labor et Fides, 
1993), 119; John I. Durham, Exodus, WBC 3 (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1987), 406; Hobson, “Cut off 
(One's) People,” 1. 
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(2) premature death,389 (3) extinction of lineage,390 and (4) punishment in the afterlife.391 
The first proposal, excommunication from the covenantal community, is mainly 
supported by the fact that the person deserving kārēt is said to be “cut off from his/her 
people,” which is interpreted as excommunication from the covenantal community. 
Pentateuchal texts seem to lend the most substantial support for the second 
proposal, premature death. There are at least five arguments of support for the second 
proposal: 
(a) This is supported by some texts that seem to equate kārēt with premature death 
(Exod 31:14;392 Num 4:18–20393). These texts suggest that kārēt and premature death are 
synonymous.394 I found that Exod 31:15 and 35:2 in relation to Exod 31:14 also point to 
the fact that kārēt and premature death are synonymous.  
In addition to Exod 31:14 and Num 4:18–20 that Sklar quoted, the following 
textual pairs further confirm that kārēt refers to the premature death of the sinner: Gen 
17:14=Exod 4:24; Lev 17:4=Exod 32:27, Deut 13:5, 9, 10, 17:5–6; Lev 20:3, 5=20:2, 4; 
 
389Wenham, The Book of Leviticus, 125, 242; Porter, Leviticus, 139. 
390Wold, “The Meaning of Biblical Penalty Kareth,” 1–45, especially 4–5. Wold’s suggestion was 
followed Wright, The Disposal of Impurity, 164n2; Milgrom, Numbers, 406–7; Gane, Cult and Character, 
145; Wright, The Disposal of Impurity, 164n2. 
391Wenham, The Book of Leviticus, 242. Milgrom found that this understanding of kārēt was 
anticipated by earlier exegetes. Milgrom, Numbers, 407. 
392“Therefore, you are to observe the Sabbath, for it is holy to you. Everyone who profanes it shall 
surely be put to death; for whoever does any work on it, that person shall be cut off from among his 
people.” 
393V. 18: “Do not let the tribe of the families of the Kohathites be cut off from among the Levites. 
19 But do this to them that they may live and not die when they approach the most holy objects: Aaron and 
his sons shall go in and assign each of them to his work and to his load; 20 but they shall not go in to see 
the holy objects even for a moment, or they will die.” 
394Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 16. 
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Lev 20:6=Exod 22:18, Lev 20:27; Num 19:13=Lev 15:31. The sins in these texts are the 
same, but the punishment is either kārēt or premature death, which suggests that either 
kārēt refers to premature death or refers to premature death with potential further 
punishment. 
(b) This is supported by three contexts where human beings are the direct object 
of the verb ָכַרת which refers to premature death (Gen 41:36,395 Deut 12:29,396 19:1). 
These texts are not legal texts, but they reflect a specific semantic preference in the Bible. 
The same semantic choice can be detected also when animals are the direct object (Gen 
9:11; Exod 8:9; Lev 26:22). 
(c) Through the use of other verbs that regularly refer to premature death of 
human beings, the context of some laws points to kārēt as premature death (Lev 23:29, 
Num 19:13). Therefore, Lev 23:30 helps explain the prohibition in v. 29.397 Thus, based 
on the present study’s research, the public or private nature of sin is insignificant in 
determining the mode of punishment; however, a sinner’s attitude can be 
determinative.398 This is particularly applicable in this case. Furthermore, Lev 7:20; 10:1–
2; 12:4; 15:31 shed light on the meaning of kārēt in Num 19:13.That is, those who   
 
395Gordon J. Wenham, Genesis 1–15, WBC 1 (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1987), 195; Gordon J. 
Wenham, Genesis 16–50, WBC 2 (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1994), 394, 25.  
396Merrill, Deuteronomy, 227–28. 
397Hartley, Leviticus, 388; Henry T. C. Sun, “An Investigation into the Compositional Integrity of 
the So-Called Holiness Code (Leviticus 17–26)” (PhD diss., The Claremont Graduate University, 1990), 
360, 372.  
398Contra Milgrom, Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27, 2024–25. 
 
127 
intentionally bring impurity in contact with God’s holy sanctuary experience premature 
death. 
(d) ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  is used as kārēt’s equivalent in some contexts (Lev 20:17, Num 9:13; 
ָעֹון ָנָׂשא .(15:31  is a punishment that is understood to mean premature death. The 
arguments for such an interpretation are presented below. Consequently, based on this 
semantic equivalence, kārēt may refer to premature death of the sinner. 
(e) The phrase “ י ֵּתן ֲאנִּ ת־פָ  אֶּ ַניאֶּ , to set my face,” is used in Lev 17:10; 20:3, 6; 
26:17 along with kārēt and suggests the type of punishment implied. According to the 
interpretation suggested in the present study regarding Lev 20:3, namely that it is a 
subcase of the case introduced in v. 2, this text points to premature death as a punishment 
for the idolater. Such a conclusion is possible since the same kind of punishment is 
explicitly stated in v. 2 for the same sin. Moreover, the death penalty and kārēt are 
equivalent in this case. However, Lev 20:6 provides more certainty that kārēt actually 
refers to premature death. Specifically, based on Exod 22:18 and Lev 20:27, the sin of 
necromancy is punishable by premature death. Leviticus 26:17 also points in the same 
direction. It describes Israel’s defeat at the hands of its enemies, which is understood as a 
reversal of v. 7 and describes Israel’s victory over its enemies. The defeat in both verses 
includes (1) killing Israel’s enemies “by the sword” in v. 7 and killing Israelites in v. 27, 
and (2) God as executioner.399 Based on the intertextual evidence, in three out of four of 
these texts that contain double punishment, the phrase “to set my face,” and kārēt are 
equivalent. The implied punishment seems to be premature death. 
 
399Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 2307. 
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The third proposal can be taken as complementary to the second and finds support 
in Num 4:18–20, which states that Kohathites are cut off from the tribe of Levi. This 
means that this particular lineage of the tribe of Levi would be terminated. The same 
principle seems to be operating in Lev 20:20–21, where the sinner’s lineage is terminated 
because of sin. Even though kārēt is not mentioned as a punishment for illicit sexual 
deeds in these texts, the parallel laws in Lev 18:14, 16 that deal with the same sins are 
understood in Lev 18:29 as punishable by kārēt.400 
The fourth proposal finds textual support in Lev 20:2–3, which requires the 
double punishment of stoning and being cut off. Wenham noticed that death in the OT is 
referred to as “sleeping with one’s fathers” (1 Kgs 1:21) and “being buried with the 
fathers” (1 Kgs 14: 31), which could imply an afterlife judgment. In that case, being cut 
off would mean the eternal annihilation of the sinner.401 Milgrom argued that another 
phrase, “to be gathered to one’s kin/fathers,” is an opposite idiom of kārēt and suggests a 
reunion of the deceased after earthly life.402 
Thus, based on the above points, the intertextual connections suggested in the 
present study and the points noted by Sklar, it can be concluded that kārēt primarily 
refers to the premature death of the sinner and possibly includes two additional more 
severe components, termination of their lineage and eternal death. However, since 
Donald Wold addresses the last two additional punishments in his research on the nature 
of kārēt, his method and interpretation will be evaluated below. 
 
400Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 16–17. 
401Wenham, The Book of Leviticus, 242. 
402Milgrom, Numbers, 407. 
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Donald Wold on the Kārēt Punishment 
Wold suggested that kārēt refers to one’s extirpation and/or the extirpation of 
his/her line of descendants, which may occur simultaneously along with or subsequent to 
the premature death that was carried out either by God or the covenantal community. 
Thus, the biblical kārēt resembles curse formulae found throughout ANE literature, and is 
“a conditional divine curse of extinction.”403 This view has been adopted by many 
modern scholars of biblical cult, such as Milgrom,404 Wright,405 and Gane.406 
The present study argues against Wold’s conclusions which are problematic due 
to the shortcomings of his methodology. As stated in his introduction, his work heavily 
relies on extra-biblical sources conceptually, ideologically, and linguistically. Although 
such information may be profitable for understanding biblical texts, it may also obstruct 
the biblical presentation of topics and concepts, especially if such sources are given 
preference over biblical texts. The present work finds that Wold allowed the extra-
biblical material to guide and greatly influence his understanding of biblical topics on the 
afterlife, which consequently influenced his understanding of kārēt punishment.  
Wold stated that his methodology would include two steps: (1) an analysis of 
expressions paradigmatically and syntagmatically associated with the verb ָכַרת in various 
kārēt formulae in order to form a stable matrix whose dimensions can construct an 
exegetical model and (2) this matrix would be rooted in the conceptual field of ideas 
 
403Wold, “The Meaning of Biblical Penalty Kareth,” 252. 
404Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 457.  
405Wright, The Disposal of Impurity, 164n2. 
406Gane, Cult and Character, 145, 201. 
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derived from the P source of the OT and extra-biblical sources.407 The three expressions 
Wold identified in his first step are (1) ים יׁש (2) ,ַעּמִּ  408.ָכַרת (and (3 ,נֶּפֶּׁש ,אִּ
 
ים ים In regard to the first element, Wold defined .ַעּמִּ  as “the sphere of the ַעּמִּ
individual’s existence. It designates the social entity from which one is cut off, whether 
from the nation Israel, the cultic community (עדה), one’s own family, etc.”409 Wold 
stated that the P source deliberately chose ים  because it is “comprehensive and ַעּמִּ
equivocal.”410 This semantic broadness led Wold to extend the meaning of this word to 
connote the afterlife. However, the initial step towards this understanding of  ַיםע ּמִּ  came 
from G. Driver’s and John Miles’ observation in regard to the Nabataean uses of ַעם as 
ancestors.411 Wold also relied on the opinions of scholars of his time who held that the 
phrases “to sleep with one’s fathers,” “buried with his fathers,” and “to be gathered to 
one’s kin” refer to a place called “community of souls” whose existence is in the 
afterlife.412 This claim suffers from at least two problems. 
First, the dissertation research of Eriks Galenieks demonstrated that the beliefs of 
 
407Wold, “The Meaning of Biblical Penalty Kareth,” v. 
408Wold, “The Meaning of Biblical Penalty Kareth,” 6–7. 
409Wold, “The Meaning of Biblical Penalty Kareth,” 12. 
410Wold, “The Meaning of Biblical Penalty Kareth,” 12. 
411Godfrey R. Driver and John C. Miles, The Babylonian Laws (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), 
1:118. 
412Wold, “The Meaning of Biblical Penalty Kareth,” 9. 
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Wold’s time, which are currently accepted,413 are not biblically supported, but rather, rest 
on evidence found in extra-biblical sources. All sixty-six passages in which אֹול  is ׁש 
mentioned in the OT are “poetic synonyms of the grave,” which denies the possibility of 
human conscious existence after death.414 Galenieks further stated: 
Sheol means no more than the place of the dead or simply the grave in general, where 
the dead bodies or corpses return to become the dust of the earth (Gen 2:7; 3:19). On 
the other hand, the fact that not even one of the sixty-six references to the term Sheol 
contains any indication that Yahweh would somehow try to communicate with the 
dead is strikingly clear and does not need to be commented on.”415 
 
Second, the fact that the OT evinces little interest in the topics of death and 
afterlife is one argument against Wold’s conclusions regarding kārēt. This is not to say 
that the OT does not speak about death in connection with the afterlife, but rather, it 
defines it in a very limited way (see e.g., Gen 5:24; Num 16:33; 1 Sam 2:6; 28:8–19; 2 
Kgs 2:11; Isa 26:19; Ezek 37:1–14; Prov 12:28).416 The OT’s focus is on the present life, 
so it emphasizes the covenant relationship between God and human beings.417 In his 
dissertation research, Jan Sigvartsen stated: “The overall impression from a study of the 
TaNaKh passages relating to the afterlife is that death was not considered the start of the 
 
413Richard C. Steiner, Disembodied Souls: The Nefesh in Israel and Kindred Spirits in the Ancient 
Near East, with an Appendix on the Katumuwa Inscription, ANEM 11 (Atlanta: SBL Press, 2015), 2. 
414Eriks Galenieks, “The Nature, Function, and Purpose of the Term Sheol in the Torah, Prophets 
and Writings” (PhD diss., Andrews University, 2005), 582, 612. 
415Galenieks, “The Nature, Function, and Purpose,” 582, 598. 
416Jan Åge Sigvartsen, “The Afterlife Views and the Use of the Tanakh in Support of the 
Resurrection Concept in the Literature of Second Temple Period Judaism: The Apocrypha and the 
Pseudepigrapha” (PhD diss., Andrews University, 2016), 1. 
417Sigvartsen, “The Afterlife Views and the Use of the Tanakh,” 2–3. 
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next life, but the end of the present.”418 He also added that “the lack of obvious religious 
burial rites in the Hebrew Bible may further suggest a lack of interest in the afterlife 
among religious leaders.”419 Finally, Sigvartsen found that “the Hebrew Scriptures do not 
present a fully developed, or rather, a complete, comprehensive, and detailed description 
of the afterlife.”420 
In the light of Sigvartsen’s and Galenieks’ research, especially of the latter’s 
exegesis of the pertinent biblical texts (which is also the method used throughout this 
work) Wold’s inclusion of extra-biblical notions of the afterlife cannot be accepted. 
Subsequently, the impact such a notion has on the noun ים  and ultimately the term ַעּמִּ
kārēt invalidates Wold’s conclusions. 
 
יׁש  In regard to the second element, building on the definition of Daniel .נֶּפֶּׁש ,אִּ
Lys, Wold concluded that נֶּפֶּׁש represents “the whole person but surely this was not an 
abstraction for the ancient Hebrew. Of significance to the kārēt formulae is the fact that 
the Israelite’s identity and existence was linked to his name and to his children.”421 While 
this is true throughout the OT, it is also true that every individual is responsible for 
his/her sin and for his/her own existence. Even more, Deut 24:16 states that “fathers shall 
not be put to death for their sons, nor shall sons be put to death for their fathers; everyone 
 
418Sigvartsen, “The Afterlife Views and the Use of the Tanakh,” 1–2. 
419Sigvartsen, “The Afterlife Views and the Use of the Tanakh,” 2. 
420Sigvartsen, “The Afterlife Views and the Use of the Tanakh,” 3. 
421Wold, “The Meaning of Biblical Penalty Kareth,” 14. See also Daniel Lys, Nèphèsh: Histoire 
de l’âme dans la révélation d’Israël au sein des religions proche-orientales, ÉHPR 50 (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1959), 161–62. 
 
133 
shall be put to death for his own sin.”422 Thus, the claim that kārēt formulae refer to one 
and exclude the other semantic domain of the word נֶּפֶּׁש is certainly a possible use in 
certain contexts, but further research is needed. Such research is lacking in Wold’s work. 
He rooted his transition from the former limited understanding of נֶּפֶּׁש to the one he 
upheld throughout his study in the quote of Josef Schrabert, who stated that “wie נפׁש im 
hebräischen Text, so kann auch ψυχή di ganze person meinen, etwa in der 
Ausrottungsformel ἐξολεθρευθήσεται ἡ ψυχὴ ἐκείνη ἐκ τοῦ γένους αὐτῆς.…”423 Based 
on this assumed definition of נֶּפֶּׁש, Wold concluded that the kārēt formulae affects the 
person and his/her progeny. The present research does not find the method used to arrive 
at such an understanding of נֶּפֶּׁש as sound. 
 
 In regard to the third element, to which Wold devoted most attention and .ָכַרת
space in his study, he studied the verb ָכַרת in the context of its Akkadian and West-
Semitic background. He stated:  
In this section we hope to establish a Gattung for the kareth formula by means of 
comparative linguistic analysis. Etymologically, karath is cognate to Akkadian 
karātu, “to cut off, cut down.” To date, our search of the Akkadian sources had turned 
up no examples of karātu with either napištum or awilum as its object so as to provide 
an exact parallel to the biblical kareth formula with the verb karātu. However, we do 
find a counterpart to karat nefesh with the verb nakāsu, a synonym of karātu, in the 
expression napištam nakāsu. By studying the paradigmatic semantic field of this 
idiom in the Akkadian literature and by comparing the usage of a network of West-
 
422Emphasis mine. 
423“As נפׁש in the Hebrew text, so can χήυχή mean the whole person, as in the extermination 
formula ἐξολεθρευθήσεται ἡ ψυχὴ ἐκείνη ἐκ τοῦ γένους αὐτῆς, Josef Scharbert, “Fleisch, Geist, und Seele 
in der Pentateuch-Septuaginta,” in Wort, Lied und Gottesspruch: Beiträge zur Septuaginta: Festschrift für 
Joseph Ziegler, ed. Josef Schreiner, FB 1 (Würzburg: Echter Verlag, 1972), 126, 130. 
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Semitic terms which mean “to cut off” it is possible to establish a Gattung for the 
biblical kareth penalty.424 
 
Based on linguistic and conceptual similarities between kārēt formulae in the OT 
and in Akkadian and West-Semitic texts, Wold concluded that kārēt punishment is 
“conditional divine curse formulae.”425 The initial step Wold utilized in his quest for the 
meaning of kārēt punishment was deriving its meaning from comparative Semitic 
examples.426 Wold then analyzed the crux interpretum texts in the OT, namely the texts 
that contain double punishment, kārēt, and premature death. These texts are Exod 31:14, 
Lev 18:18, 15, 17, 21, 23, 22; 20:3, 5, 6; Num 15:30.427 Leaving aside the potential 
irregularities of Wold’s linking of comparative insights to biblical texts, the present study 
focuses on the reasons he offered against the understanding that kārēt formulae always 
predominantly refer to premature death, regardless of the fact that premature death is 
stated along with it. He proposed three reasons.  
First, “stylistically, the Priestly Source is noted for its terseness in the legal 
portions so that a circumlocution like the ambiguous kareth formula for the death penalty 
at the very last comes as a surprise.”428 This claim is only partially correct, that is, 
terseness is a general feature of biblical literature as a whole and applies to certain but 
definitely not to all texts. It has been demonstrated throughout the present work that 
terseness was not the primary guide that led biblical author/s to generate the biblical text 
 
424Wold, “The Meaning of Biblical Penalty Kareth,” 15. 
425Wold, “The Meaning of Biblical Penalty Kareth,” 16–17. 
426Wold, “The Meaning of Biblical Penalty Kareth,” 17. 
427Wold, “The Meaning of Biblical Penalty Kareth,” 47. 
428Wold, “The Meaning of Biblical Penalty Kareth,” 47. 
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as it stands. In many instances a phrase or a word is repeated for rhetorical purposes in 
order to emphasize certain topic/s, maintain legal precision, or follow structure. To this 
can be added that many laws themselves were repeated with modifications along with 
exact verbatim repetitions. Repetitions are specifically present in the legal texts that 
speak about curses.429 For the same reason, kārēt formulae were repeated after a 
premature death penalty in order to emphasize the seriousness of the consequences for 
certain sins. In addition to the specific weaknesses against Wold’s second and third 
reason against single punishment kārēt formulae, the arguments against terseness 
presented here are also applicable to those arguments. 
Second, “logically, since the meaning of מות יומת is clear, the addition of the 
kareth formula in the aforementioned cases is tautologous and leads to confusion rather 
than clarification.”430 This claim is refuted by numerous instances of repetition of the 
same or equivalent/synonymous expressions in legal as well as narrative texts of the OT. 
For instance, Num 15:31 abounds with synonyms that are not needed. Lev 1–7 is filled 
with unnecessary repetition.  
Third, “exegetically, to accept the synonymy of the expressions for death and the 
kareth formula runs the risk of losing the exegetical process to subjectivity.”431 Even 
though this risk is possible, the repetition of the same concepts through different words is 
 
429Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 147, 204, 392, 401, 429–30, 542, 653, 656 etc.; Wenham, The Book of 
Leviticus, 58–59, 89, 157, 198, 230, 267, 276, 291, 328, 374, 410, 449, 456, 458; Michael Dean 
Hildenbrand, Structure and Theology in the Holiness Code, BIBAL Dissertation Series 10 (North Richland 
Hills, TX: BIBAL, 2004), 11, 38. See also page 588, especially fn. 91, on repetition in the present study. 
430Wold, “The Meaning of Biblical Penalty Kareth,” 48. 
431Wold, “The Meaning of Biblical Penalty Kareth,” 48. 
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well recognized and accepted.432 Removing the risk of losing exegetical objectivity in the 
texts that include such phenomena is achieved by a careful analysis of the definitions in 
context. 
Thus, terseness, style, and logic should not be made a decisive factor for 
interpretation. Rather, one should take into consideration the entire context of the 
Pentateuch/OT. 
In addition to those points of critique to Wold’s double punishment of texts that 
contain premature death and kārēt punishment, the following arguments can be 
mentioned: 
1. kārēt never appears after any case of expected kārēt punishment (see Num 
16,433 35:32–26,434 Lev 10,435 24436), but premature death does. 
2. The syntactical position of kārēt is not static in the texts causing chronological 
confusion. Sometimes it precedes other punishments (Lev 20:17; 23:29; Num 4:18; 9:13; 
19:13), sometimes it follows them (Exod 31:14, Lev 17:10; 20:3, 5, 6), and sometimes it 
appears in triple punishment texts where it is repeated twice (Num 15:31). 
3. Wold’s methodological shortcomings may suffer from uncontrollably   
 
432Hildenbrand, Structure and Theology, 4, 11. 
433Breaking the commandment against sancta encroachment Deut 16–18. Milgrom, Numbers, 
129–30. 
434Breaking the commandment against work on the Sabbath found in Exod 16:23–29; 20:8–10, 
31:13–16; 35:2 and others. 
435Breaking the commandment regarding the incense found in Exod 30:9. Levine, Leviticus, 58–
59; Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 188. 




applying insights from the ANE context onto biblical texts without establishing sound 
methods and control of the correspondence between the two literary, conceptually, and 
ideologically similar, but yet totally differently worldviews, which has continued 
unabated since the 1960s.437 Establishing a defensible method is still a demanding and 
difficult task. Although current scholarship finds some overlaps between ANE and OT 
exist, few scholars are able to find a proper method of comparison and analysis.438 
4. A valid question to ask is this: What is the difference between death and kārēt 
in reference to the afterlife? The sins deserving of premature death as a punishment are 
intentional and brazen sins, where the sinner shows an attitude of defiance against God. 
The death penalty assumes that a sinner deserving of this punishment automatically loses 
the benefits of the afterlife based on his/her own choice. 
5. Death is the primary punishment in kārēt cases outside of legal texts (Deut 
12:29; 19:1). 
In conclusion, Wold’s study is inordinately influenced by an Akkadian and West-
Semitic worldview and suffers from a limited analysis of certain linguistic similarities. 
That kārēt punishment in the OT refers to punishment in the afterlife is based on an ANE 
construct that is more fully developed in ANE literature than in the OT. Therefore, in not 
denying the existence of vague understanding of the afterlife concept in the OT, Wold’s 
proposal cannot be accepted by this study since it is not supported by the biblical 
evidence and suffers from methodological unsoundness.  
 
437Samuel Sandmel, “Parallelomania,” JBL 81 (1962). 
438Noel Weeks, “Problems with Comparative Method in OT Studies,” JETS 62 (2019). 
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Who Administers the Kārēt Penalty? 
In an attempt to provide an answer to the second question, key scholars of biblical 
cult have suggested that kārēt is carried out by God himself,439 and they have identified 
three points in support of this conclusion. First, there are texts which explicitly state that 
God executes kārēt punishment such as Lev 17:10; 20:3, 5, 6.440 Second, as Wenham 
noticed, many of the sins punishable by kārēt are secret sins, and only God could know 
them (Lev 7:20).441 Third, in regards to Wold’s classification of sins punishable by kārēt 
into six categories, specifically sacred time, substance, failure to perform purification 
ritual, illicit worship, illicit sex, and blasphemy,442 Milgrom noted that “all fall within the 
category of religious law not civil law; that is, they are deliberate sins against God not 
against man.”443 He further reasoned that “as the cardinal postulate of the Priestly 
legislation is that sins against God are punishable by God and not by man (Milgrom 
1970a: 5–8), it follows that the punishment of kārēt is executed solely by the deity.”444 
The first two points support the fact that at least in some instances God executes 
kārēt. The third point may require some adjustments. First, Milgrom’s claim that all sins 
punishable by kārēt are sins against God may benefit from more analysis. It does not   
 
439Levine, Leviticus, 241–42; Milgrom, Numbers, 405–8; Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 424, 457–60; 
Donald J. Wold, “The Kareth Penalty in P: Rationale and Cases,” SBLSP 1 (1979): 24; Wenham, The Book 
of Leviticus, 125, 241. 
440Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 18. 
441Wenham, The Book of Leviticus, 241. 
442Wold, “The Kareth Penalty in P,” 3–24. 
443Milgrom, Numbers, 406. 
444Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 457. 
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provide the grounds for the argument that God executes the punishment in the event of 
such sins. As stated in the present study, under the subheading Legal System of Ancient 
Israel in chapter three, God is the originator, source, and giver of BL. This means that 
violation of any of those laws makes the violator liable to God. Even if a person suffers 
due to the sin of another person, the sin committed is ultimately against God. Thus, 
Milgrom’s constructing a false dichotomy between religious and civil laws445 does not 
remove foundational and underlying responsibility of the law breaker to God himself. 
Second, some sins deserving of kārēt, according to Milgrom’s and Wold’s lists, 
are punished by a human party, as explicitly stated in Exod 31:14.446 Milgrom assumes 
that two punishments are implied here, as in Lev 20:2–3. The first punishment is death at 
the hand of the covenant community, followed by kārēt at the hand of God.447 While 
Sklar accepted the possibility that a double punishment may be possible but not necessary 
in Lev 20:2–3,448 he claimed that that is not the case here because the role of the Hebrew 
particle י יהָ  placed in between כִּ לֶּ ַחל  יּוָמת מֹות מ   (everyone who profanes it shall surely be 
put to death) and  ָָלאָכה ָבּה הֹעׂשֶּ ָכל־ה ָתה מ  ר  כ  נִּ וא ַהּנֶּפֶּׁש ו  ב ַההִּ רֶּ ּקֶּ יהָ  מִּ ַעּמֶּ  (for whoever does 
any work on it, that person shall be cut off from among his people) suggests that one 
clause interprets the other: kārēt is carried out by the act of capital punishment.449 
 
445Kenneth Bergland, “Reading as a Disclosure of the Thoughts of the Heart: Proto-Halakhic 
Reuse and Appropriation between Torah and the Prophets” (PhD diss., Andrews University, 2018), 88–97. 
446Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 19. 
447Milgrom, Numbers, 407–8. 
448The analysis of Lev 20:1–5 suggested in the sixth chapter of this work also suggested that kārēt 
refers to death penalty in the first place. 
449Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 19. 
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Sklar also pointed to another passage that consists of similar lexical and 
conceptual elements, Num 15. Numbers 15:27–31 discusses forgivable and unforgivable 
sins, of which the latter is punishable by kārēt. This passage is immediately followed by 
the episode of a man who was found collecting sticks on the Sabbath (v. 32). The 
covenant community inquired of the Lord and asked how they should treat the violator. 
God affirmed kārēt punishment, which was carried out by the covenant community and 
consisted of stoning the Sabbath-breaker outside the camp (v. 35). In the passage 
beginning in Num 15:31, immediately following the passages that prescribed kārēt for 
high-handed sin, v. 35 illustrates what kārēt looks like. It states that it is premature death 
carried out by a human party.450 In addition to these two texts, the following texts on 
idolatry laws in Lev 20:1–5, 6; Deut 13, and 17 prescribe that idolater/s are punished by 
premature death (stoning) by a human party. Finally, a ָיד ָרָמה ב   sin, which is not limited 
to any type of sin, but rather, is defined by the sinner’s attitude (see Num 35:32–36; 
Sabbath breaking), is also punishable by premature death at the hand of the covenant 
community. Thus, the claim that God is the only one who administers punishment for 
sins punishable by kārēt is not confirmed by the biblical texts. 
In conclusion, based on these biblical texts, it can be inferred that the kārēt 
punishment is carried out by both God and the covenantal community and not solely by 
God. Due to the nature of the sins in question, it is possible that God implemented this 
punishment more frequently than the covenantal community.  
 
450Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 20. 
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Summary and Conclusions 
Kārēt punishment predominantly refers to the premature death of the sinner. The 
sins that invoked the punishment of premature death themselves represent sins that are 
motivated by a desire to defy and reject God. As such, premature death as punishment 
affects the sinner’s status in the afterlife and prevents him/her from receiving the 
advantages of afterlife that are presented in a limited manner in comparison to the ANE 
texts and the NT. Wold’s study, which argues that kārēt punishment refers to the sinner’s 
status in the afterlife, is heavily informed by an Akkadian and West-Semitic worldview 
and based on a limited analysis of linguistic similarities. His proposal that kārēt 
punishment in the OT refers to the punishment in the afterlife is based on an ANE 
construct that is developed more fully in ANE literature than in the OT texts. Therefore, 
in not denying the existence of a limited presentation of the concept of afterlife in the OT, 
Wold’s proposal is not supported by the biblical texts. In addition, his conclusions also 
suffer from methodological unsoundness. Finally, according to the biblical texts and in 
contradistinction to Milgrom’s conclusions, God and the covenant community administer 
kārēt punishments. However, due to the secret nature of these sins, it is reasonable to 
suggest that God administers this punishment more than humans. The current study first 
presents the key points of the previous scholarly research on each term that precedes this 
study within the limits of the Pentateuch.  
 
ַׁשע/ָחָטא /פֶּ ָעֹון ָנָׂשא : The Meaning 
The analysis of the terms ׁשַ ּפֶ ע ,ָחָטא , and ָעֹון accompanied with the verb ָנָׁשא, 
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generated a considerable amount of research.451 Most scholars have studied these phrases 
under the assumption that  ַָחָטא ,ע ּפֶ ׁש, and ָעֹון are synonyms.452 The terms ַׁשע/ָחָטא  ָעֹון/פֶּ
 :are found in two contexts: (1) forgiveness for sin or (2) consequences for sin ָנָׂשא
punishment. Studies have maintained these two functions of the phrase for a long time, 
but this dichotomy was challenged by Baruch J. Schwartz in recent times.453 
 
Schwartz’s Interpretation of ָעֹון  ָנָׂשא  
Schwartz noted that there are two key reasons that have led scholars to arrive at 
the dual understanding, forgiveness for sin or punishment, of the phrase: (1) in the 
metonymic use of the terms for sin in the Hebrew Bible, they refer to both the act itself 
and its consequence and (2) the verb ָנָׁשא has two different figurative meanings, “to 
forgive” and “to suffer, endure.” This resulted in two contrasting translations of the verb 
depending on the context, “to forgive sin” or “to suffer punishment.” Other ANE 
languages seem to affirm this point further.454 
Schwartz proposed that the phrase does not have two different meanings, but 
 
451Walther Zimmerli, “Zur Vorgeschichte von Jesaja LIII,” in Congress Volume: Rome, 1968, eds. 
G. W. Anderson, et al., VTSupp 17 (Leiden: Brill, 1969), 236–44; Walther Zimmerli, Ezekiel 1: A 
Commentary on the Book of the Prophet Ezekiel, Chapters 1–24, Hermeneia 8 (Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1979), 1:116–18, 302–14; W. H. C. Propp, Exodus 19–40, AB 2A (New York: Doubleday, 2006), 
448–50; Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 3–21.  
452D. N. Freedman and B. E. Willoughby, “ָנָׂשא,” TDOT 10:31; Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 
8–10. 
453Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 8. He also cited the most important proponent of this 
understanding such as Zimmerli, “Zur Vorgeschichte von Jesaja LIII,” 236–44; Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 
1488–90; Rodríguez, “Substitution in the Hebrew Cultus,” 132; Janowski, Sühne als Heilsgeschehen, 36, 
253; Levine, Leviticus, 26; Knierim, Die Hauptbegriffe für Sünde im Alten Testament, 73–91; Kiuchi, 
Purification Offering, 50–51; Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 339. 
454Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 8, 10. 
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rather, one literal meaning. The verb ָנָׁשא means “to bear, carry,” while ָעֹון and ַׁשע  refer פֶּ
to sin, so the phrase means “to bear, carry sin or carry off, take away, remove.” As being 
a figure of speech that refers to the wrongdoing as an object rather than an event or an 
action, the phrase was used in two distinct ways. Schwartz understood the phrase as a 
figure of speech that conceives sin as an object, a load rather than an event or action. 
First, it was used to convey the sinner’s carrying of sin as a burden which might end in 
suffering the consequences if there are any. Thus, if a sinner bears sin, he or she may 
suffer the consequences if there are any related to it. In this usage, the phrase is a 
metaphor for the sinner’s unrelieved guilt and should be translated as “to bear, carry sin.” 
In other words, it is an indirect way of saying that the sinner deserves punishment and 
never represents punishment itself.455 
If somebody else bears the load, then the sinner is relieved of it and its 
consequences if there are any. In this usage, the phrase is a metaphor for the sinner’s 
relief from guilt and should be translated as “to carry off, take away, remove sin.” Thus, 
the phrase has only one meaning, but two uses.456 The former use of the phrase (just ָעֹון 
ָחָטא ָנָׂשא and ָנָׂשא ) is restricted to P and H source/tradition only, whereas the latter one 
ַׁשע ,ָחָטא)  is found throughout the Pentateuch.457 Schwartz’s main argument (ָנָׂשא ָעֹון ,פֶּ
for establishing the two uses of the same phrase is in changing the subject and the 
 
455Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 8–9, 10. 
456Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 8–9, 10. 
457Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 9. 
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execution of some sort of punishment or release from it.458 
The use of the phrase in one or another context is characterized by changing 
subject. If the sinner is the subject then the phrase refers to his or her liability, whereas if 
someone else other than the sinner is the subject, it refers to relief from the liability.459 In 
the latter usage, the sin, as a weight, is not transferred to another party so that the 
individual would bear the sin instead of the sinner, but rather, it does not weigh upon 
anyone. Schwartz stated: “It has disappeared.”460 
Schwartz ardently upheld the fact that the verb ָנָׁשא has only one basic meaning—
“to bear, carry”—and the choice of the subject of the phrase would point to one of the 
two possible uses. In his opinion, the meaning of “to forgive (sin)” or “to suffer 
punishment” is not a semantic domain of the verb ָנָׁשא. He did not support his proposition 
with research on the semantic domains of ָנָׁשא. Yet, based on the various studies of ָנָׁשא, 
gathered together by Olaffson,461 the consensus was reached that the basic meaning for 
the verb ָנָׁשא is “to lift,” “to carry,” or “to take.” The meaning “to forgive” was not 
considered as a semantic domain of ָנָׁשא. 
 
458Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 10. 
459Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 10. 
460Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 10. 
461The history of scholarly research on the verb ָנָׁשא can be grouped into two approaches: (1) 
Lexical Listings, and (2) Semantic-Theological studies. Five major representatives of the former approach 
are (1) G. Gesenius, (2) J. Fuerst, (3) F. Brown, S. R. Driver, and C. A. Briggs, (4) L. Koehler and W. 
Baumgartner, and (5) W. L. Holladay. The major scholars of the latter approach are F. Stolz, N. Freedman 
and B. E. Willboghby, J. J. Stamm, R. Knierim, W. Zimmerli, R. N. Whybray. Gundmundur Olaffson 
conveniently examined all of these studies as a part of his doctoral research. Olaffson, “The Use of nśʾ in 
the Pentateuch,” 19–51.  
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In addition to the basic meaning, the studies of ָנָׁשא showed that this meaning is 
expressed in two ways, literal or metaphorical.462 The emphasis is placed on the former 
one, whereas the latter was almost totally ignored. Finally, these studies showed a lack of 
importance and the meaning of the idiomatic uses of particular phrases encompassing the 
verb ָנָׁשא. The outcome of the approaches noted in those studies was that “no one has 
suggested the existence of a homonymous root for the concept of forgiveness, even 
though they seem to suggest that the concept of forgiveness is more or less ‘appended’ to 
the root rather than being an integral part of it.”463 These studies are uniform in 
understanding the concept of forgiveness as “removal of sin, guilt, transgressions, or 
wrongdoing.”464 Knierim, Stolz, Zimmerli, Freedman, and Willoughby pointed to the 
substitutionary aspect of forgiveness.465 Knierim, Holladay, Freedman, and Willoughby 
indicated the aspect of forgiveness in personal relationships.466 Knierim, Freedman, and 
 
462For the validity of these two basic types of meanings, see Osborne, The Hermeneutical Spiral, 
83–93; Kaiser, Toward an Exegetical Theology, 59–60, 87–88; J. Cheryl Exum, ““Whom Will He Teach 
Knowledge?”: A Literary Approach to Isaiah 28,” in Art and Meaning: Rhetoric in Biblical Literature, eds. 
David J A Clines, et al., vol. 19 of JSOTSup, eds. David J A Clines, et al. (Sheffield: JSOT Press 
Department of Biblical Studies The University of Sheffield, 1982), 114; J. Kenneth Kuntz, “The 
Contribution of Rhetorical Criticism to Understanding Isaiah 51:1–16,” in Art and Meaning: Rhetoric in 
Biblical Literature, eds. David J A Clines, et al., vol. 19 of JSOTSup, eds. David J A Clines, et al. 
(Sheffield: JSOT Press Department of Biblical Studies The University of Sheffield, 1982), 157; Lam, 
“Metaphorical Patterning,” 32–54, 415–37. For a common approach throughout the ancient Near East, see 
Othmar Keel, The Symbolism of the Biblical World: Ancient Near Eastern Iconography and the Book of 
Psalms, trans. Timothy J. Hallett (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1997), 9, 171, 201. 
463Olaffson, “The Use of nśʾ in the Pentateuch,” 53. 
464Olaffson, “The Use of nśʾ in the Pentateuch,” 52–53. 
465Knierim, Die Hauptbegriffe für Sünde im Alten Testament, 52–53, 221–22; N. Freedman, B. E. 
Willoughby, and Heinz-Josef Fabry, “נׂשא,” TWAT 5:632–37; Zimmerli, Ezekiel 1, 1:164; F. Stolz, “נׂשא,” 
THAT 2:113–14. 
466Knierim, Die Hauptbegriffe für Sünde im Alten Testament, 52; William Lee Holladay, A 
Concise Hebrew and Aramaic Lexicon of the Old Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1971), 246; 
Freedman, Willoughby, and Fabry, “נׂשא,” TWAT, 5:636–37. 
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Willoughby gave limited evidence for the “to care,” “to support” aspect of the verb 
 467.ָנָׁשא
Two characteristics of Schwartz’s work that become obvious in the following part 
of the present research: (1) no analysis of ָנָׁשא semantic domains and (2) source-driven 
division of the Pentateuch. The first caused him to go with the basic lexical meaning of 
the verb and not notice the nuances of meaning contained in the semantic domains of the 
verb. The second characteristic caused him not to conduct a source-driven understanding 
of atonement, thus eliminating the insights on the topic that can be gained outside of P. 
He isolated 22 occurrences (21 texts) of the phrase/s and one additional text in the 
Priestly tradition that captured the consequential meaning of the phrase ָעֹון or ָחָטא and he 
derived 5 arguments that confirm this meaning of the phrase (see Table 9).468 
As the table above shows, Schwartz joined Lev 7:18 and Lev 19:8 in one text due 
to the close similarity of the two texts. The phrase ַׁשע ָנָׂשא פֶּ  does not appear in those 21 
texts since they all belong to P, but it does appear in other texts of the Pentateuch. I will 
first analyze Schwartz’s research on ָעֹון or ָחָטא in priestly texts and then analyze other 
texts that also include ַׁשע ָנָׂשא פֶּ . 
First, these 22 texts are comprised of 3 types of cases of which (1) some do not 
state any punishment, (2) some include capital punishment prescribed by human or divine 
agency, and (3) some involve kārēt punishment, explicitly or implicitly prescribed. 
 
467Knierim, Die Hauptbegriffe für Sünde im Alten Testament, 51; Freedman, Willoughby, and 
Fabry, “נׂשא,” TWAT, 5:632. 
468Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 12. 
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Table 9. ָנָׂשא ָעֹון texts based on Schwartz’s research469 
 
1. Exod 28:43 – Aaron and his sons when 
they fail to wear the proper undergarments as 
they approach the altar. 
2. Lev 5:1 – A potential witness in a trial who 
refuses to testify. 
3. Lev 5:17 – A person who has unknowingly 
sinned and possibly violated “the holy things 
of Yhwh” (qodšê yhwh). 
4. Lev 7:18 – A person who eats from the 
šĕlāmîm -offering on the third day (first day = 
day of offering) 
5. Lev 17:16 – A person who eats from an 
animal that either died on its own or was 
killed by other animals and who does not then 
properly cleanse himself. 
6. Lev 19:17 – A person who does not reprove 
his neighbor and thereby “lifts (nāśā’) onto 
him (the neighbor) sin (ḥēṭ’).” 
7. Lev 20:17 – A man who “takes” his sister 
or half-sister and, presumably, has sexual 
relations with her. 
8. Lev 20:19 – A man who has sexual 
relations with his maternal or paternal aunt. 
9. Lev 20:20 – A man who has sexual 
relations with his uncle’s wife. 
10. Lev 22:9 – Priests who do not obey the 
instructions about keeping themselves ritually 
clean. 
11. Lev 22:16 – “Nonpriests who 
inadvertently eat of the sacred gifts, having 
thus been caused to ‘bear sin’ through the 
negligence of the priests.” v. 15 
12. Lev 24:15 – A person who curses his god. 
13. Num 5:31 – A wife whose husband 
suspects her of adultery and who undergoes 
the prescribed ritual under the supervision of 
the priest. 
14. Num 9:13 – A person who does not make 
the paschal offering without a good reason. 
15. Num 14:34 – The generation of adults 
who were too fearful to enter Canaan after 
hearing the report of the scouts. 
16. Num 18:1 – Aaron, his sons, and his 
ancestral house with respect to sins against the 
sanctuary (miqdāš); only Aaron and his sons 
with respect to sins connected to the 
priesthood (kĕhunnâ). 
17. Num 18:22 – Israelites who draw near to 
the Tent of Meeting. 
18. Num 18:23 – The Levites for any offenses 
connected with the service of the Tent of 
Meeting. 
19. Num 18:32 – The Levites when they fail 
to take the best of the donations (tithes) that 
they receive to pass on to the priests. 
20. Num 30:16 – A husband who, after 
hearing about his wife’s vows and obligations, 
later nullifies them. 
21. Num 15:30–31 – Any person who acts 
defiantly, deliberately transgressing any 




Based on the fact that some cases do not include potential punishment and some 
warrant it, Schwartz concluded that the phrase is a metaphor for the commonality related 
to all these texts, that is, being guilty.470 
 
469Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 10–12. 
470Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 12–13. 
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Second, if sin bearing and punishment were coextensive, it would be expected 
that either one or the other, but not both, would be mentioned in one single context. This 
not being the case signals that the punishment and the bearing of sin are two distinct 
phenomena, that is, sin bearing is culpability, liability, and guilt, whereas punishment 
may or may not follow.471 
Third, in some cases, bearing sin can be remedied ([2]472 Lev 5:1; [3] Lev 5:17; 
[11] Lev 22:9 and possibly [6] Lev 19:17, and perhaps [20] Num 30:16), thus pointing to 
it as only being the state of culpability and not the punishment itself.473 
Fourth, Schwartz found additional confirmation for his position in the fact that the 
terms for sin in this phrase, ָחָטא and ָעֹון, refer to the deed itself and never to the 
punishment since in 19/21 cases, they are sins of commission, deeds. However, he did 
notice that eight cases ([1] Exod 28:43; [2] Lev 5:1; [5] Lev 17:16; [6] Lev 19:17; [10] 
Lev 22:9; [14] Num 9:13; [18] Num 18:23, and [20] Num 30:16) appear to be omissions, 
“but in every one of them, the negligence involved is tantamount to the commission of an 
offence.”474 He listed Num 9:13 as the only exception to this point since it is a 
performative command in P which includes kārēt punishment.475 
Fifth, Schwartz found that in four cases ([2] Lev 5:1; [4] a) Lev 7:18; [5] Lev 
17:16, and [10] Lev 22:9), bearing sin is the precise equivalent for being impure in the 
 
471Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 13. 
472Numbers in square brackets refer to Table 9. 
473Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 13. 
474Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 13. 
475Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 13. 
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immediate and proximate cases. He stated: “This analogy too confirms that the sin that is 
borne is a metaphor for a condition, not the penalty that is its outcome.”476 He noticed 
that a bearing metaphor is reinforced when one realizes that impurity and sin are 
associated with the same prepositions as they relate to human beings. Consequently, 
impurity is occasionally “upon” the sinner (Lev 7:20, 22:3, Num 19:13) as is bloodguilt 
“upon” sinners ([7] Lev 20:17; [8] Lev 20:19; [9] Lev 20:20). As individuals are “in their 
impurity” (Lev 15:31; 18:19), they can also be “in their sin” (Lev 26:39; Num 27:3; Ezek 
3:18; 33:6). In case (13), Num 5:31, bearing sin is opposite to being cleansed of sin. In 
case (20), Num 30:16, the text states that the wife’s sin is borne just as her vow/oath is 
upon her.477 
Sixth, he noticed that in two cases ([2] Lev 5:1 and [3] Lev 5:17), the offender’s 
bearing of his sin is a counterpart of realizing his or her guilt ( ָאַׁשם). Sin-bearing, like 
  may also have a psychological component to it.478 ,ָאַׁשם
 
Critique of Schwartz’s Interpretation of ָעֹון 
Milgrom produced the most extensive critique of this view. The starting point of 
his argument was that behavioral terms extend the consequential meaning so that the 
phrase can be translated as punishment or God lifts his punishment. Milgrom found that 
this phenomenon is found in the Akkadian phrases ḥiṭam našû, arnam našû, šertam našû 
(CAD N 11/2:103, 104, 108). Thus, he rejected Schwartz’s first consequential meaning 
 
476Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 14. 
477Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 14. 
478Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 14. 
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and provided more arguments for Schwartz’s second meaning of “carry” or “removing 
sin.”479 
For Milgrom, all the occurrences of the phrase אָׂשנָ  ָעֹון/ֵחְטא  in P means “to bear, 
suffer punishment,”480 while in H, it means “to carry off, remove sin or forgive.”481 It 
does not mean to carry a sin as if it were a weight, but refers to its consequences. 
Milgrom first focused on proving that in all the cases ([2] Lev 5:1; [3] Lev 5:17; 
[6] Lev 19:17) that Schwartz classified as having no punishment, the phrase actually does 
refer to punishment. First, in regards to case (2) Lev 5:1, Schwartz believed that ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  
from v. 1 is parallel to ָאֵׁשם  in vv. 2, 3, and 4. This interpretation has a long history482 ו 
and was noticed as early as in the Qumran texts (CD 9.10–12).483 Milgrom claimed that 
this inference is incorrect because ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  is a part of the apodosis, a conditional part of 
the law introduced in v. 1, while ָאֵׁשם  belongs to the protasis of the subcases of this law ו 
detailed in vv. 2, 3, and 4.484 In most instances in Biblical Hebrew (hereafter BH), the 
protasis of these conditional statements begin with either י ם or כִּ  and then the apodosis ,אִּ
follows.485 Subcases of the protasis are emphatically introduced by אֹו at the beginning of 
 
479Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1488. 
480Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1488. 
481Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 295. 
482Noth, Leviticus, 44; Rodríguez, “Substitution in the Hebrew Cultus,” 90; Hoffmann, Das Buch 
Leviticus, 1:197–98.  
483Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 295–96. 
484Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1488–89. 
485Bruce K. Waltke and M. O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax (Winona Lake, 
IN: Eisenbrauns, 1990), 636–37. 
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each law in vv. 2, 3, and 4,486 emphasizing their dependence on the protasis in v. 1. The 
apodosis actually begins in 5b.487 
In addition to this syntactical point, ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  and ָאֵׁשם  could refer to the two ו 
mutually inclusive parts of the same process, namely the sinner’s realization that he has 
sinned and is guilty—the psychological and judicial consequence of one’s sin.  ָָעֹון אׂשָ נ  is 
mentioned in the protasis and would apply to all following cases in vv. 2, 3, and 4, 
whereas ָאֵׁשם  is added in the apodosis to add the subjective aspect of the same process ו 
for v. 1. ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  refers to the objective aspect of one’s consequences for sin or 
punishment since v. 1 represents a criminal case.488 The phrase ָאֵׁשם  in vv. 4b and 5a ו 
could refer to the sinner’s subjective realization of his or her condition of guilt. It also 
refers to all cases, vv. 1–4.489 Nobuyoshi Kiuchi proposed that ָנָׂשא ָעֹון, even though 
mentioned only in v. 1, applies to all the following cases in vv. 2, 3, and 4. The culprit in 
v. 1 faces two penalties, one for not testifying about the truth, and other for withholding 
testimony.490 
Second, regarding the case in (3) Lev 5:17, Milgrom rightfully pointed to the fact 
that the law explicitly states that the sin was expiated with a reparation offering, but an 
expensive ram as a fine is a stark penalty rather than a remedy. He listed Lev 5:6, 19, 
 
486Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1488–89. 
487Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 344–45. 
488Porter, Leviticus, 41; Péter-Contesse, Lévitique 1–16, 86. 
489Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 295. 
490Nobuyoshi Kiuchi, Leviticus, AOTC 3 (Nottingham: Apollos, 2007), 100. 
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25a; and Num 5:7 to prove that ָאַׁשם carries the meaning of reparation, penalty.491 Other 
scholars also recognized that ָאַׁשם was a penalty paid to God in the form of a sacrificial 
offering in this pericope.492 
Third, regarding case (6), Lev 19:17, Milgrom agreed that punishment is not 
explicitly mentioned in this case, but that does not mean that it is not implied. He went on 
to say that none of the cases ([4a] Lev 7:18; [4b] Lev 19:8; [8] Lev 20:19; [12] Lev 
24:15; [13] Num 5:31; [16] Num 18:1; [18] Num 18:23, and [20] Num 30:16) mention 
punishment, but the punishment is implied in all these texts.493 Schwartz himself agreed 
that punishment is also implicit in (4a) Lev 7:18 and (8) Lev 20:19, as well as in others 
([5] Lev 17:16 and [7] Lev 20:17). Thus, Lev 7:18 rules that those who do not uphold 
regulations for eating sacrificial meat ָעֹון ָנָׂשא , but the parallel law in Lev 19:8 specifies 
the kārēt punishment for this sin. Milgrom stated: “H (Lev 19:8) explains the ָעֹון ָנָׂשא , in 
7:18 (P) means kareth.”494 Not agreeing that this is the characteristic of the two sources, 
other scholars also noticed that these two texts illuminate each other, thus suggesting that 
7:18 does indeed imply the kārēt punishment.495 
It has been noted that the change in person and style in Lev 20:19a and 19b could 
 
491Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1489. 
492Richard E. Averbeck, “ָאָׁשם,” NIDOTTE 1:550; Eugene Carpenter and Michael A. Grisanti, 
 .NIDOTTE 1:547 ”,ָאַׁשם“
493Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 12. 
494Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1489. 
495Wenham, The Book of Leviticus, 125; Kiuchi, Leviticus, 353; Levine, Leviticus, 129–30, 44. 
Noth believed that punishment would follow if the sin was committed intentionally. Noth, Leviticus, 63. 
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suggest that this law is an appendix.496 Milgrom agreed with Michael Hildenbrand that 
the change of person is rather an attempt to distinguish this prohibition from all the others 
within its literary context by its content, style, and vocabulary.497 Hildenbrand noted that 
this prohibition is the only one in the pericope, consisting of vv. 17–21, that does not 
include a penalty except for ָנָׂשא ָעֹון and does not begin with ר יׁש ֲאׁשֶּ אִּ  498.ו 
The use of ַות ר  עֶּ ֲאחֹות ו   instead of יׁש אִּ ר ו  ֲאׁשֶּ  points back to the parallel prohibition 
in Lev 18:12–13 where this phrase begins eleven laws (vv. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 
16, 17). Another signal that Lev 20:19 builds on Lev 18:12–12 is the noun ָאר  ,ׁש 
translated as blood relative. ָאר  is used 4 times in Lev 18 (vv. 6, 12, 13, 17) and only ׁש 
used in v. 19 of Lev 20. Milgrom believed, in this regard, that H edited the list in Lev 20 
using the list in Lev 18.499 Hildenbrand saw it as a combination of Lev 18:12–13 with the 
addition of 500.ָעֹון ָנָׂשא While the composition of this law is not the question that is 
pursued in the current study, it is evident that Lev 20:19 heavily relies on the parallel law 
in Lev 18:12–13 which, in contrast to Lev 20:19, does legislate the punishment of kārēt 
via Lev 18:24–30 that serves a concluding epilogue of the chapter codifying the kārēt 
 
49619a uses apodictic style in contrast to casuistic style used in previous and following verses and 
second person whereas 19b reverts to the third person. David Daube, Studies in Biblical Law (Cambridge: 
The University Press, 1947), 80–81. 
497Hildenbrand, Structure and Theology, 160–61; Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1756. 
498Hildenbrand, Structure and Theology, 159. 
499Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1756. 
500Hildenbrand, Structure and Theology, 160. 
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punishment for committing the sins listed in the preceding verses.501 Therefore, Lev 
20:19 does imply severe punishment as do sins in Lev 18 and in the preceding and 
following verses of Lev 20:19. Schwartz himself agreed that the death penalty must be 
inferred for the laws of the entire pericope of Lev 20:17–21 because it is mentioned in vv. 
9–16.502 
Milgrom rightfully noted that case (12) Lev 24:15 is followed by a death penalty 
emphatically expressed by יּוָמת מֹות  in v. 16 which clearly means that the penalty for 
such a sin is death.503 Even though this law seems clear in terms of punishment for this 
sin, Wells suggested a scenario in which the phrase ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  would refer to the 
unspecified punishment for cursing one’s god other than the God of Israel. Wells stated 
that it is difficult to argue that there is an additional liability in this law, but he saw a 
possibility that this law may be referring to a god other than the God of Israel. Thus, the 
law could be applied in two different contexts and could imply distinct liabilities. In case 
the context includes cursing the God of Israel, the punishment would be death, but in case 
the context includes cursing some other deity, then the liability would be unspecified, 
which would make the punishment in this law similar to the punishment in Lev 5:1, 17; 
17:16; Num 5:31; and 30:15, some sort of wait-and-see unknown punishment.504 The   
 
501Wenham, The Book of Leviticus, 260; Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1582; Gane, Leviticus, 
Numbers, 321; Kiuchi, Leviticus, 338–39. 
502Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 13. 
503Milgrom made a difference regarding the mode of punishment execution between cursing or 
pronouncing God’s name, namely, execution by God himself or the community, respectively. Milgrom, 
Leviticus 17–22, 1489. 
504Bruce Wells, “Liability in the Priestly Texts of the Hebrew Bible,” SL 5 (2012): 21–22. 
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present study rejects this proposal based on the fact that Leviticus used the phrase 8 ֱאֹלָהיו 
times in 7 texts (Lev 4:22; 21:7; 12:8, 17, 21–22; 24:15) and the addition to the 
pronominal suffix 3 MSS never changed the referent of the phrase, that is, it is always the 
God of Israel.505 It would also be unlikely that BL would be concerned with protecting 
other gods than the God of Israel. This would contradict the entire thrust of the biblical 
monotheistic faith and put emphasis only on the God of Israel. Biblical legislation shows 
unfriendliness towards other gods including death penalties for serving or enticing others 
to serve them (Exod 23:13, 24; Lev 20:1–5; Deut 13; 17:1–7).506 In addition, the 
punishments in 5:1, 17; 17:16; Num 5:31; and 30:15 are not wait-and-see, but are rather 
specified. That is, if no punishment is specified, ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  refers to the death penalty. 
Case (13) Num 5:31 also contains the punishment. That is, convicted women are 
condemned to childlessness (vv. 22, 27). Milgrom stated: “Her punishment is equivalent 
to ʿărîrî.”507 This punishment is also found in Lev 20:20–21. Milgrom proved from the 
biblical texts (Gen 20:9; 26:10; 39:9b) that in the Bible, as well as in ANE,508 adultery 
was considered a crime against the husband, but also against deities. As such, it was 
treated by religious and civil laws.509 
 
505Accordance Bible Software, version 10.0 (Altamonte Springs, FL: OakTree Software, 2012). 
506Roy E. Gane, Old Testament Law for Christians: Original Context and Enduring Application 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 2017), 243. 
507Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1489. 
508The technical term, “a great sin,” was used throughout the ANE to qualify sin. Four ninth 
century marriage documents from Egypt use this phrase to label adultery. Multiple documents from 
Babylonia also qualify adultery as “great sin.” This sin always offends both the husband and deities in the 
ANE. Milgrom, Numbers, 348–49. 
509Milgrom, Numbers, 348–49. 
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Milgrom proposed two reasons why a suspected adulteress was not judged by a 
human court. First, she was not apprehended by man, and thus there were no witnesses to 
the woman’s sin. There are four indicators in v. 13 to show this: (1) “unbeknown to her 
husband,” (2) “she keeps secret,” (3) “without being apprehended,” and (4) “and there is 
no witness against her.” This further means that an unapprehended criminal is not subject 
to the jurisdiction of the human court. These kinds of crimes are punishable by God only 
with no need for human mediation.510 
Second, the technical term for adultery, naaf, found in Decalogue 20:13, Lev 
20:10[4x], Deut 5:17, is absent in a suspected adulteress pericope even though the text 
describes her infidelity in four ways. The author of this pericope perhaps intentionally 
refrained from relating a legal term naaf to suspected adultery because he wanted to 
disconnect this woman’s fate from the death penalty imposed for adultery by a human 
court. The intention was to emphasize the fact that punishment in this case comes from 
God himself, and was not a human jurisdiction.511  
The punishment itself reflects what is known in the OT as a measure-for-measure 
principle and refers to a more precise retribution that would fit the crime one commits. 
Thus, a human court could not do any more than put the apprehended adulteress to death, 
but God sentenced an unapprehended adulteress to a more suitable punishment. That is, 
since she agreed to receive forbidden seed, she was doomed to sterility for the rest of her 
 
510Milgrom, Numbers, 349–50. 
511Milgrom, Numbers, 349–50. 
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life.512 She was not put to death and could live out her life, but was doomed by God to 
childlessness.513 The final punishment in case the woman was proven to be guilty is also 
debatable. Gane’s observation that the text is silent in regard to the punishment if the 
women confessed her sin discredits Milgrom’s claim that the ritual’s purpose was to 
encourage the woman’s confession.514 
Perhaps her confession can protect her from the public humiliation of being 
involved in the ritual itself, punished by a prolapsed uterus, and eventually being 
punished by the death penalty. Milgrom believed that her full punishment could be 
sterility,515 perhaps a prolapsed uterus,516 and a childless life517 which was perceived in 
the OT as curse from God.518 In addition, if she had been proven guilty, her husband   
 
512Milgrom, Numbers, 350. For a fuller treatment and questions that this pericope generates, see 
Jacob Milgrom, “The Case of the Suspected Adulteress, Numbers 5:11–31: Redaction and Meaning,” in 
The Creation of Sacred Literature: Composition and Redaction of the Biblical Text, ed. Richard Elliott 
Friedman, UCPNES 22 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1981), 69–75. 
513Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1758. 
514Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 524. Contra Milgrom, Numbers, 350. 
515Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1758. 
516Tikva Frymer-Kensky, “The Strange Case of the Suspected Sotah (Numbers V 11–31),” VT 34 
(1984): 18. For an additional interpretation of the nature of woman’s punishment, see Gordon J. Wenham, 
Numbers: An Introduction and Commentary, TOTC 4 (Downers Grove, IL: Inter-Varsity, 1981), 84; 
Frymer-Kensky, “The Strange Case of the Suspected Sotah,” 20–1. R. K. Harrison suggested scenarios 
where the effect of the curse could be fatal for a woman if she was proven to be liable for adultery. 
Receiving the curse upon herself would result in her death. R. K. Harrison, Numbers, WEC (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Baker, 1992), 111–13. 
517Milgrom, Numbers, 350. Followed by Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 526; Frymer-Kensky, “The 
Strange Case of the Suspected Sotah,” 18. 
518Kiuchi, Leviticus, 378. 
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would have had the right to divorce her.519 
The hint that the death penalty might be involved if she was proven to be liable in 
this case is found in the inclusion of the י ירִּ  element of this punishment. Milgrom ֲערִּ
recognized that the punishment of the woman in Num 5:31 is equivalent to י ירִּ  520,ֲערִּ
punishment legislated in Lev 20:20, she would not be able to have children. 
Commenting on Lev 20:20, Kiuchi noted that ָיֻמתּו related to י ירִּ  is more ֲערִּ
particular than it might seem. That is, ָיֻמתּו does not refer to a natural death, but rather, 
describes the consequences of violating God’s laws or ordinances. Leviticus uses the qal 
stem of the verb מּות to refer to the death punishment when humans carry it out (8:35; 
10:2, 6–7, 9; 15:31; 16:1–2, 13).521 Some texts are excluded from this claim for valid 
reasons. The death of an animal in Lev 11:39 is excluded due to the non-human subject. 
However, it is unknown why Kiuchi did not include Lev 22:9 in the list since the text 
uses the qal stem of מּות and refers to the death of the human being due to punishment for 
violating God’s regulations regarding the sanctity of the sanctuary. Leviticus 21:11 is a 
true exception to this since it uses the qal of the verb מּות and refers to a human who has 
died for unknown reasons.522 However, with Lev 21:11 most likely being the only 
exception, Kiuchi’s claim that death is viewed as punishment for violating God’s laws in 
 
519Levine, Numbers 1–20, 202. 
520Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1489. 
521Kiuchi did not count texts where the qal infinitive absolute of מּות was followed by hophal 
imperfect (Lev 20:2, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 27; 24:16, 17, 27:29). 
522Kiuchi stated that death in this text is not natural, but rather, results from the violation of God’s 
commandments. For more detailed interpretations, see Kiuchi, Leviticus, 395–96. 
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the book of Leviticus potentially emphasizes the presence of death as the punishment 
along with the punishment of י ירִּ י in Lev 20:20. Since ֲערִּ ירִּ  is the same punishment in ֲערִּ
Num 5:22, 27 and in agreement with death as the punishment for adultery elsewhere in 
the OT (Lev 18:20, 28; 19:20; 20:10–21; Deut 22:22–27),523 one could argue that ָנָׂשא ָעֹון 
could include the death penalty in the course of time if the suspected adulteress were 
proved liable for the adultery. 
Olaffson pointed that it is not clear if the phrase “to die childless” in Lev 20:20–
21 refers to the inability to have children or if their efforts to have children together 
would be unsuccessful because they will both die. In the context of the pericope and the 
punishments presented for illicit sexual behaviors the latter alternative is more suitable.524 
Regardless of the fact that the nature of punishment is still a matter of debate, it is 
nonetheless certain that punishment is envisioned in Num 5:31. 
The two additional cases (16) Num 18:1 and (18) Num 18:23 are similar, and 
none of them contains any explicit penalty. However, Num 18 deals with two dominant 
concerns that were anticipated in prior legislation: (1) laws concerning the purity of the 
sanctuary, its interior space and contents, including the priesthood, and (2) laws for the 
support/compensation for the priests and Levites and their families. The law of (16) Num 
18:1 belongs to the first concern and is specifically related to Exod 29:1–37; Lev 8–10; 
Num 3–4, and 8:5–26, while the law of (18) Num 18:23 is embedded in the second 
 
523Brichto and Harrison also pointed out the fact that punishment for adultery in OT narratives is 
infertility combined with the death sentence. Herbert Chanan Brichto, “The Case of the Śōtā and 
Reconsideration of Biblical ‘Law, ’” HUCA 46 (1975): 66; Harrison, Numbers, 113. 
524Olaffson, “The Use of nśʾ in the Pentateuch,” 177. 
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concern. The specific issue of these laws in Num 18 covers the duties of the priests and 
Levites.525 
The former are responsible for preserving the purity of the sanctuary and its 
contents by not allowing encroachment, which could have been done by priests’ entering 
it in the state of impurity (Lev 22:3)526 or by allowing a disqualified priest—blemished 
(Lev 21:23), inebriated (Lev 10:9), unwashed (Exod 30:20), improperly dressed (Exod 
28:43)—to officiate at the altar or enter the sanctuary. Priests are the only ones who could 
prevent some among them from entering the Most Holy place (Num 18:7) or if the high 
priest entered it without proper safeguards (Lev 16:2).527 The priest had access to the 
outer area of the Sanctuary and was punished by death if he encroached on the Sanctuary 
or allowed a non-Levite to commit such an offense (Num 18:3).528 In the light of the 
greater responsibility of the priesthood to guard the Sanctuary, the Most Holy, and the 
altar and the fact that the Levites who guarded the outside of the sanctuary would receive 
the death penalty if they failed, it is very difficult to claim that the punishment for priests 
would not be death, as well.529 In addition to this, the fact that previous legislation 
associated with potential violations envisioned in Num 18:1 stipulates kārēt (Lev 22:3; 
Lev 21:23–ָחַלל) or the death penalty (Lev 10:9; Exo 30:20; Exo 28:43; Lev 16:2, and Lev 
 
525Levine, Numbers 1–20, 435. 
526Levine, Numbers 1–20, 435–36. 
527Milgrom, Numbers, 146. 
528Levine, Numbers 1–20, 441; Milgrom, Numbers, 147. For a more precise analysis of what 
specifically guards priests and Levites, see Milgrom, Numbers, 147, 424. 
529John H. Walton, Victor H. Matthews, and Mark W. Chavalas, “Numbers,” in IVPBBCOT 




cf. v. 7) for the culprit also emphasizes the responsibility of the priests and Levites in 
relation to preventing its defilement. Case (18) Num 18:23 portrays the same 
phenomenon of implied punishment. That is, the punishment for an encroaching Israelite 
is death (Num 18:22), whereas the punishment for the Levite who failed to prevent this is 
not specified.530 Well’s suggestion that ָנָׂשא ָעֹון in these two texts has the role of 
designating who bears liability531 would be redundant in the light of the beginning of the 
verse, where Aaron was introduced and addressed. 
Case (20) Num 30:16 is a law that regulates the annulment of a woman’s vows 
and oaths. The law states that if a husband does not annul his wife’s vow or oath within 
the next 24 hours of hearing it,532 but annuls it afterwards, he will ָנָׁשא her ָעֹון if the 
vow/oath is not honored. Milgrom deduced from Num 30:6 that not fulfilling a vow or 
oath causes punishment for the culprit. That is, the unfulfilled vows or oaths are punished 
by God533 or in this case, forgiven by him. Wells admitted again that it is difficult to 
argue for any additional liability, as he did in relation to Lev 24:15, and the clarity of the 
text prevented him from proposing any possibility in favor of ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  having additional 
liability over punishment. He is right thought that the nature of punishment is not   
 
530Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1489. 
531Wells, “Liability in the Priestly Texts,” 30–31. Wells did acknowledge that ָנָׂשא ָעֹון refers to 
death punishment in these two texts, as well as others. 
532Milgrom, Numbers, 254; Levine, Numbers 21–36, 433. 
533Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1489. 
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specified;534 it is unknown and God implements it.535 
The phrase יאּו ּׂשִּ הִּ ָמה ֲעֹון אֹוָתם ו  ַאׁש   in case (11) Lev 22:16 would be rendered sin 
of guilt/reparation, which makes no sense. Rather, ָעֹון in this context, refers to 
punishment of guilt/reparation.536 
In addition, Milgrom found Schwartz’s proposal that bearing sin is a counterpart 
of being impure incorrect.537 The preposition bet is the bet of means, thus changing the 
translation of the texts which Schwartz translated from “in the sin” into “by means of 
(sin)” (Lev 26:39; Num 27:3; Ezek 4:17; 18:17, 19; 20; 33:6, and so on).538 Others also 
recognized that the bet of means or cause539 is a more accurate use/meaning of the 
preposition in these texts.540 
Finally, Schwartz argued that ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  in cases (7) Lev 20:17, (8) Lev 20:19, and 
(9) Lev 20:20 is analogous to ם ָבם ֵמיהֶּ  Lev 20:11, 12, 13).541 Milgrom added v. 16) ּד 
since this law also contains ם ָבם ֵמיהֶּ ם ָבם ,However 542.ּד  ֵמיהֶּ  is not a statement of ּד 
 
534Wells, “Liability in the Priestly Texts,” 23. 
535Milgrom, Numbers, 43, 254. 
536Kiuchi, Leviticus, 407; Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1489; Levine, Leviticus, 150; Levine, 
Numbers 21–36, 345; Budd, Numbers, 299; Dennis R. Cole, Numbers, NAC 3B (Nashville: Broadman & 
Holman, 2000), 464. 
537Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 14. 
538Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1489. 
539Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 198. 
540Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 946; Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1489; Levine, Leviticus, 98; Kiuchi, 
Leviticus, 284–85. 
541Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 14. 
542Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1489. 
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condition in Lev 20:11, 12, 13 and 16, but rather, provides the reason why the culprits are 
punished by the death penalty. Therefore, Milgrom stated, it cannot be analogous with 
ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  in cases (7) Lev 20:17, (8) Lev 20:19, and (9) Lev 20:20 since the phrase ֹוןעָ  ָנָׂשא  
has a role of a declaratory formula in these texts.543 Its role is to express that the culprits 
will be punished. 
Hartley, on the other hand, believed that ם ֵמיהֶּ ָבם ּד   and ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  both represent the 
declaratory formula in these laws. Their function is to underscore the certainty that the 
punishment will be executed. The death penalty qualified by the declaratory formula 
ם ֵמיהֶּ ָבם ּד   conveys two points: (1) the guilty are deserving of death, and (2) the executors 
of the penalty are not responsible for shedding blood.544 
It is also possible that the structure of the law in case (7) Lev 20:17 points to the 
meaning of the phrase ָעֹון ָנָׂשא . That is, the phrase ַוַ֧ת ר  ָּלָ֖ה ֲאֹח֛תֹו עֶּ ּגִּ  “he has uncovered his 
sister’s nakedness” is redundant at the end of this law. The phrase ָרָא֨ה ּה ו  ָוָתָ֜ ר  ת־עֶּ יא־  אֶּ ִֽ הִּ ו 
ה ֶ֤ אֶּ ר  ָותֹו   תִּ ר  ת־עֶּ אֶּ  “he sees her nakedness and she sees his nakedness” conveyed this 
already at the beginning of the law. However, the redundant phrase ַוַ֧ת ר  ָּלָ֖ה ֲאֹח֛תֹו עֶּ ּגִּ  “he 
has uncovered his sister’s nakedness” is followed by ָעֹון ָנָׂשא . I suggest (1) that the first 
clause of this redundant part, ַוַ֧ת ר  ָּלָ֖ה ֲאֹח֛תֹו עֶּ ּגִּ  “he has uncovered his sister’s nakedness” 
summarizes the entire law without punishment, and (2) that the second clause, the phrase 
 
543Hartley, Leviticus, 330–31; Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1754. 
544Hartley, Leviticus, 331. 
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 emphasizes the punishment, the fact that the man will be punished.545 ,ָנָׂשא ָעֹון
Thus, the subsequent law in v. 18, does not contain ָעֹון ָנָׂשא , but does include 
kārēt punishment; v. 19 does not state the exact penalty, but does have ָעֹון ָנָׂשא ; v. 20 
contains both the penalty and ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  in reverse order ( ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  first, penalty second); and 
v. 21 contains just the penalty. It seems that the author was not concerned about 
establishing a consistent pattern. Hildenbrand and Hartley presented a detailed study on 
the laws contained in Lev 20:17–21546 and agreed on two points: (1) the inconsistency in 
these laws has a role of a rhetorical force, and (2) ָנָׂשא ָעֹון refers to the penalty.547 
Based on the well supported proposal that some sort of death penalty is implied in 
all the laws in 20:17–21 and the structure of the law in v. 17, it might be that the author of 
the laws defined ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  in v. 17 as another way of expressing but not specifying a 
serious penalty that applies to all the laws in this pericope. Thus, wherever the penalty is 
not stated, (v. 19) ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  appears to ensure that the penalty is implied and will be 
 
545The fact that only the man ָנָׂשא ָעֹון, while both of them are cut off, is puzzling in this law. There 
are valid explanations for this. First, Gane’s quotation sheds light on the process of law administration in 
ancient Israel which was implemented by males. “In ancient Israel, legal matters were normally 
administered by males, and dependent females came under their legal protection and jurisdiction (cf. Num 
30). Men initiated marriage and divorce proceedings (e.g., Deut 24:1–4) and also charges of sexual 
misconduct, which could lead to capital punishment (cf. 22:13–21).” Second, Milgrom pointed out that 
LXX and Peshita read the plural “they” to refer to the punished ones as v. 19 reads plural. Milgrom, 
Leviticus 17–22, 1754. Both of them would be punished by the same punishment as it is stated in v. 19 for a 
similar illicit sexual activity. Wells, who tried to establish that ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  in P refers to additional liability 
separated from the punishment, was not able to find any additional liability that one was to bear, but the 
one stated in v. 17, that is, cut off. Wells, “Liability in the Priestly Texts,” 17–18. 
546Hildenbrand eloquently proved through a detailed structural study that Lev 20:17–21 is a 
distinct pericope. Hildenbrand, Structure and Theology, 160. 
547Hartley, Leviticus, 330–31; Hildenbrand, Structure and Theology, 160–61. 
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executed. In the cases where it shows up along with the penalty (v. 20), it emphasizes that 
the penalty will be executed. 
In the light of the three proposals, it seems clear that ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  basically refers to 
the punishment. It has two roles: sometimes it ensures that the punishment will be 
executed, and sometimes it refers to the implied punishment. 
Schwartz also supported his claim that ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  refers to the bearing of the sin as a 
load by quoting Ezek 16:58 and 23:35.548 However, Milgrom noted that taking ָּמה/ּתֹוֵעָבה  זִּ
as the object of ָנָׁשא makes no sense unless the punishment for these sins is implied.549 In 
reference to Ezek 16:58, Keil and Delitzsch noted that “the perfect ים ָׂשאתִּ  indicates that נ 
the certainty of the punishment is just as great as if it had already commenced.”550 They 
held that the same idea of punishment is projected in 23:35.551 A recognized Ezekiel 
scholar, Walther Zimmerli, saw a carrying of ּתֹוֵעָבה/ ָּמה  זִּ in both texts as equivalent to the 
punishment for these sins.552 The claim that the punishment is implied in these texts is 
strengthened even more by the historical and literary context of Ezek 16:53–63 which 
presupposes the destruction of Jerusalem.553 
 
548Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 14n46. 
549Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1490. 
550Carl Friedrich Keil and Franz Delitzsch, Biblical Commentary on the Prophecies of Ezekiel, 
BCOT 23 (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1952), 1:230. 
551Keil and Delitzsch, Biblical Commentary on the Prophecies of Ezekiel, 1:332. 
552Zimmerli, Ezekiel 1, 1:352, 491. 
553William H. Brownlee, Ezekiel 1–19, WBC 28 (Waco, TX: Thomas Nelson, 1998), 244; Leslie 
C. Allen, Ezekiel 20–48, WBC 29 (Waco, TX: Thomas Nelson, 1998), 50; Moshe Greenberg, Ezekiel 1–20, 
AB 22 (Garden City: Doubleday, 1983), 294; Moshe Greenberg, Ezekiel 21–37, AB 22A (New York: 
Doubleday, 1997), 490. 
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Milgrom’s definitions of ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  seem to state accurately the meaning presented 
in Lev 20, but is overstated when studied in the context of the entire Pentateuch:554 
nāśāʾ ʿāwôn is a nonexpiable, irremediable divine sentence. In all cases where the 
punishment is not stated, it is forthcoming—irrevocably. In the theological terms, 
perhaps one might say the punishment (usually mwt or kārēt, see above) expiates for 
the sin (explicitly, m. Yoma 8:8), but the punishment itself is unavoidable.555 
 
Gane pointed to a critical weakness of Schwartz’s proposal on the second use of 
ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  when somebody other than a sinner is the subject of the phrase. Schwartz 
proposed that the liability disappears when transferred to someone else.556 Following 
Claus Koch, Gane rightly pointed to the fact that there has to be a transfer of the 
liability/punishment from the sinner to the other party who receives the sinner’s 
liability/punishment, making the sinner free of liability, forgiven. The Pentateuchal texts 
state that the priests, as God’s representatives, temporarily ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  and eventually, the 
high priest confesses ָעֹון, transferring it over to the scapegoat.557 
In conclusion, even though Schwartz's proposal that the term ַׁשע/ ָחָטא /פֶּ ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  
refers to the state of guilt, thus representing consequential bearing of sin, is an eloquent 
attempt to suggest fresh meaning to the phrase. However, the weaknesses it contains 
make it indefensible so the traditional understanding of the phrase consisting of two 
meanings: “to forgive” and “punishment,” still remains a better option. That the 
 
554This meaning is challenged by texts like Exod 34:7; Num 14:18–19, 34. 
555Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1489–90. 
556Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 10; Gane, Cult and Character, 103. 
557Klaus Koch, “עון,” TDOT 10:559; Gane, Cult and Character, 103–4. 
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behavioral terms extend a consequential meaning so that the phrase can be translated as 
“punishment” or “God lifts his punishment” is well attested to in the Pentateuch/OT. 
Schwartz’s first point that some texts do not include punishment is not correct as 
was suggested above. Punishment is implied, explicitly or implicitly, in all the texts as it 
has been shown above. 
Second, the texts of the Pentateuch prove that the terms for sin, especially ָעֹון, 
refer to all three elements a sinful situation causes: an act, guilt, and punishment. Thus, 
one, two, or even all three elements are coextensive in the texts. Schwartz himself 
admitted that in 17 out of 22 occurrences, the phrase assumes punishment, either 
explicitly or implicitly; thus, ָנָׂשא ָעֹון and punishment are coextensive in Pentateuch.558 
Third, punishment is included in all texts, but it is not capital in every text. 
Fourth, the terms for sin combined with the verb ָנָׁשא refer to the sin as an act, but 
also to punishment. They do that in the texts that speak of the sin of commission and 
omission. Schwartz himself realized that there are texts that deal with the sins of 
commission, and yet, are punished by capital punishment. Taking ָעֹון as a term for sin 
only and always does not make sense because punishment is an obvious meaning in a 
number of texts. 
Fifth, ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  is not a counterpart of being ritually impure because the same 
preposition,   ב, has different meanings in Pentateuchal, as well as in other OT texts. 
Sixth, ָאַׁשם and ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  are not parallel in Lev 5:1–4 because ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  is not a 
 
558Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 12–13. 
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protasis, but an apodosis and thus ָאַׁשם and ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  do not refer to the psychological 
component of the process. Sins in vv. 1 and 4 and 2–3 are radically different. 
The proximity of the phrase with punishment in the majority of cases in Priestly 
tradition (17/22 times is based on Schwartz’s interpretation, but in reality, in all cases as 
suggested above) also confirms that ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  is another, emphatic way of saying that the 
sinner is being punished. It has to be emphasized that the punishment is not necessarily 
capital. The reason why some texts contain both explicit punishment and ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  is a 
matter of rhetorical effect. 
The remaining 14 non-priestly texts (Gen 4:13 ( ָעֹון ָנָׂשא ); 50:17 ( ַׁשע ָנָׂשא פֶּ  and 
) x2); Exod 10:17 ָחָטא ָנָׂשא ָחָטא ָנָׂשא ); 23:21 ( ַׁשע ָנָׂשא פֶּ ); 28:38 ( ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  ָחָטא) 32:32 ;(
) 34:7 ;(ָנָׂשא ֶּפַׁשע ,ָחָטא , and ָעֹון ) x3); Lev 10:17 ָנָׂשא  ָעֹון ָנָׂשא ); 16:22 ( ָעֹון ָנָׂשא ); and Num 
14:18 ( ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  and ַׁשעפֶּ  ָנָׂשא  x2) that employ the same and modified phrases are 
discussed in the first part of this subheading. Two meanings of the phrase that are 
employed in those texts are the same, “to punish” if the sinner is the subject of the phrase 
or “to forgive” in case other than the sinner is the subject of it. 
 
Insights from Olaffson’s Work on ָעֹון  ָנָׂשא  
These aspects of the verb ָנָׁשא that went unnoticed by the previous lexical listings 
prior to Olaffson’s research are fully recognized in the lexicons published subsequent to 
Olaffson’s dissertation defense in 1993. In particular, DCH, in addition to recognizing the 
main points Olaffson discovered, also clearly lists that “to suffer punishment for,” or “to 
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forgive,” “to pardon,”559 “to be forgiven of”560 are semantic domain of the verb ָנָׁשא. 
HALOT and NIDOTTE listed both of these meanings as a semantic domains of the verb 
 In addition, all these lexicons provide ANE background for the meanings they 561.ָנָׁשא
suggested. 
I am referring to Olaffson’s work here to provide rationale for the claim that the 
meanings “to forgive” and “to suffer punishment” are included in the semantic domains 
of the verb ָנָׁשא. His work seems to be the most detailed work on discerning the semantic 
domains of ָנָׁשא. In addition, I also follow Olaffson’s approach since the contextual 
seems to be the most complete way to find out the meaning of the word/verb within the 
biblical literature. Examining the distribution of ָנָׁשא in the Pentateuch, Olaffson noticed 
that 
All the morphological, syntactical, and contextual evidence seems to point to a single, 
very flexible and neutral root which is fairly evenly distributed throughout of all the 
OT, without any significant difference noted between individual books and sections. 
… No noticeable development was detected in the OT writings relating to time, 
authorship, or sources.562 
 
The diversity of ָנָׁשא uses in the Pentateuch itself is demonstrated by use in two 
basic groups of passages, cultic and non-cultic. As it is used in the rest of the OT, the 
Pentateuch also uses  ָנָׁשא in a literal (45 times or 27.2%) and metaphorical (124 times or 
 
559DCH 5, s.v. “נׂשא.” 
560DCH 5, s.v. “נׂשא.” 
561HALOT, s.v. “נׂשא”; Victor Hamilton, “נׂשא,” NIDOTTE 3:161–65. 
562Olaffson, “The Use of nśʾ in the Pentateuch,” 121. For details on the distribution of ָנָׁשא, see 
Olaffson, “The Use of nśʾ in the Pentateuch,” 79–120. 
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72.8%) sense. These two shades of meaning, along with the others, are not discernable by 
a characteristic pattern, but are rather solely dependent on the context.563 
Olaffson delineated 5 categories of ָנָׁשא uses in the Pentateuch. The two most 
common aspects of  ָאָנׁש  are (1) transport and (2) support. However, idiomatic 
expressions indicating (3) utilization of tools or parts of the human body and (4) 
interpersonal relations are quite frequent. Finally, there is (5) dealing with sin and 
wrongdoings.564 The last one is of special interest to this study, along with the 4th one 
since it occasionally represents the context for the 5th one. 
When ָנָׁשא is used with the terms for sin, the key concern is the consequences 
which depend on who the subject of ָנָׁשא was. The subject may either be (1) the sinner 
himself/herself or (2) someone else who bears the sinner’s sin.565 In regard to the fact that 
the context suggests different meanings depending on who the subject of the phrase was, 
Knierim asked a valid question: 
Liegen hier zwei verschiedene Vorgänge zugrunde, so dass die Konformität der 
Bezeichnung rein zufallig und darum unsere herkommlich verschiedene Ubersetzung 
der vorgange sachlich richting ist? Oder Druckt die Wendung beidemal vor allen den 
gleichen Grundvorgang der Wendung, sondern nur asu dem Zusammenhang 




563Olaffson, “The Use of nśʾ in the Pentateuch,” 120–21. 
564Olaffson, “The Use of nśʾ in the Pentateuch,” 123. 
565Olaffson, “The Use of nśʾ in the Pentateuch,” 169. 
566Are there two different processes underlying this so that the conformity of the designation is 
purely coincidental and therefore, our traditionally different translation of the process is objective? Or does 
the phrase in both cases equalize, above all, the same basic process of the phrase, but can only be deduced 
from the context? Personal translation. 
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Sinner Is the Subject of ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  
There are 19 texts in which the sinner ָנָׁשא his or her own sin. They demonstrate 
that the sinner who commits sin/wrongdoing either knowingly or inadvertently has to 
bear it (see Table 10). 
 
 
Table 10. ָנָׂשא ָעֹון text based on Olaffson’s research567 
 



















1. Lev 5:1 
“Now if a person 
sins after he 
hears a public 
adjuration to 
testify when he is 
a witness, 
whether he has 
seen or otherwise 
known, if he 
does not tell it, 
then he will bear 
his guilt.” 
 
2. Lev 5:17 
“Now if a person 
sins and does 
any of the things 
which the LORD 
has commanded 
not to be done, 
though he was 
unaware, still he 
is guilty and 
shall bear his 
punishment.” 
1. Lev 7:18 
2. Lev 19:8 
3. Lev 22:16 
4. Lev 22:9 
5. Num 18:32 
6. Lev 17:16 
1. Exod 28:43 1. Lev 20:17 
2. Lev 20:19 
3. Lev 20:20 
4. Num 5:31 
1. Lev 24:15 
2. Num 14:34 
3. Num 18:22 
4. Num 9:13 
1. Lev 19:17 
2. Gen 4:13 
  
 
567Olaffson, “The Use of nśʾ in the Pentateuch,” 176. 
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The ultimate consequence of such bearing is death.568 Olaffson’s research showed 
that the difference between the deed and its consequences is not clear, thus confirming 
that the findings of the previous scholars on the topic such as Knierim and others569 seem 
to be correct.570 His conclusion was that in these contexts, ָנָׂשא ָעֹון refers to a twofold 
picture which includes that the one who commits sin acted against God and as a 
consequence, has to bear the effects of his or her actions. This bearing involves 
“Eingeständnis eigener Schuld und Einsicht in die Strafe—acknowledgement of one’s 
guilt and insight into punishment.”571 The phrase indicates (1) the sinner’s responsibility 
for his or her sin and (2) the impending punishment that the sin assumes. In 3 out of 19 
contexts, the punishment is not capital, even though it might become that (Lev 5:1, 17; 
19:17), while in 16 out 19 contexts, the punishment is capital whether explicitly stated 
(11 times) or implicitly indicated or based on intertextuality (5 times).572 “nāśāʿāwon, can 
state the consequences for a number of different wrongdoings. When it does, it often 
takes the place of a specific punishment. That is, the expression can be used to mean that 
a person will be punished without specifying the exact nature of the punishment.”573  
 
568Olaffson, “The Use of nśʾ in the Pentateuch,” 173. 
569See page 144–146 of the present study. 
570Olaffson, “The Use of nśʾ in the Pentateuch,” 174. 
571Freedman, Willoughby, and Fabry, “נׂשא,” TWAT, 5:633. 
572For a detailed table that reflect this statistic, see Olaffson, “The Use of nśʾ in the Pentateuch,” 
176. 
573Wells, The Law of Testimony, 161. 
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Another Party Is the Subject of ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  
There are 16 texts in which the subject of ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  is someone other than the 
sinner. In 11 of them, a human being is subject of the verb, whereas God was the subject 
in 4 of them and in 1 of them, an animal is the subject.574 Table 11 contains all the texts. 
The texts will be commented on as grouped in Table 11. Thus, the texts in which 
the subject of ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  is human will be commented on first, followed by the texts where 
an animal is the subject of the phrase, and finally, the texts wherein God or divine beings 
are the subject. 
 
ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  with Human Subject. A study of these texts reveals several activities 
related to the verb ָנָׁשא. First, the priests and Levites were appointed to bear, within the 
confines of the sanctuary, the wrongdoings of the people and priesthood against the 
sanctuary’s sanctity. There are a number of interpretations of what, exactly, the “ ן ת־ֲעֹוֹ֣  אֶּ
ׁש ָּדָ֑ ק  “ or ”ַהּמִּ ן ת־ֲעֹוֹ֥ ם אֶּ ִֽ כֶּ ֻהַּנת  כ  ” in Num 18:1, 23 are. Knierim believed that the phrases 
point to every conscious or unconscious act done by the people against the sanctuary or 
the priesthood.575 This means that if a non-Levite tried to enter the sanctuary, divine 
anger would break out against both the Levites and non-Levites who attempted to enter 
the sanctuary, violating its sanctity. God would hold the priests responsible for preventing  
 
574Olaffson started off by saying that there are eighteen of these passages, but in reality, there are 
sixteen. Two of them have the phrase used twice in them, Gen 50:17 and Num 18:1. Olaffson, “The Use of 
nśʾ in the Pentateuch,” 179. 
575Knierim, Die Hauptbegriffe für Sünde im Alten Testament, 242. Philip J. Budd thought that it 
referred to “the penalty for all ritual errors,” which would mean that the priests were fully responsible for 
every aspect of priestly ministry. Budd, Numbers, 205. 
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Table 11. Someone else but the sinner is the subject of ָנָׂשא ָעֹון/bears sin576 
 
Someone Else Other Than the Sinner Bears Sin 
Human Being 
General Functions of the 
Priests 
Transport by Eating Canceled Vow General Wrongdoings 
1. Num 18:1 x2 
 
So, the LORD said to 
Aaron, “You and your sons 
and your father’s household 
with you shall bear the guilt 
in connection with the 
sanctuary, and you and your 
sons with you shall bear the 
guilt in connection with 
your priesthood.” 
 
2. Num 18:23 
 
Only the Levites shall 
perform the service of the 
tent of meeting, and they 
shall bear their iniquity; it 
shall be a perpetual statute 
throughout your 
generations, and among the 
sons of Israel they shall 
have no inheritance. 
 
3. Exod 28:12 
 
You shall put the two stones 
on the shoulder pieces of the 
ephod, as stones of 
memorial for the sons of 
Israel, and Aaron shall bear 
their names before the 
LORD on his two shoulders 
for a memorial. 
1. Lev 10:17 
 
Why did you not eat 
the sin offering at 
the holy place? For 
it is most holy, and 
He gave it to you to 
bear away the guilt 
of the congregation, 
to make atonement 
for them before the 
LORD. 
1. Num 30:15 
 
But if he indeed 
annuls them after 
he has heard them, 
then he shall bear 
her guilt.” 
1. Gen 50:17 x2 
 
Thus, you shall say to 
Joseph, “Please forgive, I 
beg you, the transgression 
of your brothers and their 
sin, for they did you 
wrong. And now, please 
forgive the transgression of 
the servants of the God of 
your father.” And Joseph 
wept when they spoke to 
him. 
 
2. Exod 10:17 
Now therefore, please 
forgive my sin only this 
once, and make 
supplication to the LORD 
your God, that He would 
only remove this death 
from me. 
 
3. Num 14:33 
Your sons shall be 
shepherds for forty years in 
the wilderness, and they 
will suffer for your 
unfaithfulness, until your 









4. Exod 28:29 
 
Aaron shall carry the names 
of the sons of Israel in the 
breastpiece of judgment 
over his heart when he 
enters the holy place, for a 
memorial before the LORD 
continually. 
 
5. Exod 28:30 
 
You shall put in the 
breastpiece of judgment the 
Urim and the Thummim, 
and they shall be over 
Aaron’s heart when he goes 
in before the LORD; and 
Aaron shall carry the 
judgment of the sons of 
Israel over his heart before 
the LORD continually. 
 
6. Exod 28:38 
It shall be on Aaron’s 
forehead, and Aaron shall 
take away the iniquity of the 
holy things which the sons 
of Israel consecrate, with 
regard to all their holy gifts; 
and it shall always be on his 
forehead, that they may be 
accepted before the LORD. 
Animal God and Heavenly Beings 
Confession of Faith Intercessory 
Plea 
A Warning 
1. Lev 16:22 
The goat shall 
bear on itself 
all their 
iniquities to a 
solitary land; 
and he shall 
release the 
goat in the 
wilderness. 
1. Exod 34:7–8 
Then the LORD 
passed by in front 
of him and 
proclaimed, “The 
LORD, the LORD 
God, 
compassionate and 









sin; yet He will by 
no means leave the 
guilty unpunished, 
visiting the iniquity 
of fathers on the 
children and on the 
grandchildren to 






returned to the 
LORD, and 
said, “Alas, this 
people has 
committed a 
great sin, and 
they have made 
a god of gold 
for 
themselves.32 
But now, if You 
will, forgive 
their sin — and 
if not, please 
blot me out 
from Your book 
which You have 
written!” 
1. Exod 23:21 
Be on your 
guard before 
him and obey 













an attempt of a non-priest or Levite to encroach on a priestly prerogative.577 In the 
context of the rebellion in Num 17, the regulations in Num 18:1, 23 are the assurance to 
the rest of the people that they would be released from the consequences for the violation 
of the sanctuary’s sanctity. The culprit would be punished, but the rest of the people 
would be released from the punishment. Keil and Delitzsch emphasized the nuance of 
 
577Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 652; Milgrom, Numbers, 146, 155, 423–24. 
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this interpretation, that the Levites and priests were to take upon themselves and remove 
the guilt brought upon the sanctuary by the sins of the people and their holy gifts (Exod 
28:38), “contaminated” by the giver’s sinfulness.578 
The next group of texts from Exod 28 that discuss the various parts of the priestly 
garments and their function in the sanctuary services seems to support this point. There is 
in v. 12 a description of two stones engraved with the names of the sons of Israel that 
were fastened to Aaron’s shoulders. Verse 29 mentions the breastplate and the stones, but 
this time, each tribe had its name engraved on a stone. The high priest would “bear their 
names” on his shoulders and heart as he entered God’s presence as their representative579 
and substitute.580 
The entire chapter of Exod 28 in general, and especially v. 30, which talks about 
the Urim and Thummim in the breastplate and v. 38 that speaks about the golden plate on 
Aaron’s forehead, point to the fact that the carrying process is related to the people’s 
wrongdoings. The function of the former one is for Aaron “to bear the judgments” of the 
people over his heart, and of the latter, that he may “bear their iniquity” before the Lord. 
In light of the inseparable connection between sin and its punishment in Ancient 
Israel, these two phrases are almost synonymous. Judgment related to the Urim and 
Thummim is the result of the people’s wrongdoings, whereas the iniquities associated 
with the golden plate caused that judgment. By bearing these articles, Aaron identified 
 
578Carl Friedrich Keil and Franz Delitzsch, The Pentateuch, BCOT (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 
1952), 2:315–16.  
579Keil and Delitzsch, The Pentateuch, 2:195; Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 54; Douglas K. Stuart, 
Exodus, NAC 2 (Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 2006), 609, 611. 
580Olaffson, “The Use of nśʾ in the Pentateuch,” 185. 
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himself with the people’s wrongdoings as he entered God’s presence on the people’s 
behalf. He symbolically carried the people’s wrongdoings on his body before the Lord. 
These articles signified the mediating aspect of the high priestly office, along with a 
substitutionary character.581 
Olaffson found confirmation for this interpretation of the articles from Exod 28 in 
Lev 10:17. That is, the priest was to eat the sin offering (Lev 6:19 [26]), but Eleazar and 
Ithamar failed to do that, and Moses rebuked them for not performing their priestly duties 
properly. Eating had a symbolic meaning of acceptance and/or relationship, and even 
identification with someone.582 Thus, when the priest ate the sacrifice, he symbolically 
made it part of himself, taking upon himself its function to ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  of the people into the 
sanctuary to make atonement on behalf of the congregation. He became a substitute for 
the sinners and literally carried their wrongdoing in his body.583 Thus,  ָנָׂשא ָעֹון seems to 
be a significant element of the ר פֶּ  process without necessarily being synonymous with כִּ
it.584 
Numbers 30:15 is the only text in the Pentateuch that explicitly spells out the 
alternative of a person ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  of another person, thus providing forgiveness to the latter. 
This law treats the sanctity of vows and seems to be indirectly related to the cult. The key 
 
581Olaffson, “The Use of nśʾ in the Pentateuch,” 187–88. 
582Johannes Pedersen, Israel: Its Life and Culture (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1991), 2:334. 
583Olaffson, “The Use of nśʾ in the Pentateuch,” 190; Gerhard Hasel, “Studies in Biblical 
Atonement-I: Continual Sacrifice, Defilement//Cleansing, and Sanctuary,” in The Sanctuary and the 
Atonement: Theological and Historical Studies, ed. Frank B. Holbrook (Silver Spring, MD: Biblical 
Research Institute, 1989), 103–6. 
584Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 98–99. 
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standard portrayed in the law is that regardless of the gender of the one who makes the 
vow, it has to be honored (v. 2). The husband of a married woman can annul or confirm 
her vow (v. 13). In case he decides the former, he has to do it within a certain time limit, 
and the Lord would forgive (ָסַלח) the wife (v. 12). If he did that outside of the time 
constraints, then he would ָנָׂשא ָעֹון his wife.585 
The similar point is found in the following 2 passages (Gen 50:17 x2, Exo 10:17) 
in the Pentateuch which are not related to the cult. All 3 times the wrongdoer/s plead with 
the wronged party to ָנָׁשא their ָעֹון so that the former can avoid the consequences of his or 
her actions. In Gen 50:17, Joseph’s brothers asked him to bear the wrongdoing they had 
done to him from their relationship so that there would not be any obstacle or threat to 
their relationship. It was evident that neither the wrong nor its effects could be revoked, 
but regardless, Joseph responded in a way that showed that he would ָנָׁשא their ָעֹון (v. 
21). He comforted them, spoke kindly to them, and obliged himself to provide for their 
needs. Thus, the integral concern of ָנָׁשא in this instance is the care for the party that had 
committed the wrong.586 
The context of Exod 10:17 is the eighth plague due to Pharaoh’s opposition to 
God’s instructions. After his command in v. 16, Moses and Aaron were summoned 
before Pharaoh. He admitted his sin and pleaded for forgiveness. He asked Moses to  ָנָׂשא
 so that the consequences of his sin, the eighth plague, could be removed from ַחָּטאת
 
585Olaffson, “The Use of nśʾ in the Pentateuch,” 191–92. 
586Olaffson, “The Use of nśʾ in the Pentateuch,” 192–93. 
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Egypt. Subsequently, Moses prayed to God and God removed (ָנָׁשא) the locusts.587 
The inference from both of these texts is that the entire process of removing the 
effects of the wrongdoing is based entirely on the goodwill of the wronged party towards 
the wrongdoer. The final outcome is that the guilty party is freed from the consequences 
of his or her actions while the wronged party or the substitute takes on the burden of 
wrong.  
Finally, no removal or carrying of the wrongs of others on their behalf is involved 
in the last passage, Num 14:33, but rather the emphasis is on the communal sharing of the 
consequences of wrong actions. The context of Num 14 is the reaction of the people of 
Israel on the report the spies brought about the Promised Land. The people grumbled 
against Moses (v. 2–3) and the whole congregation called for the stoning of Joshua and 
Caleb as they suggested that the people should follow God’s leadership (v. 10). This 
attitude translates into rejection of a covenantal relationship (Deut 31:20) and rejection of 
God’s leadership (v. 4). Even though they were forgiven (v. 20), they were not allowed to 
enter the Promised Land.588 They received a mitigated punishment. 
In particular, out of the 5 groups589 involved in the incident, all of them were 
affected differently. In the sense of bearing the consequences of their actions, special 
emphasis was placed on 3 groups of people: (1) the 10 spies who caused grumbling;   
 
587Olaffson, “The Use of nśʾ in the Pentateuch,” 193. 
588Olaffson, “The Use of nśʾ in the Pentateuch,” 195. 
589The first group consists of the ten spies and the second, of the remaining two spies. Those who 
were twenty years of age of older when they left Egypt belong to the third, while those younger than twenty 
at the time of the Exodus belong to the fourth group. Finally, the fifth group consists of priest and Levites. 
Olaffson, “The Use of nśʾ in the Pentateuch,” 196. 
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(2) the grumbling crowd; (3) the faithful spies, Joshua and Caleb; (4) the descendants of 
the grumblers, and (5) the priests and Levites. The first two groups cut themselves from 
the covenant by their own free choice. The 10 spies, as the initiators of the grumbling, 
died shortly after the incident (14:36–37). The grumblers lost their inheritance suffering, 
just a less severe punishment. Even though not having negative effects in the incident, but 
still being a part of the corporate body of Israel, the third group also suffered 
consequences. That is, their entrance into the Promised Land was delayed; ultimately, 
they received fulfillment of the promise. They had to bear the consequences by remaining 
with the wrongdoers in the wilderness until the whole generation died. The younger 
generation did not become co-guilty with the older one, nor was the older generation 
released from their guilt, but rather, the younger generation became co-sharers of the 
consequences. 
 
ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  with Animal as the Subject. Out of 5 texts wherein the subject of ָנָׁשא is 
an animal,590 only 1 is directly related to the removal of sins in the sanctuary, Lev 16:22. 
The meaning and function of “the goat for Azazel” is hotly debated in scholarly 
research591 with no consensus in sight. Wenham seemed to propose inclusive and general 
evaluation on the question: “Whatever we understand by Azazel, there is a little doubt 
about the total meaning of the ceremony … it all comes back to the same idea: that sin is 
exterminated from Israel.”592 
 
590Gen 37:25, 45:23 x2; Num 23:24; Lev 16:22. 
591Wright, The Disposal of Impurity, 21–30. 
592Wenham, The Book of Leviticus, 235. 
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The main concern of the current research is which sins are dealt with in this ritual. 
Does the goat for Azazel bear away unconfessed sins593 or the totality of the confessed 
sins of the Israelites?594 Rodríguez argued for the latter alternative, which seems to be 
supported by the straightforward reading of Lev 16.595 I addressed this question below in 
greater detail on page 376–79 of the present study. 
Lev 16 explicitly states that the high priest confesses the accumulated sins from 
the sanctuary and potentially the ones that the priest himself bears over the head of the 
goat for Azazel, thus transferring them to it so that the goat could bear them away from 
the camp into the wilderness. In this way, the sins of the people were removed from the 
sanctuary (v. 20) and the camp.596 Olaffson further claimed three points regarding the 
Azazel goat ritual: (1) forgiveness is nowhere mentioned in connection with the Day of 
Atonement ritual, (2) the goat for Azazel was not killed, nor was its death a part of 
sanctuary symbolism, and (3) the goat was not a sacrifice prepared for Azazel. Its only 
role in the ritual was the one of a vehicle of transport for the sins of Israel from a 
populated area to a place they cannot threaten Israelites.597 Thus, Olaffson saw the ָעֹון 
 .of the goat for Azazel as purely removal with no traces of the concept of forgiveness ָנָׂשא
This conclusion is heavily influenced by the interpretation of the ritual itself and will be 
discussed at multiple occasions of the present study. 
 
593Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 1040. 
594Rodríguez, “Substitution in the Hebrew Cultus,” 117. 
595Rodríguez, “Substitution in the Hebrew Cultus,” 117–20. 
596Olaffson, “The Use of nśʾ in the Pentateuch,” 201. 
597Olaffson, “The Use of nśʾ in the Pentateuch,” 201–2. 
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ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  with God or Divine Beings as Subject. There are 4 texts in this 
category. Two of them are liturgical declarations or possibly confessions of faith598 and 
are focused on God’s character (Exod 34:6–7; Num 14:18). One is part of an intercessory 
prayer (Exod 32:31–32) and one is a form of a warning (Exod 23:31).599 
Scholars usually refer to Exod 34:6–7 as a “Sinaitic theophany”600 which appears 
to be the basis for other liturgical confessions frequently used in the OT.601 This text is 
propositional in its nature. It is not concerned with God’s acts, but rather, with his 
character.602 The key part of this passage is “ַחָּטה ַׁשע ו   As already shown 603”.ֹנֵׂשא ָעֹון ָופֶּ
above, scholars considered the three key terms for sin in the OT to convey universality or 
totality of sin and not just a specific nuance that each of these terms could refer to.604 In 
 
598Robert C. Dentan, “Literary Affinities of Exodus XXXIV 6f,” VT 13 (1963): 37. 
599Olaffson, “The Use of nśʾ in the Pentateuch,” 202. 
600Dawn Elizabeth Waring, “The Nature of Yahweh’s Relationship with His People: A Literary 
Analysis of Exodus 32–34” (PhD diss., Fuller Theological Seminary, 1985), 169–88. 
601At least eight passages show lexical connection with Exod 34:6–7: Num 14:18, Neh 9:17, Pss 
86:5; 103:8; 145:8, Joel 2:13, Jonah 4:2, and Neh1:3. R. W. L. Moberly, At the Mountain of God: Story and 
Theology in Exodus 32–34, JSOTSupp 22 (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1983), 128–31. 
602Dentan, “Literary Affinities,” 48; G. Ernest Wright, “The Divine Name and the Divine Nature,” 
Perspective 12 (1971): 177; W. Ross Blackburn, The God Who Makes Himself Known: The Missionary 
Heart of the Book of Exodus (Downers Grove, IL: Apollos, 2012), 153. 
603Exod 34:6–7 is one of the texts in the OT that poses the problem associated with the 
relationship between God’s mercy and his righteousness. Blackburn, The God Who Makes Himself Known, 
154. Even though, the phrase “ ַׁשע ָעֹון ֹנֵׂשא ַחָּטָאה ָופֶּ ו  ” is crucial in this regard since it represents the first part 
of the equation. The debate on that topic will not be included here because it goes beyond the scope of this 
study.  
604Knierim, Die Hauptbegriffe für Sünde im Alten Testament, 233; Johannes Pedersen, Israel: Its 
Life and Culture (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1991), 1:414. 
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other words, this triad refers to all sins. The whole phrase literally refers “to the one who 
carries/removes sin.”605 
The use of a participle of ָנָׁשא is noteworthy since it “as a verbal adjective the 
participle tends to describe a state of affairs rather than to present a bare event” or “a 
continuing state of affairs.”606 Accordingly, God is presented as constantly bearing the sin 
of his people, subjecting himself to its consequences. As a result of this, the people 
continue to live and enjoy God’s guidance and protection.607 On the other hand, God’s 
bearing of people’s sin does not include annulment of the consequence nor declaration of 
people’s innocence. This is confirmed in the account of the spies.608 Although, Moses 
pleaded that God would ָסַלח the people’s sin just as he had ָנָׁשא them from Egypt 
onward609 and God did not forgive them, they had to suffer the consequences of their sin. 
On the other hand, God’s bearing of the people’s sin involves the participation 
and support of the one who bears sin in the sinner’s suffering.610 God’s direct speech in v. 
11 reveals the attitude of the people that caused them to reject him. It reads: “The LORD 
said to Moses, ‘How long will this people spurn Me? And how long will they not believe 
in Me, despite all the signs which I have performed in their midst?’” All the piel uses of 
the verb ָנַאץ (nāʾaṣ) in the OT “refer without exception to the despising and spurning of 
 
605Olaffson, “The Use of nśʾ in the Pentateuch,” 208. 
606Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 614, 626. 
607Olaffson, “The Use of nśʾ in the Pentateuch,” 208–9. 
608Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 84–85. 
609Olaffson, “The Use of nśʾ in the Pentateuch,” 210. 
610Olaffson, “The Use of nśʾ in the Pentateuch,” 209. 
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God or something sacred to him. The contexts suggest that the action is regarded as 
tantamount to rejection of the whole covenant relationship.”611 
Thus, God’s pronouncement of judgment over the people did not happen as a 
result of an arbitrary unleashing of his temper, but rather, it was an expression of an 
unavoidable outcome of the people’s decision to reject him. Moses interceded not 
because injustice was done toward people by God or that God acted arbitrarily in his 
judgment, but exclusively on the basis of his nature, especially ד סֶּ ד Based on .חֶּ סֶּ  God ,חֶּ
is able to preserve a relationship that he has already created. The passage does not 
indicate that forgetting or removing the consequences is a part of the concept of 
forgiveness. It seems to be a more relational experience in which the forgiving party 
removes the barrier that hinders the relationship with the forgiven party in order to restore 
or maintain it. Sakenfeld seemed to be on point when she commented on forgiveness in 
this context: 
[Forgiveness] has to do with the preservation of the fundamental covenantal 
relationship rather than simply with eliminating some particular act of punishment (e. 
g. Jer 5:1, 7; 31:34; 50:20) … Forgiveness is understood basically as preservation of 
the community, and this preservation need not be precluded or even cheapened by the 
punishment of the community while the relationship is being continued.612 
 
The last text where God is the subject of ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  is a warning to the people about 
the danger of rebelling against God’s angel which God promised to send to guard them as 
they wandered in the desert. The identity of the angel mentioned in this narrative is 
closely associated to God himself. This narrative contains God’s announcement that his 
 
611Katharine Sakenfeld, The Meaning of Hesed in the Hebrew Bible: A New Inquiry (Missoula, 
MT: Scholars Press, 1978), 321. 
612Sakenfeld, The Meaning of Hesed in the Hebrew Bible, 327. 
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name would be in this angel (v. 21). Douglas Stuart noticed multiple references which 
provide the ground for the inference that a name can mean presence or identity (Exod 
20:24; Num 6:27; Deut 18:19–20; 2 Sam 7:13; I Kgs 8:16; 2 Kgs 21:7; Jer 7:10–12.) In 
addition, the phrases “what he says,” referring to the angel’s words, and “all that I say,” 
(v. 22) referring to God’s words, are treated syntactically as synonymous.613 In the same 
venue, Gerhard von Rad suggested that the angel was “the personification of Yahweh’s 
assistance to Israel” and it is frequently impossible to make a difference between God 
himself and the angel of the Lord.614 Rebellion against this angel is paralleled with the 
rebellion against God himself and will not be forgiven, ָנָׁשא. This is the only passage in 
the Pentateuch where ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  is not provided regardless of the fact that in all the previous 
3 passages, God agreed to ָנָׂשא ָעֹון of the people.615 
There is another passage in Deut 29:20 where ָסַלח is used and forgiveness is not 
granted. Here a law regulates the punishment for an idolater who exhibits a rebellious 
attitude toward the God of Israel that leads to worshipping other gods.616 The reason why 
God cannot ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  such individuals is simply because they rejected him. They turned to 
other gods and disregarded him.617 These individuals chose to ָנָׁשא their own ָעֹון and 
 
613Keil and Delitzsch, The Pentateuch, 2:152; Stuart, Exodus, 544–45; John H. Walton, Victor H. 
Matthews, and Mark W. Chavalas, “Exodus,” in IVPBBCOT (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 
2000), 103–4; Alan R. Cole, Exodus, TOTC 2 (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2008), 190. 
614Gerhard von Rad, “ַמלָא ְך in the OT,” TDNT 1:77–78. 
615Olaffson, “The Use of nśʾ in the Pentateuch,” 213. 
616Olaffson, “The Use of nśʾ in the Pentateuch,” 213–15. 
617Olaffson, “The Use of nśʾ in the Pentateuch,” 215. 
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die.618 Thus, open, conscious, and intentional rebellion also belongs to the group of sins 
that are punishable by various sorts of capital punishment for which forgiveness is not 
available. 
Olaffson’s research on the meaning of ַׁשע/ ָחָטא /פֶּ ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  showed that “to forgive” 
is the semantic domain of the phrase. He did not see the forgiveness element in Lev 
16:22, but as it was pointed out at the beginning of the previous subheading, this ritual 
activity sealed the forgiveness process that had begun in the sinner’s private and daily 
sacrifices. 
It is noteworthy to mention that neither Schwartz nor Olaffson emphasized any 
difference if the ָנָׁשא was used with different terms for sin, but they both took these to 
refer to be sin in general.619 
 
Conclusion on the Study of ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  
Thus, based on the study of ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  just presented, it becomes obvious that a 
human being, animal/s, or God can be the subject of the verb ָנָׁשא when it is associated 
with sins of others. The key principle that proceeds from this study is that whoever 
commits sin/does not live in accordance with God’s revealed standards is guilty and must 
bear, ָנָׁשא consequences for it, which includes punishment. Ultimately, that person suffers 
death. The punishment is fixed in most cases where sinners ָנָׁשא their own sin. 
However, because God is presented as a loving God in the OT, some incidents 
 
618Olaffson, “The Use of nśʾ in the Pentateuch,” 216. 
619Olaffson, “The Use of nśʾ in the Pentateuch,” 173, 179–80. 
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that involve sin are repairable. Thus, priests and Levites are appointed and are able to 
ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  of the people, thus releasing them from the consequences that would result in 
their death. When a priest officiated a sin offering on behalf of someone else, he ate the 
meat of the offering, thus making it part of himself, whereas in other cases, he would 
function as a substitute for the people by wearing stones in his vestments along with the 
golden plate on his forehead. In this way, he carried the sins of the people and provided 
for their acceptance before God. 
A unique ritual on the Day of Atonement included sending the goat for Azazel, 
into the wilderness, loaded with the forgiven sins of the people that were accumulated in 
the sanctuary. This activity on a yearly basis sealed the forgiveness process that began on 
a daily basis in the experience of the sinner. 
A husband could provide forgiveness for the obligation of the vow made by 
dependents of his home by taking the responsibility of the vow on himself. The wronged 
party could decide to ןָעֹו ָנָׂשא  of the wronged party and remove it from the relationship. 
Individuals could ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  of the others without being held guilty or releasing the 
wronged party from his or her punishment. Finally, individuals could be instrumental in 
removing the consequence of the others’ sin by taking them to God in prayer who is the 
ultimate sin bearer. Conclusively, these tests show that forgiveness is one of the semantic 
domains of the verb ָנָׁשא. 
 
The Root ָחָטא as a Key Term for Sin in the OT 
Based on the major lexicons and dictionaries, with slightly different outcomes, the 
root חטא with its derivatives is most frequently associated with the concept of sin in the 
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OT. The term occurs 591,620 593,621 595,622 or even 605623 times in the OT. This statistic 
makes חטא stand out from all other terms that refer to sin and indicate that it is the most 
important term for the concept of sin in the OT.624 
The basic, literal meaning of the verb ָחָטא is “to miss (a mark),” but, apart from a 
few exceptions, the root is only used figuratively in religious contexts. The term marks 
particular acts such as crimes or errors, and for that reason, is considered a general or 
comprehensive term for sin.625 It conveys a sin or error of a person against another person 
or a person against God.626 Quell has pointed out that this word is preferred to other 
words because “this root conveyed a clear, objective picture to the mind, with no 
reference to motive, or to the inner quality of the sinful behavior.”627 
This characteristic of the term results from the fact that the verbal form is 
frequently utilized in various formulaic usages that refer to various sort of errors. Thus, 
the verb is found 30 times in the context of individual sins with the characteristic phrase, 
“I have sinned,” in confessions after (sacral or profane) legal sentencing (Josh 7:20; 1   
 
620Youngblood, “A New Look,” 202. 
621Luc, “חטא,” NIDOTTE 2:87. 
622Knierim, “חטא,” TLOT 1:406; Cover, “Sin, Sinners,” ABD 6:32. 
623Accordance Bible. 
624Robinson, “Terminological Study,” 119; Knierim, “חטא,” TLOT 1:410; Porùbčan, Sin in the 
Old Testament, 4, 11; Cover, “Sin, Sinners,” ABD 6:31–40; Quell, “ἁμαρτάνω, ἁμάρτημα, ἁμαρτία,” 
TDNT, 1:267. 
625Robinson, “Terminological Study,” 119; Knierim, “חטא,” TLOT 1:407–8. 
626Knierim, “חטא,” TLOT 1:409; HALOT, s.v. “א  ”.ֵחט 
627Robinson, “Terminological Study,” 119. 
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Sam 15:24; 2 Sam 19:21; 24:10; Ps 41:5; 51:6) or in the affirmation of innocence 
following an indictment (Judg 11:27; 1 Sam 24:12). It is also found 24 times in the 
context of communal confessions with the reoccurring phrase, “We have sinned,” in rites 
of penance or prayers of repentance and the communal laments (Num 14:40; 21:7; Judg 
10:10, 15; 1 Sam 7:6; 12:10; Jer 3:25; 8:14; 14:7, 20; Dan 9:5ff; Neh 1:6). It is also used 
in the cases of the indictment or verdict formulae within both profane and sacral 
procedures, as well as in dictions to disclose an error or justify the sentence (Exod 32:30; 
Num 23:23; Deut 9:16, 18; Jer 40:3; Hos 10:9).628 
There are about 15 nominal forms of the root which refer to various settings and 
all sorts of errors including legal, cultic, and social ones (2 Sam 12:13; Jer 16:10; Hos 
8:13; Gen 41:9; Lev 16:16; Mic 3:8; Ps 59:4; 32:5; Lam 4:22; Ps 51:4; Jer 36:3; Ps 85:3; 
Isa 44:22). Some significant usages are related to two other roots, ָנָׁשא and 629.מּות When 
paired with the verb ָנָׁשא the term, depending on the context, refers to either forgiveness 
or punishment. In the case of forgiveness, the representative bears the א  Exod 34:7) ֵחט 
and Gen 50:17; Exod 32:32; 1 Sam 15:25), while in the case of punishment, it is the 
sinners themselves who bear it (Lev 19:17; 22:9; 20:20).630 When paired with the verb 
 the term refers to the sins that are punishable by death (Deut 21:22; 22:26; 24:16; 2 ,מּות
Kgs 14:6; Ezek 18:4, 20; Amos 9:10).631 
 
628Knierim, “חטא,” TLOT 1:408. 
629Knierim, “חטא,” TLOT 1:408. 
630Knierim, “חטא,” TLOT 1:408. 
631Knierim, “חטא,” TLOT 1:409–10. 
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Based on the variety of contexts and usages of the term, Knierim more 
specifically suggested that the term refers to the act of sinning per se as the following 
quotation shows: “For the rejection of a behavior as ‘error,’ it is basically inconsequential 
whether a deed occurs consciously or unconsciously. In a great many passages, such a 
distinction plays no role whatsoever. Neither the motive nor the attitude is characterized, 
but the fact as such.”632 
Knierim also suggested that the error expressed by ָחָטא is not directed towards 
some specific commandment, but rather, affects the relationship of a man toward another 
man or God. He claimed this based on the fact that the term is used to express sins or 
crimes against the ban (1 Sam 14:33ff.), adultery (2 Sam 12:13) or another sexual offense 
(Lev 20:20), theft (Gen 31:36), crimes against innocent blood (2 Kgs 21:17), against 
Yahweh’s anointed (1 Sam 24:12), idolatry (Deut 12:29f.), social misdeeds (Mic 3:8; 
6:6–8, etc.). The term was frequently used in so-called profane-legal spheres as in 
Hezekiah’s confession of rebellion (2 Kgs 18:14), in reference to the failure to perform 
professional duties by Pharaoh’s baker and butler (Gen 40:1), and other instances (Gen 
42:22; 43:9). Knierim thus concluded: “Beside the known impossibility of strictly 
distinguishing between the profane and the sacral realms, these usages of the term 
indicate that the discussion of “sin” applies to all areas of life and was in no way limited 
only to the religious sector.”633 
Based on the meanings appropriate for certain texts in the OT where ָחָטא was 
 
632Knierim, “חטא,” TLOT 1:409. 
633Knierim, “חטא,” TLOT 1:409. 
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translated with English “sin” or in some legal contexts with the English words “crime, 
negligence,” Gnana Robinson also noted that the term “indicated both intentional and 
unintentional sins.”634 Along the same lines, while observing that the term refers to 
unwitting sin in some instances, Ryder noted a frequent use of the term to convey both 
intentional and unintentional sins, as the following quotation shows: “While the word is 
overwhelmingly used of conscious and voluntary sins, there are a few instances in the 
ritual code where it seems to refer to ‘unwitting sin,’ and is rendered ‘sin-offering’ (e.g. 
in Lev 4:5).”635 Based on the entire OT, Ryder also noted the following regarding the 
moral versus rare, literal uses of ָחָטא: “The hundreds of examples of the word’s moral 
use require that the wicked man ‘misses the right mark because he chooses to aim at a 
wrong one’, —that is, there is no question of an innocent mistake or of the merely 
negative idea of ‘failure’.”636 Martens also noted that this term denotes both intentional 
and unintentional sins.637 Milgrom did the same thing.638 
Thus, based on the variety of uses of this term in the OT, Rolf Knierim suggested 
the following overall meaning of the root חטא in the OT: “The theological character of 
the understanding of ‘error’ is therefore not only grounded in the meaning of the word, 
formally and psychologically only minimally developed, but in terms of whether and how 
 
634Robinson, “Terminological Study,” 120. 
635Smith, The Bible Doctrine of Sin and of the Ways of God with Sinners, 17. 
636Smith, The Bible Doctrine of Sin and of the Ways of God with Sinners, 17. 
637Elmer A. Martens, “Sin, Guilt,” in Dictionary of the Old Testament: Pentateuch, eds. T. 
Desmond Alexander and David W. Baker, IVPBD 1 (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2003), 765. 
638Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 229, 320, 1034. 
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Yahweh views a misdeed. In this sense ‘error’ has the same weight as all other types of 
‘sin.’”639 
 
The Nature of ָחָטא Sins in Leviticus and the Rest of the Pentateuch 
As was set out at the beginning of this chapter, by applying a 
terminological/contextual/intertextual approach, I intend to address two questions in the 
study of ָחָטא sins in Leviticus and the rest of the Pentateuch in the present study. The first 
question is to find out whether ָחָטא refers to an intentional or unintentional sin. The 
second question is to explore whether ָחָטא signifies expiable or inexpiable sin.  
 
Intentionality and Expiability 
Associated to ָחָטא Sins 
Out of 86 instances of nouns derived from the root חטא in the book of Leviticus 
the term refers 25 times to sin or error. Of those 25 uses,640 the term refers to both 
intentional (4:3, 14, 23, 26, 28x2, 35, 5:6x2, 10, 13; 16:30, 34, 19:17, 22x2; 20:20; 22:9, 
24:15; 26:18, 21, 24, 28) and unintentional (4:3, 14, 23, 26, 28x2, 35; 16:30, 34) sin or 
error. The rest of the 61 uses of the nominal derivatives of ָחָטא refer to the sin offering 
(4:3, 8, 14, 20, 21, 24, 25, 29x2, 32, 33x2, 34; 5:6, 7, 8, 9x2, 11x2, 12; 6:10[17], 
18[25]x2, 23[30]; 7:7, 37; 8:2, 14x2; 9:2, 3, 7, 8, 10, 15, 22; 10:16, 17, 19x2; 12:6, 8; 
 
639Knierim, “חטא,” TLOT 1:410. 
640The nominal א  was used in ַחָּטאת was used four times (19:17; 20:20; 22:9; 24:15) and the ֵחט 
remaining twenty-one times (4:3, 14, 23, 26, 28x2, 35; 5:6x2, 10, 13; 16:30, 34, 22x2; 26:18, 21, 24, 28).  
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14:13x2, 19, 22, 31; 15:15, 30; 16:3, 5, 6, 9, 11x2, 15, 25, 27x2; 23:19).641 The statistics 
on the nominal uses of ָחָטא in Lev 16 reflect the understanding that two nominal uses of 
this term in verses16, 21 refer to the sin offering, rather than to sin itself.642 
The study of verbal uses of the term exhibit the same result as the use of the 
nominal forms. Of 30 verbal forms in Leviticus, 25 refer to the activity of sinning; the 
verb speaks of intentional sinning 21 times (4:2, 3x2, 14, 22, 23, 27, 28x2, 35, 5:1, 5, 6, 
7, 10, 11, 13, [6:2] 21, [6:3] 22, [6:4] 23; 19:22), while it refers to unintentional sinning 
14 times (4:2, 3x2, 14, 22, 23, 27, 28x2, 35; 5:15, 16, 17). In the remaining 5 usages (6: 
[19] 26; 8:15; 9:15; 14:49, 52), the verb has different meanings.643 
These statistics confirm that the root  ָאָחט  was used in Leviticus to refer to both 
intentional and unintentional sins. This claim is strengthened later when ָחָטא is studied by 
applying the terminological/contextual/intertextual approach. That is, the sins expressed 
by ָחָטא are both expiable and inexpiable. The intentionality of a given sin, but not 
exclusively its intentionality, impacts whether it is expiable or inexpiable. The first step 
of the terminological/contextual/intertextual approach established that the certain verbs 




642The arguments for this decision are presented in the subheading “William H. Shea Proposal” of 




Capital Punishment644 and  ָחָטא 
The first set of contexts relates to capital punishment expressed through six 
Hebrew terms, ָנָכה ,ָׂשַרף ,ָסַקל ,ָרַגם ,ָהַרג ,מּות, and ָיָרה, for sins expressed by ָחָטא. The 
nominal derivatives of ָחָטא, accompanied by the verbal and/or nominal derivatives of מּות 
are found in 8 texts in the Pentateuch (Exod 10:17 [death refers to punishment that does 
not include biological death]); Lev 20:20; 22:9; Num 18:22, 32; 19:13 ([refers to human 
carcass]); 27:3; Deut 21:22; 22:26; 24:16). These statistics shows that the verb מּות, when 
it refers to capital punishment, is related to the ָחָטא more than any other verb that refers 
to capital punishment. A syntactical connection between ָחָטא and מּות is found in all these 
texts. The following presents the references (Table 12): 
In the capital punishment contexts, ָחָטא always refers to intentional sin. The fact 
that capital punishment was associated with ָחָטא sin suggests that in these cases, such a 
sin was considered as an inexpiable one. 
The Pentateuch uses the verb ָהַרג to express punishment for various sins in eight 
texts (Gen 20:4: adultery, kidnapping; Exod 4:23; 13:15: refusal to obey God; Exod 
22:24: affliction of a widow or orphan; Exod 32:27: idolatry; Lev 20:16: sodomy; Num 
25:5: idolatry; Deut 13:9: idolatry). The syntactical or conceptual connection between the   
 
644For a more comprehensive study on capital punishment and understanding the input from 
rabbinic sources, see Hyman E. Goldin, Hebrew Criminal Law and Procedure: Mishnah: Sanhedrin, 
Makkot (New York: Twayne, 1952), 18–37; Aryen Amihay, “Capital Punishment,” OEBL 1:93–97; Trevor 
W. Thompson, “Punishment and Restitution,” OEBL 2:433–46. 
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Table 12. The term  ָחָטא in relation to the verb  מּות 
 
 Reference Sin Punishment Expiable Inexpiable Intention 









































verbs ָהַרג and ָחָטא exists in Abraham’s not presenting Sarah as his wife, thus causing 
potential adultery or kidnapping (Gen 20:4) and in the Golden Calf incident (Exod 
32:27). 
In the first event, God used the verb ָחָטא to describe Abimelech’s potentially 
taking Abraham’s wife Sarah for himself. The act could have resulted in adultery, as well 
as in kidnapping (Gen 20:6). 
The connection between ָהַרג and ָחָטא is more emphatic in the second event. The 
verbal and nominal forms of ָחָטא are used multiple times to refer to the act of idolatry. 




noun is used in 32:21, 30x2, 31, 32, 34 for the same cause.645 
The verb ָרַגם is used in Lev 24:14 to refer to the punishment of the sin of cursing 
the Lord; this is designated by ָחָטא in v. 15. Stoning expressed via ָרַגם was the 
prescribed mode of capital punishment in Num 15:35–36 for breaking the Sabbath, but 
the act itself was never designated by ָעֹון, ַׁשע  two other ,ָרַגם In addition to .ָחָטא or , פֶּ
verbs were used to express punishment for this sin. מּות was repeatedly used in Exod 
31:14 and 35:2 to refer to the punishment for Sabbath breaking. Kārēt was also a mode of 
capital punishment related to the breaking of the Sabbath (Exod 31:14). 
Stoning expressed with ָסַקל for sinning that is designated with ָחָטא is rare. That 
is, Exod 19:13 (refusal to obey God’s instructions), Deut 13:10 (idolatry); 17:5 (idolatry), 
and 22:21, 24 (sexual promiscuity) all use ָסַקל to express a mode of capital punishment 
for various sins. However, it is only Deut 22:21, 24 that portrays that the sin of sexual 
promiscuity could imply the ָחָטא term, since sexual promiscuity sins are designated with 
 .in Lev 19:20–22; 20:20; and Deut 22:26 ָחָטא
Burning646 as a capital punishment is expressed through the verb ָׂשַרף. The 
narratives in Gen 38:24 and Lev 10:6 and laws in Lev 20:14; 21:9; and Deut 22:21 all 
 
645Num 25:5 and Deut 13 use ָהַרג to express capital punishment for idolatry, but idolatry is not 
specified as a ָחָטא sin in these two texts. An individual idolater was killed by a spear in Num 25:5, while 
Deut 13:10 and the parallel law for idolatry in Deut 17:5 mention stoning as a mode of capital punishment. 
The corporate idolatry act of the entire city is punished by sword: Deut 13:15. Idolatry is expressed by ָרָעה 
and ֹוֵעָבהּת . 
646Burning was a rare mode of capital punishment reserved for the most serious sexual crimes. 
John H. Walton, “Genesis,” in Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, Deuteronomy, vol. 1 of ZIBBCOT, 




state that burning was used to punish the sin of illicit fire for the altar in Lev 10:6, and 
illicit sexual acts in the remaining texts. The verb ָחָטא designates the sins in all the texts 
but Lev 10:6. 
The verb ָנָכה is syntactically connected to ָחָטא in one text, Lev 26:24, which is 
illuminating regarding the nature of ָחָטא sin. In the contexts involving capital punishment 
discussed in this subsection, the term ָחָטא refers to intentional sin, unwillingness to obey 
God. The imposition of capital punishment included in this text alludes that this sin is 
inexpiable and unforgivable.647 The verb ָיָרה is never used to express punishment for the 
sin designated by ָחָטא. 
 
Kārēt and  ָחָטא 
The second group of contexts examines the connection between kārēt and ָחָטא. 
The term ָחָטא with its derivatives, accompanied by the verb ָכַרת, is found 3 times in the 
Pentateuch, namely in Num 9:13: neglect of the Passover; and 19:13, 20: not purifying 
him/herself. Of these texts, the syntactical connection between kārēt and the nominal of 
 .(exists only in Num 9:13 (see Table 13 ָחָטא
The pattern found in  ָחָטא-capital punishment contexts is followed in ָחָטא-kārēt 
contexts. The term ָחָטא refers to intentional sin. In addition, the nature of the punishment, 
kārēt, suggests that this sin is an inexpiable one.  
 
647Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27, 2309–15. 
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Table 13. The term  ָחָטא in relation to kārēt 
 
 Reference Sin Punishment Expiable Inexpiable Intention 




 x x 
2 Num 19:13 n/a n/a    




 ָחָטא and ָנָׂשא
The third context provided insight into the connection between ָחָטא and ָנָׁשא. The 
nominal and verbal derivatives of ָחָטא accompanied by the verb ָנָׁשא are found in 18 texts 
in the OT. The term is syntactically connected to the verb ָנָׁשא in 11 texts. Table 14 
displays all the occurrences. 
 
 
Table 14. The term  ָחָטא in relation to the verb ָנָׁשא 
 
 Reference Sin Punishment Expiable Inexpiable Unintentional Intention 
1 Gen 50:17 Kidnapping Death 
Deut 24:7 
forgive x  x 





forgive x  x 
3 Exod 32:32 Idolatry Death 
Deut 
forgive x  x 
4 Exod 34:7 Unknown n/a forgive n/a n/a n/a n/a 
5 Lev 19:17 Hatred  punishment   x 
6 Lev 20:20 Illicit sex Death; 
childless 
punishment x  x 
7 Lev 22:9 Charge over 
sanctuary 
 punishment x  x 
8 Lev 24:15 Cursing God Death punishment x  x 
9 Num 9:13 Not 
attending 
Passover 
 punishment x  x ָּכַרת
10 Num 18:22 Coming 
close to the 
tent 
Death punishment x  x 
11 Num 18:32 Profaning 
holy gifts 




Scholars have widely accepted that ַחָּטאת ָנָׂשא  in Gen 50:17 to mean “to 
forgive.”648 Schwartz’s proposal that the sin disappears if it is carried away by someone 
else other than the sinner is problematic in P since the trajectory of sin from the sinner to 
the sanctuary/priest is extensively elaborated in the cultic context. However, his proposal 
seems to fit the texts outside of P, but only if the phrase ָחָטא ָנָׂשא  is translated as 
“forgive.” Jacob was dead and Joseph was in the position to get his revenge and punish 
his brothers who had committed a horrific sin towards him. This context strongly 
suggests that ָחָטא ָנָׂשא conveys the meaning, “forgive.” The patriarchal narratives (Gen 
11:27–50:26)649 described the religion of the patriarchs in a very limited manner.650 Thus, 
the contrast of priestly detailed treatment of sin and lack of it in the patriarchal narratives 
makes the vanishing of sin, if forgiven, plausible. If not forgiven, sinners would still ָחָטא 
 .themselves. Most likely they would get punished for their sin ָנָׂשא 
 
648Robert Alter, Genesis (New York: W.W. Norton, 1996), 305; Mathews, Genesis 11:27–50:26, 
925–26; Claus Westermann, Genesis 37–50: A Commentary, trans. John J. Scullion (Minneapolis: 
Augsburg, 1986), 204; Kenneth O. Gangel and Stephen J. Bramer, Genesis, HOTC 1 (Nashville: Broadman 
& Holman, 2002), 375; Wenham, Genesis 16–50, 490; Victor P. Hamilton, Genesis 18–50, NICOT 1B 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1980), 703; Nahum M. Sarna, Genesis = [Be-reshit]: The Traditional 
Hebrew Text with the New JPS Translation, JPSTC 1 (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1989), 
350; Keil and Delitzsch, The Pentateuch, 2:411–12. 
649William Sanford LaSor, David Allan Hubbard, and Frederic William Bush, Old Testament 
Survey: The Message, Form, and Background of the Old Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1982), 
15–18, 32–43; Tremper Longman and Raymond B. Dillard, An Introduction to the Old Testament, 2nd ed. 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2006), 53. For a different view on the division of the patriarchal narratives 
in Gen 11:27–50:26 and the further references, see Longman and Dillard, An Introduction to the Old 
Testament, 59–61; Wenham, The Book of Leviticus, 256–64; Wenham, Genesis 16–50, 167–70, 343–45. 
Gleason L. Archer, A Survey of Old Testament Introduction, Rev. and exp. ed. (Chicago: Moody Press, 
2007), 155. 
650They prayed (Gen 25:21) and built altars and offered sacrifices (Gen 12:7; 22:9; 35:1), but there 
is no special reference to the location of these rites, no official priesthood, nor established cult. The 
distinctiveness of their religion can be seen in their conception of God and close personal relationship with 
him. LaSor, Hubbard, and Bush, Old Testament Survey, 46. 
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The 3 remaining texts state that God himself (Exod 10:17–18; 34:6–7) ָחָטא ָנָׂשא  
of various human beings or his angel does not  ָחָטא ָנָׂשא  of the people (Exod 21:23). 
There is no indication in these texts about what happen with the sins in case God bears 
them. Most likely, they vanish away as Schwartz proposed. 
Texts 1–4 were all also commented above in the present study and were based on 
the analysis provided on these pages. I adopted the view that the phrase ָחָטא ָנָׂשא  in these 
texts the subject of the sin is not the one who committed the sin, but rather, someone else 
is “to forgive.” 
The texts 5–11 were all commented above in the present study and based on the 
investigation proposed on these pages, I agree with the idea that the phrase in these texts 
refers to the explicit or implicit verb or noun “punish or punishment.” 
The sins that ָחָטא refers to in these texts, when they are syntactically connected to 
the verb ָנָׁשא, belong to both groups, namely expiable and inexpiable ones which contrast 
the connection that was established between ָחָטא and ָכַרת and ָחָטא and מּות. Also, at least 
one of the sins listed in the Table 14 is an unintentional one; the rest are intentional ones. 
Thus, ָחָטא refers to expiable and inexpiable as well as intentional and unintentional sins. 
 
 ָאַׁשםand 651 ָחָטא
The ָאַׁשם cognates appear 103 times in the OT (2 nouns: ָמה  ,ָאָׁשם 19x and ,ַאׁש 
46x, the adjective 3- ,ָאֵׁשםx, and the verbal form 35 ,ָאַׁשםx). The Pentateuch uses it 51 
 
 ,is a stative verb. Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 134; Levine, Numbers 1–20, 188; Milgrom ָאַׁשם651
Leviticus 1–16, 243. 
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times, of which the books of Leviticus and Numbers use ָאַׁשם and its derivatives forty-
nine times. The concentration of the term ָאַׁשם along with its derivatives suggests that the 
meanings for these forms should be sought in these two books. The meaning of 
reparation offering is attached to two nominal derivatives. Twenty-nine of thirty-three 
occurrences of the nominal 652ָאָׁשם refer to the offering as well as 2/4 occurrences of the 
nominal ָמה  653.ַאׁש 
Of special interest for the present study is the verbal form of םׁשַ ָא  since it 
expresses the outcome the sinners’ experience after committing a sin.654 The nominal 
form of the same root refers to the guilt sacrifice that remedies the wrong, the wrong 
itself, and the penalty for the wrong. Thus, both the nominal and verbal derivatives of 
 represent a punishment for the wrong.655 However, the verbal form is analyzed here ָאַׁשם
because it represents the sinners’ initial condition or state after they have committed 
sin;656 the approach set out in this study examines whether the punishment is applied for 
both intentional and unintentional sins. 
 
652Lev 5:6–7, 15–16, 18–19; 6:6, 17; 7:1–2, 5, 7, 37; 14:12–14, 17, 21, 24–25, 28; 19:21–22; Num 
6:12; 18:9. Different meanings are associated with the noun in the following texts: Gen 26:10: guilt; Num 
5:7, 8x2: wrong. Scholars consider this nominal as a technical term for restitution/reparation offerings. 
Hartley, Leviticus, 77; Wenham, The Book of Leviticus, 104–12; Carpenter and Grisanti, “ָאַׁשם,” NIDOTTE 
1:547. Based on the statistics presented where the noun refers to the offering, 29/33 occurrences, that claim 
seems to be justified. 
653Lev 4:3, 5:24 [6:5]. The other two occurrences in Lev 5:26 [6:7] and 22:16 are used adjectively 
and mean “guilty.” 
654Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 24. 
655Averbeck, “ ָאַׁשם,” NIDOTTE 1:550–59; Carpenter and Grisanti, “ָאַׁשם,” NIDOTTE 1:547. 
656Carpenter and Grisanti, “ָאַׁשם,” NIDOTTE 1:547. 
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The verbal form of the term ָאַׁשם is used thirteen times in the Pentateuch, eleven 
times in Lev 4–5 (4:13, 22, 27; 5:2, 3, 4, 5, 17, 19x2, 23), and 2 in Num 5 (5:6, 7). There 
are four proposals of what the verb means: (1) “to be/become guilty, to incur guilt, to 
be/to become liable for guilt,” (2) “to feel guilt,” (3) “to realize guilt,” and (4) “to suffer 
guilt’s consequences.”657 Arguments for each of these meanings are analyzed on pages 
288–313 of the present study, but at this point, it is important to notice that the texts of 
the Pentateuch make a syntactical connection between the verb ָאַׁשם and the nominal ָחָטא 
in two passages, a set of pericopes in Lev 4–5 and Num 5. The verses with syntactical 
interaction between these two terms in Lev 4 are vv. 13–21, 22–26, 27–28; 5: 5:2, 3, 4, 5, 
17, 19x2, 5:23 [6:4], and Num 5:6, 7. 
Since it is important to establish the nature of the sin for which one experiences 
 all these pericopes need to be addressed. It is important to state that Lev 4 deals ,ָאַׁשם
with both intentional and unintentional sins, as are the ones in the second and third 
pericopes in Lev 5 (vv. 14–16, 17–19), while the ones listed in the first and the last 
pericopes of Lev 5 (vv. 1–4, 20–26 [6:1–7]) are intentional.658 
The unintentionality of the sins is indicated the fact that verbs that refer to the 
activity/action of sinning are adverbially modified by the nominal prepositional phrase 
ָגָגה ׁש  ָגָגה In Lev 4:2, 27, the 659.בִּ ׁש   in 4:22, it modifies the verb ;ָחָטא modifies the verb בִּ
 The .ָׁשַגג while in 5:18, it modifies the verb ,ָחָטא In Lev 5:15, it modifies the verb .ָעָׂשה
 
657Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 25. 
658Wells, The Law of Testimony, 64. 
659Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 24. 
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syntactical connection between ָגָגה ׁש  גגַ ׁשָ  ,ָחָטא and the verbs בִּ , and ָעָׂשה suggests two 
points. First, the verbs that refer to the activity/action of sinning, ָׁשַגג ,ָחָטא, and ָעָׂשה, are 
interchangeable. This claim is reinforced below as I comment on the pericopes of Lev 4–
5 and Num 5. Second, the sins described in the pericopes where ָגָגה ׁש   is used are בִּ
unintentional. The topic of intentionality and unintentionality is examined in greater 
detail on pages 271–313 of the present study, but at this point it is sufficient to state that 
the sins in these pericopes are either intentional or unintentional.  
Lev 4: The first pericope in ch. 4, vv. 3–12, is included here even though it does 
not contain the verbal form of ָאַׁשם because the nominal form of this term causes the 
same effect on the people. That is, a sin of the high priest brings ָאַׁשם on the people. The 
verbal forms that refer to the activity/action of sinning in this pericope are ָחָטא in vv. 2, 
3x2, and ָעָׂשה in v. 2. In v. 2, the verbal form of ָחָטא is adverbially modified by ָגָגה ׁש   בִּ
which is infinitival as is ַמת ַאׁש   additionally designates the act ַחָּטאת in v. 3.660 The noun ל 
of sin in v. 3. 
There is a cluster of verbs in vv. 13–21 that express the activity of sinning, and a 
single noun, ַחָּטאת, that refers to the act of sinning. In v. 13, the whole congregation 
experiences ָאַׁשם as a result of doing activity that is expressed by the verbal of ָׁשָגה. 
However, in v. 14, the act of sinning expressed by the verb ָׁשָגה in v. 13 is labeled as ָחָטא   
 
660Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 231; Hannah S. An, “The Delayed Recognition of Sin in the Sacred 
Precinct: A Reconsideration of ָאֵׁשם and ָיָדה in Leviticus 4–5 in the Light of the Hittite Instructions for 
Priests and Temple Officials (CTH 264)” (PhD diss., Princeton University, 2014), 31. 
 
204 
in this verse, which leads to the conclusion that both the verb ָׁשָגה and the noun ַחָּטאת 
produce the ָאַׁשם condition of the sinner. It is worthy to note that v. 13 uses the verb ָעָׂשה 
to refer to the activity/action of sinning in this pericope because of which, the doer 
experiences ָאַׁשם. Thus, the activity/action of sinning is expressed by three verbs: ָׁשָגה 
and ָעָׂשה in v. 13 and ָחָטא in v. 14, while the act itself is indicated by the noun ַחָּטאת. 
In the pericope of the leader in vv. 22–26 the verbal ָאַׁשם is again related to the 
nominal ָחָטא. In v. 22, the verbal of ָחָטא and ָעָׂשה plus the adverbial use of ָגָגה ׁש   that בִּ
modifies ָעָׂשה cause  ָאַׁשם. In vv. 23 and 26, the act itself is labeled with the nominal of 
 Thus, the same cluster of terms that defines the activity of sinning (the verbal of .ָחָטא
ָגָגה plus the adverbial use of ָעָׂשה and ָחָטא ׁש   is the same in both pericopes. The act of (בִּ
sinning is also defined with the nominal ָחָטא in both pericopes. 
The pericope of the commoner in vv. 27–31 shows that same pattern that was 
identified in the pericope that presents the sinning of the whole congregation (vv. 13–21) 
and the leader (vv. 22–26). That is, in v. 27, the text uses the verbal of ָחָטא that is 
modified by the double adverbials ָגָגה ׁש   to describe the activity that ָעָׂשה and the verbal בִּ
causes the doer to experience ָאַׁשם. In v. 28, the verbal of ָחָטא is used two times to 
express the activity of sinning while the nominal of the same term is used to describe the 
act committed. 
The pattern that emerges out of these four pericopes is that the activity/action of 
sinning is expressed by the three verbs: ָעָׂשה ,ָחָטא, and ָׁשָגה. The prepositional phrase 
ָגָגה ׁש   functioning adverbially, is occasionally used to modify the meaning of the verbs ,בִּ
 
205 
that refer to the activity/action of sinning, either ָחָטא in vv. 2, 27 or ָעָׂשה in v. 22. The act 
of the sin committed is always labeled with the nominal of ָחָטא (vv. 14, 23, 26, 28x2, 
35). The outcome of the activity/action that are expressed by these verbs and the verbal 
constructions cause the doer to experience ָאַׁשם, mainly the verbal form of the term (vv. 2 
[verbal use of nominal], 13, 22, 27). 
Lev 5: There is a consensus among scholars regarding the pericopes division in 
Lev 5661 and the element of intention and lack of it as regards the sins listed. Milgrom, for 
instance, stated that Lev 5 consists of four pericopes and provided his own interpretation 
of these sins. Thus, vv. 1–13 (graded sin offering) refer to intentional sin in v. 1 and sins 
of forgetfulness in vv. 2–4; 14–16 (sacrilege against sancta) refer to unintentional, 
inadvertent sin; 17–19 (suspected sacrilege against sancta) refer to unintentional, 
inadvertent sin; and 20–26 (sacrilege against the oath) refer to intentional sin.662 The 
verbal forms of ָאַׁשם are found in vv. 2, 3, 4, 5, 17, 19x2; and 5:23 [6:4] which means 
that it is a consequence of sin in all of these pericopes but 5:14–16. 
The verbs used in the first pericope, vv. 1–13, only use the verbal of ָחָטא to 
describe the activity/action of committing the sin (vv. 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 13). The act of sin is 
expressed through the nominal of ָחָטא (vv. 5, 6x2, 10, 13). 
The second pericope, vv. 14–16, uses the verb ָחָטא in two verses, vv. 14 and 16, 
 
661The more detailed interpretation of Lev 5 is suggested under subheading “ָגָגה/ָׁשָגה/ָׁשַגג  and ”ׁש 
 .of the present study ”ָעַלם and ָיַדע“
662Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 292–93, 314, 319; Keil and Delitzsch, The Pentateuch, 2:315; Kiuchi, 
Purification Offering, 99–101, 112–15; Rooker, Leviticus, 116–26; Gane, Cult and Character, 117–23, 
132–35; Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 24.  
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to refer to the activity/action of sinning. The verbal form is modified by the adverbial use 
of ָגָגה ׁש   in v. 15. This pericope is unique in Lev 4–5 for it does not use any noun to refer בִּ
to the act of sin, nor it uses the verb ָאַׁשם. Based on the pattern from the previous 
pericopes in Lev 4 and 5, it is reasonable to claim that the act of sin in this pericope is 
also ָחָטא, and that the doer also experiences ָאַׁשם. 
The verbal forms that refer to the activity/action of sinning in the next pericope, 
vv. 17–19, are ָחָטא (v. 17), ָעָׂשה (v. 17), and ָׁשַגג (v. 18). The act of sin is designated 
differently in this pericope. The nominal used in v. 18 is ָגָגה  .ָחָטא instead of the usual ׁש 
The last pericope, v. 20–26 [6:1–7], uses the verb ָחָטא (vv. 20, 22 [6:21], 23 
[6:6]) and ָעָׂשה (v. 26) to denote the activity/action of sinning. The nominal form to 
designate the act of sin is missing in this pericope. 
Two of the pericopes in Lev 5, vv. 14–16 and 5:20–26 [6:1–7], use an additional 
verbal form of the root ָמַעל to designate further the activity/action of sinning and also use 
the nominal derivative of the same root to describe the act of sin. These two pericopes are 
unique because the sins that they deal with are directed toward God. In other words, this 
sin constitutes a sacrilege.663 In the first case, it is directed toward God’s holy things. In 
the second case, sacrilege consists of misusing God’s name in an oath.664 
The pattern that surfaces out of the four pericopes in Lev 5 is very similar to the 
one that was identified with the pericopes of Lev 4. That is, the activity/action of sinning 
 
663Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 319–32; Averbeck, “ ָאַׁשם,” NIDOTTE 1:553.  
664Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 320, 345–56; Gane, Cult and Character, 132–35. 
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is expressed by the three verbs  ָאָחט  The nominal derivative of the .ָׁשַגג  and ,ָעָׂשה ,
ָגָגה ,ָׁשָגה/ָׁשַגג  that ָחָטא functioning as an adverb, supplements the meaning of the verb ׁש 
refers to the activity/action of sinning in v. 15. The act of the sin committed is expressed 
by the nominals of ָחָטא and ָגָגה  in the second and third pericopes, the nominals are ;ׁש 
omitted (vv. 14–16, 20–26 [6:1–7]). The outcome of the activity/action that are expressed 
by these verbs and verbal constructions cause the doer to experience ָאַׁשם, a verbal form 
of the term ָאַׁשם (vv. 2, 3, 4, 5, 17, 19 x2, 23 [6:4]). 
Num 5: Compared to the previous pericopes, Num 5:6–7 shows a limited use of 
both verbal forms to refer to an activity/action of sinning. The only verbal form that is 
used in this pericope derives from the root ָעָׂשה (vv. 6, 7), whereas other pericopes 
frequently used ָחָטא and ָׁשָגה/ָׁשַגג. When it refers to an act of sinning, this pericope 
utilizes the usual nominal derivative of ָחָטא (v. 6, 7) in agreement with pericopes in Lev 
4 and in contrast to the pericope in Lev 5, vv. 17–19, that used the nominal derivative of 
 is used. This ָעָׂשה Thus, besides the limited use of verbs, only the verbal of .ָׁשָגה/ָׁשַגג
pericope follows the previous pericopes in Lev 4–5 in using the usual term, the nominal 
of ָחָטא, to refer to an act of sin. 
The analysis of the contexts when ָחָטא designates sins that causes ָאַׁשם to the 
sinner demonstrates that ָחָטא refers to intentional and unintentional sins. However, both 
intentional and unintentional sins are expiable. These texts do not propose any sort of 
capital or non-capital punishment that would imply that these sins would be inexpiable. 
On the contrary, Lev 4–5 laid out the way for a sinner to receive expiation for their sins. 
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Conclusion on the Study of ָחָטא 
Based on insights from the studies that have been done in the history of 
interpretation on the term ָחָטא which were confirmed in the present study and the insights 
presented here, it is accepted that ָחָטא does not focus on the motive or the inner quality of 
a sinful act. In many instances, the term itself does not specify whether the sin is 
intentional or unintentional, whereas some texts show that it can refer to both types of 
sins. The focused analysis conducted in the present study demonstrated that sins 
designated with the term ָחָטא also signify intentional and inexpiable sins in the 
Pentateuch. That has been verified by the syntactical or conceptual connection between 
the term ָחָטא and various verbs that convey the capital penalty (ָׂשַרף ,ָסַקל ,ָרַגם ,ָהַרג ,מּות, 
 .and the punishment of kārēt (ָנָכה
The sins referred to by the phrase inexpiable and or are expiable  665 ָנָׂשא ָחָטא
mainly intentional. The analysis of ָחָטא and ָאַׁשם contexts showed that the sins that cause 
the sinner to be ָאַׁשם are all expiable and are either intentional or unintentional. The 
implication of the fact that ָחָטא refers to expiable and inexpiable sins is that it describes 
forgivable and unforgivable sins. 
Finally, in expressing the concept of sin, this term is not limited to the particular 
aspect or context of human life but rather is found in all of them: legal, cultic, and social. 
Having provided the evidence that this term carries the same meaning/s in the book of 
 
665This phrase refers to the use of the verb ָנָׂשא with both nominal derivatives of the root  ָחָטא, 
א and ַחָּטאת  .ֵחט 
 
209 
Leviticus and in the Pentateuch, the present study agrees with the claim that ָחָטא refers to 
unintentional and expiable sins or errors, but based on pieces of evidence presented 
above, it also suggests that ָחָטא also refer to intentional and inexpiable sins in the book of 
Leviticus and in the Pentateuch. 
 
The Root ָעֹון as a Key Term for Sin in the OT 
By contrast with the term ָחָטא which is used in a variety of contexts, ָעֹון is mostly 
used in religious and ethical settings.666 Its plural form has been recognized as a 
“summary word” that encompasses all sins against God.667 Based on the fact that the term 
is used in the confession of the high priest in Lev 16:21 for sins that were removed from 
the most holy and is the only term repeated in Lev 16:22, Milgrom claimed that ָעֹון is the 
key term used to convey “the totality of offences against the deity that the high priest then 
transfers to the scapegoat.”668 
It is still dispute whether ָעֹון originates from the Hebrew root ʿwh (עוה) or the 
Semitic root attested in Arabic ʿawā.669 However, scholars mainly believe that the 
Hebrew ʿwh is the root of 670.ָעֹון Statistics on the occurrences of ָעֹון coincide with those 
 
666Luc, “עון,” NIDOTTE 3:349; Quell, “ἁμαρτάνω, ἁμάρτημα, ἁμαρτία,” TDNT, 1:271. 
667Luc, “עון,” NIDOTTE 3:349; Carl Schultz, “ָעָוה,” TWOT 2:650. 
668Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 25, 1043. 
669Cover, “Sin, Sinners,” ABD 6:32; Rolf P. Knierim, “ָעֹון,” TLOT 2:863. 
670Knierim, “ָעֹון,” TLOT 2:862; HALOT, s.vv. “ָעָוה ,ָעֹון.” 
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of ָחָטא in that that there are several proposals, ranging from 229,671 227672 to 231673 
nominal occurrences in the OT. The metonymic uses of the term exemplify the affiliation 
between “sin,” “guilt” and “punishment” in biblical thought,674 since ָעֹון can mean any or 
all of these three meanings in a single verse.675 Knierim coined a phrase, “dynamistic 
holistic thought,” pointing that ָעֹון is a term of motion that basically conveys a process of 
movement to emphasize the relatedness between the act and its consequence that is 
embedded in the meaning of the term.676 Von Rad employed the phrase, “synthetic view 
of life,” to refer to the same phenomenon.677 
 can refer to a conscious activity related to verbal forms, assuming that the verb ָעֹון
derives from ʿwh (1) (עוה Kgs 8:47; Jer 3:21; 9:4; Ps 106:6; Job 33:27; Prov 12:8; Esth 
1:16; Dan 9:5), as well as nominal forms (Gen 44:16; Num 14:19; Josh 22:20; 1 Sam 
25:24; 2 Sam 3:8; Isa 22:14; Jer 11:10). Yet, multiple references also show that ָעֹון 
represent unconscious and unintended activity (Gen 15:16; 19:15; Lev 22:16; Num 18:1, 
23; 1 Sam 14:41 LXX; 20:1; 2 Sam 14:32; 1 Kgs 17:18; Isa 6:7). In addition, some uses 
emphasize the relationship between a deed and its consequence (Gen 4:13; Deut 19:15; 2 
 
671Cover, “Sin, Sinners,” ABD 6:32. 
672Quell, “ἁμαρτάνω, ἁμάρτημα, ἁμαρτία,” TDNT, 1:270–71. 
673Knierim, “ָעֹון,” TLOT 2:862–63. 
674Joseph Lam, “The Concept of Sin in the Hebrew Bible,” RC 12.3–4 (19 February 2018).  
675Cover, “Sin, Sinners,” ABD 6:32; Schultz, “ָעָוה,” TWOT 2:650. 
676He listed multiple meanings that ָעֹון can have and supported them all with biblical references. 
Knierim, “ָעֹון,” TLOT 2:863. 
677Rad, Old Testament Theology, 1:264–65. 
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Kgs 7:9; Isa 5:18; Ps 25:11; 31:11). Some texts emphasize the totality of sin without 
interest in clarifying the type of sin (Deut 19:15; Amos 3:2; Ps 103:3). There are also 
instances where ָעֹון is used synonymously with 678.ָחָטא 
Finally, since ָעֹון refers to both a deed and its consequence, then the 
consequential-volitional element is not essential because the consequence often occurs 
unknowingly or unintentionally. Knierim noted that “the emphasis on consciousness does 
not characterize the term, then, but lies in the nature of the—always historically 
conditioned—context that makes the issue of guilt comprehensible (Gen 3; Hos; Jer; 
Ezek).”679 Thus, the general implication is that ָעֹון can express both intentional and 
unintentional sins, and it is the context that clarifies whether the sin expressed by ָעֹון 
belongs to the former or latter category.680 After presenting the key points related to the 
term ָעֹון from scholarly discussions, the present study focuses on ָעֹון in the Pentateuch. 
 
The Nature of ָעֹון Sins in Leviticus and the Rest of the Pentateuch 
 is in the ָעֹון is used 42 times in the Pentateuch. The majority of occurrences of ָעֹון
books of Leviticus (18x) and Number (12x). The books of Genesis (4x), Exodus (6x), and 
 
678Knierim, Die Hauptbegriffe für Sünde im Alten Testament, 19–20, 50–54. followed by 
Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 8n17. Gane noticed the following in the case of sin in Lev 5:1, 5–6: “A 
witness who sins (verb חטא) by failing to give required testimony bears his עון, ’culpability,’ unless/until 
he confesses what he has sinned (verb חטא) and bring a purification offering for the sin he has sinned 
( ר ַחָּטאתֹו ָחָטא ֲאׁשֶּ ) and the priest effects purgation on his behalf from his sin (ֹו  ,Compare 5:17 .(ֵמַחָּטאתִֽ
where sinning (verb  חטא) also results in bearing עון.” Gane, Cult and Character, 294. 
679Knierim, “ָעֹון,” TLOT 2:864. 
680Knierim, “ָעֹון,” TLOT 2:864. 
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Deuteronomy (2x) show low frequency of ָעֹון usage.681 The general meaning/s suggested 
by scholarly research that the term ָעֹון covers a sinful act and its consequence, along with 
the guilt for the sin, seems to be operating in the book of Leviticus and the wider literary 
context of the Pentateuch. The following tables list the ָעֹון occurrences, demonstrating 
that the term in the Pentateuch refers to (1) sinful act, (2) punishment as a consequence 
for a sinful act, and (3) guilt or liability for a sinful act. The application of the 
terminological/contextual/intertextual approach with the questions set out at the 
beginning of this chapter is also applied in the further analysis of ָעֹון. 
 
Intentionality and Expiability Associated to ָעֹון Sins 
It is challenging to determine precisely the meaning of ָעֹון. Sometimes, all three 
components of sin are in view—an act, guilt, and punishment. It is very likely that it is a 
matter of emphasis of one or the other. Thus, the following paragraphs are not intended to 
suggest the firm meanings of ָעֹון, but rather, to point to the emphasis on specific 
meanings of the term in certain texts. In addition, I will seek to determine whether ָעֹון 
refers to intentional or unintentional sin and whether ָעֹון is expiable or inexpiable sin. 
 
 as Sinful Act ָעֹון
There are at least four contexts where ָעֹון was used six times to refer to intentional 
and inexpiable sin. This suggestion points to the use of the term ָעֹון when it refers to the 





Table 15. The noun ָעֹון as inexpiable sin, i.e. sinful act 
 
 Reference Sin Punishment Expiable Inexpiable Intentional Intentional 
1. Lev 26:39x2682 Various sins Death, exile  x x X 
2. Lev 26:40x2683 Various sins Death, exile  x x X 
3. Lev 26:41684 Various sins Death, exile  x x X 




The occurrences in Table 15 demonstrate that ָעֹון is perceived as an inexpiable 
sin. All these ָעֹון occurrences have in common the fact that they refer to sins punished by 
capital punishment and exile. It is worthy to note that these texts do not provide details 
about the act of sin itself, but rather a general idea of sin is in view. 
The severity of the punishment for these sins suggests that they are inexpiable. As 
being a background of all the texts in the Table 15, exile represents God’s most severe 
punishment for people’s sins. The intentionality of the sins portrayed in this chapter can 
be suggested on the basis of verbs used to refer to Israel’s sins and thematic contrasts. 
Milgrom noticed a lexical link between the phrase ת ַתֲעׂ֔שּו ת ֵאֹ֥ ֹוָ֖ צ  ָכל־ַהּמִּ ּו …  עָ֖ מ  ׁש   תִּ
in Lev 26:14 and the phrase ֔רּו מ  ׁש  ם ּתִּ ָ֖ יתֶּ ם ַוֲעׂשִּ ֹאָתִֽ  in v. 3. He suggested that this link via 
use of the verb ָׁשַמע in v. 14, which is the equivalent of the verb ָׁשַמר used in v. 3, refers   
 
682The term ָעֹון can take on two potential meanings in this text. The one favored by Milgrom is 
“iniquity.” Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27, 2273, 2327. However, Milgrom referred to this iniquity as sins. 
Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27, 2327. This meaning is followed by many other scholars. Gane suggested 
culpability as other meaning. Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 454. 
683Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27, 2273, 2330–31. 
684Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27, 2274, 2333. 
685Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27, 2274. Gane understood the term ָעֹון refers to culpability in this text. 
Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 455. 
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to the negation of the heading of the previous “blessings” section. Both verbs used in vv. 
3 and 14, ָׁשַמר and ָׁשַמע, need an additional verb, ָעָׂשה, to communicate acting against or 
breaking the commandments. ָׁשַמר and ָׁשַמע, meaning “to obey” or “to keep,” refer, 
rather, to physical passivity, while ָעָׂשה conveys the action of breaking the 
commandments.686 
In the context of God’s commandments expressed by the noun ָוה צ   with a ָעָׂשה ,מִּ
human subject always refers to intentional and conscious activity (Ex 15:26; Lev 4:2, 13, 
22, 27; 5:17; 22:31; 26:3, 14, 15; Num 15:22, 39, 40; Deut 5: 31; 6:1, 25; 7:11; 8:1; 
11:22; 13:18; 15:5; 19:9; 27:10; 28:1, 13, 15; 30:8; 31:5).687 The same pattern is detected 
when ָעָׂשה is studied in the context of the nouns ֹחק and  ֻחָּקה that refer to God’s 
commandments (Exod 15:26; 18:20; Lev 16:29, 34; 18:4, 5; 19:37; 20:8, 22–23; 25:18; 
26:3; Num 9:3, 12, 14; Deut 4:1, 5, 6, 14; 5:1, 31; 6:1, 24; 7:11; 11:32–12:1; 16:12; 
17:19; 26:16; 27:10).688 In some contexts, ֻחָּקה is paired with ָפט ׁש   ,and in those contexts מִּ
 .(also refers to intentional activity (Lev 18:4–5, 26; 19:37; 20:22; 25:18; 26:15 ָעָׂשה
When God’s commandments are expressed through the noun ָעָׂשה ,ּתֹוָרה with human 
subject also refer to intentional and conscious activity (Exod 18:20; Num 5:30; 6:21;   
 
686Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27, 2304.  
687This principle also apply to the uses when God is subject of the verb ָעָׂשה (Exod 20:6; Deut 
5:10). 
688Several texts do not follow this pattern, but do not negate it. In Lev 6:22 ָעָׂשה means “to offer a 
sacrifice.” In Lev 18:3, 26, 30; 23:21, 31; 26:15; Deut 28:15 ָעָׂשה is negated. In Lev 18:3, 26, ָעָׂשה is also 




15:29; Deut 17:11, 19; 27:26; 28:58; 29:29; 31:12; 32:46). In the context of the verb ָצָוה, 
the verb ָעָׂשה always expressed intentional activity (Lev 8:4–5, 34, 36; 9:6–7; 16:34; 
24:23; 25:21689). 
On the same note, the phrase י ֻחֹּקַתָ֖ כּו ב  ֵּתֵלָ֑  in v. 3 is reversed in v. 15  ָא֔סּו מ   ּתִּ
י ֻחֹּקַתֹ֣  This reversal of verbs also points to the intentional change of people’s attitude 690.ב 
towards God’s commandments. The verb ָמַאס is critical in this verse since it points to an 
intentional, willful rejection or refusal in various contexts.691 God promised blessings for 
people’s willingness to follow God’s commandments and curse/punishment if they 
decide to refuse, reject, despise and not do them. 
In addition, the use of ָפַטי ׁש  ֻחֹּקַתי in v. 15 along with מִּ ֹות in vv. 3 and ב  צ   .in v ַהּמִּ
14, adds a legal notion of the sins associated with the activities elaborated in these texts. 
The use of all 3 terms that refer to the totality of Israel’s legislative system692 further hints 
at the totality of their sins or illegitimate status/condition. 
Another hint concerning the nature of the sins implied in this chapter is found in 
the phrase “ ָ֖ם כֶּ ר  ַהפ  י ל  ִֽ יתִּ רִּ ת־ב  אֶּ ,” and it reveals that the background of this entire chapter is 
the Sinaitic covenant, including all of its stipulations.693 The stipulations of the Sinaitic 
 
 .does not have a human subject in this text ָעָׂשה689
690Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27, 2304. 
691HALOT, s.v. “ָמַאס”; H. Wildberger, “מאס,” TLOT 2:651–60, 653; Eugene H. Merrill, “ָמַאס,” 
NIDOTTE 2:826–27. 
692Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27, 2305. 
693Roy E. Gane, “Leviticus,” in Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, Deuteronomy, vol. 1 of 




covenant encompass cultic, legal, and moral laws.694 Consequently, it is to be expected 
that the sins referred to by the term ָעֹון include a variety of inexpiable sins in this context. 
The sins implied here are unlikely to be unintentional sins since God would provide 
atonement for those sins via the cult. These texts do not contain clues about nor describe 
the act of sin. Biblical accounts of the exile of the kingdom of Judah testify that 
individuals within covenant people retained their brazen rebellious and in doing so died 
(Jer 52, Lamentations). The point from Lev 26:39–41, 43 and later texts about exile is 
that ָעֹון can refer to intentional brazen inexpiable sin. 
 
 as Punishment ָעֹון
The present study suggests that two texts with ָעֹון emphasize the punishment (Lev 
18:25; 22:16). Scholars are divided on the meaning of ָעֹון in 18:25. Snaith and Milgrom 
suggested that the ָעֹון should be translated by “sin” as becomes obvious from their 
translation of Lev 18:25.695 The majority of scholars stressed punishment in the pericope 
of v. 25, assuming punishment as the translation of ָעֹון, based on the fact that 18:24–30, 
as a conclusion of the law collection presented in ch. 18, would speak about punishments 
 
694Shalom M. Paul, Studies in the Book of the Covenant in the Light of Cuneiform and Biblical 
Law, VTSupp 18 (Leiden: Brill, 1970), 28–29, 34; Nahum M. Sarna, Exodus = [Shemot]: The Traditional 
Hebrew Text with the New JPS Translation, JPSTC 2 (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1991), 
117–50; Joe M. Sprinkle, Biblical Law and Its Relevance: A Christian Understanding and Ethical 
Application for Today of the Mosaic Regulations (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2006), 51; 
Raymond Westbrook and Bruce Wells, Everyday Law in Biblical Israel: An Introduction, 1st ed. 
(Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2009), 12. 
695Snaith, Leviticus and Numbers, 126; Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1515, 1580. 
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as a consequence of breaking the laws just presented.696 The literal translation of the 
phrase ד ֹקֹ֥ פ  ֲעֹוָנָּ֖ה ָואֶּ  would be “I have visited, punished its sin” as recognized and 
verbalized by some scholars, but its meaning undeniably points to the punishment of the 
people via punishment of the land. This literary tendency to emphasize punishment in the 
case of disobedience at the conclusion of a group of laws was noticeable in the ANE texts 
and followed in the OT.697 
There is no such disagreement related to the meaning of Lev 22:16. That is, key 
scholars agree that ָעֹון should be translated as punishment in this text.698 
Like the texts that emphasize the act of sin, meaning of ָעֹון, these texts do not 
contain clues about nor describe the act of sin. Emphasis on the punishment component 
of the term makes the nature of sin (intentional or unintentional) insignificant. 
 
 as Sin/Guilt/Punishment ָעֹון
The term was used 8 times to express all three components of sin (Lev 5:1, 17; 
7:18; 10:17; 17:16; 19:8; 20:17, 19). The precise or emphasized meaning/s is a matter of 
interpretation, than based on solid, textual clues. Contrary to the uses of ָעֹון when it refers 
 
696Keil and Delitzsch, The Pentateuch, 2:418; A. Noordtzij, Numbers, BSC (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Zondervan, 1983), 189; Levine, Leviticus, 123–24; Rooker, Leviticus, 249; John H. Walton, Victor H. 
Matthews, and Mark W. Chavalas, “Leviticus,” in IVPBBCOT (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 
2000), 133; Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 321; Kiuchi, Leviticus, 338–40; Jay Sklar, Leviticus: An 
Introduction and Commentary, TOTC 3 (Downers Grove, IL: Inter-Varsity Press, 2014), 239–40.  
697Wenham, The Book of Leviticus, 260; W. H. Bellinger, Leviticus and Numbers, UBCS 
(Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2012), 113–14; Gane, “Leviticus,” 323. 
698Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1869–70; Kiuchi, Leviticus, 407; Noordtzij, Numbers, 224; 
Wenham, The Book of Leviticus, 296n10; Snaith, Leviticus and Numbers; Levine, Leviticus, 150; R. K. 




to sin as an act or punishment, these texts do provide details about and describe the act of 
sin. That is, the act for which one is guilty and punished is described in detail. 
Schwartz suggested that in all of these texts, the phrase refers to the guilt or 
consequential bearing.699 Bruce Wells approved of Schwartz’s findings, but furthered the 
dialogue by limiting his work to the category of consequential sin-bearing, or as he 
termed it, ‘āwōn-clause, in the OT.700 He proposed that the phrase “point[s] to a liability 
that is in addition to the general liability for having committed an act that these texts 
consider sinful.”701 The fact that discredits Well’s proposal is the inability to identify 
what that additional liability would be in some texts.702 
Schwartz and Wells both reduced the meaning of the phrase to the consequential 
meaning only. The part of Schwartz’s list of the Leviticus texts with the consequential 
meaning of the phrase differs from the list suggested here due to the fact that the list of 
texts here includes only those that have ָעֹון ָנָׂשא , contrary to Schwartz’s inclusion of the 
other two terms for sin, ַׁשע  Additional texts .ָחָטא and the nominal derivatives of the root פֶּ
found in Schwartz’s list all have א  ;Lev 19:17; 20:20) ָעֹון instead of ָנָׁשא paired with ֵחט 
22:9; 24:15). 
Another difference is that Schwartz did not ascribe consequential meaning to    ָנָׂשא
 
699Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 12–13. 
 in the OT, but ָנָׂשא ָעֹון does not mean that Wells examined only phrases that consist of ָנָׂשא ָעֹון700
rather, ‘āwōn-clause refers to ָנָׁשא paired with any of the 3 terms for sin, ָעֹון, and ַׁשע  ,Wells .ָחָטא , פֶּ
“Liability in the Priestly Texts,” 1. 
701Wells, “Liability in the Priestly Texts,” 1, 13, 15. 
702Wells, “Liability in the Priestly Texts,” 16, 18, 21, 23. 
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 in Lev 10:17, but rather, a carrying, bearing away, or removing the sin from the ָעֹון
sanctuary, not from the sinner.703 Finally, Lev 18:25 does not have the verb ָנָׁשא and thus, 
it is not on Schwartz’s list. The meaning of the phrase ַׁשע/ ָחָטא /פֶּ ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  is revisited on 
pages 139–85 above of the present study. However, at this point, it is important to note 
that other scholars recognized that ָעֹון in these Leviticus texts point to sin as an act and 
guilt. In order for ָעֹון to have consequential meaning, the subject of the phrase ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  is 
always human.704 
This group of texts contains sins of various kinds. It is evident that the majority of 
them are intentional and inexpiable, but some of the intentional ones are expiable. In 
addition, except for Lev 10:17, the texts provide clues that describe the sin in details.  
 
Capital Punishment and ָעֹון 
The order of verbs that refer to capital punishment is the same as in the section of 
the term ָחָטא, namely (ָנָכה ,ָׂשַרף ,ָסַקל ,ָרַגם ,ָהַרג ,מּות, and ָעֹון .(ָיָרה is syntactically related 
to the verb מּות once in the Pentateuch, in Exod 28:43. It is debatable what the actual 
nature of the sin in this ordinance was,705 but it is inevitable that the 
punishment/consequence was death.706 ָעֹון is never associated with the term of ָהַרג. In 
 
703Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 16. 
704Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 10. 
705Keil and Delitzsch: “either through disobedience to these instructions, or, what was still more 
important, through such violation of the reverence due to the holiness of the dwelling of God as they would 
be guilty of, if they entered the sanctuary with their nakedness uncovered.” Keil and Delitzsch, The 
Pentateuch, 2:205–6. 
706Keil and Delitzsch, The Pentateuch, 2:205–6; Wells, “Liability in the Priestly Texts,” 29. 
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two contexts, Gen 4:8 and Lev 20:16, ָהַרג is used to express a capital punishment for the 
sin but they are not designated with ָעֹון. The term ןָעֹו  is never found in contexts where the 
term ָסַקל or ָרַגם are used to communicate punishment for sin. 
The term may also be associated with ָׂשַרף in the contexts of various sexual 
misconducts. Various texts use ָׂשַרף to designate the mode of punishment for sexual 
misconducts that are defined by the term ָזָנה (Gen 38:24: adultery; Lev 21:9: illicit sex; 
Num 25:1: illicit sex); and once ָּמה  Lev 20:14: illicit sex). Illicit sexual misconducts are) זִּ
also defined as ָעֹון in Lev 20:17,707 19,708 and 20.709 The law in v. 17 deals with illicit 
marriage and sex. The text in v. 19 refers to a potential double sexual misconduct. First, it 
refers to an illicit sexual relationship with one’s mother’s or father’s sister. Second, it 
potentially refers to adultery since the sister referred to in the law might have been 
married. They are not married since the usual verb that refers to marriage ָלַקח is missing, 
but rather just have illicit sex. The law in v. 20 undoubtedly refers to adultery, illicit sex 
with one’s uncle’s wife.710 The term ָעֹון is used in a metonymic way in all these three 
laws to refer to sin, guilt, and its punishment. Thus, certain sexual misconducts initiate 
punishment by ָׂשַרף in the texts that do not define them as ָעֹון, but rather, ָזָנה and ָּמה  .זִּ
 
707Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1763; Wells, “Liability in the Priestly Texts,” 18–19. 
708The marital status of his aunt is ambiguous, but the law might imply that the aunt was married. 
709The illicit sexual deeds in Lev 20–21 are considered as ָעֹון via the parallel laws in Lev 18:14, 16 
that deal with the same sins. The sins in Lev 18 are designated as ָעֹון in 18:25. 
710Wells, Liability in the Priestly Texts, 20–21. 
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However, these sexual misconducts are defined by ָעֹון in other texts of the Pentateuch. As 
a result, it is plausible to state that ָׂשַרף is used as a mode of punishment for ָעֹון sins. 
The term ָעֹון is never syntactically associated with the verb ָנָכה in the Pentateuch. 
There are only 2 out of 3 contexts where ָעֹון and ָנָכה are syntactically associated outside 
of the Pentateuch (Isa 57:17; Jer 30:14). Neither is associated to the term ָיָרה in the sense 
of punishment. 
 
Kārēt and ָעֹון 
The term ָעֹון is syntactically related with the verb ָכַרת in 3 contexts in the 
Pentateuch. The following table (Table 16) provides the references of those contexts:  
 
 
Table 16. The verb kārat and  ָעֹון 
 
 Reference Sin Punishment Expiable Inexpiable Intentional Unintentional 




 x x  
2 Lev 20:17 Illicit sex Death 
Lev 20:17 
 x x  












The nature of kārēt punishment for all three of these sins points to the fact that 
they are inexpiable and unforgivable sins. The presence of the intention is unquestionably 
explicit in Lev 20:17711 and Num 15:31.712 One could technically argue for negligence in 
the case of Lev 19:8 since a person or the participants in the offerer’s feast could fail to 
handle the sanctified offering meat properly. The full responsibility for handling the 
peace offering is on the offerer and/or the participants in the offerer’s feast, not on the 
priests.713 The offerer could have forgotten the day the sacrifice was offered and then eat 
from it on the third day and serve it to his guests, or by not checking with the participants 
of this feast, if they fulfill the prerequisites of ritual purity to participate in the feast (Lev 
7:19–20), just to name some potential compromising situations. The full responsibility 
lies on the offerer or his invitees.  
In all three contexts where kārēt is related to the term ָעֹון, a punishment seems to 
be implied in the term. In other words, this connection points to the punishment to which 
a person is liable because the term ָעֹון immediately defines these sins.714 Milgrom stated 
that the term ָעֹון and kārēt are equivalents here.715 The sins in these texts are intentional 
and inexpiable.  
 
711The use of the verb ָלַקח, which is frequently used to denote forming of a marital relationship in 
the Pentateuch, suggests that the law discusses the situation of a person marrying his full sister which 
includes illicit sexual intercourse. Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1763; Wells, “Liability in the Priestly Texts,” 
18–19. 
712Milgrom, Numbers, 125; Cole, Numbers, 252–53; Keil and Delitzsch, The Pentateuch, 3:103. 
713Rooker, Leviticus, 256; Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1622–23; Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 155. 
714Levine, Numbers 1–20, 398; Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1488–90, 1622–23. 
715Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1622. 
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 ָעֹון and ָנָׂשא
The syntactical relationship between the term ָעֹון and the verb ָנָׁשא is found in 
twenty contexts in the Pentateuch. Table 17 provides the list of references: 
Based on the analysis presented above, under the subheading, ַׁשע/ָחָטא /פֶּ ָעֹון ָנָׂשא , 
on pages 139–85 of the present study, the meanings associated with the phrase ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  
depend on the subject of the phrase. When the sinner is the subject of the phrase, that is, 
the sinners ָנָׁשא their own ָעֹון, the phrase refers to two points: (1) the sinners’ 
responsibility for their sin, and (2) the impending punishment that the sin assumes. That 
the act of sin has occurred is implied in this use. Accordingly, stating the consequences 
for a number of different sins, the phrase takes the place of a specific punishment without 
explicitly stating the exact nature of it.716 
When another party is the subject of the phrase or ָנָׁשא another’s ָעֹון, the phrase 
ultimately implies forgiveness. Thus, in some of the texts from Table 17, the phrase      
 ;refers to punishment (Gen 4:13; Exod 28:43; Lev 5:1, 17; 7:18; 10:17; 17:16 ָעֹון ָנָׂשא
19:8; 20:17, 19; 22:16; Num 5:31; 14:34), while in others, it implies forgiveness      
(Exod 28:38; 34:7; Lev 16:22; Num 14:18–19; 18:1, 23; 30:15).717  
 
716See page 172 of the present study. Olaffson, “The Use of nśʾ in the Pentateuch,” 176; Wells, 
The Law of Testimony, 161. 
717For a more detailed interpretation of the texts that convey punishment, see Olaffson, “The Use 
of nśʾ in the Pentateuch,” 170–78. For a more detailed interpretation of the texts that convey forgiveness, 
see Olaffson, “The Use of nśʾ in the Pentateuch,” 179–216. 
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Table 17. The relationship of ָעֹון and  ָנָׁשא 
 
 Reference Sin Punishment Expiable Inexpiable Intentional Unintentional 




x  x  
2. Exod 28:38 Study this      






 X x  
4. Exod 34:7 Unknown Unknown n/a n/a n/a n/a 




x  x  





x   x 





 X x  
8. Lev 10:17 Unknown ָעֹון ָנָׂשא -
death 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 
9. Lev 16:22 Unknown ָעֹון ָנָׂשא -
death 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 
10. Lev 17:16 Fail to 
purify 
ָעֹון  ָנָׂשא  n/a n/a x  
11. Lev 19:8 Illicit 
eating of 
sacrifice 
Cut off  x x  
12. Lev 20:17 Illicit sex Cut off  x x  
13. Lev 20:19 Illicit sex ָעֹון ָנָׂשא , cut 
off Lev 
20:17 
x   x 
  
 
718A brief history of the interpretation of the meaning of ָעֹון in this text is provided in the Claus 
Westermann’s Commentary with the most influential suggestions for it. Scholars were divided into two 
groups, those who translate ָעֹון as sin in this text, and those who translate it as punishment. Westermann’s 
solution points to the fact that (1) Hebrew ָעֹון describes an event which can include both sin and 
punishment and (2) it is the context that places the stress on one or the other potential meaning. The 
outcome of these two inferences is that none of these two groups is totally incorrect nor totally correct. 
Westermann suggested that these two meanings for the Hebrew ָעֹון are not mutually exclusive, but rather, 
complimentary, and the context determines which of them is stressed in a given text. Along with von Rad 
and Koch, Westermann believed that Gen 4:13 stressed the punishment meaning. Claus Westermann, 
Genesis 1–11: A Commentary, trans. John J. Scullion (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1984), 309; Gerhard von 
Rad, Genesis, rev. ed., OTL (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1972), 107. This view is later affirmed by 
subsequent scholars like Kenneth Mathews, Genesis 1–11:26, NAC 1A (Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 





14. Lev 22:16 Illicit 
eating of 
sacrifice 
ָעֹון ָנָׂשא , 
unknown 
    
15. Num 5:31 Potential 
adultery 
Death  x x  
16. Num 14:18 Unknown Unknown n/a n/a n/a n/a 






x   x 
18. Num 18:1x2 Unknown Unknown n/a n/a n/a n/a 
19. Num 18:23 Unknown Unknown n/a n/a n/a n/a 
20. Num 30:15 Annulling 
wife’s 
vow 




 ָעֹון  and ָאַׁשם
The connection between these two terms exists in two pericopes, Lev 5:1–13 and 
5:17–19. The phrase  ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  designates the sin and points to its punishment in v. 1. The 
 ,is not mentioned in this verse, but it is in vv. 4b and 5 which, as a general protasis ָאַׁשם
governs all four cases in vs. 1–4.719 As a result, one of the sins that produces ָאַׁשם in the 
sinner is ָעֹון, and the sin referred to by this term is intentional and expiable. 
In the same manner, the sin and its punishment are expressed by the phrase    ָעֹון
 vv. 17, 19). The sin of) ָאַׁשם in v. 17. That sin further causes the sinner to experience ָנָׂשא
this pericope, like that in the previous one, is intentional and expiable.  
 
719Wells, The Law of Testimony, 66; Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 314. 
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Conclusion on the Study of ָעֹון 
The previous research showed that ָעֹון occurs mainly in religious and ethical 
settings and refers to intentional and unintentional sin in the OT. The verbal form of ָעָוה, 
from the root, from which the noun ָעֹון is apparently derived, refers to both a conscious 
activity and unconscious or unintended activity in the OT. Some nominal uses emphasize 
the relationship between a deed and its consequence. ָעֹון can be used synonymously with 
אָחטָ  . The verbal form ָעָוה, of which ָעֹון is the nominal derivative, is never found in the 
Pentateuch. The occurrences of the noun ָעֹון in the Pentateuch demonstrate that the term 
is used in a metonymic way to exemplify the affiliation between “sin,” “guilt,” and 
“punishment,” as the previous scholarly research has shown. 
The present research also agrees that it is difficult to determine whether the term 
refers to any or all the elements of the sinful event, the act of sin, and/or guilt and/or 
punishment, since in the majority of the texts, they overlap. A study of the texts where ָעֹון 
refers to an act of sin demonstrated that it refers to intentional and inexpiable sins. When 
 emphasizes punishment, then inference on what kind of sins it refers to is ָעֹון
insignificant. The texts that convey metonymic use of this term encompass a variety of 
intentions. In other words, ָעֹון refers to both intentional and unintentional sins. In 
addition, some intentional sins, besides the unintentional ones, are expiable. It has also 
been noticed that the texts that potentially imply only one meaning, sinful act or 
punishment, do not provide the descriptions nor designation about the sinful act, but 
emphasis is rather on the general idea of sin. To the contrary, when all three possible 
meanings are implied, the text provides details about and designates that particular sin. 
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When ָעֹון is studied with the intent to establish whether the sin it refers to is 
intentional or unintentional and expiable or inexpiable, the Pentateuchal texts provide 
hints that ָעֹון, aside from Lev 10:17; 16:21–22; and 22:16, always refer to intentional and 
both expiable and inexpiable sin. ָעֹון as inexpiable and intentional sin results in capital 
punishment via its association with the verbs that convey this kind of punishment, such as 
 but is never used in the contexts where the punishment is conveyed via ,ָׂשַרף and מּות
 refers to inexpiable and ָעֹון Another set of contexts where .ָיָרה and ,ָנָכה ,ָסַקל ,ָרַגם ,ָהַרג
intentional sin is when it is associated with kārēt punishment. It has to be mentioned that 
in Lev 19:8, one could argue for negligence, but the sin is still inexpiable. In ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  
contexts, the term refers to punishment or forgiveness. Sins that caused punishment are 
both intentional and inexpiable. However, some intentional sins are expiable, in addition 
to the unintentional sins which are mostly expiable. The punishment is not capital even 
though in most cases, it is. In the contexts where ָעֹון and ָאַׁשם are associated ָעֹון refer to 
intentional and expiable sin. The fact that ָעֹון refers to both expiable and inexpiable sin 
implies that ָעֹון sins are forgivable or unforgivable. 
The term ָעֹון rarely explicitly expresses unintentional sin in the book of Leviticus. 
The only exceptions could be Lev 10:17; 16:21–22; and 22:16, where the contexts do not 
indicate whether intentional or unintentional sins, or both, are in view. It is very likely 
that ָעֹון refers to unintentional sin in these instances. An analysis of Lev 16:21 will be 
provided below after all three terms for sin have been analyzed. Lev 10:17 seems to 




This understanding of ָעֹון also does not coincide with Gane’s understanding that 
 refers to culpability in Leviticus 1–16.720 The research just presented suggests that it ָעֹון
refers to any sinful element, including sin, guilt, and punishment, and sometimes all of 
them. 
 
The Root ַׁשע  as a Main Term for Sin in the OT פֶּ
The term is used 134 times in the OT including 41 verbal forms (40 times in qal 
and 1 time in niphal) and 93 nominal forms. The commonly accepted meaning of the 
term is “dispute, rebellion,” based on the understanding of Exod 22:8 suggested by L. 
Köhler. Knierim found Köhler’s exegesis untenable based on the fact that the term refers 
to various sins that cannot be classified as dispute or rebellion such as Gen 31:36: Jacob’s 
potential theft of Laban’s gods; Gen 50:17: the act of Joseph’s kidnaping by his brothers; 
1 Sam 24:10–14: David’s potential murder of Saul; Prov 28:24: the act of a son’s robbing 
his parents; Amos 1:3, 6, 9, 11, 13; 2:1:various criminal acts, and other texts.721 
Knierim, noting that the exegesis of Exod 22:8[9] does not support dispute or 
rebellion, stated that the assumption of a dispute in this case “rests on inconsistent and 
self-contradictory exegesis of the verse.”722 He suggested that translating the nominal 
derivative of the term ַׁשע  by “property offence” or crime in this text presents fewest פֶּ
 
720Gane, Cult and Character, 294. 
721Rolf P. Knierim, “ַׁשע  .TLOT 2:1034 ”,פֶּ
722Knierim, “ַׁשע  .TLOT 2:1034 ”,פֶּ
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difficulties. In addition, it is supported by Deut 22:1–3, which is considered to be the 
oldest exegesis of Exod 22:8.723 
He also suggested that the verbal form of this term should be translated with “to 
break with,”724 rather than with “to rebel.” Knierim justifiably questioned whether the 
verb in 2 Kgs 8:20, 22 “refers to a basic process of completed disengagement from a 
social union or only to the process of rebellion, of protest against the union, whether 
successful or not. Consequently, the definition of the term must involve a distinction 
between (completed) separation and (attempted) rebellion.” The context of this text, 
along with the phrase   ָיָמיו ע ב  ַחת ֱא֔דֹום ָפַׁשֹ֣ ַּתָ֖ ה מִּ הּוָדָ֑ ַיד־י   irrefutably demonstrates that the 
separation was achieved, which further leads to the conclusion that this act was a type of 
removal of property. Thus, he preferred “to break with,” over “to rebel.” The apparent 
incongruity of the former translation is found when the term is accompanied by the 
preposition   ב. However,   ב does not denote the direction of motion, but rather, an 
association. The association of the term with the preposition ַעל is unique and may denote 
secondary usage and, having in mind circumstances, may be translated with “to suffer 
revolt.”725 
Based on these remarks, Knierim suggested that nominal forms of ַׁשע  refer to a פֶּ
formal category that is comprised of various types of personal and material crimes 
described by the verbs such as “to rob,” “to steal,” “to lay hand on,” and so on, whose 
 
723Knierim, “ַׁשע  .TLOT 2:1035 ”,פֶּ
724This translation is accepted by HALOT. HALOT, s.v. “ַׁשע  ”.פֶּ
725Knierim, “ַׁשע  .TLOT 2:1035 ”,פֶּ
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meaning is not included in the semantic range of ַׁשע ַׁשע ,As such .פֶּ  should be seen as “a פֶּ
legal technical term for crimes that were subject to legal penalties.”726 The verbal forms, 
implying some sort of loss, removal of a segment of a state structure, are to be translated 
with “to break with,” “to break away from,” “to behave criminally,” or “to suffer loss, 
crime, breach” depending on the literary contexts.727 
Based on the meanings he derived from researching both nominal and verbal 
forms of ַׁשע ַׁשע Knierim suggested the following theological meaning of ,פֶּ  :פֶּ
Whoever commits pešaʿ does not merely rebel or protest against Yahweh, but breaks 
with him, takes away what is his, robs, embezzles, misappropriates it. Although it 
always implies conscious behavior, the term per se does not describe the attitude, but 
the criminal act that consists in removal of property or breach of relationship. As a 
result, in the OT, the most serious aspect of the sin phenomenon is the offense as a 
breach, but not “the revolt of the human will against the divine will.”728 
 
Knierim, followed by Seebass,729 indicated a profound implication due to the fact 
that the term was used in a variety of distinctive contexts: “Finally, then, pešaʿ does not 
mean “sin.” For just as surely as the term has a theological dimension, the OT is in 
general interested in speaking of ‘sin’ in such a way as to call deeds and procedures by 
their proper names.”730 
H. Seebass suggested a more neutral translation, “offence,”731 than Knierim’s 
 
726Knierim, “ַׁשע  .TLOT 2:1035 ”,פֶּ
727Knierim, “ַׁשע  .TLOT 2:1035–36 ”,פֶּ
728Emphasis mine. Knierim, “ַׁשע  .TLOT 2:1037 ”,פֶּ
729H. Seebass, “ָפַׁשע,” TDOT, 12:144–45. 
730Knierim, “ַׁשע  .TLOT 2:1037 ”,פֶּ
731Seebass, “ָפַׁשע,” TDOT, 12:141. 
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“crime.” Lexically, Seebass’s suggestion is more plausible and precise since “crime” is a 
limiting word by associating it to criminal law only.732 However, it has to be indicated 
that in Knierim’s treatment of this term, he did not limit it to criminal law only, but 
rather, recognized various contexts in which it is found. Thus, the issue of the translation 
might be related to Knierim’s unsuitable choice of the word, rather than 
misunderstanding what the term/concept meant. In addition, Knierim’s procedure of 
deriving the meaning from one text and attempting to prescribe it to all subsequent 
contexts where the term is used shows insensitivity for the context and may lead into an 
inaccurate representation of what the term refers to. However, his suggestion of 
translating ַׁשע  .as “crime” does not seem inaccurate in biblical uses of the term פֶּ
Seebass’s suggestion is more inclusive and also suits the context, but it is informed by his 
analysis of all OT texts which, on the other hand, includes reading into Exod 22:8[9] 
what is actually not there. Deciding which of these two suggestions is more accurate does 
not affect the core of the questions dealt with in the present study and will be left open. 
The essential difference between the crime and offence is found in the fact that 
crime is always violation of the law and is punishable by it, while some offences are not 
punishable by law.733 Carrol has recognized that ַׁשע  was also used in parallelism with פֶּ
 734.ָעֹון and ָחָטא
The part that is crucially important for the present study is the fact that there is a   
 
732Seebass, “ָפַׁשע,” TDOT, 12:136. 
733For a more in-depth analysis on crime, see pages 251–66 of the present study. 
734R. P. Carroll, “Rebellion and Dissent in Ancient Israelite Society,” ZAW 89 (1977): 181. 
 
232 
solution regarding Exod 22:8 [9] which does not include any of the punishment that 
would indicate that ַׁשע  is inexpiable and unforgivable sin in every case. Wells proposed פֶּ
that this case is an example of lex talionis being applied to a false testimony735 which 
does not include a terminal penalty, that would classify this sin as inexpiable. With the 
review of the scholarly research on the term ַׁשע  the analysis of this term within the ,פֶּ
Pentateuch follows. 
 
The Nature of ַׁשע  Sins in Leviticus and the Rest of Pentateuch פֶּ
In contrast to the terms ָחָטא and ָעֹון, the term ַׁשע  is used infrequently in the פֶּ
Pentateuch. The nominal form of the term is used 2 times in Leviticus and 7 more times 
in the rest of the Pentateuch (Genesis, 2x; Exodus, 3x; and Numbers, 1x) to make a total 
of 9 occurrences.736 The verbal form is not used in the Pentateuch, but occurs for the first 
time in 1 Kgs 8:50.737 
Applying the same terminological/contextual/intertextual approach to study ַׁשע  פֶּ
that was used in the above study with ָחָטא and ָעֹון does not give much insight into the 
meaning of this term as it did with the previous two terms due to the fact that ַׁשע  is a far פֶּ
less frequently used term in the Pentateuch.  
 
735Wells, The Law of Testimony, 143–44. 




Capital Punishment and  ַׁשע  פֶּ
A context in which ַׁשע  ,מּות  and capital punishment, expressed via the verb פֶּ
occur together is not detected in the Pentateuch. The syntactical connection can be 
established in two out of six contexts where these two terms occur together outside of the 
Pentateuch (2 Kgs 1:1; 3:5; Isa 53:12; 66:24; Ezek 18:28, 31). Both of them are found in 
the book of Ezekiel. However, these texts will not be considered here because they do not 
belong to the Pentateuch. ַׁשע  never occurs in the context of other verbs that refer to פֶּ
capital punishments such as ָנָכה ,ָׂשַרף ,ָסַקל ,ָרַגם ,ָהַרג, and ָיָרה. 
 
Kārēt and ַׁשע  פֶּ
The statistics on ַׁשע  resemble the one established with capital ָכַרת and פֶּ
punishment and ַׁשע ַׁשע contexts. Out of the 3 contexts where פֶּ תַר כָ  and פֶּ  appear together 
outside of the Pentateuch (1 Sam 24:12; Isa 50:1; Ps 37:38), the syntactical association 
between them might be potentially established in Ps 37:38 based on the literary devices 
used. That is, the line is written as a synonymous parallelism in which ים עִּ ים and ֹפׁש  ָׁשעִּ  ר 
are a lexical pair. However, this text does not belong to the Pentateuch, so the potential 
insights from it are not considered as the meaning of ַׁשע  examined in this part of the פֶּ
Hebrew Bible. 
 
ַׁשע  and ָנָׂשא  פֶּ
There are four contexts in the Pentateuch in which a syntactical relationship 




established in this study where the term is analyzed against certain elements provided in a 
given context such as the activity the term refers to, the sort of punishment it invokes, and 
whether the sin is expiable/inexpiable and intentional/unintentional (Table 18).  
 
 
Table 18. The relationship of ַׁשע  ָנָׁשא  and פֶּ
 
 Reference Sin Punishment Expiable Inexpiable Intentional Unintentional 
1 Gen 50:17x2 Kidnapping Death  x x  
2 Exod 23:21 Unknown Many  x n/a n/a 
3 Exod 34:7 Unknown Unknown x  n/a n/a 




Out of four contexts in which ַׁשע  occur together in the Pentateuch, Gen ָנָׁשא and פֶּ
50:17 provides explicit insights for the points sought in the analysis pattern set in this 
study for sin terminology. The action of Joseph’s brother towards him involves 
accountability for several crimes such as kidnapping, breach of the kinship covenant, and 
forced usurpation of the father’s privilege of selling a family member into slavery.738 The 
context explicitly suggests that the sin of Joseph’s brothers was intentional, and later 
legislative material found in the Pentateuch requires the death penalty for their most 
obvious sin of kidnaping (Exod 21:16). It is an inexpiable and unforgivable sin. However, 
all those sins were forgiven (Gen 50:19–20). 
The other three texts are actually descriptions of God’s dealing with the sins of his 
people. Two of those three contexts speak of God’s willingness to forgive the sins (Exod 
34:7; Num 14:18), while in one, it is stated that God will not forgive them (Exod 23:21). 
 
738Seebass, “ָפַׁשע,” TDOT, 12:137. 
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It should be noted that the terminology does not give grounds for an undisputed definition 
or nature of the sins represented by the term ַׁשע  .פֶּ
That is, nominals forms ַׁשע  are used in these three texts. In Exod ָעֹון and ,ָחָטא ,פֶּ
23:21 where it states that God will not forgive the people’s sin, the term used is ַׁשע  ,פֶּ
which represents the activity of the verb ָמַרר which, in piel, means “to make bitter” or in 
Hiphil, “to cause bitterness, grief.”739 The contexts of the piel usage of ָמַרר in the 
Pentateuch point to a willful decision of someone to make someone else’s life bitter by 
physically attacking/hurting or physically forcing him or her to perform various physical 
activities (Gen 49:23; Exod 1:14).740 The context of the Hiphil use of ָמַרר in Exod 23:21 
can include various activities that make/cause God to feel/be bitter.  
 
Is It  ַָררמ  or ָמָרה? 
Rolf Knierim’s suggestion that the verbal form in this text was probably derived 
from another root, ָמָרה, “to rebel”741 that points to a more intense intentionality of its 
subject reflects the understanding commonly accepted by the English Bible translations742 
that ַׁשע  refers to rebellion perceived as unforgivable sin. Propp noticed that this textual פֶּ
 
739HALOT, s.v. “מרר.” 
740Rolf P. Knierim, “ָמַרר,” TLOT 2:687; Knierim, “ַׁשע  ,TLOT 2:1035. Also, Gary V. Smith ”,פֶּ
 TLOT 3:1363; Eugene Carpenter and Michael ”,ֵׁשם“ ,NIDOTTE 2:1103–4; A. S. Van Der Woude ”,מרר“
A. Grisanti, “ָמָרה,” NIDOTTE 2:1092–94; HALOT, s.v. “מרר”; Cole, Exodus, 189. 
741HALOT, s.v. “מרה.” 
742NASB, NRSV, ESV, NET, NIV, NLT. 
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emendation of the MT’s ָמַרר into ָמָרה is possible under the assumption, favored by the 
contexts of their uses, that these two roots are equivalents  
While the meaning is in little doubt (however, see Rashbam, ibn Ezra), the 
vocalization is uncertain. The MT Hiphʿil tammēr appears to be influenced by 
Aramaic (GKC §67g, y) and assumes the root mrr, which ordinarily means “to be 
bitter” (so Symmachus). However, Sam (tmry), LXX, Aquila, Tgs. and Syr read the 
Hiphil of mry “rebel,” as the context dictates. So we should probably vocalize *temer 
(GKC §67y) or *tāmēr (assuming a root mrr is equivalent to mry; cf. GKC §77e).743 
 
However, the uses of ָמַרר and ָמָרה do not completely support the claim that the 
sin of ַׁשע  expressed by any of these two verbs is unforgivable. The majority of these פֶּ
contexts testify that ָמָרה/ָמַרר activity assumes capital punishment, in which case, ַׁשע  פֶּ
could refer to inexpiable/unforgivable sin. However, out of five ָמָרה contexts in the 
Pentateuch,744 Num 20:24 and 27:14 point to the complexity of such sins. That is, the act 
of ָמָרה can refer to the sin that requires punishment, in this case, a ban from entering the 
Promised Land which also included premature death, and in this sense might be regarded 
as implying inexpiable/unforgivable sin. However, at the same time, textual hints in Num 
20:24, 27:14 and the treatment of Moses and Aaron in rest of OT suggest that the 
treatment of their sin was exceptional and not considered inexpiable/unforgivable 
regardless of the premature death of both of them.  
 
743Propp, Exodus 19–40, 136.  
744First, Moses addressed the sons of Israel by using the participle of ָמָרה in Num 20:10. Second, 
Moses’ and Aaron’s sin of not obeying God’s command at the water of Meribah was described as a ָמָרה act 
in Num 20:24; 27:14. Third, Israel’s disobedience of God’s commands to go and occupy the Promised 
Land in Deut 1:26; Deut 9:23 or not to go to occupy it in Deut 1:43 was described by the verb ָמָרה. Fourth, 
the rebellious attitude of the son of Israel in Deut 9:7, 24; 31:27 is expressed by ָמָרה. Fifth, the rebellious 
son is described by the participle of ָמָרה in Deut 21:18, 20. 
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Closer Look at Num 20:10 and 
Num 20:24; 27:14 
Two contrasting contexts are Num 20:10 and Num 20:24; 27:14. In the first, 
Moses addressed the sons of Israel as “rebels,” while God never addressed them in such a 
way in this context, but rather, in the latter two texts, God defined Moses’ and Aarons’ 
behavior at the Meribah incident as being act of 745.ָמָרה Moses’ and Aaron’s sin was not 
considered rebellion in the sense of breaking with or separating from God, but rather, 
expression of their GHS and weakness, since they were “honored in their deaths with all 
the status and dignity afforded the great patriarchs of Israel.”746 However, it is clear that 
capital punishment elsewhere implies that these sins were inexpiable/unforgivable in 
other contexts. 
The act of ָמָרה in the third set of contexts always implies capital punishment, 
thereby indicating inexpiability/unforgiveness of these sins. It should be noted that the 
main reason for their rebellion, recognized to be disobedience,747 was fear748 of the 
Amorites and later, their arrogance749 (Deut 1:26, 43; 9:23).750 The emphatic presence of 
 
745Cole, Numbers, 327–38. For a potential background of Moses’ sin, see Milgrom, Numbers, 452. 
746Cole, Numbers, 340. See also other valid arguments suggested by Tigay and Merrill related to 
Moses’ burial and details related to it. Jeffrey H. Tigay, Deuteronomy = [Devarim]: The Traditional 
Hebrew Text with the New JPS Translation, JPSTC 5 (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1996), 
336–38; Merrill, Deuteronomy, 453–54. 
747Merrill, Deuteronomy, 75–76. 
748Duane L. Christensten, Deuteronomy 1:1–21:9, revised, WBC 6A (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 
2001), 31, 182.  
749Merrill, Deuteronomy, 86. 
750It is the fear of the Canaanites that prevented the sons of Israel from beginning to occupy the 
Promised Land, not their desire to break with or separate from God, which would have indicated a desire to 
rebel. Their zeal to fight the Amorites in 1:43, regardless of God’s revealed will not to, reflects their 




fear also points to the fact that they did not necessarily wanted to break with or rebel 
against God, but they allowed fear to inform their behavior and decisions, rather than the 
mighty deeds of God on their behalf. Therefore, the nature of their rebellion is not desire 
to break with God because of who he was, but rather, they disobeyed his orders because 
they were afraid. This does not change the final result of their choice which was capital 
punishment as stated in 14:29, 32, 35, but it does shed light on the nature of their 
rebellion. In other words, it was instigated by fear, rather than a mere desire to separate 
from God. The same can be said regarding Deut 9:7, 24; 31:27, which include many 
incidents, such as at Taberah (Num 11:1–3), Massah (Exod 17:1–7), Kibroth-hattavah 
(Num 11:31–35), Kadesh-barnea (Num 14–15; cf. Deut 1:19–40) and others. The fear for 
their physical existence can be added to the background of their rebellion.751 Their 
rebellion was not motivated by their desire to break with or separate from God because 
they do not want him as a leader, but rather by fear originating from their disbelief in 
what God can do.  
These ָמָרה contexts describe the attitude of the Israelites during their journey after 
the Exodus from Egypt, and they included capital punishments, but the texts do not 
provide much clarity as to who, exactly, was punished. They do show that not all the 
 
in order to withdraw his punishment over them. The actual account of the event referred to in Deut 1:26 is 
found in Num 13–14 and the activity of the sons of Israel is never described by the term ָמָרה in these two 
chapters. Even more emphatic words used in chapter 14 to refer to their activity and character such as ָמַרד 
“to rebel, revolt” against the Lord (14:9); ָנַאץ “to reject, disdain” me [the Lord] (14:11, 23); ָרָעה “evil” 
congregation who are gathered together or to grumble against Me (27, 35); ָעַבר “to transgress” the 
commandment of the Lord (14:41) should include the fact that the underlying factor of their behavior was 
fear. It is explicitly stated two times in 14:9 that a driving force behind their rebellious disobedience to God 
was fear. Having seen all the miraculous acts of God, the sons of Israel should not have developed such a 
fearful attitude. 
751Stuart, Exodus, 390. 
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participants of certain events were punished. Christensen captured this by stating that 
“the long history of Israel’s perfidy underscores that they would not be standing in the 
plains of Moab to renew their covenant but for the grace of God.”752 This provides 
grounds for the claim that God punished those who deserved punishment and spared 
those who did not. 
The final context of Deut 21:18–21 could be used to claim that ָמָרה refers to 
rebellion in the sense of wanting to separate from God because of who he was, in contrast 
to the previous two sets of contexts. This context contains references to a young man’s 
continuous behavior against God’s commandments, particularly the fifth.753 The 
rebellious attitude of his persistent breaking of God’s commandment, even though he was 
warned not to do so (the negated form of the verb ָׁשַמע is repeated 2 times in v. 18 and 1 
time in v. 20) shows that the son wanted to break with God. 
These points of the ָמָרה contexts demonstrate that there is no solid textual ground 
for the claim that ָמָרה activities, defined as ַׁשע  in Exod 23:21, should be considered as פֶּ
inexpiable/unforgivable sin. 
Moreover, it is probable that Exod 23:21 should be read with ָמַרר and not ָמָרה, 
since this verb refers to the bitter, resentful attitude of the sons of Israel. In the following 
quotation, John I. Durham emphasized the broader context of Exod 23:21 that confirms 
that ָמַרר fits this context better than ָמָרה. He noticed that the context of Exod 23:21   
 
752Duane, Deuteronomy 1:1–21:9, revised: 187.  
753Gane, Old Testament Law for Christians, 259–60. 
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stresses the totality of Israel’s journey which, in turn, does not favor the rebellion sense 
of the potentially emended verbal form ַּתֵּמר, in which case MT’s ָמַרר would need to be 
changed to ָמָרה. Rather, the verb reveals Israel’s wrong attitude towards God:  
This is why the messenger’s guidance can be trusted: his guidance is Yahweh’s 
guidance into the land “made ready,” the gift of which will fulfill the second half of 
the covenant promise of progeny and land. Exodus begins with an account of the first 
half of this promise, and ends, at least in its narrative sequence, with the anticipation 
of the fulfillment of its second half. Paying close attention to the Presence of 
Yahweh’s messenger and listening to his voice is equal to paying close attention to 
Yahweh’s Presence and listening to Yahweh’s voice. They must not “resent” or “be 
bitter against (מרר) the “messenger’s” guidance and counsel, because to do so will 
bring punishment authorized by Yahweh, whose “name” (ׁשמ = “Presence”) is 
“within him” (754.(בקרב 
 
The use of ָמַרר makes more sense if the diachronic element of the text is taken 
into consideration since at the point the warning in Exod 23:21 was stated, many events 
of Israel’s rebellious acts were still in the future. Later, this attitude, in some cases of 
their journey, would grow into  הָמָר , rebellion, while in some cases, it remained just a 
wrong, provoking attitude toward God.  
A point that can be derived from ָאַׁשם and ַׁשע ַׁשע texts below is that פֶּ  points to פֶּ
intentional and planned activities. It is noteworthy that the rebellious son in Deut 21:18–
21 is described with the participial form in v. 20, which conveys a definite decision of the 
subject to continue with his attitude of rejection and rebellion. As such, these activities 
have the potential of being considered as unforgivable sins. The doer actually does not 
want forgiveness. 
Continuing to describe the nature of God, Exod 34:7 includes the full triad of 
 
754Durham, Exodus, 335. 
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nouns ַׁשע ,ָעֹון  to convey the sins of God’s people that he is able and willing to ָחָטא and ,פֶּ
forgive his people. The semantic domain of ַׁשע  and the kinds of activities it covers is פֶּ
uncertain from this text. It may refer to either intentional or unintentional sins. However, 
the text does indicate that ַׁשע  ,are ָחָטא and ָעֹון sin is forgivable sin in the same way as פֶּ
and since the term covers both intentional and unintentional sins in the Pentateuch, it 
seems reasonable `to accept the proposal of Knierim and others755 that when this triad is 
found, it points to the totality of sin without strictly assigning particular meaning to any 
of them.756 In other words, ַׁשע  can refer to both expiable and inexpiable sin, as well as פֶּ
intentional and unintentional sin with the context determining which meaning is intended 
depending on the context. The wider literary context of this text is idolatry recorded in 
Exod 32, but the lexical link between idolatry and ַׁשע  .does not exist in the Pentateuch פֶּ
In addition, the text portrays the forgiving trait of God’s character which includes 
forgiving sin in its totality. 
The nouns of ַׁשע  are paired in Num 14:18 to communicate again God’s ָעֹון and פֶּ
willingness to forgive his people’s sins. Even though the noun ָחָטא is omitted in this text, 
it heavily relies on Exod 34:7 through multiple lexical and topical similarities.757 
However, even though God forgave people’s sin of rebellion against him, they were   
 
755Stuart, Exodus, 717. The same idea is implied in Keil’s comment on Lev 16:21. Keil and 
Delitzsch, The Pentateuch, 2:402–3. Also, Harrison, Leviticus, 175–76; Luc, “חטא,” NIDOTTE 2:88. 
756Knierim, “חטא,” TLOT 1:410. 
757God promised that he would forgive people’s sins and he reminded the people of the need to be 
obedient in order to see his miracle of driving multiple nations before them. Cole, Numbers, 232. 
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punished with the mitigated penalty of not entering the Promised Land. As with the 
previous text, the wider literary context of this text is rebellion recorded in the previous 
verses, but the lexical link between rebellion and ַׁשע  does not exist in the Pentateuch. In פֶּ
addition, the text depicts the forgiving characteristic of God’s character which involves 
forgiving sin in its totality. 
 
ַׁשע  and ָאַׁשם  פֶּ
That sin expressed by the noun ַׁשע  is implied in the laws of false ָאַׁשם causes פֶּ
testimony in Lev 5:20–26 [6:1–7]. False testimony is mentioned six times in the OT, two 
times in the Decalogue (Exod 20:16; Deut 5:20), two times in the Covenant code (Exod 
22:6–8 [7–9]; 23:1–3), once in Lev 5:20–26 [6:1–7]; and once in Deut 19:16–21.758 False 
testimony seems to be a part of the law of deposit in Exod 22:6–8 [22:7–9]. Exodus 22:6–
8 [7–9] portrays a situation where one person deposits his or her belongings for 
safekeeping with another person. When those belongings are missing, the law implies 
two potential situations: (1) The belongings could have been stolen from the receiver and 
the thief has been apprehended, or (2) no third party has been involved which further 
implies two additional scenarios: (1) The receiver illegally appropriated some of the 
belongings and perhaps falsely alleged that they were stolen, or (2) the receiver claims 
the purported owner never deposited his/her belongings to the receiver or not in the 
amount/s they claim. The guilty party in the first scenario is the receiver, whereas the 
 
758Wells grouped the texts in a different way. Wells, The Law of Testimony, 134. 
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purported owner is liable in the second.759 The law focuses on the first of the two 
scenarios, namely that the receiver misappropriated the belongings of the owner.760 Verse 
7 [8] states that in order to determine the receiver’s guilt or innocence, he/she must go to 
Elohim for a decision. This part of the law could have been referring to the judicial oath 
or divine oracle, and the punishment761 is spelled out at the conclusion of v. 9.762 
However, there is an expansion of the list of possible belongings in v. 9 before the 
penalty is stipulated to other kinds of property including cattle and clothing. It is obvious 
that the punishment for this illicit treatment of other’s belongings does not include any 
sort of capital punishment. Instead, the punishment in both scenarios, when a thief is 
identified, or the receiver or depositor is found guilty, is double the worth of the 
belonging/s.763 The term ָאַׁשם does not appear in Exod 22:6–8 [7–9] along with ַׁשע  .פֶּ
However, the hint that ַׁשע  is found at the beginning of v. 9 where the ָאַׁשם causes פֶּ
designation for all these illicit activities is ַׁשע  and the same sin appears in Lev 5:20–26 פֶּ
[6:1–7] causing םׁשַ ָא . In other words, the fact that the same sin that is expressed by ַׁשע  פֶּ
sin in Exod 22:6–8 [7–9] causes ָאַׁשם in Lev 5:20–26 [6:1–7] lead to the conclusion that 
 
759Wells, The Law of Testimony, 141–42. 
760Wells, The Law of Testimony, 142. 
761On the punishment issue, see Bruce Wells, “Exodus,” in Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, 
Deuteronomy, vol. 1 of ZIBBCOT, ed. John H. Walton, 5 vols. (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2009), 
141–42. 
762It is more likely that this part of the law refers to the divine oracle. Wells, The Law of 
Testimony, 142. 
763Wells, The Law of Testimony, 142–44. 
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ַׁשע  ,can refer to the activities that are not considered as inexpiable and unforgivable sins פֶּ
but are expiable and forgivable. 
The specific issue in this law is that the defendant takes a false oath. The 
following statement from Milgrom reflects his careful reading and accurate interpretation 
of the function of the phrase, “and then he swears falsely,” in v. 22: “This clause does not 
specify a discrete wrong. Rather, it applies to all of the preceding cases: not only has the 
offender wronged his fellow but he has denied it under oath.”764 Commenting on the 
possible misdeeds listed in v. 21–22, Wells identified 3 of them: “Lying about property of 
another that was not lost and then discovered, but that was taken in some other way; 
extorting property from another; and lying about the property of another that was lost.”765 
That is, the defendant is accused of having in his possession an item that most likely 
belongs to the person who claims it. The defendant denies the charge under oath, but later 
decides to confess his misdeed and restore it to its owner. Of the first misdeeds, the first 
one undoubtedly is dealt with in the law of deposit in Exod 22:6–8 [7–9]. Milgrom 
recognized that “the bailee laws of Exod 22:6–12 are subsumed under piqqādôn and 
represent no new category.”766 Thus, the same misdeed that are designated by ַׁשע  in פֶּ
Exod 22:2–8 [7–9] are contained in Lev 5:20–26; in the case of the latter text, a new 
element is the oath and the fact that they are treated as sins against God, but in both cases,   
 
764Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 337 
765Wells, The Law of Testimony, 139. 
766Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 367; Toorn, Sin and Sanction in Israel and Mesopotamia, 19. 
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they are expiable and forgivable. Accordingly, ַׁשע  does refer to expiable and forgivable פֶּ
sins in the Pentateuch. 
 
Conclusion on the Study of ַׁשע  פֶּ
Based on the biblical texts, it seems that terms like property offence, crime, or 
simply offence fit better what ַׁשע  refers to in the OT than dispute or rebellion. The פֶּ
verbal forms, implying some sort of loss, are to be translated with “to break with,” “to 
break away from,” “to behave criminally,” or “to suffer loss, crime, breach,” depending 
on the literary context. The nominal form refers to various acts that are described with the 
verbs such as “to rob,” “to steal,” “to lay hands on,” and so on, whose meaning is not 
included in the semantic range of ַׁשע  The term is used in a variety of contexts such as .פֶּ
legal, social, and ethical. It is used in parallel with ָחָטא and ָעֹון. 
Within the limits of the Pentateuch, ַׁשע  is never found in the context of capital or פֶּ
kārēt punishment. A study of ַׁשע  provided some ָנָׁשא when it is associated with the verb פֶּ
insights into the nature of the sins it refers to. That is, in Gen 50:17, ַׁשע  refers to פֶּ
intentional sin that deserves the death penalty, but the sin was forgiven. Other texts 
include Exod 34:7 and Num 14:18, where God stated that he would forgive ַׁשע  and פֶּ
Exod 23:21, where God said that he would not forgive it. These texts, however, do not 
give undisputed guidelines regarding the nature of the sins expressed by ַׁשע  .פֶּ
Exodus 23:21 includes clues to state that God or his angel does not forgive sin 
because the sinner does not ask for or want forgiveness. In Exod 34:7, God assures that 
he will forgive ַׁשע ַׁשע .ָעֹון and ָחָטא along with ,פֶּ  seems to be treated by God in the same פֶּ
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way as ָחָטא and ָעֹון, which both represent intentional or unintentional and expiable or 
inexpiable sin. Thus, it seems preferable to accept the proposal that the triad used here 
refers to the totality of sin.767 ַׁשע  is to be considered as expiable and inexpiable, as well פֶּ
as intentional and unintentional sin. Determining which type of sin is in view depends on 
the immediate and broader literary context. 
Numbers 14:18 is an allusion to Exod 34:7 with the omission of ָחָטא. God 
declares that he will forgive ַׁשע ַׁשע However, even though the immediate context of .פֶּ  is פֶּ
rebellion against God for which people experienced mitigated punishment, the term ַׁשע  פֶּ
is never associated with the rebellion in Num 14. The most solid clue that ַׁשע  is פֶּ
intentional, but yet expiable sin is found in the fact that a sinner experiences ָאַׁשם in Lev 
5:20–26 for the list of sins of which one is expressed by ַׁשע  described in detail in Exod פֶּ
22:8. This is also intentional, but yet expiable sin.  
 
Conclusion on the Study of ַׁשע ,ָחָטא  ָעֹון  and פֶּ
Based on the research conducted in the present study which included an 
application of the terminological/contextual/intertextual approach on the three key terms 
for sin in the Pentateuch, it has been demonstrated that ׁשַ ּפֶ ע ,ָחָטא , and ָעֹון all have their 
own distinct characteristics by which they refer to the concept of sin. However, at the 
same time, they often semantically overlap. The present study suggests three implications 
 
767The meaning/function of this triad in Lev 16:16, 21 is closely examined under the subheading, 
“Interpretation of Lev 16:21” and “William H. Shea’s Proposal,” of the present study. 
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about these terms regarding their (1) intentionality and (2) expiation/forgiveness of the 
sins expressed by them. 
ּפֶ ׁשַ ע ,ָחָטא (1) , and ָעֹון refer to intentional and unintentional sins. ַׁשע  mainly פֶּ
refers to intentional sin (4/6 times) except in two accounts of theophany events in Exod 
34:7 and Num 14:18, where it potentially covers unintentional sins because it is used in 
the triad along with ָחָטא and ָעֹון to communicate a totality of sin which includes both 
intentional and unintentional sins. Outside of these special events, it always refers to 
intentional sin. 
 designate expiable/forgivable and inexpiable/unforgivable sin ָעֹון and ָחָטא (2)
whereas ַׁשע  generally refers to expiable sin with an exception in Exod 23:21, where פֶּ
ַׁשע  .expresses an inexpiable/unforgivable sin פֶּ
(3) On the one hand, in some contexts, all of them refer to expiable/forgivable 
sins, while on the other hand, in some contexts, they all designate 
inexpiable/unforgivable sins. 
With this in mind, Gerhard von Rad could not be more correct when he reflected 
upon his own terminological study and stated, “As can be well understood, as far as 
terminology went, Israel had very varied ways of expressing what she understood by sin, 
for of course there were very many ways in which she met the phenomenon of sin. … But 
such a statistical review, even if were prosecuted in much more details, would still come 
far short of disclosing what is the heart of the matter for theology.”768 
 
768Rad, Old Testament Theology, 1:263. 
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Terminology that expresses ritual and moral impurity does not give grounds for 
the claim that ֶּפַׁשע ,ָחָטא , and ָעֹון are related to specific illicit activity. However, it does 
give grounds for the claim that ָטֵמא can express one of the two types of impurity, 
whereas ֶּפַׁשע ,ָחָטא , and ָעֹון exclusively express moral impurity. 
The current study agrees with Lam, who defined sin in the OT as follows: “Sin 
denotes personal wrongdoing, which in biblical terms has to do either with actions (moral 
or cultic) that violate the will of God (i.e., sin as an act), or with the human condition 
resulting from such behavior (i.e., sin as a state—encompassing the ideas of sinfulness 
and guilt).”769 This definition basically conveys a conceptual understanding of sin. It is 
comprehensive, but yet refers to the main components of which sin is composed: (1) it is 
a wrongdoing, (2) it can come out of a state or activity, and (3) it can be moral or 
cultic/ritual in its nature. 
 
Ontology of Impurity 
As was established in chapter two, ritual and moral impurity are conceptual 
entities. As such, impurity is emptied of cognitive and motor skills characteristic of live 
entities, such as motion, thinking, and instinct. Maccoby and Milgrom assigned some sort 
of literal material nature to impurity, such as gas, miasma, radiation, or electricity.770 
Gane, on the contrary, endorsed J. Porter’s, appealing but yet misleading, assertion on the 
nature of moral impurity: “In the priestly theology, sin is an objective, quasi-physical 
 
769Lam, “Metaphorical Patterning,” 8. 
770Maccoby, Ritual and Morality, 19–22, 169; Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 257. 
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thing-hence, even if committed inadvertently, its consequences cannot be avoided — and 
so not sharply distinguished from defilement or uncleanness.”771 
In Gane’s understanding, impurity is a conceptual, but yet quasi-physical entity 
with the ability to behave like a living and, to some extent, an intelligent entity, namely, 
to travel from one point to another. Gane stated that “because the defilement in question 
is conceptual, it can have an effect through space in the sense that it causes a change of 
state to occur at a distance.”772 He also stated that 
words such as “miasma” or “ray” may be helpful as metaphors for explaining to the 
modern mind a dynamic that that connects objects located at some distance from each 
other, provided it is clear that in our ritual context they do not refer to literal physical 
substances subject to physical constraints in the material world, such as the time it 
takes for miasma or even radiation to spread.773 
 
These quotations from Gane contain serious contradictions. First, the concept 
does not possess a physical quasi-physical quality to it. It is a mental construct and, as 
such, is purely abstract. It does not even look like a miasma or ray that could be 
characterized as quasi-physical entity. Schwartz stated the following about ritual impurity 
which at rare occasions can have physical characteristics “though invisible, it is believed 
to be quite real; though amorphous it is substantive.”774 This can be applied with more 
force to moral impurity. Second, biblical metaphors are rooted in well-known and 
established realities that operate within physical limitations. For instance, the metaphor of   
 
771Porter, Leviticus, 37; Gane, Cult and Character, 159. 
772Gane, Cult and Character, 160. 
773Gane, Cult and Character, 160. 
774Baruch J. Schwartz, “Leviticus,” in The Jewish Study Bible, eds. Adele Berlin and Marc Zvi 
Brettler, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 230. 
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load is used in the OT to represent sin. However, this metaphor of load that portrays that 
sin produces a pressure on the sinner’s shoulders that is a well-known reality and 
possesses physical limitations. A load referred to in this metaphor is a purely abstract 
entity without any physical or quasi-physical component to it and cannot jump from one 
sinner to another or travel to the sanctuary. The assumption that any sort of physical or 
quasi-physical component is related to it would greatly diminish if not eliminate the 
symbolism of the concept of impurity in the defilement of the sanctuary aspect of the 












INSIGHTS FROM MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS AND BIBLICAL 
LAW ON INTENT AND EXPIABILITY/INEXPIABILITY 
IN THE PENTATEUCH 
 
 
The second part of the first section is covered in this chapter. A taxonomy of 
crime is necessary in order to develop a basic conceptual framework and take part in a 
more productive dialogue concerning the nature of sins. The purpose of this subheading 
is twofold. First, it introduces fundamental concepts of modern legal systems which assist 
in clarifying concepts used in scholarly dialogue on the topic and present study. Second, 
it provides a rationale for using simple, yet biblically informed, legal terminology. The 
subsequent part of the present study shows that these fundamental concepts were present, 
but judging from the records, more implicit in the biblical legislative corpuses. The 
following interrelated concepts are vital for a meaningful conversation on sin: (1) mens 
rea and actus reus, (2) types of wrongs, (3) intent or mental state/s, (4) negligence, and 
(5) ignorance. 
 
Mens Rea and Actus Reus 
The following quotation presents two basic elements of which a crime consists: 
“A fundamental principle of Criminal Law is that a crime consists of both a mental and a 
physical element. Mens rea, a person's awareness of the fact that his or her conduct is 
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criminal, is the mental element, and actus reus, the act itself, is the physical element.”1 
An act is not considered a crime if any of these two elements is missing.2 
Mens rea is considered to be the internal side of the committed wrong.3 Mens rea 
refers to the mental process of the offender associated with the wrong he/she committed. 
It is also called intent or culpability.4 Mens rea or intent is sometimes equated with 
motive, but motive is a slightly different concept5 and will be discussed below. 
 
Types of Wrongs 
Modern legal systems6 recognize two types of these wrongs which lead to harm: 
(1) torts or civil wrong and (2) crimes.7 Some add one more type called moral wrongs,   
 
1BLD, 8th ed., s.v. “Mens Rea.” See also Norman M. Garland, Criminal Law for the Criminal 
Justice Professional, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2009), 61; George P. Fletcher, Basic Concepts of 
Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Garland, Criminal Law for the Criminal Justice 
Professional (2009), 61; “Actus Reus and Mens Rea,” Google, 
https://www.google.com/#q=actus+reus+and+mens+rea. 
2Garland, Criminal Law for the Criminal Justice Professional (2009), 61. 
3Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Criminal Law, 112. 
4Garland, Criminal Law for the Criminal Justice Professional (2009), 66. 
5Garland, Criminal Law for the Criminal Justice Professional (2009), 67. 
6I agree with Westbrook’s definition of modern law: “By modern law I mean law based upon the 
Common Law or Civil Law traditions, as mediated by the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century and 
consequently characterized by restless innovation. The two traditions have been carried, in part by 
imperialism and in part by their own intellectual force, to virtually every corner of the globe. Today they 
are the basis, directly or indirectly, of the legal systems of most of the member states of the United Nations 
and of international law. The only other widely prevalent legal traditions are conservative systems: local 
customary law and religious law.” Raymond Westbrook, “The Character of Ancient Near Eastern Law,” in 
A History of Ancient Near Eastern Law, eds. Raymond Westbrook and Gary M. Beckman, Handbook of 
Oriental Studies, Section 1: The Near and Middle East 72/1 (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 1:1. 
7Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Criminal Law, 77; Westbrook and Wells, Everyday Law in Biblical 
Israel, 69; Kenneth W. Simons, “The Crime/Tort Distinction: Legal Doctrine and Normative Perspective,” 
WLJ 17 (2008): 719–32; Kenneth W. Simons, “Deontology, Negligence, Tort, and Crime,” BULR 273 
(1996): 273–99; Anthony Phillips, Essays on Biblical Law, JSOTSup 344 (London: Sheffield Academic 
Press, 2002); Westbrook, “The Character of Ancient Near Eastern Law,” 1:1. 
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which may actually be objects of both civil and criminal proceedings, but not all moral 
wrongs are classified as crimes or torts. This is due to the fact that criminal law does not 
seek to punish thoughts or moral character, but just acts or omissions that cause social 
harm.8 Therefore, the first two concepts will be presented below. 
The definition of tort and crime suggested by biblical scholar Raymond 
Westbrook resembles the definitions of the tort9 or crime10 found in modern legal 
literature and sources. He defines the tort as follows: “A tort is conceived of purely as a 
personal wrong against the victim. The initiative for proceeding against the tort-feasor 
(guilty party) is solely in the hands of the victim, and the role of the court is to 
compensate the victim for any harm caused him.”11 The following quotation compliments 
Westbrook’s definition of tort: “A tort is a legal wrong committed against a person or 
property independent of contract. A tort is either an intentional act that causes damage to 
legally protected interest, or the breach of a legal duty that is the proximate cause of harm 
to a legitimate interest of another.”12 The tort can be an intentional or unintentional act, 
but is, by rule, a personal wrong towards another person. In addition, the initiation of a   
 
8Garland, Criminal Law for the Criminal Justice Professional (2009), 58.  
9ERLA, s.v. “Torts and Religious Organizations”; David Partlett, “Torts,” OEBL 2:407; “Tort,” 
Wikipedia, released 17 July 2017, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tort; Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts, 
HSer (St. Paul, MN: West Group, 2000), 5; Westbrook and Wells, Everyday Law in Biblical Israel, 69; 
Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Criminal Law, 77; Garland, Criminal Law for the Criminal Justice 
Professional (2009), 56. The crime required the “taking from possession and carrying away of a thing with 
the intent permanently to deprive the owner of his property.” Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Criminal Law, 79. 
10“Crime,” Wikipedia, released 17 July 2017, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crime. 
11Westbrook, “Punishments and Crimes (OT and NT),” 5:548. 
12ERLA, s.v. “Torts and Religious Organizations”; Dobbs, The Law of Torts, 3. 
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legal procedure depends on the victim. Compensation to the victim is regulated by legal 
institutions.  
The nature of a crime is different, as Westbrook’s definition13 of it shows: “A 
crime, by contrast, is conceived of as a wrong to society, in which the harm to the 
particular victim is incidental—indeed, there may be no specific victim at all. The 
initiative is in the hands of the state, which may proceed irrespective of the victim’s 
wishes; and the purpose is to punish the offender.”14 Even though an individual can also 
be harmed in the event of a crime and initiate retaliation, it is the state that is the primary 
party which prosecutes and sanctions the offender.15 
It has been recognized that certain acts can fall into both of these two basic 
categories, crimes and torts, both in biblical and MLS.16  
As was mentioned above, the two legal terms crucial for examining both types of 
wrongs, torts and crimes, are intent and negligence. Modern legal systems recognize the 
difference between intentional and negligent wrongs, but disagreement appears when it 
comes to the definition or the implications of these two types of liability. It is also 
assumed that intentionally committing a wrong is worse than committing it negligently   
 
13Westbrook’s definitions of crime, as his definition of tort, also resemble definitions of crime 
found in legal literature and sources. See BLD, 8th ed., s.v. “Crime”; Paul Bergman and Sara J. Berman-
Barrett, The Criminal Law Handbook: Know Your Rights, Survive the System (Berkeley, CA: Nolo Press, 
1997), 24/22; Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Criminal Law, 77. For a more in debt discussion on definition 
and nature of tort and crime, see Simons, “Deontology, Negligence, Tort, and Crime,” 273–99. 
14Westbrook, “Punishments and Crimes (OT and NT),” 5:548; Dobbs, The Law of Torts, 5. Also, 
Moshe Greenberg, “Crime and Punishment,” IDB 1:733. 
15Garland, Criminal Law for the Criminal Justice Professional (2009), 56. 
16Westbrook, “Punishments and Crimes (OT and NT),” 5:548; Fletcher, Basic Concepts of 
Criminal Law, 57. 
 
255 
and bears higher responsibility. The key to separating these two ways of committing a 
crime is the factor of knowledge, desire, commitment, or likelihood of execution.17 In 
order to do so, legal systems have established four types of wrongs that are associated 
with a certain level of responsibility.18 As will be noticed below, the level of 
responsibility grows along with the level of consciousness/awareness or knowing the one 
who does something wrong. 
The process of establishing responsibility in the event of committed wrong starts 
with the possibility of accident where the level of responsibility is the lowest and 
progresses to negligence, intention, and bad motive, with a gradual increase of 
responsibility with each new possibility.19 Accident has the lowest possible level of 
responsibility of the actor. By rule, “accidents are possible only where there is a 
conceptual gap between the action and the consequence. This is the case with regard to 
homicide, battery, and arson but not true relative to rape, larceny, and burglary.”20 The 
subsequent possibility is the negligent act where the level of responsibility is higher. 
Negligence is closely related to accident and differs from it in the fact that the actor has 
the ability to avoid harm by exercising due care—acting reasonably or nonnegligently.21 
The concept of negligence is discussed below in more detail. 
A major conceptual divide exists between accident and negligence on one hand,   
 
17Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Criminal Law, 112. 
18Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Criminal Law, 113. 
19Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Criminal Law, 113. 
20Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Criminal Law, 113. 
21Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Criminal Law, 113. 
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and intent and bad motives on the other. The matter of intent assumes the second highest 
level of responsibility and can exist independently prior to actions, as well as in the 
actions themselves. In other words, an actor comes to the point where he/she intends to 
perform the criminal act which later translates into an actual criminal act. The intention 
of performing the act is formed before the action confers upon it its particular quality as a 
criminal act.22 The act of the bad motive represents the highest level of responsibility. 
Motive refers to the emotions which prompt a person to perform an act.23 Motives form a 
basis for distinguishing between various levels of bad intentional conducts. These levels 
of bad intentions make a difference between various types of certain crimes, the most 
notable being homicide and theft.24 
 
Intent or Mental State/s in the MLS 
Modern legal systems have various definitions of mens rea, but a consensus has 
been reached on the following four types. In the past, legal systems used to employed 
various phrases that consisted of the adjective plus the noun “intent” to refer to a specific 
mental state or mens rea. The three most common are (1) special intent which refers to 
the consequences which surpass the performing a criminal act itself, (2) a general intent 
which refers to the actual act of a crime, and (3) transferred intent that holds an actor 
liable even if he/she did not intend the consequences of the act.25 However, it has been 
 
22Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Criminal Law, 121. 
23Garland, Criminal Law for the Criminal Justice Professional (2009), 67. 
24Garland, Criminal Law for the Criminal Justice Professional (2009), 124. 
25Garland, Criminal Law for the Criminal Justice Professional (2009), 67. 
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noted that these phrases, along with the others26 used in the legal system are confusing 
and complicated.27 Thus the following four phrases28 that describe the way an act has 
been realized began to be used more frequently: 
1. Acting with Purpose. This mental state consists of two subcategories. With 
respect to the result of conduct, “the perpetrator’s voluntary will is to act in a certain way 
or produce a certain result.”29 With respect to attendant circumstances, “the perpetrator is 
aware of conditions that will make the intended crime possible.”30 In other words, the 
perpetrator’s voluntary wish is to act in a certain way or construct a certain result. 
2. Acting knowingly. This mental state consists of two subcategories. With 
respect to the result of conduct, “the perpetrator commits an act aware that it is practically 
certain that his or her conduct will cause a certain result.”31 With respect to attendant 
circumstances, “the perpetrator commits an act aware that his or her actions are criminal 
or that attendant circumstances made an otherwise legal act a criminal one.”32 
Accordingly, the perpetrator acts knowing well that his/her behavior will cause a certain 
result. 
 
26BLD, 8th ed., s.v. “Intent”; William C. Burton, BLT (1998), s.v. “Intent”; A Dictionary of 
Modern Legal Usage, 2nd ed., s.v. “Intent.” 
27Garland, Criminal Law for the Criminal Justice Professional (2009), 67; DMLU, s.v. “Intent.” 
28“Model Penal Code,” Wikipedia, released 27 09 2018, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Model_Penal_Code,  
29Norman M. Garland, Criminal Law for the Criminal Justice Professional, 4th ed. (Dubuque, IA: 
McGraw-Hill Education, 2017), 71. 
30Garland, Criminal Law for the Criminal Justice Professional (2017), 71. 
31Garland, Criminal Law for the Criminal Justice Professional (2017), 71. 
32Garland, Criminal Law for the Criminal Justice Professional (2017), 71. 
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3. Acting recklessly33 This mental state is explained in the following way: “The 
perpetrator voluntarily ignores a substantial and unjustified risk that a certain 
circumstance exists or will result from the reckless conduct.” 34 Emphasis in this state is 
on the perpetrator’s ignorance of the fact that his/her reckless conduct will result in 
certain circumstances. 
4. Acting negligently35 This mental state is defined in the following way: “The 
perpetrator should be aware that a substantial and unjustifiable risk exists or will result 
from the negligent conduct.36 In other words, acting negligently refers to the perpetrator’s 
failure to know that his/her negligent conduct results in certain circumstances. 
 
Negligence37 
A closely related term to the concept of intent is negligence. Black’s Law 
Dictionary (BLD) defines it as follows: “The negligence is failure to exercise the standard 
of care that a reasonably prudent person would have exercised in a similar situation; any 
conduct that falls below the legal standard established to protect others against   
 
33Reckless conduct is equated with adverted conduct in legal literature. Kenneth W. Simons, 
“When is Negligent Inadvertence Culpable?: Introduction to Symposium, Negligence in Criminal Law and 
Morality,” CLP 5.2 (2011): 98. 
34Garland, Criminal Law for the Criminal Justice Professional (2017), 71. 
35Negligence is paralleled with inadvertent act in legal jurisprudence. Simons, “When is Negligent 
Inadvertence Culpable?,” 98. 
36Garland, Criminal Law for the Criminal Justice Professional (2017), 71. 
http://study.com/academy/lesson/mens-rea-definition-types-requirement-examples.html 
37On the arguments for objective and subjective negligence, see Fletcher, Basic Concepts of 
Criminal Law, 117–20; Simons, “When is Negligent Inadvertence Culpable?”; Joseph Raz, “Responsibility 
and the Negligence Standard,” OJLS 30 (2010): 1–18; Nils Jansen, “Duties and Rights in Negligence: A 




unreasonable risk of harm, except for conduct that is intentionally, wantonly, or willfully 
disregardful of other’s rights.”38 As such, “negligence in law ranges from inadvertence 
that is hardly more than accidental to the sinful disregard of the safety of others.”39 
Kenneth Simons concluded the following concerning negligence: 
The conscious choice of a reckless actor can be culpable even though the choosing 
actor almost never is aware of, much less consciously chooses, all of the morally and 
legally relevant features of his act. Thus, the actor need not be aware of the illegality, 
or even the immorality, of his act, in order to deserve blame and punishment; nor 
must he believe that the risk he is running is unjustifiable.40 
 
As such, negligence refers to an unintentional activity, but at the same time it is 
considered as culpable carelessness.41 Modern jurisprudence classifies thirty types of 
negligence,42 some of which even blur the lines between negligence and intention. Types 
such as wanton negligence, willful negligence, and the combined terms of willful and 
wanton negligence all depend on awareness, consciousness, and/or the voluntary nature 
of the activity. In other words, they depend on the intention of a doer.43 That is why 
legislative theorists state that “negligence is indeed a surprisingly complex and pluralist 
concept.”44 
An example of negligence is found in the law which regulates safety in the event   
 
38BLD, 8th ed., s.v. “Negligence.” 
39Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), 36. 
40Simons, “When is Negligent Inadvertence Culpable?,” 112. 
41BLD, 8th ed., s.v. “Negligence”; Brent A. Strawn, “Intention,” OEBL 1:433–46. 
42BLD, 8th ed., s.v. “Negligence.” 
43Strawn, “Intention,” 1:443; François Lareau, “The Distinction between Conscious Negligence 
and Recklessness,” revised 2 December 2001, http://www.lareau-law.ca/article-consciousnegligence.html.  
44Simons, “When is Negligent Inadvertence Culpable?,” 98. 
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of building a new house. Deuteronomy 22:8 requires the construction of a parapet on the 
roof of a new house to prevent someone falling down and potentially suffering death. 
Having someone falling down from his roof and consequently dying is not the 
homebuilder’s intention, but is a possible outcome. Not building the railing would be an 
act of negligence. This is also similar to the law of goring ox45 when it went its ways and 
gored someone to death, but the owner is not liable (Exod 21:28). However, if the owner 




A sub-category of negligence is inadvertence. Inadvertence is defined as “a fault 
resulting from not paying attention; a mistake caused by an oversight.”46 Inadvertence 
may result from the following four flaws: (1) motor control (e.g., clumsiness), (2) 
cognition (e.g., stupidity or short attention span), (3) conation (e.g., weakness of will), 
and (4) motivation (e.g., character flaws such as selfishness or indifference).47 The 
concept of inadvertence as a sub-category of negligence emphasizes the fact that 
negligence is intentional conduct,48 especially flaws (3) and (4). 
Weakness of will is an especially important concept for the overall understanding 
 
45Strawn, “Intention,” 1:443. 
46A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage, 2nd ed., s.v. “Inadvertence; inadvertency.” 
47Simons, “When is Negligent Inadvertence Culpable?,” 108. For a more detailed analysis of these 
flaws, see Douglas Husak, “Negligence, Belief, Blame and Criminal Liability: The Special Case of 
Forgetting,” CLP 5 (2011): 199–218; Michael S. Moore and Heidi M. Hurd, “Punishing the Awkward, the 
Stupid, the Weak, and the Selfish: The Culpability of Negligence,” CLP 5 (2011): 147–98; Holly M. Smith, 
“Non-Tracing Cases of Culpable Ignorance,” CLP 5 (2011): 115–46. 
48Frank Jackson, “Weakness of Will,” Mind 93 (1984): 2–4, 6. 
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of inadvertence. It refers to a conflict between practical thought and action.49 In other 
words, an agent is intentionally doing something he/she knows is wrong. The concept has 
a long tradition in the philosophical and lately, psychological conversation.50 The first 
mention of this topic appeared in Plato’s Protagoras (352b–356c) and Aristotle’s 
Nichomachean Ethics 7 (2–3) who both referred to Socrates who denied the existence of 
akrasia51 or weakness of will.52 In Socrates’ understanding, “no one who either knows or 
believes that there is another possible course of action better than the one he is following 
will ever continue on his present course.”53 
The history of interpretation of this concept portrays two major points that 
permeate the dialogue. First, the concept of weakness of will has moved from being 
deeply puzzling and denied in antiquity to being considered as a common component of 
human experience in the present. Philosophers who, following Socrates, questioned this 
concept understood that that free intentional act that opposes one’s better judgement is 
 
49Christine Tappolet, “Weakness of Will,” IEE 9:5412; HDE, s.v. “Weakness of Will.”  
50Jackson, “Weakness of Will,” 1; Byron Williston, review of Weakness of Will from Plato to the 
Present, ed. Tobias Hoffmann, NDPR (2008, 3 September), https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/weakness-of-will-
from-plato-to-the-present/; Tappolet, “Weakness of Will,” 9:5412. 
51Akrasia is considered a moral state that refers to the lack of mastery. Generally, English uses the 
noun “incontinence” to translate it. Tappolet, “Weakness of Will,” 9:5413. “A literal translation of the 
Greek term ‘akrasia’ might be ‘powerlessness,’ signifying ‘being overcome by desire’ and a consequential 
loss of self-control.” Richard Reilly, “Plato and Augustine on Human Weakness,” Cithara 18.2 (1979): 48; 
Sarah Stroud, “Weakness of Will,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 2014, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/weakness-will/  
52R. M. Hare, “Weakness of Will,” EncEth 3:1789; Gerard J. Hughes, “Weakness, Moral,” NDCE 
655. 
53Protagoras 358b-c. For a more detailed work on classical conceptions of akrasia and their 
relations to the present debates, see Christopher Bobonich and Pierre Destrée, Akrasia in Greek 
Philosophy: From Socrates to Plotinus, PA 106 (Leiden: Brill, 2007). 
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feasible. This view is now widely accepted.54 Second, initially being a moral problem that 
used to be discussed in moral philosophy, weakness of will is now understood as a failure 
of practical rationality and has moved into the domain of moral psychology and more 
generally, in the philosophy of action.55 
Besides being an object of philosophical debates, weakness of will is widely 
debated among Christian thinkers too. Along with Socrates who was the first among 
philosophers to mention this concept, the apostle Paul expressed diametrically different 
opinion on the weakness of will. He actually endorsed the theoretical possibility of it as 
an inevitable reality for fallen humanity.56 Gerard J. Hughes conveniently summed up 
Christian understanding as follows: “The shortest way with the problem of moral 
weakness is to assert roundly that there is nothing here that requires explanation. It is 
simply a fact about ourselves that we are able to act against our sincerely held moral 
principles, with full knowledge and full deliberateness.”57 This view is widely accepted 
today and is also well argumented in philosophical and psychological debates.58 
 
54Even though some moral philosophers such as R. M. Hare still deny the possibility of this 
concept, or Alison McIntyre who understood weakness of will as strong desires that are imperfectly 
directed and one can learn how to share their desires so that in the course of time. Reilly, “Plato and 
Augustine on Human Weakness,” 48.  
55Tappolet, “Weakness of Will,” 9:5413; Stroud, “Weakness of Will”; Yujian Zheng, 
“Interpretational Paradox, Implicit Normativity, and Human Nature: Revisiting Weakness of Will from a 
Perspective of Comparative Philosophy,” DJCP 16 (2017): 145. 
56Williston, review of Weakness of Will from Plato to the Present (ed. Hoffmann). 
57Hughes, “Weakness, Moral,” NDCE 655; Gerard J. Hughes, “Weakness, Moral,” WDCE, 655. 
On the fine difference between the classical Greek understanding of the akrasia and Christian moral 
weakness, see Reilly, “Plato and Augustine on Human Weakness,” 48–69. 
58Tappolet, “Weakness of Will,” 9:5419–20; Sarah Stroud, “Weakness of Will and Practical 
Judgement,” in Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality, eds. Sarah Stroud and Christine Tappolet 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), doi:10.1093/0199257361.003.0006.  
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The most influential work on the weakness of will was done by Thomas 
Aquinas.59 Denis J. M. Bradley noted that “whereas for Aristotle, agents do not choose to 
act incontinently, for Thomas they do. However, they do not choose the action as such 
but rather the passion that is its proximate cause or psychological support.”60 
From this basic study of the weakness of will concept one thing becomes obvious: 
weakness of will is an intentional and free act of an agent. The reasons why people 
decide to act contrary to their judgment may be rooted in their passions, desires, and 
bodily appetites,61 but they do not deny the fact that one acts intentionally and willfully. 
Thus, intentionality for at least one reason, weakness of will, is embedded in the concept 
of inadvertence.  
 
Ignorance 
Biblical scholars frequently used this concept in the process of defining sin in 
important texts of the Pentateuch62 which requires that it, too, be defined. A Dictionary of 
Modern Legal Usage defines ignorance as follows: “Ignorance implies a total want of 
knowledge in reference to the subject matter.”63 Glanville Williams defined it as follows: 
“Ignorance is lack of true knowledge, either (1) because the mind is a complete blank or 
 
59Williston, review of Weakness of Will from Plato to the Present (ed. Hoffmann). 
60Williston, review of Weakness of Will from Plato to the Present (ed. Hoffmann). 
61Jackson, “Weakness of Will,” 2; Reilly, “Plato and Augustine on Human Weakness,” 48. For 
more elaborate study of the potential weaknesses, see J. C. B. Gosling, The Weakness of the Will (Problems 
of Philosophy) (London: Routledge, 1990), 186–94. 
62Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 228–29; Milgrom, “The Cultic שגגה and Its Influence in Psalms and 
Job,” 115–18; Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 25–31; Harrison, Leviticus, 173.  
63A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage, 2nd ed., s.v. “Mistake.”; Glanville Llewelyn Williams, 
Criminal Law: The General Part, 2nd ed. (London: Stevens, 1961), 151–52. 
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(2) because it is filled with untrue (mistaken) knowledge on a particular subject. The first 
variety, lack of knowledge without mistaken knowledge, may be called simple ignorance. 
The second variety, lack of true knowledge coupled with mistaken knowledge, is 
mistake.”64 It is a conscious and intentional act, but is opposed to the law because of the 
doer’s misconceptions regarding the matter.65 
It is evident, at least at the level of written records, that modern jurisprudence is 
much more complex, comprehensive, and precise in understanding the concept of intent. 
Terminology of the legal collections of the OT was not as extensive and precise as the 
terminology utilized in modern legal systems.66 A look at the definitions of some legal 
terms used in modern legislative systems would suffice to support this claim. For 
instance, BLD has 31 different types of act entries:67 61 crime entries (crime 
accompanied by other terms is not included in this number of types),68 19 of the intent 
entries,69 19 intention entries,70 and 64 of the property entries.71 The legal terms such as 
crime and/or criminal law do not exist in OT texts.72 
Even though the term intention is not present in the legal corpus of the OT and is 
 
64DMLU, s.v. “Mistake.”; Williams, Criminal Law, 151–52. 
65BLD, 8th ed., s.v. “Ignorantia.” 
66Gordon J. Wenham, “Law,” NBD (1996), 674. 
67BLD, 10th ed., s.v. “Act.” 
68BLD, 10th ed., s.v. “Crime.” 
69BLD, 10th ed., s.v. “Intent.” 
70BLD, 8th ed., s.v. “Intention.” 
71BLD, 8th ed., s.v. “Property.” 
72Goldin, Hebrew Criminal Law and Procedure, 11. 
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not as precisely defined as it is in modern legislative systems, some phrases irrefutably 
point to the presence or absence of intention related to some forbidden activities. As 
shown above, this claim is valid for the laws that cover various aspects of human life in 
ancient Israel. Table 19 is a simple representation of the relationship between the basic 




Table 19. The assessment of the sinful act 
 






Accident Act Consequences no 
Negligence 
act, consequences-
by some extent 
Consequence yes, no 
Intent act, consequences  yes 





Like any other activity that breaks certain sets of laws, sin that in the Bible refers 
to breaking the biblical legal corpus, including the Decalogue, consists of two elements: 
(1) the internal/psychological, called mens rea or intent or mental state, and (2) the 
outward/physical part, called actus reus or an act itself. 
The biblical legal corpus resembles modern jurisprudence in recognizing two 
basic types of offences, torts that refer to the wrong towards an individual and crimes that 
refer to the wrong towards society when the individual may or may not be affected. It has 
to be emphasized that the biblical legal corpus does not employ specific terms to refer to 
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torts or crimes. However, the biblical legal corpus contains these two types of offences 
conceptually. 
Legal jurisprudence has recognized four ways in which an act can be committed. 
First, a person can purposely act in a certain way to bring about a certain outcome. 
Second, a person can knowingly act in certain way to bring about certain outcome. Third, 
the perpetrator ignores the fact that his/her reckless conduct will produce certain 
outcomes. Fourth, the perpetrator does not know that his/her conduct results in certain 
circumstances. 
Negligence is wrong based on the failure of one to exercise certain laws that 
prevent harming other people. By definition, negligence is unintentional, unwilful 
activity, but certain forms of negligence are undoubtedly intentional conducts and 
sanctioned as such. The concept of inadvertence as a part of negligence points to the 
presence of intention in negligent conduct. Intentionality stems from weakness of will. 
Ignorance is a product of two elements of the mental state. First, ignorance takes 
place a result of one not knowing the law, or second, having a wrong perception of it.  
The review of these definitions from modern legal jurisprudence that biblical 
scholars frequently use to discuss the concept of sin was needed in order to proceed into a 
meaningful dialogue with secondary literature. 
 
Legal System of Ancient Israel 
In contrast to the modern legal system,73 the legal system of ancient Israel   
 
73“Modern legal systems generally classify wrongful acts as crimes and civil delicts (torts) and 
approach them in different ways.” Westbrook and Wells, Everyday Law in Biblical Israel, 69. 
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reflected the basic concepts and categories of her ANE neighbors’ tripartite division: (1) 
offences against a hierarchical superior, especially a king or a god, that called for 
disciplinary action; (2) morally grave offences against another individual that called for 
revenge;74 and (3) offenses against the interests of an individual involving less moral 
culpability, for which the remedy was compensation.75 However, this tripartite division is 
an external scholarly assessment of the BL, rather than a division that comes out of the 
law since BL does not make the distinction between the law collections.76 Even though 
scholars of the BL have reached some sort of consensus on the similarities and 
differences of ANE law collections and the legislative corpus between ancient Israel, this 
is still a highly controversial topic.77 
There are several similarities and differences that are widely accepted. First,  
ANE law collections are older than BL. Second, ANE law collections come out of royal 
jurisprudence and represented the voice of the establishment. They existed from ancient 
times and have been innovated as new circumstances arose or through administrative 
order issued by the ruler. BL collections do not reflect circles sympathetic to the king. 
Third, in Israel, to the contrary, God was portrayed as the author of the legislative system.   
 
74Even though the society was an agent in solving these types of offences they cannot be compared 
to modern law of crimes. Westbrook, “Punishments and Crimes (OT and NT),” 5:549. 
75Westbrook and Wells, Everyday Law in Biblical Israel, 69–70. This type of offense is 
comparable to modern law of torts. Westbrook, “Punishments and Crimes (OT and NT),” 5:548–49; Martin 
J. Selman, “Law,” in Dictionary of the Old Testament: Pentateuch, eds. T. Desmond Alexander and David 
W. Baker, IVPBD 1 (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2003), 505. 
76Selman, “Law,” 507. 
77Westbrook and Wells, Everyday Law in Biblical Israel, 70; Samuel Greengus, Laws in the Bible 
and in Early Rabbinic Collections: The Legal Legacy of the Ancient Near East (Eugene, OR: Cascade 
Books, 2011); Westbrook, “Punishments and Crimes (OT and NT),” 5:546–56. 
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He was also considered as divine and the ideal king of justice. His role was to maintain 
equity and protect the poor and oppressed.78 In this sense, God is also the ultimate 
judge.79 Fourth, in accord with ANE law collections, BL was not legislation in the 
modern sense since these texts present just a small fraction of the law and assumed the 
knowledge of the rest.80 
The third and the fourth points are especially relevant for the present study. In 
regard to the fact that God is portrayed as a king in Israel who gives the laws, it is 
important to know that his kingship over ancient Israel was based on the divine-
covenant.81 The primary way of speaking about a special relationship between God and 
ancient Israel is in the context of the covenant.82 The law was given in the context of an 
established covenantal relationship (Exod 19–14) and therefore, in breaking the law, one 
is liable and accountable to God.83 Moshe Greenberg profoundly stated: “In the biblical 
view, the law is the command of God; hence violation of it is rebellion against God’s will 
 
78Westbrook, “Punishments and Crimes (OT and NT),” 5; Selman, “Law”; Huiping Hu, “Codes as 
Constitution: The Development of the Biblical Law-Codes from Monarchy to Theocracy” (PhD diss., 
Durham University, 2009); Michael LeFebvre, “Legal Institutions,” OEBL 1:433–46; Anthony Phillips, 
Ancient Israel’s Criminal Law: A New Approach to the Decalogue (Oxford: Blackwell, 1970); Gane, Old 
Testament Law for Christians. On different conceptions of kingship in Ancient Near East and the 
difference to God’s kingship in Ancient Israel, see Hu, “Codes as Constitution,” 140–42, 170–72. 
79LeFebvre, “Legal Institutions,” 1:536; Gane, Old Testament Law for Christians, 120. 
80“The biblical codes, like their cuneiform counterparts, were not legislation in the modern sense. 
Their text was not interpreted by the courts as authoritative (except perhaps at the very end of the biblical 
period); far from being comprehensive, it presented only a small fraction of the law and assumed 
knowledge of the rest.” Westbrook, “Punishments and Crimes (OT and NT),” 5:546; Hu, “Codes as 
Constitution,” 2–10. 
81Phillips, Ancient Israel’s Criminal Law, 3–13; Hu, “Codes as Constitution,” 175; LeFebvre, 
“Legal Institutions,” 1:132–34; Greenberg, “Crime and Punishment,” IDB 1:734–35. For a scholarly 
discussion on the role of Decalogue for BL, see Phillips, Essays on Biblical Law, 2–48. 
82LeFebvre, “Legal Institutions,” 1:131. 
83Phillips, Ancient Israel’s Criminal Law, 3; Pauline A. Viviano, “Covenant,” OEBL 1:132–33. 
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– i.e. crime is sin.”84 Studying legal institutions in Ancient Israel, Michael LeFebvre said, 
“Notwithstanding the resulting complexities, there is one consistent ideal behind these 
institutions that helps explain them: the conviction that Yahweh was Israel’s true 
lawgiver and judge.”85 
The BL separated itself from ANE law collections by uniquely integrating various 
law regulations into one legal collection. regarding the ANE legal corpuses, Shalom Paul 
stated: “There is a complete separation of secular and religious law: dīnu (law), kibsu 
(moral rules), and parṣu (religious orders) are never combined in a single corpus. Legal 
rules, moreover, have no didactic purpose; they do not serve as a goal for pedagogic 
instruction.”86 Basing her study on the analysis of Moshe Greenberg’s work on the 
relationship between biblical and ANE law collections, Ruxandria Pădure stated: “In the 
theory referring to the Biblical law, the idea of the transcendence of the law becomes 
clearer. Here, God is not just the guardian or the judge, He is the very source of the law, 
and the latter is the expression of His will.”87 As such, BL expresses the will of Yahweh. 
Frank Crüsemann noted that “the basic notion that Israelite law is direct divine utterance 
is not at all common in the ancient world.”88 This fact is foundational for the claim that 
 
84Greenberg, “Crime and Punishment,” IDB 1:734. 
85LeFebvre, “Legal Institutions,” 1:536. 
86Paul, Studies in the Book of the Covenant, 8–9. This is also noted by Umberto Cassuto, A 
Commentary on the Book of Exodus, trans. Israel Abrahams (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1997), 263; 
Kaufmann, The Religion of Israel, 171. Also, Greenberg, “Crime and Punishment,” IDB 1:734. 
87Ruxandra Pădure, “Comparison between the Biblical and the Near Eastern Laws,” SJHS 3.4 
(2011): 237. Ruxandra Pădure’s analysis of Greenberg’s work on the relationship between biblical and 
ANE law collections brought up several other significant distinctive features of BL that separate it from 
ANE law collections. Pădure, “Comparison between the Biblical and the Near Eastern Laws,” 233–37. 
88Frank Crüsemann, The Torah: Theology and Social History of Old Testament Law, trans. Allan 
W. Mahnke (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996), 15. 
 
270 
“instruction” or “teaching,” rather than “law” in the majority of cases, reflects better the 
sense of what tôrâ is.89 
In addition, M. J. Selman stated that “many parallels exist between the laws of the 
OT and those from the rest of the ancient Near East, though no laws have been found so 
far that are identical in form in both Israel and Mesopotamia.”90 Biblical Law experts 
resist claims that the laws found in the Pentateuch are identical to the laws of ANE law 
collections, but rather speak of mutual similarity between the two collections.91 Selman 
has noted two extreme views of the law that are not necessarily contradictory if put in the 
right perspective. 
Scholars have suggested two opposed views of the function of BL. First, working 
out of the realization of the close connectedness between the commandments and 
covenant and the fact that revelation of the commandments was a salvific event, Gerhard 
von Rad viewed the law as a form of gospel. This implication is based on the fact that 
covenant was completed at a time when Israel had had no chance to exhibit its obedience 
to the law.92 Thus, the law had a salvific role. Complementary rather than contrary to this 
is the inference of W. Zimmerli and H. D. Preuss. They noted that besides blessings, 
covenant laws also contain curses. Zimmerli noted that the validity of divine law that 
assumes threatening judgments is embedded in Israel’s election. Preuss discredited the 
 
89Selman, “Law,” 509. 
90Selman, “Law,” 506. 
91Shalom E. Holtz, “Reading Biblical Law,” in The Jewish Study Bible, eds. Adele Berlin and 
Marc Zvi Brettler, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University, 2014), 2206–7. 
92Rad, Old Testament Theology, 1:193. 
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law’s ability to save by emphasizing Israel’s inability to obey the laws.93 The law had a 
legal, obligatory function. 
Selman believed that von Rad’s, on the one hand, and Zimmerli’s and Preuss’s 
view, on the other, can be seen as complementary if viewed in the context of God’s 
covenant with Israel which implies that the law is not law per se, but rather, serves for 
God’s larger purpose for Israel. The laws given to Israel as a nation redeemed from 
slavery (Ex 20:1–2; Deut 5:6; cf. Deut 1:1–4:43) in order to preserve and shape their 
newly won freedom and provide further opportunities to commune with him as they 
journeyed from Egypt.94 Thus, both of these functions, salvific and legal, are obligatory 
as valid elements of the covenant. 
These distinctive features of the BL are crucial since the present study views BL 
as a whole. Breaking any regulation of BL assumes the liability of the one doing it and 
accountability to God himself.95 This further means that breaking any regulation requires 
offering a sin and/or reparation sacrifice and making restitution when needed. 
Regarding the claim that BL is different than modern legislative systems, Bernard 
S. Jackson conveniently outlined the manner in which modern scholars have related 
ancient biblical codes to modern legal systems. It is factual that both ancient and modern 
legal codes, common and civil traditions, consist of the three principal parts of legal   
 
93Walther Zimmerli, Gottes Offenbarung: Gesammelte Aufsätze zum Alten Testament, TBü 19 
(München: C. Kaiser, 1963), 271; Horst Dietrich Preuss, Old Testament Theology (Louisville: Westminster 
John Knox, 1995). 
94Selman, “Law,” 509. 




source, statute, precedent, and doctrine. Jackson concluded that 
ancient phenomena corresponding to these modern institutions are certainly to be 
found. But once discovered they are all too readily invested with the particular 
attributes of their modern counterparts. Moreover, such identifications sometimes 
suggest inappropriate lines for further investigation. Much effort has been misapplied 
in seeking to determine such questions as whether ancient “codes” are restatements of 
custom or reform (i.e. consolidating or reforming statutes); whether they are 
comprehensive or merely collections of “difficult cases” (i.e. codes or miscellaneous 
provisions acts); whether they are “official” or “private” (i.e. statute or doctrine).96 
 
The similarities between biblical and modern law do exist since they share some 
shared features when basic concepts and terminology of the two systems are compared.97 
However, the differences are more numerous, which is a signal against applying a 
conceptual understanding regarding similar laws from modern, legal understanding to 
related or similar laws of the ancient legal corpus.98 Rather, they should be studied 
separately first, and then similarities should be discussed/compared. This principle also 
applies to the use of modern, legal terminology which, in the case of this study, is related 
to the concept of intention in reference to some crimes. Instead of applying already 
preconceived terminology of intent and related subconcepts such as inadvertence and 
negligence, fresh terminology is needed that is defined by the study of the laws 
themselves and to the extent the laws provide.  
 
96Bernard S. Jackson, “From Dharma to Law,” AMJCL 23 (1975): 491. For a more detailed 
analysis of the influence of modern legal terminology on ancient legal systems and the inadequacy of 
applying the concept of the former to the latter, see Hu, “Codes as Constitution,” 2–12. 
97Richard H. Hiers, Justice and Compassion in Biblical Law (New York: Continuum, 2009); 
Jackson, “From Dharma to Law,” 491; Westbrook, “The Character of Ancient Near Eastern Law,” 1:1–2. 
98Gane agreed with Christine Hayes on the fact that “the relationship between OT law and modern 
categories of law is complex.” Gane, Old Testament Law for Christians, 27; Christine Elizabeth Hayes, 




Intent or Mental State/s in Biblical Law 
The term intent or mental state/s is never used in the OT and most likely was not 
in use in Ancient Israel (Early Judaism and rabbinic texts).99 “On the contrary, all of them 
frequently employed a rich selection of concepts and expressions to refer to state of mind 
that a person had when he or she performed a given action.” 100 Another difficulty in 
studying intent/mental states is spelled out in the following quotation by Brent A. Strawn: 
“The notion of intention is controversial given the difficulty of determining internal 
dispositions (solely) on the basis of external factors.”101 Strawn captured the core 
difficulty in determining the nature of intent in legal cases. Intent, as such, takes place in 
a very private domain, namely, the human mind, but its nature is established based on 
external factors, physical activities. Yet, it is obvious that intent plays a crucial role in 
BL, and some of these laws provide textual hints into the mental state of a potential 
human agent.102 
Greenberg recognized that BL provide bases for establishing both types of guilt, 
objective and subjective: 
The notion of objective guilt, which still operates in the realm of cult and taboo, has 
but faint echoes in the penal laws of the Bible. As a rule, it is the subjective factor, the 
mind of the doer, which is determinant in evaluating the nature of the offense. The 
laws distinguish clearly between murder, on the one hand, and homicide through 
negligence or accident, on the other. Bodily injuries inflicted deliberately and with 
premeditation are treated differently from those inflicted in the sudden heat of 
passion. The religion of Israel heightened both the awesome sanctity of all that 
 
99Aurelian Botica, The Concept of Intention in the Old Testament, Philo of Alexandria and the 
Early Rabbinic Literature: A Study in Human Intentionality in the Area of Criminal, Cultic and Religious 
and Ethical Law, PHSC 9 (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2011), 2. 
100In addition, for a selected terminology on intent, see Botica, Concept of Intention, 2–3. 
101Strawn, “Intention,” 1:433. Also Botica, Concept of Intention, 1n2, especially. 
102Botica, Concept of Intention, 1; Strawn, “Intention,” 1:434. 
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touched upon God—an objective datum—and the importance of the individual’s 
moral choice—a subjective datum; these laws illustrate the dilemma that may arise 
out of the class of the two.103 
 
Analyzing intention in the present study is limited to so-called “action” cases,104 
that is, the cases in which the wrong is not limited to an inward offense, but is 
accompanied by the physical act, as well. An individual may sin either by committing a 
sinful action or by failing to perform an act that the law required. The criterion of 
intention is equally important in criminal and cultic laws.105 
 
Intent or Mental State/s in Criminal Law 
The notion of intent is first mentioned in the Decalogue. Exodus 20:17 uses the 
verb ָחַמד “to covet,” and Deut 5:21 used the verb ָחַמד along with ָאָוה I “to desire.” It is 
very probable that ָחַמד refers to mental states only,106 whereas ָאָוה I is clearly restricted 
 
103Greenberg, “Crime and Punishment,” IDB 1:734. 
104Bernard S. Jackson started off his study on intention with the claim that “numerous texts in the 
early history of law suggest that the ancients were concerned with the problem of liability for mere 
intention, that is, the imposition of liability upon a person solely because of the intention he has formed in 
his mind, and without reference to any external act by which such intention may be projected into practice.” 
Thus, he introduced the conceptual division between action (criminal and cultic scenarios) and non-action 
(coveting, devising evil) cases. The latter cases do not necessarily exclude the physical act and its 
consequential impact, but rather, the emphasis is on the fact that biblical authors perceived the offense 
consisting not just of the physical act, but also of inward trespass. Bernard S. Jackson, Essays in Jewish and 
Comparative Legal History, SJLA 10 (Leiden: Brill, 1975), 202ff. Also, Botica, Concept of Intention, 6. 
105Botica, Concept of Intention, 51. 
106Some scholars related this text with Mic 2:1–2 in which the verb ḥāmad involves action besides 
feelings. Thus, the semantic domain of the verb can include action, as well, so the verb encompasses the 
feelings that precede the act and the act itself follows those feelings. However, in this particular text, the 
former is encapsulated since including the latter would mean overlapping with other commandments 
against stealing, adultery, and so on. Patrick D. Miller, The Ten Commandments (Louisville: Westminster 
John Knox Press, 2009), 389–90. 
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just to the mental states.107 The key law is the one of homicide.108 
Exod 21:12–14: The first mention of this law is in Exod 21:12–14, and the 
offender’s intent candidly affects the gravity of the punishment. That is, the opening 
clause of the law, the protasis, states that the punishment in case of a person’s hitting 
another person which ends in the death of the latter is the death of the former.109 This 
introductory statement is a generic case of intentional homicide.110 This would be typical 
example of a well-attested concept in the OT, lex talionis or talionic retribution. 
However, vv. 13 and 14 further provide immediate qualifications. If the murder was not 
premeditated,111 but the event was “an act of God,” then it is classified as an 
unintentional homicide, and the offender can flee to the appointed place for sanctuary 
(Exod 21:13). If it was a premeditated,112 then the offender has no right for refuge (Exod 
21:14). He suffers capital punishment. The issue associated with this law is the fact that 
the law does not specify who performs the execution of the punishment. The place of   
 
107Botica, Concept of Intention, 453–56; Jackson, Essays in Jewish and Comparative Legal 
History; Strawn, “Intention,” 1:434–35. 
108Strawn, “Intention,” 1:435; Botica, Concept of Intention, 15. 
109Strawn, “Intention,” 1:435; Botica, Concept of Intention, 14. 
110Botica, Concept of Intention, 15. 
111The absence of the verb ָצָדה demonstrates the fact that there was no premeditation. Strawn, 
“Intention,” 1:435; Sarna, Exodus, 122, 252n33. Sarna cited other texts on murder which also point to the 
lack of premeditation. Linguistic pointers toward the unintentional acting in these additional texts are 
different, but solid and widely accepted in the scholarly dialog. Strawn, “Intention,” 1:436–37. The 
unintentionality is confirmed besides the absence of   ר א ַוֲאׁשֶּ ֹֹ֣ ה ל ָצָד֔  by the phrase ים ָ֖ ָהֱאֹלהִּ ָּנֹ֣ה ו  ֹו אִּ ָידָ֑ ל  . Botica, 
Concept of Intention, 17. 
112The verb ָיזִּד indicates that there was a premeditation on the part of the offender in the event of 
murder. Strawn, “Intention,” 1:436. Even more, this verb in the OT often conveys “an attitude of 
purposeful disregard for laws and morality, or of presuming to exert a role or authority against the divine 
will.” Botica, Concept of Intention, 19. He provides more references. 
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refuge for unintentional manslayers is discussed later in Num 35:9–34 and Deut 4:41–43; 
and 19:1–13.113 Premediating can be understood as “scheming” to fit the context of a 
crime.114 Another term, ָעַרם I, is used in v. 14 to strengthen the intent idea behind this 
crime and it refers to the attitude of deceit as a result of prior intention.115 The role of the 
court and judges is also not specified in Exod 21:12–14, but is stipulated in Num 35:9–
28.116 
The homicide law in Exod 21:12–14 contains clear pointers for the presence of 
intent, and even more premeditation of a criminal act. All the pointers in this law come 
close to the descriptions of similar crimes in the MLS. 
Num 35:9–34: In contrast to Exod 21:13–14 where the details of the homicide are 
lacking, Num 35:9–34 includes a series of specific circumstances under which the crime 
happened, along with tools/means included in it. A basic division between two sets of 
circumstance related to the crime is that the former points to an unintentional homicide, 
while the latter points to an intentional one.117 The switch in content is followed by the 
use of a literary pointer, the particle  ִּםא , that also separates the cases (vv. 16, 22). 
Concerning intentional homicide, in the first set of texts, vv. 17–18, the manner of 
committing the crime was striking and it was performed by the use of the objects (v. 16—
 
113Strawn, “Intention,” 1:436. 
114Botica, Concept of Intention, 20. 
115Botica, Concept of Intention, 20. 
116The study on the evolution of the law found in Exod 21:12–14 in the subsequent text of Num 
35:9–34 is conveniently outlined in Botica’s study and being irrelevant for the current study will not be 
discussed here. Botica, Concept of Intention, 22–30. 
117Botica, Concept of Intention, 31. 
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iron object, v. 17—stone, and v. 18—wooden object). In the second set of texts, vv. 20–
21, the manner is conveyed by pushing, throwing at, or lying in wait, whereas the state of 
mind is communicated by the use of hatred and enmity.118 
Regarding unintentional homicide, vv. 22–23 state that the manner related to this 
act was through “suddenness, not seeing,” while the mental state is expressed by “no 
enmity nor personal enmity, no malice aforethought, no intent to hurt.”119 
Thus, the terminology that is used to point to the intent of a murder such as 
premeditation, plotting, lying in ambush or in wait and acting out of hatred or enmity is 
negated in the parts of the law that emphasize unintentional acting.120 
The phrase ָגָגה ַמֵכה־נֶּפֶּׁש ׁש  בִּ  used in Num 35:11, 15 describes accidental homicide 
and Botica appropriately asked if it refers to the state of mind or only refers to the generic 
case of accident. Numbers 35:11 does not contain indications to answer this question. 
The terms used in the homicide contexts in the same fashion as ָגָגה  with the ,ׁש 
preposition   יד ,ב  ,(enmity, Num 35:21) ֵאיָבה acting presumptuously, Exod 21:14),121) זִּ
ָּיה ,(craftiness, Exod 21:14) ֲעֵרָמה דִּ ָאה malice, lying in wait, Num 35:20),122 and) צ  נ   ׂשִּ
(hatred, Num 35:20) all possess a distinct mental/emotional connotation.123 Botica 
correctly concluded: “Perhaps, one could apply here the legal distinction between 
 
118Botica, Concept of Intention, 32. 
119Botica, Concept of Intention, 32. 
120Strawn, “Intention,” 1:437–38; Rolf P. Knierim, “ ׁשגג,” TLOT 3:1303. 
121This verb is not accompanied with the preposition be. 
122Botica, for some reason, missed including this term. 
123Botica, Concept of Intention, 34–36. 
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intention to harm (on the spur of the moment but not to kill), intention to kill (not fore-
planned, but on the spur of the moment) and premeditation (planning to kill in 
advance).”124 These semantic properties are not covered by ָגָגה ָגָגה ,Rather .ׁש   is used to ׁש 
convey both accidental and unintentional activity. The context of Num 35 suggests that 
ָגָגה  refers to the unintentional and accidental nature of the act and is followed by the ׁש 
phrase י־ַדַעת לִּ ב   in order to emphasize the fact that it does not imply previous mental בִּ
planning of the act.125 In other words, it is an accident which itself presumes 
unintentionality on the part of the human party involved. 
The suggestion that the homicide law in Exod 21:12–14 contains clear pointers 
for the presence of intent and premeditation is even more expanded in the case of Num 
35:9–34, where the text contains terms based on which, one can determine various levels 
of intent. In this regard, this law comes closer to the descriptions of similar crimes in the 
MLS. 
Deut 4:41–42: The main concern of the short law in Deut 4:41–42 is the 
establishment of the cities of refuge, rather than particulars of homicide intentionality and 
unintentionality. It actually deals only with the latter. In this regard, it resembles the law 
in Josh 20. That is, this similarity in terms of content between the two texts is also 
extended to the realm of terminology. The phrase that is used to refer to unintentionality 
 
124Botica, Concept of Intention, 36. 
125Botica, Concept of Intention, 34–36. For a more specific meaning related to the terms 




in these two texts is י־ַדַעת לִּ ב   Deut 4:42, Josh 20:3, 5).126 No new details appear in this) בִּ
text that are not covered in the previous two texts. 
Deut 19:1–13: A general statement concerning the mental state involved in 
unintentional homicide is found in v. 4 which states that the perpetrator did not have the 
intention of committing the act, י־ַדַעת לִּ ב   nor did he have a history of hatred toward his ,בִּ
fellowmen, ֹלו  לֹא־ֹׂשֵנא . Verse 5 provides details of the circumstances of the accident and 
object involved, slipping of a head from the axe handle as one swings to cut wood and 
striking his fellowman as he cuts wood in the forest. Intentional homicide is more 
precisely described in v. 11. The manner of committing the crime was conveyed by lying 
in wait, attacking and striking, whereas the state of mind includes hatred.127 
The analysis of the homicide laws in the Pentateuch demonstrates that the concept 
of intention is present in these laws even though the texts do not use the term 
intent/intention or mental states. The level of intention in homicide laws range from the 
law that has no specifications (Exod 21:12–14), but just states that the person who kills 
another person is to be executed, to the ones where there is a distinction between the 
intention to kill and premeditated intentionality to kill (Num 35:9–34). The laws of 
homicide require the death penalty for the intentional murderer.128 In the case of 
accidental, unintentional homicide, the laws of homicide do not require the death of the   
 
126This phrase is also used in Deut 19:4. Joshua 20 also used the verb ָׁשָגה/ָׁשַגג to emphasize the 
fact that the act is accidental, without mental planning.  
127For a more detailed analysis of these two scenarios and a slight difference with other homicide 
laws, see Botica, Concept of Intention, 43–46. 
128Botica, Concept of Intention, 48. 
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killer, but protect him/her by making sure that he/she has valid legal investigation and 
protection if it is proven that he/she did not act intentionally. Not negating these insights 
of levels of intent, Botica plausibly stated: “Nevertheless, the understanding of intention 
in biblical criminal law is still basic. The observable/physical dimension is 
paramount.”129 
However, even though determining the mental state was not an easy task due to 
the lack of a fuller list of explicit verbal indicators and their definitions, the legal corpus 
contains certain hints which indicate the existence of certain and specific verbal 
pointers.130 
Other laws where intent plays an important role in determining the magnitude of 
punishment are related to various aspects of life in Ancient Israel. Some of these laws are 
the goring ox found in Exod 21:28–32, the thief breaking in found in Exod 22:2–3, injury 
of a pregnant women in a quarrel found in Exod 21:23–25, bodily injuries found in Lev 
24:19–20, the malicious witness found in Exod 20:16; 23:1–3; Deut 5:20; 19:15–21, and 
sex between a man and a betrothed woman in Deut 22:23–27.131 The present study limits 
itself to the homicide law because intention is developed in these laws in the most 
comprehensive way.  
 
Intent or Mental State/s in Cultic Law 
The difficulty of determining intention in legal texts also appears in cultic texts. 
 
129Botica, Concept of Intention, 49. 
130Strawn, “Intention,” 1:437–38. 
131Strawn, “Intention,” 1:438–40; Botica, Concept of Intention, 9–50. 
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The two key texts are Lev 4–5 and Num 15.132 Determining the nature of intent in Lev 4–
5 and Num 15 requires understanding the semantics of nominal and verbal forms of the 
terms ָיַדע ,ָאַׁשם ,ָׁשָגה/ָׁשַגג ,ָחָטא and ָעַלם. Insight into the nature of intent consequentially 
provides understanding of the nature of sins mentioned in these texts. In both passages, 
the noun ָגָגה /ָׁשַגג or the verb ׁש  ָׁשָגה  indicate sins for which expiation is available (Lev 
4:2, 13, 22, 27; 5:15, 18; Num 15:22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29) while ָיד ָרָמה ב   points to the 
intentional sin which excludes the chance for expiation (Num 15:30–31), and this sin is 
denoted by ָעֹון. Scholars have understood that former terms refer to inadvertence,133 
while the latter is associated with sins committed out of brazen opposition to God.134 
The study of intent or mental state/s in criminal law demonstrated that the context 
of Num 35 suggests that the phrase ָגָגה ׁש   conveys accidental and thus, the unintentional בִּ
nature of the act and is followed by the phrase י־ַדַעת לִּ ב   in order to emphasize that it בִּ
does not imply previous mental planning of the act. 
 
Jacob Milgrom on Leviticus 4–5 and Numbers 15 
Milgrom’s work and understanding of the nature of sin, and consequently, intent, 
outlined in Lev 4–5 and Num 15 is foundational and has immensely influenced most of 
 
132Strawn, “Intention,” 1:440–41. 
133Botica, Concept of Intention, 69, 85. 
134Caspar J. Labuschagne, “The Meaning of bᵉyād rāmā in the Old Testament,” in Von Kanaan bis 
Kerala: Festschrift für J. P. M. van der Ploeg O.P. zur Vollendung des siebzigsten Lebensjahres am 4. Juli 
1979, eds. J. P. M. van der Ploeg and W. C. Delsman, Alter Orient und Altes Testament 211 (Kevelaer, 
Germany: Butzon & Bercker, 1982), 143; Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16. 
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recent scholarship135 and encompasses all the crucial terms listed above. For that reason, 
it is analyzed in this section. He proposed that ָאַׁשם has a consequential meaning like 
other verbs that deal with sin, such as ָעֹון and ָחָטא, and express both sin and its 
punishment.136 He summarized the meaning of nominal and verbal derivatives of the root 
 :in cultic contexts as follows ָאַׁשם
The cultic usages of the root ʾšm are as follows: the noun ʾāšām is the restitution for 
desecration by either composition or sacrifice and should be rendered “reparation” 
and “reparation offering,” respectively. The verb ʾāšam is a stative. When it is 
followed by the preposition l and a personal object it means “to incur liability to” 
someone for reparation; without an object, it refers to the inner experience of this 
liability, meaning “to feel guilt.”137 
 
In Milgrom’s understanding, the meaning of the intransitive  ַםָאׁש , “to feel guilty,” 
is supported by the technical noun which Milgrom held to mean  138 ָגָגה ׁש 
“inadvertence.”139 Before continuing further into the analysis of Milgrom’s position on 
the nature of intent and sins in these chapters, I need to address the concept of 
inadvertence which was discussed on pages 258–61 above. 
For Milgrom, inadvertence is an overarching criterion in all expiatory sacrifices. 
This is how he expressed it: 
 
135Strawn, “Intention,” 1:440–41; Gane, Cult and Character, 202; Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, 
Atonement, 24; Wells, The Law of Testimony. However, Milgrom’s view was also heavily criticized and 
rejected by others. Hartley, Leviticus, 55, 58–59, 76–77; Kiuchi, Purification Offering; Knierim, “ׁשגג” 
TLOT 3:1303.  
136Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 339. 
137Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 339. 
138An, “Delayed Recognition,” 21. 
139Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 228. 
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Inadvertent wrongdoing may result from two causes: negligence or ignorance. Either 
the offender knows the law but involuntarily violates it or he acts knowingly but is 
unaware he did wrong. The former situation underlies the examples of accidental 
homicide—Num 35:16–18, 22–23; Deut 19:5–6—and the latter is presumed by 1 Sam 
14:32–34; Ezek 45:20; and such nonritual texts as 1 Sam 26:21; Prov 5:23; Job 6:24; 
19:4. These two types of inadvertence have also been termed “error” and “accident” 
(Daube 1949). In either case, as the citations illustrate, unconsciousness of the sin and 
consciousness of the act are always presumed (contra Kiuchi 1987: 25–31), as 
recognized by the rabbis: “Scripture says bišĕgāgâ implying the existence of 
consciousness” (b. B. Qam. 26b). By contrast, an unconscious wrong, when the 
offender is unaware of both his act and his sin, when he only suspects that he has 
done wrong, is expiated by a different sacrifice, the ʾāšām (see the NOTES on    
5:17–19).140 
 
This quotation requires close analysis. First, based on the review of the legal 
concepts it is negligence that encompasses wrongs done inadvertently or ignorantly, and 
not inadvertence that encompasses wrongs done negligently or ignorantly. Negligence is 
a more complex and neutral concept in terms of intent involvement. It includes both—
inadvertence, a wrong that can be done intentionally and unintentionally, and accident, 
where wrong is exclusively unintentional. Negligence assumes knowledge of the law as 
does inadvertence, but inadvertence, as a subcategory of negligence is a narrower concept 
related to the nature of the intent of a wrong act,141 while negligence includes other 
elements such the circumstance, level of damage, consequences… Milgrom seems to 
bypass the meaning of these concepts as they are defined by MLS and loaded them with 
the meanings based on his interpretation of Lev 4–5 and his understanding of sin. 
Loading precisely defined terms in MLS with incorrect meaning added even more 
confusion to the understanding of which sin/s is/are in question in Lev 4–5. He claimed   
 
140Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 228–29. 
141Simons, “When is Negligent Inadvertence Culpable?,” 98, 107. 
 
284 
that inadvertence precisely meets the condition of being conscious of the act, but not its 
sinfulness.142 One of the ways inadvertence takes place is by the weakness of will which 
is intentional activity and includes consciousness of its wrongness. I revisit this below in 
greater detail.  
Second, Milgrom understood negligence when the offender knows the law, but 
involuntarily violates it. This is a very unlikely scenario since knowing the law and 
involuntarily breaking it is a contradictory scenario in itself. Knowledge of the law and 
still breaking it must include either intention of breaking it, regardless of knowing it or 
knowing the law and accidentally break it. I later suggest an additional way of how one 
can know the law and break it. Milgrom himself related the wrong of negligence to 
accidental homicide (Num 35), and it is to an accident, just one aspect of negligence, that 
he attached the term ָׁשַגג/ ָׁשָגה  and applied it to all the cases of wrongs done ָגָגה ׁש   They .בִּ
are always exclusively accidental wrongs.143 Thus, Milgrom’s reducing negligence to 
accidental wrong only presents the obscure and incorrect use of the word that refers to the 
concept which includes wrongs done intentionally and unintentionally or accidentally. 
However, there is another misuse of the legal terminology. Milgrom’s quotation   
 
142Milgrom, “The Cultic שגגה and Its Influence in Psalms and Job,” 118. Milgrom’s use of David 
Daube’s terminology of “error” and “accident” does not fit the concepts he related to them since Daube 
defined error and accident as follows: “If there is a flaw in your plan, in your assumptions, but the act as 
such is executed as intended, without anything to upset it, we speak of error; whereas if the very act goes 
wrong, we speak of accident.” David Daube, “Error and Accident in the Bible,” RIDA 2 (1949): 189. 
Daube’s error sounds like MLS’s ignorance in the event of the misconception of the law by an individual 
and only partially fits Milgrom’s negligence. In other words, it is not unintentional, but intentional activity. 
Daube’s accident is an intentional act which an individual accidentally turns into an unplanned activity. It 
does correlate with Milgrom’s understanding of ignorance. This also reflects Milgrom’s loose use of 
terminology to define types of sins in Lev 4–6. 
143Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 283, 488. 
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above indicates that the he assumed that accidental nature of the wrong is done by both 
negligence and ignorance. As I discussed above, MLS theorists have recognized and 
endorsed the fact that inadvertent wrongs are not always unintentional or accidental. 
Thus, Milgrom misused his overarching concept of inadvertence in the same way that he 
misused the concept of negligence. That is, he reduced inadvertence to unintentional or 
accidental wrongs only. I come back to the use of MLS terminology as I conclude the 
analysis of Milgrom below. 
Third, based on the quotation above, Milgrom defined ignorance as acting 
knowingly, but being unaware of the fact that one’s acting is wrong. He did not explain 
how this scenario unfolds. This vague statement is explained by the definition of 
ignorance by MLS provided above. Ignorance results from not knowing the law or by a 
wrong perception of it. It is a conscious and intentional act, but a doer is unaware that his 
act is breaking the law since he either does not know the law or his perception of it is 
incorrect. This correlate with Milgrom’s understanding of ignorance. 
Milgrom cited two cases to show the sin of ignorance: 1 Sam 14:32–34 and Ezek 
45:20.144 The case of 1 Sam 14:32–34 is of the warriors who ate meat with blood in it. 
However, this case does not look like ignorance, but rather, an intentional act due to their 
hunger and physical exhaustion. Verse 31 states that after the battle was over, “the people 
were very weary.” Verse 34 also states that after Saul provided the solution, a big stone 
was installed so the people could use it to drain blood from the slaughtered animals for 
food, “all the people that night brought each one his ox with him and slaughtered it   
 
144Non-ritual case includes 1 Sam 26:21; Prov 5:23; Job 6:24; 19:4, but are not analyzed here. 
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there.” The narrative presents a smooth transition from eating with the blood to going 
through a process of draining it from the animals and then eating it; it seems that they 
were familiar with the reasoning behind this prohibition, but still broke it since they were 
hungry and exhausted. Rather, this was intentional sin out of hunger and exhaustion. The 
context of Ezek. 45:20 does not provide any insights into the nature of sins that were to 
be atoned by the prince, except that the verb ָׁשָגה was used to refer to the action of 
sinning. This is extremely insufficient to argue that the sin in these texts is one of 
ignorance. 
The cases of ignorance are very much unlikely in the society of ancient Israel. In 
the light of covenantal obligations which included stipulations, laws, that Israelites 
obliged themselves to as they accepted a covenant with God and in the light of the texts 
such as Deut 24:8, 33:10, that Milgrom referred to in support of a plausible idea that the 
law was publicly taught in Ancient Israel.145 It is hard to imagine that the Israelites did 
 
145That function of the priesthood was, as Milgrom said, “stressed in the later literature (2 Kgs 
17:27b; Ezek 22:26; 44:23; Hag 2:11; Mal 2:7). It is also emphasized in H: ûlĕhôrōt ʾet-bĕnê yiśrāʾēl ʾēt 
kol-haḥuqqim ʾăšer dibber YHWH ʾălêhem bĕyad-mōšeh,‘ and you must teach the Israelites all of the laws 
that the Lord has imparted to them through Moses’ (10:11)” Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 52; Gane, Old 
Testament Law for Christians, 33, 117. Contrasting the mysterious character of the Babylonian temple 
program, Milgrom stated that “that the priests must teach their lore to the Israelites” that is diametrically 
different from the Mesopotamian religion systems. Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 52. The following quotation 
provides insights into the limited and mysterious nature of the Mesopotamian temple program: “The ritual 
which you perform, (only) the qualified person shall view. An outsider who has nothing to do with the 
ritual shall not view (it); if he does, may his remaining days be few! The informed person may show (this 
tablet) to the informed person. The uninformed shall not see (it)—it is among the forbidden things of Anu, 
Enlil, and Ea, the great gods” (ANET 336a; for the Egyptian equivalent, see the NOTE on 1:2). Milgrom, 
Leviticus 1–16, 52. Finally, as Milgrom noted again: “Furthermore, the recurring refrain in P is wayyōʾmer 
YHWH ʾel-mōšeh lēʾmōr dabbēr ʾelbĕnê yiśrāʾēl ‘The Lord spoke to Moses, saying: Speak to the 
Israelites’ (e.g., 1:1–2; 4:1; 7:22; 11:1; 12:1; 15:1). The torah of the Lord is, therefore, not an esoteric 
doctrine, stored in the Temple archives and available solely to the elite priesthood (see also the NOTE on 
‘to them,’ 1:11). Hence, the Lord’s commandments compose the curriculum of the priest-teachers, so to 
speak, in Israel’s schoolhouse. Its purpose is to reduce the incidence of impurity in Israel so that holiness, 
the sphere of God, can expand beyond the sanctuary.” Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 52.  
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not know the majority of the law. To the contrary, due to the nature of the law146 it is 
expected that the Israelites would be quite familiar with it.147 Shalom M. Paul noted that 
each member of the community, then, has a dual responsibility: to observe the law 
personally and to see that the law is observed by the group. Each must see that justice 
is executed and that all crimes are punished—otherwise the community and its 
members are threatened with dire consequences. … Law becomes the single most 
important factor in the life and destiny of Israel.”148 
 
Even if the public impact of the law on individual court cases was less direct than 
that of modern statutory law149 and because it was available to any Israelites, parties 
involved in the case could settle the matter without involvement of the third-party.150 All 
these insights into the role and status of the law in ancient Israel suggest that the cases of 
ignorance were significantly reduced. Not that they would never happen, but such 
importance and inclusion of the law in public life and exposure to it reduced the chance 
for these kinds of violations. 
Fourth, Milgrom surprisingly equaled the wrong of negligence with “error” and 
ignorance with “accident,” as can be observed from the quotation above.151 However, as 
 
146The covenantal stipulations were public and normative. John H. Walton, Ancient Near Eastern 
Thought and the Old Testament: Introducing the Conceptual World of the Hebrew Bible (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Baker Academic, 2006), 293, 297; Phillips, Essays on Biblical Law, 51–52. Gane stated that “Moses 
commanded the priests and elders to read ‘this law’ (torah; possibly Deuteronomy) to the assembled 
Israelites every seven years at the Festival of Boots (Deut 31:19–13)” Gane, Old Testament Law for 
Christians, 33. Based on Deut 17:18–20, the future king was to have his own copy of the law and read it so 
he could learn and follow it. Gane, Old Testament Law for Christians, 33. 
147Paul, Studies in the Book of the Covenant, 38–39. 
148Paul, Studies in the Book of the Covenant, 38; See also Greenberg, “Crime and Punishment,” 
IDB 1:733–34. 
149Michael LeFebvre, Collections, Codes, and Torah: The Re-Characterization of Israel's Written 
Law, LHB/OTS 451 (New York: T & T Clark, 2006), 47. 
150Bernard S. Jackson, Wisdom-Laws: A Study of the Mishpatim of Exodus 21:1–22:16 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 29. 
151These terms are borrowed from David Daube. Daube, “Error and Accident in the Bible,” 189. 
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he explicitly stated in the quotation, negligence is conceptually an accident in his 
understanding. He related ignorance to “accident,” which is a totally different concept 
than ignorance.152 
Fifth, Milgrom suggested that common to both ways of breaking the law is 
unconsciousness of the sin and consciousness of the act. This part of the statement is the 
most critical point of Milgrom’s evaluation of sin and consequently, in the notion of 
intent in   ָגָגהׁש  contexts. This is addressed further in the following analysis of ָגָגה  but at ,ׁש 
this point, I want to emphasize the major weakness of this interpretation. 
Putting aside Milgrom’s inaccurate use of MLS’s legal terminology, perhaps he 
did not intend it to be used with the precision with which it was presented in this work, 
but his interpretation of sin in Lev 4–5 downsized the types of sins that can be forgiven 
through the sin offering to sins that are always accidentally or unintentionally committed 
where a sinner is never aware at the time that he is committing sin. The sinner becomes 
aware only later that the activity of which he is conscious is sinful. 
Such an understanding of sin excludes the major class of sin which is sin 
committed out of GHS and weakness. The concept of GHS is conceptually identical (or 
close) to the concept of weakness of will, and as noted above, this concept is debated in 
the major works of philosophy back to Socrates, Plato, and others, and is widely accepted 
within Christianity from its beginnings. Sin resulting from GHS may be sin committed in 
full consciousness and knowledge by sinners which, by consciously committing it, they 
 
152“1. An unintended and unforeseen injurious occurrence; something that does not occur in the 
usual course of events or that could not be reasonably anticipated. 2. Equity practice. An unforeseen and 
injurious occurrence not attributable to mistake, negligence, neglect, or misconduct.” BLD, 8th ed., s.v. 
“Accident.” Mistake is a form of ignorance. DMLU, s.v. “Mistake.” 
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break God’s law. This sin is intentional activity where there is consciousness of its 
meaning and consequences. This type of sin is missed by some modern commentators,153 
but some admit that this type of sin has to be taken into consideration.154 Averbeck stated 
regarding sin in Lev 4–5: “It probably has the sense of someone straying from the 
commands of the Lord (see 4:2b) whether unintentionally or because they were tempted 
to do so and followed their temptations.”155 
 
 ָאַׁשם 
The meaning of the verb ָאַׁשם is crucial. Scholarly proposals on the meaning of 
this term are various, and Sklar conveniently summarized and critiqued them.156 As 
mentioned above, there are four proposals for the verb’s meaning: (1) “to be/become 
guilty, to incur guilt, to be/to become liable for guilt,” (2) “to feel guilt,” (3) “to realize 
guilt,” and (4) “to suffer guilt’s consequences.”157   
 
153The key representatives are Jacob Milgrom, Roy E. Gane, David P. Wright, and Jay Sklar 
whose works are extensively evaluated in the present study.  
154“In many cultic passages, especially in Lev 4, the term בׁשגגה, ‘inadvertently,’ is joined to חטא, 
‘sin,’ in order to restrict it to offenses committed out of ignorance or human frailty (4:27; 5:25[6:6]). In 
Num 15:22–31 a sin committed inadvertently is contrasted to one done with ביד רמה, ‘a high hand,’ i.e., a 
deliberate, defiant action. An inadvertent sin may be committed in total ignorance, such as unknowingly 
eating food that has become unclean (cf. Ps 19:13[12]). It also includes offenses that one commits 
accidentally or out of negligence or because of a weak will. Thus בׁשגגה חטא , ‘to sin inadvertently,’ 
includes transgressions other than those done in ignorance.” Hartley, Leviticus, 55. “It is commonly held 
that agah denotes both complete ignorance as well as an imperfect knowledge or advertence.” P. P. 
Saydon, “Sin-offering and Trespass-offering,” CBQ 8 (1946): 394; Eichrodt, Theology of the Old 
Testament, 2:161. 
155Averbeck, “ַחָּטאת,” NIDOTTE 2:94. 
156Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 25–41. 
157Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 25. 
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To Be/Become Guilty, To Incur Guilt, To Be/To 
Become Liable for Guilt 
The traditional meaning “of ָאַׁשם has been understood as the objective statement 
of guilt.”158 First, as noted below, limiting ָאַׁשם to objective meaning creates difficulty in 
Lev 4–5 since the transition between vv. 13–14 is expressed by the conjunction   ו whereas 
transition between vs. 22–23 and 27–28 is expressed by a different particle, אֹו. The most 
natural meaning for 159 אֹו “or” is not possible using the traditional meaning since it 
produces the following translation: “If anyone sins, and is guilty or is told what their sin 
is, then he or she shall bring an offering.”160 This reading requires a different translation 
for אֹו since, in this case, sinners are guilty and required to bring a sacrifice before they 
even know they have sinned.161 The difficulty is augmented even more due to the 
assumption that the sinner is not aware of the sinfulness of their sin in these chapters.162 
It has to be noted that Sklar reasoned under the assumption that the sin in these   
 
158Péter-Contesse, Lévitique 1–16, 71; Janowski, Sühne als Heilsgeschehen; Toorn, Sin and 
Sanction in Israel and Mesopotamia, 92; Levine, Leviticus, 22–23; Paul Joüon, “Notes on Lexicographie 
Hébraique,” Bib 19 (1938): 455; Rolf P. Knierim, “ָאַׁשם,” THAT 1:255. 
 319x), of whose occurrences 75 percent are in the Pentateuch. Its main function is to) אֹו …“159
serve as a separator of alternatives in either main or subordinate clauses. The latter usage is especially 
noticeable in legislative narrative, where it introduces an alternative or an exception to the rule being stated. 
In Lev 13:47–49 it appears 10x.” Allan Harman, “Particles,” NIDOTTE 4:1035. “Other than waw, the only 
coordinating conjunction established in Hebrew is אֹו ‘or,’ used to join alternatives. It is alleged that p ‘and 
then’ is to be found in Hebrew. The coordinator או is found separating alternatives in main clauses … and, 
more often, in subordinate clauses … subordinate clauses are common in legal materials where the 
precision of  או is desired.” Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 654. 
160Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 30. 
161Of the notable scholars in this field, Baruch A. Levine held this position. Levine, Leviticus, 22–
23. 
162Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 30. 
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texts is unknown to the sinner. This detail prevents him from allowing a subjective sense 
of ָאַׁשם which, if it was assumed in ָאַׁשם, would provide smooth reading without 
exclusion of the objective sense. 
The other translations are not troubled by the natural translation of אֹו as “or” 
since sinners either (1) recognize their sin and subsequently feel guilty or their sin was 
made known to them, (2) they simply realize their sin or their sin was made known to 
them, or (3) they realize their sin because of suffering or their sin was made known to 
them. Subsequently, after recognizing in their sin in some way, the sinners bring the 
sacrifice or begin the process of rectifying their sin.163 
Second, Sklar noted that reading Lev 5:23 also does not make sense if it is 
assumed that ָאַׁשם bears only the objective sense. He assumed that the sin in Lev 5:20–26 
is intentional and that the sinners are aware of it, which further means that they know that 
they are guilty from the outset. Excluding the subjective element of ָאַׁשם and reading this 
text with the objective sense only poses a problem of insufficiency of objective guilt to 
motivate the sinner to bring the sacrifice.164 I return to this text and the solution to it 
below as I analyze Milgrom’s “to feel guilt” translation. 
 
Bruce Wells’ Suggestion 
Wells’ explanation of ָאַׁשם is not new in terms of the verb’s meaning per se: he 
retained an objective sense of it “to be/become guilty,” but his suggestion is new in that   
 
163Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 31. 
164Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 31–32. 
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he proposed that sinners basically do not need to be aware of their sin in order for it to be 
extirpated, and consequently, forgiven. Gane expressed the same understanding of sin in 
Lev 5:17–19. Sinner never knew nor recalled their sin.165 Wells’ view of ָאַׁשם is not 
based on the study of this verb in the Pentateuch or OT, but is totally informed by the 
ANE text, specifically the Mesopotamian Šurpu incantations, and then applied to Lev 4–
5. Unlike Milgrom who tried to establish the meaning of ָאַׁשם by considering both 
biblical and ANE texts, Wells mainly relied on the Šurpu incantations. He rightly 
dismissed attempts of some scholars who combined הּוא ָיַדע ו   and ָאֵׁשם  in Lev 5:3–4 to ו 
claim that sinners acquire knowledge of their sin, become guilty, and subsequently offer 
sacrifice.166 The verb ָיַדע is qatal in הּוא  and thus, cannot be temporarily placed ָיַדע ו 
before ַלם נֶּע   which refers to sinners initially forgetting their sin. Wells added the ,ו 
argument from Lev 4 where he also thought that the “knowledge [of sin] never precedes 
the guilt and the guilt sometimes does the prompting without knowledge ever being 
acquired.”167 He did recognize two alternatives in Lev 4:22–23 and 27–28, but limiting 
 to the objective sense only prevented him from seeing that there is no knowledge of ָאַׁשם
sin in the first alternative, but rather, the guilt itself is the only motivator for the sinner to 
offer sacrifice. Knowledge of sin is not needed at all.168 This argument is heavily 
 
165Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 133. 
166Paul Heinisch, Das Buch Leviticus (Bonn: P. Hanstein, 1935), 30–31; Karl Ellinger, Leviticus, 
HAT 4 (Tübingen: Mohr, 1966), 55. Gordon J. Wenham proposed a similar view. He claimed that the 
sinners confessed their sin and offered sacrifice after being smitten by their conscience. Wenham, The Book 
of Leviticus, 93, 86. 
167Wells, The Law of Testimony, 67. 
168Wells, The Law of Testimony, 68. 
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influenced by the understanding that ָאַׁשם refers to the sinners’ objective guilt only, 
which is in contradiction to the conceptual and literary reading of Lev 4 suggested in this 
work. 
Wells declared the subjective-psychological sense (feelings of guilt or remorse, 
pangs of conscience) as an anachronistic claim that it was unlikely for the ancients to 
identify guilt in this way.169 Rather, the person would experience some tangible signs of 
being guilty of sin or of suffering divine punishment.170 
Wells stated that this kind of attitude is demonstrated in the belief of Job’s three 
friends as they witnessed his experience of great misfortune and severe physical pains. As 
Job did not know what his sin was, so the ancients did not know their sin when struck 
with physical sufferings. Wells demonstrated this by using the Šurpu incantations. There, 
he pointed out “that there was a way for a person, usually someone who was ill, to go to a 
priest and obtain pardon for sin and relief from its effects, even if the person had no 
inkling what sin he or she may have committed.”171 Wells then cited M. J. Geller’s 
observation on the case of a sick person who visited the priest due to their sickness: 
“Since the patient does not know the exact nature of his transgression, the incantation 
priest recites an exhaustive list of 95 possible personal misdemeanours, presumably 
hoping to include the relevant sin.”172 Wells concluded that “it is then assumed that if the   
 
169Wells, The Law of Testimony, 68–69. 
170This argument is based on Raymond Westbrook, Studies in Biblical and Cuneiform Law, 
CahRB 26 (Paris: Gabalda, 1988), 27–30. 
171Wells, The Law of Testimony, 68. 
172M. J. Geller, “The Šurpu Incantations and Lev V.1–5,” JSS 25 (1980): 182. 
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offending sin is included in the recitation and the proper ritual performed, people will 
receive the pardon and relief they seek. Also included in the Šurpu texts is a section 
indicating that a person can ask “for some omen or sign confirming his guilt, or 
identifying his exact sin.”173 Wells’ final conclusion was that “this is the context in which 
to understand the term ʾāšam Leviticus 4 and 5.”174 This would translate into the 
following scenario: A person would experience some kind of misfortune, Wells 
suggested sickness, losing a loved one, or other sort of suffering, which could make him 
think that he was guilty and incite him to seek out a priest in order to perform ritual 
involving a purification offering. Thus, it was not knowledge of sin, but the onset of the 
guilt that triggers the entire process.175 
The contextual and conceptual difference between pagan religions of ANE and 
the one of ancient Israel is considerably immense,176 as is the difference between the 
roles of the priest in these two religion systems177 which call for detailed work in 
potentially establishing the connection and mutual influence. The context of the sick 
person from Šurpu  texts does not resemble any context in the OT. 
There are three well-taken points in Well’s understanding of ָאַׁשם and Lev 5:1–4. 
First, upholding the objective sense of ָאַׁשם as the reference to the sinner’s guilty   
 
173Wells, The Law of Testimony, 68; Geller, “The Šurpu Incantations,” 182. 
174Wells, The Law of Testimony, 68. 
175Wells, The Law of Testimony, 69. 
176Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 42–43. 
177Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 52–57; Hector Ignacio Avalos, “Illness and Health Care in Ancient 
Israel: A Comparative Study of the Role of the Temple” (PhD diss., Harvard University, 1991). 
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condition is obviously present in this verb. Second, the point that the ancients 
experienced guilt in a tangible way is also a well-taken point. However, it has to be 
mentioned that Milgrom and others have already stated that physical, along with 
psychological, suffering is a part of the sinner’s being ָאַׁשם, as was discussed above.178 
Third, Wells rightly noted that the phrase הּוא ָיַדע ו   should be understood as a pluperfect 
and refers to the knowledge of the sin that was subsequently forgotten prior to the 
experience of ָאַׁשם. The other points of his argumentation are misleading, over-
exaggerated, and not supported by the OT. The main concern of Wells’ suggestion is an 
unconvincing lexical and conceptual connection between these two texts. 
First, a proper method of inferring insights from ANE texts to the biblical texts 
has been highly debated over the last 150 years, resulting in two totally opposing 
positions. One camp is recognizable for overemphasizing parallels (parallelomania)179 
between the two texts corpuses and another one for downplaying them 
(parallelophobia).180 The right direction for arriving at a sound comparative method is a 
middle ground proposed by William W. Hallo, termed a “contextual method,” that seeks 
to observe both the similarities, as well as differences between the two texts.181 William 
 
178Jacob Milgrom, Cult and Conscience: The Asham and the Priestly Doctrine of Repentance, 
SJLA 18 (Leiden: Brill, 1976), 76. 
179Sandmel, “Parallelomania,” 1–13. 
180R. Ratner and B. Zuckerman, “‘A Kid in Milk’?: New Photographs of KTU 1.23, Line 14,” 
HUCA 57 (1986): 15–60, especially 52. 
181William W. Hallo, “Compare and Contrast: The Contextual Approach to Biblical Literature,” in 
The Bible in the Light of Cuneiform Literature: Scripture in Context III, eds. William W. Hallo, Bruce 
William Jones, and Gerald L. Mattingly, Ancient Near Eastern Texts and Studies 8 (Lewiston, NY: Mellen 
Press, 1990), 1–30; William W. Hallo, “Biblical History in Its Near Eastern Setting: The Contextual 




Younger correctly stated that “the best comparative studies recognize that the literature of 
the ancient Near East was produced not only out of a particular culture but also out of a 
larger literary tradition, and that comparison with other literature that is similar within 
that tradition—serving the same purpose, using the same structure, or referring to the 
same subject—reveals certain aspects of a text that might remain hidden.”182 This method 
seeks to expose what is traditional, conventional, or generic in a story in order to lessen 
the conjectural element in historical analysis, or the subjective element in literary 
criticism. A balanced evaluation of the evidence is comprised of four closely linked lines 
of assessment: (1) linguistic, (2) geographic, (3) chronological, and (4) cultural (not 
necessarily in this order).183 In addition, this method cautions that there is a degree of 
uncertainty in the interpretative process.184 
In terms of the comparative approach, Wells followed Meir Malul by accepting 
the “historical compassion approach,” which seems to be a better alternative than the 
“typological comparison approach,” since the former looks for the correspondence 
between two societies that share common geographical and historical settings in contrast 
to the latter that compares geographically and historically unrelated societies.185 
 
and J. B. White, PTMS 34 (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 1980), 1–12; William W. Hallo, The Book of the 
People, BJS 225 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1991), 17–23. 
182K. Lawson Younger, “The ‘Contextual Method’: Some West Semitic Reflections,” in Archival 
Documents from the Biblical World, ed. William W. Hallo, COS 3 (Leiden: Brill, 1997), xxxvii. 
183Younger, “The ‘Contextual Method’”, xxxvii. 
184Younger, “The ‘Contextual Method’”, xli. 
185Wells, The Law of Testimony, 6; Meir Malul, The Comparative Method in Ancient Near Eastern 
and Biblical Legal Studies, AOAT 227 (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 1990), 13; Claus Westermann, 
The Structure of the Book of Job: A Form-Critical Analysis, trans. Charles A. Muenchow (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1981), 33; Paul Maxwell and John Perrine, “The Problem of God in the Presence of Grief: 
Exchanging ‘Stages’ of Healing for ‘Trajectories’ of Recovery,” JSFSC 9.2 (2016): 192. 
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However, Wells excluded most literary and contextual links from his method,186 which is 
crucial for establishing the fact that the Šurpu incantations and Lev 4–5 share the same 
characteristics, thus justifying their comparison. This would be essential, as Hallo’s 
“contextual approach” suggests, in order to establish ground for comparing two texts 
from different geographical, cultural, and chronological settings and is required to 
precede a bold statement such as Wells made that the ָאֵׁשם  from Lev 4–5 is to be ו 
understood in the same context where the sick find healing in Šurpu incantations. In 
addition, Wells’ work focuses on similarities only neglecting the importance of 
considering contrasts which is contrary to Malul’s understanding of the “historical 
comparison approach.”187 
Second, it is problematic to take the assumptions of Job’s friends which were 
never explicitly spelled out in the OT nor defined as a common way of sinners’ 
realization of their unknown or forgotten sin and use them to interpret the technical text 
of Lev 4–5, the only text besides Num 15 that resolves the situation in which a person 
sinned. These assumptions were proven to be totally wrong later in the book of Job.188 
There is a need to establish more solid connections between the two texts in order to have   
 
186Wells, The Law of Testimony, 9–10. 
187“This pre-assumption of some historical link between the Old Testament and the ancient Near 
East is, of course, justified in principle. After all, the Old Testament grew up in the same cultural, 
linguistic, and historical context of the ancient Near East, and it is only natural to expect to find similarities 
and parallelisms here and there, as well as significant contrasts.” Malul, The Comparative Method in 
Ancient Near Eastern and Biblical Legal Studies, 34. 
188Scholars mainly deny any sin on Job’s part in the book of Job. Robert L. Alden, Job, NAC 11 
(Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 1993), 409; John H. Holbert, “The Rehabilitation of the Sinner: The 
Function of Job 29–31,” ZAW (1983): 237; John E. Hartley, “Job,” NIDOTTE 4:781. Some believe that Job 
committed sin during his sickness as he was questioning God, but not before it. Lynne B. Newell, “Job: 
Repentant or Rebellious?,” VT 46 (1984): 315. 
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one influence over the other. The nature of these two texts is totally different; this is 
reflected in the use of different literary genres. Job, for the most part, belongs to wisdom 
literature that deals with concepts and notions,189 while Leviticus, for the most part, is 
legal/cultic law. Belief that sufferings, physical or psychological, can come on people 
because of their sin is definitely a part of ANE and the biblical worldview, but singling it 
out as the only way by which sinners realize that they have committed sin and need to 
offer a sacrifice would be a matter of arbitrary, subjective opinion and forced 
interpretation, rather than a textually proven assessment. If that were true, it would 
greatly dispute the sophisticated and intellectual cognition the ancients had. 
This inexhaustive list of serious weaknesses in Wells’ comparative method that is 
reflected in his interpretation of Lev 4–5 led me to dismiss his suggestion that ָאַׁשם refers 
to the physical pain caused by the sinners’ sin, which actually motivates sinners to offer 
sacrifice rectifying the situation in which they find themselves. His work shows a poor 
connection between the contexts of Šurpu incantations and Lev 4–5 in order to infer 
insights from the former and apply them to the latter. 
 
“To Realize Guilt” 
Kiuchi proposed that ָאַׁשם means “to realize guilt.”190 Kiuchi also assumed that 
the sinners are unaware of their sin in Lev 4,191 but he allowed for “or” as the meaning 
 
189Lawrence Boadt, “Wisdom, Wisdom Literature,” EDB 1380–82; Roland E. Murphy, “Wisdom 
in the OT,” ABD 6:925–26, 928; C. Hassell Bullock, An Introduction to the Old Testament Poetic Books 
(Chicago: Moody Publishers, 2007), 19–78, especially 29–34. 
190Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 31–34. Also followed by Hartley, Leviticus, 44–45, 72–73. 
191Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 25–31. 
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for אֹו, which introduces two alternative ways in which sinners realize their sin. Sinner are 
told their sin after the particle, but it was the way sinners learn about their sin before it is 
described by ָאַׁשם that led them to propose that ָאַׁשם contains sinners’ realizing their sin. 
Since the consciousness of sin is missing in the verb ׁשגה, it must be expressed through 
 Kiuchi’s suggestion also provides a persuasive reading of the texts in Lev 4–5 192.ָאַׁשם
since it solves the difficulty that, chronologically, sinners are not aware of their sins or 
they forget them until the inference that sinners realize their sin that is told to them by 
others, and subsequently bring the sacrifice. Sklar first critiqued Kiuchi’s suggestion that 
 ָאַׁשם does not necessarily convey sinners’ consciousness of sin. Sklar thought that ָאַׁשם
can refer to the suffering caused by sin which leads to the realization of the sin. In this 
case, ָאַׁשם expresses the result of sin, rather than the lack of realization itself. However, 
Sklar did, in a way, uphold Kiuchi’s proposal by stating that sinners could realize their 
sin, which would subsequently lead them to feel guilty. This point of Sklar’s critique is 
fully informed by Milgrom’s understanding of ָאַׁשם that is limited to the subjective-
consequential meaning of it193 and is not convincing. As such, it opens up the possibility 
for the inclusion of both realization of sin and feeling guilt in the semantic domain of 
 .ָאַׁשם
Sklar’s second point of criticism of Kiuchi’s suggestion is that the translation, “to 
realize sin,” creates an unreasonable reading of Lev 4:3: “If the high priest sins so as to 
 
192Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 31. 
193Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 33. 
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make people realize their guilt.”194 First, Kiuchi never excluded the notion that this text, 
due to the infinitival idea, meaning leshmat, “causing guilt to the people,”195 assumes 
some sort of consequences on the people because of the high priest’s sin, but rather noted 
the fact that when the high priest commits sin, the entire people, besides him, is 196;ָאַׁשם 
in his words, “the people realize guilt.” Behind Kiuchi’s proposal that leshmat197 means 
“so that the people realize guilt” stands his subjective and objective understanding of 
 meaning that they realized their guilt and are guilty, which correlates with the ,ָאַׁשם
experience of the high priest himself.198 Sklar’s criticism is informed by Milgrom’s idea 
that ָאַׁשם is the sinner’s purely subjective-psychological experience of guilt for the sin, 
not the objective. Second, the correlation between the high priest’s sin and the experience 
of guilt of the people is a well-established interpretation of this text;199 it is thus expected 
that the high priest’s sin has an impact on, and is eventually noticed by, the people. Thus, 
this point of criticism essentially depends on whether one allows for the ָאַׁשם to   
 
194Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 34. 
195Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 126; Kiuchi, Leviticus, 88. 
196Kiuchi, Leviticus, 92–93. 
197Kiuchi seems to disagree with himself on the meaning of ָאַׁשם in Lev 4:2 since he seems to 
allow for both senses of ָאַׁשם, and yet denies the objective one in this text. Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 
126; Kiuchi, Leviticus, 88, 92–93, 95–96. However, his position is generally that  ָאַׁשם is comprised of both 
senses. Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 33–34. 
198Kiuchi, Leviticus, 92–93. 
199Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 231–32; Snaith, Leviticus and Numbers, 41; Noordtzij, Numbers, 57; 
Noth, Leviticus, 38; Levine, Leviticus, 20; Wenham, The Book of Leviticus, 97; Gane, Cult and Character, 
81. Sklar himself included Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 41; Sklar, Leviticus, 110. 
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encompass in a subjective and objective sense or only in the subjective, which makes it 
highly inadequate. 
 
“To Feel Guilt” 
Milgrom is the key proponent of the “to feel guilt” understanding of ָאַׁשם. He 
proposed the following meaning of ָאַׁשם: “When it is followed by the preposition l and a 
personal object it means “to incur liability to” someone for reparation; without an object, 
it refers to the inner experience of this liability, meaning “to feel guilt.””200 It either 
conveys that the guilt is incurred by someone in the former or to the sinner’s 
psychological experience of guilt in the latter case, but he denied that the root contains 
the reference to sinners’ realizing their sin. Milgrom displayed an inconsistency of his 
own reasoning since he stated that one of the ways sinners realize their sin is on their 
own.201 Chronologically, this happens before sinners are told of their sin, before   ו in v. 13 
or אֹו in vv. 22 and 27. The subjective-psychological component of ָאַׁשם is also 
augmented by the consequential sense of it. Milgrom explained the subjective-  
 
200Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 339.  
201“The subsequent cases certify that remorse for (ʾāšām) and knowledge of (yādaʿ) one’s error are 
prerequisites for the purification offering (see on vv 13–14, 22–23). Yet surprisingly, neither term is found 
in the case of the high priest. Moreover, the text does not even state that his error was committed 
inadvertently! The latter objection is removed once it is realized that the factor of inadvertence is expressly 
given in the previous verse, the heading for the entire chapter. But what of the missing remorse and 
knowledge? There is no choice but to infer that these things are taken for granted (Keter Torah). Because 
the high priest performs most of his rituals in the privacy of the tent-shrine, only he can inform himself of 
his error. And once discovered, it is inconceivable that he would not feel remorse.” Milgrom, Leviticus 1–
16, 232. “The individual who errs either finds out the nature of his error on his own or (ʾô) someone else 
informs him of it.” Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 243–44. “Either the chieftain discovers his error (and regrets 
it) or someone else informs him.” Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 247. Also, Milgrom, “The Cultic שגגה and Its 
Influence in Psalms and Job,” 117; Jacob Milgrom, Studies in Cultic Theology and Terminology, SJLA 36 
(Leiden: Brill, 1983), 117. 
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psychological sense in the following way:  
Wrongdoing creates guilt and fear of punishment, and, conversely, suffering 
reinforces the presence of guilt feelings because it is interpreted as punishment for 
sin. Thus it is logical to expect that a language that, as observed, will express the 
consequential syndrome of sin-punishment by a single word will also have at least 
one root in its lexicon to express another consequential relationship, that which exists 
between sin-punishment and guilt feelings. This root, I submit, ʾšm.202 
 
Milgrom limited ָאַׁשם in cultic texts, when used as an intransitive verb, to the 
subjective sense only: 
In the cultic and legal texts, however, where metaphors are eschewed, a precise term 
would be essential to pinpoint the existence of guilt: it is the verb ʾāšam. Thus, 
contrary to usual translations, ʾāšam without an object does not refer to a state of 
guilt; rather, in keeping with its consequential meaning, it denotes the suffering 
brought on by guilt, expressed now by words such as qualms, pangs, remorse, and 
contrition. ʾāšam would then mean to be conscience-smitten or guilt stricken, and 
henceforth it will be rendered as “feel guilt.” 203 
 
Sklar critiqued the essence of the arguments in both Milgrom’s quotations. First, 
Milgrom assumed that ָאַׁשם encompasses a consequential connection between sin-
punishment and guilt feelings without providing valid arguments for such a claim. Sklar 
correctly stated that just because it is logical for a word with a certain meaning to exist in 
a given language does not necessarily mean that that word actually exists in that 
language.204 Second, Milgrom also saw the need of a word in cultic and legal texts that 
would convey the notion of guilt and proposed that that word is ָאַׁשם. However, he did 
not provide any substantial proof for such a claim. Sklar correctly pointed out that the 
 
202Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 343.  
203Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 343. Emphasis mine. 
204Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 38. 
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proof for this meaning of ָאַׁשם must come from the study of the root itself within its 
contexts.205 
Kiuchi noticed that Milgrom’s line of thinking to come to this subjective-
consequential understanding of ָאַׁשם is supported by two observations. First, it is 
reasonable to assume that sinners are aware of the sinfulness of their act, even while 
planning it, since the sin in Lev 5:22 is intentional but Milgrom proposed that “only the 
element of remorse fits wĕʾāšēm here.”206 Sinners feel guilt and, therefore, begin the 
process of rectifying their sin, v. 23. 
Second, if one applied the objective sense, “be guilty,” the protases in Lev 4–5 
would lose their prescriptive function since the objective sense of ָאַׁשם, “to be/become 
guilty,” is an external assessment of the sinners’ condition that is alienated from the 
sinners’ own internal assessment of themselves. This is further confirmed by the fact that 
the term immediately precedes the bringing of the sacrifice or the beginning of the 
rectifying process of the sinners’ sin.207 
However, the understanding of ָאַׁשם with a translation/meaning of “to feel guilt” 
creates an inconsistent reading of Lev 4–5. This limited view of ָאַׁשם as a subjective-
psychological-consequential sense especially affects the protases in Lev 4:3, 13–14, 22–
23, 27–28; 5:3–5, 17, 23. 
Lev 4:3. In this text, the community becomes ָאַׁשם by the high priest’s sin. The 
 
205Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 38–39. 
206Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 344. 
207Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 32. 
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prepositional phrase ת ַמֹ֣ ַאׁש   is morphologically nominal, but syntactically infinitival.208 ל 
In this context, ָאַׁשם modifies the noun “people” and the verb indicates that the people are 
endangered because of the high priest’s sin. Applying his consequential understanding of 
 even includes some sort of penalty on the people.209 At ָאַׁשם Milgrom claimed that ,ָאַׁשם
this point, ָאַׁשם, besides bearing the subjective-consequential sense, simultaneously 
conveys the objective fact that the people are guilty for an unknown reason. 
Sklar, noting the sameness of ritual and sacrifice in the first two subcases (vv. 3–
12 and 13–21) which would imply the same sort of guilt, critiqued Milgrom for changing 
a consequential understanding of ָאַׁשם in v. 3, “to the detriment (of the people),” into a 
subjective one in v. 13, “they feel guilty.” The understanding of ָאַׁשם should be the same 
in the two subcases.210 
Milgrom excluded the consciousness of sinfulness of the act from ָאַׁשם based on 
Lev 5:17, 23 because sinners are aware of their sin and guilt before ָאַׁשם in v. 23, or in v. 
17, they are unaware of their sin and thus, cannot realize it.211 Milgrom proposed that in 
5:17, the sinner was unaware of both his sin along with its sinfulness and therefore, ָאַׁשם 
refers to the sinner’s “suspecting that he has done wrong.”212 This sin turns out to be the 
 
208Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 231. 
209Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 231. 
210Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 36–37. 
211Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 342–43; Milgrom, “The Cultic שגגה and Its Influence in Psalms and 
Job,” 117n11. 
212Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 342. 
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sin against God like the sin in vv.14–16.213 Milgrom connected the subcases in vv. 14–19 
and 20–26 [6:1–7] as being the laws that treat sins against God. The former treats 
sacrilege against sancta and the latter deals with sacrilege involving oaths.214 This was 
Milgrom’s starting point for arriving at the subjective-psychological-consequential sense 
of ָאַׁשם. Accordingly, it can only refer to the state of remorse. 
The fear of unknown sins is a well-known concept in ANE people. Hence, sinners 
suffer either mentally or physically, which make them conclude that they must have 
committed a sin. Yet, despite the ancient’s fear of unknown sin, the law assumes an 
objective fact that a person committed a sin. The law does not envision the situations in 
which sinners suspect that they have committed wrong, but rather, states that sinners 
committed sin and subsequently feel guilty. Kiuchi correctly stated that “when he [the 
sinner] feels guilty, he [the sinner] knows what the sin was.”215 Sinners are undeniably 
aware of their sin and guilt before even feeling guilty. Accordingly, ָאַׁשם includes 
consciousness of sin by the sinner. Sklar noted similar weakness. That is, Milgrom’s 
psychological sense, “to feel guilt,” inadequately accounts for the fact that sinners cannot 
feel guilt for the sin they do not know. In addition, Milgrom’s psychological or physical 
suffering as an element of ָאַׁשם assumes that sinners come to know their sin and feel guilt 
for it.216 
 
213“The law of Lev 5:17–19 is thus the legal formulation of the psychological truth that he who 
does not know the exact cause of suffering imagines the worst: he affronted the Deity; he has trespassed on 
His sancta and “incurred liability to the Lord” (v. 19)” Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 332. 
214Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 320. 
215Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 33. 
216Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 37–38. 
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Finally, it is highly questionable whether the realm of conscience can be separated 
so finely from the realm of consciousness.217 Hartley argued that this precision is not the 
customary manner of expression in the Hebrew Bible: 
While Milgrom has made an excellent point, nevertheless, אׁשם has an objective 
usage for a person’s ethical/legal culpability, rather than for a person’s existential 
feelings. In that Hebraic thought tends not to make strict categorical distinctions, it is 
possible that both of these meanings are present in some occurrences of the verb; a 
person who is guilty and accountable before God would also experience the stirring 
of guilt in his conscience, awaking him to his need to take the steps to expiate his 
wrongdoing.218 
 
In 5:23, sinners are aware of their sin expressed by the Hebrew term ָמַעל from the 
outset. This term was used previously in v. 14 and since the Pentateuch does not define it, 
nor does the rest of the Bible, Milgrom studied it in the ָמַעל contexts in the Bible, in 
rabbinic texts, and in similar contexts within ANE texts to find its meaning and applied it 
to v. 23.219 Based on all these three sources, Milgrom proposed that ָמַעל refers to 
 
217David Daube, Ancient Jewish Law: Three Inaugural Lectures (Leiden: Brill, 1981), 123ff. 
218Hartley, Leviticus, 76–77. 
219Milgrom particularly studied the ANE Instructions for Priests and Temple Officials (CTH 264). 
Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 353. This Hittite text provides “a full range of biblical maʿal” by treating a 
variety of sancta trespasses. Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 353–56. However, Milgrom’s comparative work is 
critiqued in depth by An, who claimed that his understanding of ָאַׁשם was based on his interpretation of 
Lev 5:17–19 in the ANE literature and applied it to all other places in Lev 4–5. An, “Delayed Recognition,” 
23. An critiqued Milgrom’s methodology of working with the English translation of Hittite texts since it 
“does not fully capture the rich details of the conception of sin and the consequent legal proceedings,” since 
his presentation is limited to the “hierarchy of penalties for sancta trespass among the Hittites.” An, 
“Delayed Recognition,” 23. She found out that he pointed to the differences and disregarded striking 
similarities between the two texts. Finally, she suggested that Milgrom’s work on the priests and temple 
officials (CTH 264) needs a thorough reassessment in light of recent work of Ada Taggar-Cohen on the 
same text that demonstrated a complex compositional relatedness of this text to earlier sections. In other 
words, a more comprehensive perspective of literary features and the underlying ritual system in the Hittite 
text is necessary if one wants to compare these two texts. An, “Delayed Recognition,” 23; Ada Taggar-
Cohen, Hittite Priesthood, THeth 26 (Heidelberg: Winter, 2006), 33–139. 
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sacrilege against sancta or sacrilege involving oaths.220 Sinners, in v. 23, are aware of 
their sin subjectively and objectively, but it seems reasonable to think that only after they 
experience the consequential aspect of ָאַׁשם (pangs of their consciousness) is their 
subjective and objective experience of guilt placed in the right context and they fully 
understand their sin.221 This scenario of a sin in v. 23 resonates with sin out of the 
weakness of will. People sin regardless of the fact that they know that they are sinning 
against God. This would mean that Milgrom’s proposal that sinners are fully aware of 
their guilt even while planning their sin is not correct.222 
A simple inclusion of the objective sense of ָאַׁשם along with the subjective solves 
the inconsistent reading of Lev 4–5. Sinners sin, know that they are guilty, experience the 
feelings or pangs of guilt, realize the full scope of their sin, and decide to undergo the 
necessary steps to rectify their sin. A limiting ָאַׁשם to subjective-psychological-
consequential sense of ָאַׁשם to “feel guilt” is a contradictory choice in this context. 
Lev 4:13–14, 22–23, 27–28. One of the problems with these texts was caused by 
the attempt to amend the opening of the vv. 23, 28 that starts with the Hebrew particle אֹו 
based on the fact that v. 14 begins with the conjunction   ו, instead causing ָאֵׁשם  to be ו 
translated objectively “to be, become guilty.”223 The particle introduces an alternative to 
 
220Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 320.  
221Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 32. 
222Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 32. 
223Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 33–34. 
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the preceding ָאֵׁשם  to mean “or” and אֹו and there is no need to amend it.224 Taking ו 
excluding consciousness of sin from ָאַׁשם would mean that sinners feel guilty even 
though they do not know their sin. On the contrary, sinners are fully aware that their act 
is sinful before they offer a sin offering or proceed to rectify their sin.225 They become 
aware of their act’s sinfulness in two ways, on their own which is contained in the verb 
 they suffer the pangs of their consciousness or feel guilt, subsequently recall their) ָאַׁשם
sin and realize that they are guilty), or they are informed about their sin by someone else. 
The Hebrew particle אֹו undeniably separates two different ways of sinners’ cognition 
about their sin (Lev 4:22–23, 27–28).226  
This separatedness does not disappear nor diminish because of the fact that that 
the transition in v. 14 is expressed through the conjunction   ו instead of אֹו, since   ו is 
frequently used to separate two different/contrasting items in the Pentateuch, especially in 
conditional phrases or alternative cases as this one is.227 Commenting on Lev 4:14, 
Milgrom himself confirmed the two ways of sinners’ learning of their sin in Lev 4:22–23 
and 27–28: “The individual who errs either finds out the nature of his error on his own or 
(ʾô) someone else informs him of it.”228 Again, Milgrom confirmed that the same   
 
224Toorn, Sin and Sanction in Israel and Mesopotamia, 92. 
225Milgrom, “The Cultic שגגה and Its Influence in Psalms and Job,” 116. 
226Toorn, Sin and Sanction in Israel and Mesopotamia, 92. 
227Also, HALOT, s.v. “ו”; BDB, s.v. “ו.” See Gen 26:11, Exod 20:10, 17; 21:16, 17; Lev 21:14; 
22:23, 24 and Job 31:13, 16, 26; Prov 29:9; Jer 44:28 outside of the Pentateuch. See also Lev 1:2, 10 where 
 .are interchangeable אֹו and ו  
228Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 243.  
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principle operates in vv. 23–24 as he commented on v. 23: “Either the chieftain discovers 
his error (and regrets it) or someone else informs him.”229 He and Kiuchi,230 by not 
reading   ו with the meaning of “or,” totally missed the point about two alternative ways of 
realizing sin, which also means that ָאַׁשם includes realization of the sin by the sinner. 
Instead he erroneously stated: “Here [v. 14] the temporal sequence is reversed, wĕʾāšēmû 
wĕnôdĕʿà ‘and they feel guilt when [the wrong] becomes known’: the second verb 
precedes the first in time.”231 Milgrom explained this by saying, “But as the community 
as a whole has erred there can be no ‘or’; the communal guilt results from the eventual 
discovery of the error by the community itself.”232 The temporal sequence reversal is 
syntactically unlikely since both verbs are weqatals meaning the action conveyed by the 
second verb temporally follows the action conveyed by the first verb. The temporal 
reversal is clearly implied in Lev 5:3–4, 17–18, since all ָיַדע verbal forms are qatal, 
pluperfects which is not the case in Lev 4:13–14. 
In addition, the clause beginning with   ָעה ֹוד  נִֽ  the beginning of v. 14, is further ,ו 
explained by the relative clause ר ֹ֥ ּו ֲאׁשֶּ אָ֖ יהָ  ָחט  ָ֑ ָעלֶּ  which would be redundant since מּו ָאֵׁשִֽ  ו 
was already explained with another set of clauses, ּ֔גּו ׁש  ַלֹ֣ם יִּ נֶּע  ר ו  ל ֵמֵעיֵנָ֖י ָּדָב֔ ָעׂשּו ַהָּקָהָ֑ ת ו ְ֠  ַאַח֨
ת ֹוַ֧ צ  ָכל־מִּ הָו֛ה מִּ י  , which basically communicate the same idea that the people sinned. It 
makes more sense to view the clause that opens v. 14,   ָעה ֹוד  נִֽ  as an alternative way of ,ו 
 
229Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 247. 
230Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 33–34. 
231Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 243. 
232Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 243–44. 
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realizing sin since the text would be redundant if the   ָעה ֹוד  נִֽ  were temporarily transported ו 
before מּו ָאֵׁשִֽ ָעה   thus making the set of clauses that follows ,ו  ֹוד  נִֽ  .totally superfluous ו 
This would go against the subsequent two subcases in Lev 4:22–23, 27–28, which 
use the same verbs and temporal sequence, but also use the particle אֹו which definitely 
separates the two alternatives. Thus, instead of emending אֹו “or” in different ways233 in 
vv. 23 and 27 that produce a smooth reading, one should note and apply a regular “or” 
meaning for   ו and uphold two alternative ways of realizing sin by the sinner in the last 
three subcases in Lev 4. 
In 4:13–14, the whole community sins ( ׁש   ּוּג֔ יִּ ), forgets their sin ( ַלֹ֣ם נֶּע  ר ו   ֵמֵעיֵנָ֖י ָּדָב֔
ל מּו) and becomes guilty ,(ַהָּקָהָ֑ ָאֵׁשִֽ  that ends v. 13 does not include both ָאַׁשם If .(ו 
subjective and objective meanings, but rather, just the subjective as proposed by 
Milgrom,234 Sklar,235 and Gane,236 the text would be irrational and Sklar’s critique would 
be well taken. This scenario would have sinners bringing the sacrifice for a sin they do 
not even know. To the contrary, the context suggests that ָאַׁשם should include both 
semantic meanings of ָאַׁשם. In case both aspects of ָאַׁשם are assumed, the following   
 
233For the alternative translations of אֹו in v. 23 and 28 see Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, 
Atonement, 30. 
234Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 342–43. 
235Accepting that ָאׁשַ ם assumes just the objective and excludes the subjective, Sklar noted that this 
reading is senseless in 4:13, 22, 27: “This is because the sin is hidden from the sinner; as a result it would 
make no sense to say that ‘if anyone sins, and is guilty or is told what their sin is, then he or she shall bring 
an offering’, for in the first instance the sinner is not aware of their sin and would thus not even know to 
bring a sacrifice.” Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 30. 
236Gane, Cult and Character, 205, 211n58. 
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scenario would be in place. The people sinned, forgot their sin, subsequently remembered 
it (through feelings or pangs of guilt, subjective-consequential element of ָאַׁשם), realized 
that they were guilty (objective element of ָאַׁשם), and brought the sacrifice to receive 
forgiveness. In addition, before the point when the text proceeds with the procedure to 
address their sin, that is, to bring the sacrifice (יבּו ֨ רִּ ק  הִּ  the opening clause of v. 14 that ,(ו 
stands between מּו ָאֵׁשִֽ יבּו and ו  ֨ רִּ ק  הִּ  The conjunction .ָיַדע begins with the weqatal of ו 
introduces another and totally different way in which the sin is being objectively realized. 
Someone else lets the people know that they sinned since they are not aware of their sin 
at all. This reading suggests two types of sin. The first type of sin is done both 
intentionally or unintentionally, subsequently forgotten, and eventually remembered, 
while the second type of sin is unknown to the people. They need somebody else to tell 
them. 
This reading of protases in Lev 4 suggests that ָאַׁשם assumes both the objective 
and the subjective sense without excluding the consequential component of the subjective 
sense. Only allowing the verb ָאַׁשם to encompass all these senses that are derived from 
the immediate context of Lev 4 provides a credible reading of the text. 
 
“To Suffer Guilt’s Consequences” 
Following K. van der Toorn,237 Sklar adopted the idea that ָאַׁשם should be 
translated as “to suffer guilt’s consequences” based on the fact that terms for sin in   
 
237Toorn, Sin and Sanction in Israel and Mesopotamia, 92. 
 
312 
general have a consequential meaning. He stated that “ָאַׁשם is often explicated with the 
description of the punishment it describes.” In addition, he suggested that this is 
confirmed by the uses of ָאַׁשם outside of the Pentateuch (Psa 34:22 [21]; Hos 10:2; 
14:1[13:16]; Isa 24:6; Jer 2:3).238 These texts are not commented on, for the latter 
argument is dismissed since, in essence, it is an old hermeneutical mistake called root 
fallacy. 
Sklar claimed that this translation of ָאַׁשם provides smooth transitions from Lev 
4:22 to 4:23 and from vv. 27 to 28 since it allows for the “or” translation of the particle 
 It fits the context well in which the sinners are initially not aware of their sin, but .אֹו
subsequently, learn of it when they experience guilt’s consequences, both physical and 
psychological, which was common in ANE. Sklar cited another text outside the 
Pentateuch to support this particular point (2 Sam 21:1). In addition, this translation does 
well with Lev 5:23 since sinners, struck by guilt’s consequences, decide to rectify their 
sin. Finally, this translation introduces the same sort of suffering for both subcases in Lev 
4:3–12 and 13–21 since the sin is the same in both cases and necessitates that the effect 
of it be the same, as well.239 He then concludes that “the most appropriate translation for 
 in the priestly literature is a general consequential one; that is, it refers to the general ָאַׁשם
consequences brought on by the guilt of sin and may be translated with ‘to suffer guilt’s 
consequences.’”240 
 
238Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 39. 
239Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 40–41. 
240Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 41. 
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This proposal does contribute to the debate since it provides a smooth reading of 
the transitional particles in vv. 3, 13–14, 23–24, and 27–28. However, it excludes the 
notion of the objective sense after sinners come to realize their sin. This detail is crucial 
for an even more natural reading of the transitional particle in these verses. 
 
Conclusion on ָאַׁשם 
The solution I propose is that both aspects, subjective-psychological-
consequential and objective, are contained in the verb ָאַׁשם. Based on the analysis from 
above, my understanding of ָאַׁשם concurs with the one of Eugene Carpenter’s and 
Michael A. Grisanti’s observation: “ [It] signifies the state in which the perpetrator finds 
himself as a result of his offense.”241 Knierim augmented this understanding by stating 
that “the double usage—from a modern perspective—of the one root ʾšm (see 3a) 
apparently relates to a common foundation assumed in all aspects from judgment of guilt 
to resolution of guilt: it is the obligation, the duty, the liability, that results from incurring 
guilt.”242 ָאַׁשם is a multifaceted verb encompassing basically all the proposed 
translations: (1) to be/become guilty, (2) to realize guilt, (3) to feel guilt, and (4) to suffer 
guilt’s consequences. These meanings are not mutually exclusive, but rather, 
complementary. The context is a determining factor if both or one particular sense is to 
be a preferred meaning. Inclusion of both of these factors, the subjective-psychological-
consequential and objective sense of the verb  ָאַׁשם expressed in the four ways of 
 
241Carpenter and Grisanti, “ָאַׁשם,” NIDOTTE 1:547. 
242Rolf P. Knierim, “ָאַׁשם,” TLOT 1:192. 
 
314 
translating it, and the literary and grammatical flow of the texts provides the most 
satisfactory and consistent reading of Lev 4–5. The contexts in Lev 4–5 suggest that the 
terms would be open to take on any, some, or even all of these meanings since choosing 
only certain meanings does not provide satisfactory nor consistent reading. The struggle 
of choosing the right translation remains since at least four different English translations 
were suggested in the history of research of this term. However, “to be/become guilty” 
remains the least misleading translation since it embodies all the others and it remains the 
most basic meaning of the term in the context of legal/moral standing.243 
This understanding of ָאַׁשם reconciles all conceptual and literary difficulties if just 
one of the suggested understandings/translations of ָאַׁשם is accepted. 
First, it chronologically places sinners’ recognition of the sinfulness of their sin 
before they offer sacrifice or make confession in Lev 5:1–5, 17, which is obvious in Lev 
4:3, 13–14, 23–24, and 27–28. Sinners are always fully aware of their sin before offering 
sacrifice. 
Second, it provides the rationale of how sinners who are aware of their sin are 
motivated to rectify their sin in Lev 5:23. Besides being objectively and subjectively 
aware of their sin, sinners also experience the consequential aspect of  ָאַׁשם (pangs of their 
consciousness), and their objective and subjective experience of guilt is placed in the 
right context; they fully understand their sin. 
Third, this chronology of activities where sinners’ awareness of their sin before 
they begin to rectify it is preserved and upheld by the recognition of the temporal 
 
243Hartley, Leviticus, 76–77; Knierim, “ָאַׁשם,” TLOT 1:194.  
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sequence of activities in Lev 4–5 is expressed by wayiqtol and weqatal verbs and of the 
pluperfect sense of qatal verbs.244 
Fourth, it recognizes that the two different ways by which sinners become aware 
of their sin, which are obvious in Lev 4:23–24, 27–28, can apply in the other translations 
in Lev 4:3, 13–14 by understanding the Hebrew particle אֹו in the most natural way as 
“or” and understanding the Hebrew conjunction   ו to mean “or,” as well as is one of its 
frequent meanings in the Pentateuch and the Hebrew Bible.245 
Fifth, the presence of two different ways for sinners’ recognition of their sin also 
explains why both  מּו ָאֵׁשִֽ ָעה and ו  ֹוד  נִֽ  in Lev 4:12–13, 22–23, 27–28 are accompanied by ו 
additional clauses that basically communicate that sinners have committed sin. This is not 
the case in Lev 5:5, 17, 23, where only ָאַׁשם occurs with no additional clauses to 
communicate the act of sinning. The only exception is a short reference to   ָהָיה א ו  י־יֱֶּחָטֹ֣ ִֽ כִּ  
in v. 23. 
 
/ָׁשָגה/ָׁשַגג ָגָגה  ׁש  and ָיַדע 
I suggest that ָאַׁשם cannot inform the meaning of the verbs ָׁשַגג and ָׁשָגה or the 
noun ָגָגה  being a stative verb, describes the effect of the sinner’s sinning ,ָאַׁשם because ׁש 
ָגָגה) or of sin (ָׁשָגה/ָׁשַגג)  .on the sinner (ׁש 
 
244The only exception is Lev 5:24, where the yiqtol instead of wayiqtol verb comes after qatal 
verbs to express the pluperfect sense. 
245Also, HALOT, s.vv. “ו ,או”; BDB, s.v. “ו.” See Gen 26:11, Exod 20:10, 17; 21:16, 17; Lev 
21:14; 22:23, 24 and Job 31:13, 16, 26; Prov 29:9; Jer 44:28 outside of the Pentateuch. See also Lev 1:2, 10 
where   ו and אֹו are interchangeable. 
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These two roots are crucial for determining the nature of sins in Lev 4–5246 and 
affect the meaning of ָאַׁשם. Milgrom noticed that the two verbal forms,  ָׁשַגג and ָׁשָגה, 
have coalesced.247 
The verb ָׁשַגג is used 2 times, the verb 3 ׁשגה times, while the noun ָגָגה  is used ׁש 
15 times in the Pentateuch.248 The basic meaning of the verb is “to err, to lead astray.”249 
The root conveys activities that are done unintentionally and intentionally in the OT.250 
Scholars have generally understood ָגָגה ׁש   ,adverbially as “unintentionally, unwittingly בִּ
inadvertently.”251 
Based on the study presented below, ָגָגה  and ָחָטא is a generic term for sin, like ׁש 
 referring to the intentional or unintentional act as confirmed by the use of this term in ,ָעֹון
Lev 4–5. However, it does not refer to brazen or high-handed sin. That is, it is used in 
contexts where sinners know that they have sinned (Lev 4:2, 3 [through v. 2], 22, 27; 
5:14–16, 17–19; Num 15:24, 25x2, 26, 27, 28, 29; 35:11, 15), as well as in the ones 
where they do not know (Gen 43:12; Lev 4:2, 3 [through v. 2], 27; 5:17–19; 22:14; Num 
15:24, 25x2, 26, 27, 28, 29). 
 
246Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 24. 
247Milgrom, “The Cultic שגגה and Its Influence in Psalms and Job,” 116; Milgrom, Leviticus 1–
16, 242. Also, “But biconsonantal roots that expanded into geminates and lamed-he are attested 
frequently.” Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 242. 
248Accordance Bible. 
249Knierim, “ׁשגג” TLOT 3:1302; BDB, s.v. “ָׁשַגג”; HALOT, s.v. “ׁשגג.” 
250Botica, Concept of Intention, 35n59; Saydon, “Sin-offering and Trespass-offering,” 394–95. 
251Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 228–29, 264–65; Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 21, 25, 31; Botica, 
Concept of Intention, 67; Levine, Leviticus, 19; Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 24. 
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Determining the difference between the consciousness of an act and its sinfulness 
is crucial for the meaning of ָגָגה  I suggest that the contexts this term occurs in 252.ׁש 
provide arguments for such distinction. 
The verbal form of the term ָעַלם occurs 10 times in the Pentateuch (Lev 4:13; 5:2, 
3, 4; 20:4 [x2]; Num 5:13; Deut 22:1, 3, 4), and its basic meaning is “to be concealed, 
hidden.”253 This indicates the lack of knowledge.254 
Based on his proposal that ָאַׁשם refers to the consciousness of the sinfulness of an 
act, Milgrom suggested that ָגָגה  refers to the sinner’s consciousness of an act of ׁש 
sinning, but not its sinfulness255 or that he is unaware of both.256 With some adaptations, 
Hartley,257 Hill,258 and Kiuchi259 have all accepted Milgrom’s proposal. Knierim,260 
Rendtorff, Seidl, Schenker, and Janowski, on the other hand, have rejected Milgrom’s 
proposal claiming that ָגָגה  does not convey the subjective state of the actor.261 Knierim ׁש 
 
252Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 26. 
253HALOT, s.v. “עלם.” 
254Wells, The Law of Testimony, 65. 
255Milgrom, Studies in Cultic Theology and Terminology, 117nn11,13. 
256Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 228. Even though ָגָגה ׁש   does not adverbially modify the verbs of בִּ
sinning, ָחָטא and ָעָׂשה in 5:17, both the nominal and verbals of the root  ַגָׁשג  are used in this pericope ָׁשָגה/
to describe sin in v. 18. This makes Milgrom’s claim that sinners in this pericope are not aware of their act, 
nor of its sinfulness. The terms ָׁשָגה/ָׁשַגג define sin in 5:17–19. 
257Hartley, Leviticus, 59. 
258Andrew E. Hill, “ָׁשַגג,” NIDOTTE 4:41–42. 
259Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 25–27. 
260Knierim, “ׁשגג” TLOT 3:1303. 
261Botica, Concept of Intention, 68. 
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suggested that if sinners are cognizant of their sin or not is to be deduced from the 
immediate context, rather than from the term 262.ָׁשָגה/ָׁשַגג Knierim’s claim has been 
confirmed in the present study. The literary, grammatical, and syntactical contexts prove 
to be crucial in determining the nature of the sin conveyed by this and all other nouns. 
Kiuchi’s observation that a meaning of a word should be distinguished from 
information or a situation inferred from the context agrees with the overall method 
utilized in this study.263 The context is the primary determinant of the word meaning.264 
Accordingly, it is important to determine whether the consciousness of the act and 
unconsciousness of its sinfulness is the meaning of ָגָגה  or is inferred from a given ׁש 
context. 
Kiuchi made another critical point. The meaning of ָגָגה  in the context of Lev 4 ׁש 
suggests the existence of commands, God’s prohibitions, which means that an act can be 
defined as sinful only in the context of prohibitions. Thus, Kiuchi proposed that ָגָגה  ׁש 
refers to the unconsciousness of sinfulness of an act, rather than consciousness of an 
act.265 The distinction between consciousness of an act and its sinfulness is crucial for the 
meaning of ָגָגה ָגָגה in Lev 4–5. However, the meaning of ׁש     has to be confirmed by the ׁש 
 
262Knierim, “ׁשגג” TLOT 3:1303. 
263Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 26. 
264“A determinative function to context, that is, the context does not merely help us understand 
meaning, it virtually makes meaning.” Silva, Biblical Words and Their Meaning, 139; Osborne, The 
Hermeneutical Spiral, 97. 
265Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 26. 
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immediate context. Two key texts that illuminate the meaning of this term are Lev 5:17–
19 and 4:13. 
Lev 5:17–19. Milgrom found the argument for his claim that  ַגָׁשג  refers to the 
consciousness of the act but not its sinfulness in the absence of ָׁשַגג from the protasis of 
this subcase. The sinner has sinned, but is not aware of this. The missing element of the 
sinners’ remorse for their sin is expressed by ָאַׁשם. This demands a detailed study of this 
subcase. 
The protatis in v. 17 introduces the activity of sinning with two clauses. In all 
other protasis in Lev 4–5, this pattern presents two alternative ways of sinning. That 
pattern is overruled in this pericope by its grammar, syntax, and literary structure. The 
first clause   ׁש פֶּ ם־נֶּ  אִּ י ו  ֹ֣ א כִּ ֱחָט֔ ִֽ תֶּ  in v. 17 looks like the first alternative in the previous 
protases in Lev 4–5, while the other one ָתה ָעׂש  ֹות ַאַחת ו  צ  ָכל־מִּ הָוה מִּ ר י  יָנה לֹא  ֲאׁשֶּ ֵתָעׂשֶּ  is 
like the second contrasting alternative of the same verse. However, two times in this text, 
it is stated that sinners did not know that they had sinned. The first לֹא־ָיַדע is reference to 
the act of sinning conveyed with the verb ָעָׂשה in v. 17, ָתה ָעׂש  ֹות ַאַחת ו  צ  ָכל־מִּ הָוה מִּ ר י   ֲאׁשֶּ
יָנה לֹא ֵתָעׂשֶּ . That the absence of knowledge chronologically follows the act of sinning is 
supported by the syntax and grammar in v. 17 since לֹא־ָיַדע is inflected as weqatal and 
follows ָעָׂשה, also weqatal, that has a future sense. The second לֹא־ָיַדע refers to the act of 
sinning expressed by the verb ָׁשַגג in v. 18, ר פֶּ כִּ ֹו ַעל ַהֹכֵהן ָעָליו ו  ָגתַ֧ ג  ר־ָׁשָגג ׁשִּ ֲאׁשֶּ . The 
inflection of the verb  ָׁשַגג is qatal and it is followed by לֹא־ָיַדע, also qatal, that 
corresponds to the preceding ָׁשַגג in this aspect. Thus, it should be translated as the 
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pluperfect, “he had not known.” Accordingly, the short relative clause, ר־ָׁשָג֛ג  and the ,ֲאׁשֶּ
following clause, ּוא הֹ֥ ע ו  א־ָיַדָ֖ ִֹֽ ל , refer to the time prior to the time expressed in the first two 
clauses in v. 17,   ׁש פֶּ ם־נֶּ  אִּ י ו  ֹ֣ א כִּ ֱחָט֔ ִֽ תֶּ , and  ָע ֹות ַאַחת ָתהׂש  ו  צ  ָכל־מִּ הָוה מִּ ר י  יָנה לֹא  ֲאׁשֶּ ֵתָעׂשֶּ . It 
refers to the time of committing the sin, also potentially including the time prior to it. The 
first לֹא־ָיַדע modifies the verb ָעָׂשה of the second clause in v. 17, referring to the sinners’ 
absence of knowledge, unawareness after they have sinned, while the second לֹא־ָיַדע 
modifies the verb ָׁשַגג in v. 18, saying that they did not even know that they had 
committed sin. This sin is a sin out of ignorance, where sinners never knew that they had 
sinned, neither before nor after the act. Accident is not possible here regardless of the 
presence of the ָגָגה  that could add the element of accident in this sin because grammar ׁש 
and syntax point to the ignorance. The present study assumes that this scenario of sinning 
has been very limited in Israel due to the nature of BL that conditioned Israel’s good 
acquaintance with it. However, it is uniquely addressed here. 
The use of verbs that denote the activity of sinning in this pericope demonstrates 
that the verbs ָעָׂשה ,ָחָטא, and ָׁשַגג are equivalents in the sense that they describe the same 
act of sinning in this pericope, although from different perspectives. The sinning that is 
expressed by ָחָטא and ָעָׂשה in the first two clauses in v. 17 is expressed by the verb ָׁשַגג 
in v. 18. The noun used to denote the sin expressed by all these three verbs is ָגָגה  As .ׁש 
regards usage of terms, this pericope is the most complex and proves that in sin 
terminology, both the verbs that express the activity of sinning and nouns that label the 
act of sinning are interchangeable and possess multiple meanings. 
The above interpretation of 5:17–19 confirms that Milgrom and Kiuchi are both 
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partially correct in their understanding of what the sinner has been aware of in this 
pericope. Milgrom is right that לֹא־ָיַדע refers to the sinner’s unconsciousness of an act,266 
but so is Kiuchi that the sinner is unconscious of the act’s sinfulness.267 Intention is not 
important here since sinners do not know that they have sinned as the verb ָעָׂשה that is 
modified by ַדע־יָ לֹא  in v. 17 suggests, nor did they know that their activity represents 
breaking of the law when לֹא־ָיַדע modified the verb ָׁשַגג and noun ָגָגה  in v. 18. It is ׁש 
likely that the intention is involved, if not based, on the use of the verb ָׁשַגג, then based 
on the verb ָעָׂשה which refers to the intentional activity, in this case, of breaking God’s 
commandments,268 but they did not know the law. 
The grammar and syntax of this pericope have an advantage over the literary 
structure that has been in accordance with the grammar and syntax in all other protases in 
Lev 4–5. The context, grammar, and syntax of 17–19 annulled the established literary 
structure. 
Lev 4:13. This verse separates itself from the rest of the verses in Lev 4 due to the 
extra clause,   נֶּע םו  ל ֵמֵעיֵני ָּדָבר ַלֹ֣ ַהָּקָהָ֑ , and use of a different verb, ׁשגה, instead of a regular 
 to denote the act of sinning. This clause is the key for the proper reading of the ָחָטא
protasis. All the other subcases contain two verbs that convey the activity of sinning at 
the beginning of their pericopes, vv. 2, 22, 27, and these verbs are ָחָטא and ָעָׂשה. The   
 
266Milgrom, Cult and Conscience, 9. 
267Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 26. 
268Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27, 2304. 
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meaning of the construction consisting of the verb ָעַלם and the preposition ן  that is מִּ
attached to the noun or pronoun is well established and refers to the lack of knowledge 
(Lev 5:2, 3, 4; Num 5:13) as presented below.  
That consciousness of an act or unconsciousness of its sinfulness are not 
contained in the verb ָׁשָגה in this pericope is evident from syntactical, grammatical, and 
conceptual standpoint. Syntactically, the verb ׁשגה is a predicate of an opening clause of 
Lev 4:13, ם אִּ ָרֵאל ָכל־ֲעַדת ו  ׂש  ּגּו יִּ ׁש  יִּ . The following new clause, marked off with the 
conjunction   ו is ַלם נֶּע  ַהָּקָהל ֵמֵעיֵני ָּדָבר ו  . The third new clause set off by another 
conjunction   ו is ָעׂשּו ֹות ַאַחת ו  צ  ָכל־מִּ הָוה מִּ ר י  יָנה ֲאׁשֶּ לֹא־ֵתָעׂשֶּ . Most scholars have 
understood that these clauses follow each other chronologically and have the second 
clause modify the first one, which means that the conjunction   ו is taken to mean “and.” In 
that case, the two clauses are translated as “now if the whole congregation of Israel 
commits error and the matter escapes the notice of the assembly,” and Milgrom’s 
understanding that the clause ַלם נֶּע  ַהָּקָהל ֵמֵעיֵני ָּדָבר ו   modifies the verb  ׁשגה results in the 
claim that ָׁשָגה refers to the consciousness of act of sinning, but unconsciousness of its 
sinfulness.269 It is correct to state that ַלם ָּדָבר ֵמֵעיֵני ַהָּקָהל נֶּע  ָרֵאל modifies ו  ׂש  ם ָכל־ֲעַדת יִּ אִּ ו 
ּגּו ׁש     On the other side, Kiuchi correctly .ׁשגה but this is not the only clause that modifies ,יִּ
 
269Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 242. It is surprising that Milgrom totally excluded the verb ָעָׂשה from 
his comments in Lev 4. Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 246–47, 251, 264–65. It is surprising since he devoted 
considerable attention to this verb in various other contexts in his three volume commentary, basically 
correctly claiming that  ָהָעׂש  conveys intentional activity. Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1522, 1582; Milgrom, 
Leviticus 23–27, 2292–93, 2304.  
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proposed that the object of ַלם נֶּע   governs ָׁשָגה from the previous clause, since ׁשגה is not ו 
a separate clause, but rather, ָּדָבר. However, he then erroneously suggested that it is 
explained by the verb ָעָׂשה that opens the next clause, ָעׂשּו ֹות ַאַחת ו  צ  ָכל־מִּ הָוה מִּ ר י  לֹא־  ֲאׁשֶּ
יָנה  consists of two elements: (1) violation of a divine ׁשגה and concluded that ֵתָעׂשֶּ
prohibition, and (2) hidden nature of the act.270 
If the general understanding of this protasis is accepted, then the clause ָעׂשּו  ַאַחת ו 
ֹות צ  ָכל־מִּ הָוה מִּ ר י  יָנה ֲאׁשֶּ לֹא־ֵתָעׂשֶּ  is redundant since it just repeats what has been conveyed 
already by the verb ׁשגה and in the main casuistic statement, the protasis in v. 2. I suggest 
that Kiuchi’s first point is correct, but suggest that the syntax of the three clauses points 
to the double nature of the act of sinning. That is, along with the clause271 מּו ָאֵׁשִֽ  these ,ו 
three clauses constitute the first sentence, v. 13, that is followed by the second sentence   
 
270Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 27–28. 
271“A clause is the syntactic combination of a subject and predicate. … The two clauses together 
constitute a sentence, … When a sentence consists of only one clause it is called a ‘simple sentence’; when 
it consists of more than one clause it is called a “compound” or ‘complex’ sentence, depending on how the 
clauses within the sentence are joined.” Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 
69. Before defining these three types of clauses, it is helpful to introduce general understanding of the 
sentence. Francis I. Andersen defined the sentence in BH as follows: “A sentence is a grammatically self-
contained construction,” meaning that “the grammatical functions of all constituents in a sentence may be 
described in terms of relationships to other constituents in the same sentence.” Francis I. Andersen, The 
Hebrew Verbless Clause in the Pentateuch, JBLMS 14 (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1970), 20. In addition, 
Andersen also noticed that “Grammatical completeness … may prove as hard to establish as completeness 
of thought.” Francis I. Andersen, The Sentence in Biblical Hebrew, JLSP 231 (The Hague: Mouton, 1974), 
22. Waltke defined a simple sentence as “consisting of grammatical elements that cannot exist apart from 
their syntactical connection with each other and that together constitute a unified utterance.” Waltke and 
O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 79. Waltke defined the compound sentence as 
containing multiple “verbs, with the single subject and the single adverbial modifier, follow each other with 
only the conjunctions to join them.” Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 79. 
The complex sentence consists of at least two clauses, the second of which is subordinate to the first, 
usually a relative clause, and modifies that subject of the first clause. Waltke and O’Connor, An 
Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 79.  
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consisting of another two clauses that form most of v. 14,   ָעה ֹוד  נִֽ את ו  ַחָּט֔ ר ַהִֽ ֹ֥ ּו ֲאׁשֶּ אָ֖ יהָ  ָחט  ָ֑ ָעלֶּ  
and יבּו רִּ ק  הִּ ן־ָבָקר ַפר ַהָּקָהל ו  ַחָּטאת בֶּ ל  . This entire construction is actually a modified real 
conditional clause272 that functions as a protasis which describes the subcase of the entire 
community’s sinning. The understanding of the particle   273,ו which connects all of these 
clauses and the two sentences, is crucial in this text in order to grasp the full meaning of 
what the sentences convey. 
The essence of the protasis is contained in the first clause, ם אִּ ָרֵאל ָכל־ֲעַדת ו  ׂש   יִּ
ּגּו ׁש   and is modified with the two following clauses that propose two different ,יִּ
alternatives. The verbs that govern these four clauses is the opening yiqtol and three 
weqatal that follow. This grammatical and syntactical construction is regularly used in 
BH to convey succession of thought274 which is the case in this construction. The first 
 
272Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 636–37. “Any two clauses, 
the first of which states a real or hypothetical condition, and the second of which states a real or 
hypothetical consequence thereof, may be taken as a conditional sentence.” Thomas Oden Lambdin, 
Introduction to Biblical Hebrew (New York: Scribner’s Sons, 1971), 276. 
273The particle   ו is a macrosyntactic sign. “Macrosyntactic signs are words, particles, and 
expressions which serve … to mark out the major divisions of a text. … The speaker inserts such 
macrosyntactic signs in order to highlight for the hearer the beginning, transitions, climaxes, and 
conclusions of his address. …. Even if the spoken (colloquial) language is the essential sphere of such 
macrosyntactic signs, nevertheless its influence can be also observed in the literary, fixed linguistic forms, 
such as we encounter in the Bible, especially in contexts involving dialogue.” Wolfgang Schneider and 
Oskar Grether, Grammatik des Biblischen Hebräisch: Ein Lehrbuch (München: Claudius-Verlag, 1974), 
261. The particle   ו can also be used at different syntactic levels, thus, besides the macrosyntactic or 
intersentential level, it is often used on the interclausal level. Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to 
Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 79. 
274Waltke stated that “scholars are agreed that the we in the wəqatalt ́construction usually (though 
not always) signifies succession (temporal or logical), but they are not agreed about the meaning of the 




alternative is conveyed with  ַלם 275ָּדָבר ֵמֵעיֵני ַהָּקָהל נֶּע   and refers to the sinning that does ו 
not come out of awareness or intention.276 The second alternative is expressed by  ָעׂשּו ו 
ֹות ַאַחת צ  ָכל־מִּ הָוה מִּ ר  י  יָנה ֲאׁשֶּ לֹא־ֵתָעׂשֶּ . The first argument that this clause represents an 
alternative to the previous clause is found in the fact that regardless of the very large 
semantic field of 277,ָעׂשָ ה in the context of God’s commandments in the Pentateuch, it 
refers to the intentional activity of breaking them whatever that might be (Ex 15:26; 20:6; 
Lev 4:13, 22, 27; 5:17; 26:14–15; Num 15:22, 40; Deut 5:10; 6:25; 15:5; 27:10; 28:1, 15; 
30:8; 31:5). Aside from Lev 4–5, this verb is used in Lev 26:14–15 which clearly refers 
to the intentional activity of sinning, breaking God’s commandments. The second 
argument is found in the semantics of these two clauses. The first clause points to the 
unawareness of the sinner that he/she has sinned, while the second clause conveys 
intentional activity of sinning. Thus, having established the contrastive nature of these 
two clauses based on the meaning of the words from their immediate context and 
considering grammar and syntax of conditional clauses, the conjunction   ו that connects 
these two clauses, that modifies the opening clause of the protasis, is best understood as 
“or” rather than “and.” The opening clause ם אִּ ָרֵאל ָכל־ֲעַדת ו  ׂש  ּגּו יִּ ׁש  יִּ  is modified with the   
 
275Kiuchi’s remark that this word is definite, referring to something, is implausible since it does 
not have the definite article and is syntactically unsupported since it belongs to the clause that modifies the 
opening clause of the protasis introducing the first alternative of the way the activity of sinning took place. 
276Rooker’s claim that this clause refers to initial hiddenness of the act lacks grammatical and 
syntactical grounds. Rooker, Leviticus, 112–13. Namely, ַלם נֶּע   ,is a weqatal verb that temporally ו 
chronologically follows the verb ָׁשָגה/ָׁשַגג from the previous clause. The use of this verb that can be used as 
a pluperfect is found in Lev 5:2–4, but there, ָעַלם is not inflected as weqatal, but as qatal. 
277J. Vollmer, “עׂשה,” TLOT 2:945; Eugene Carpenter, “ָעָׂשה,” NIDOTTE 3:543. 
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two following clauses ַלם נֶּע  ַהָּקָהל ֵמֵעיֵני ָּדָבר ו   and ָעׂשּו ֹות ַאַחת ו  צ  ָכל־מִּ הָוה  מִּ ר י  לֹא־  ֲאׁשֶּ
יָנה  thus giving the following meaning: “if the whole community of Israel errs and ,ֵתָעׂשֶּ
the matter escapes the notice of the community (unknowingly or in a hidden way) or they 
do any of the Lord’s commandments that are not to be done, and they are guilty.” In other 
words, two ways of sinning expressed through this protasis are (1) unconscious-
unintentional (out of ignorance or accident), and (2) intentional-non-brazen. 
This interpretation of Lev 4:13–14 suggests that the verb ׁשגה in this context is 
equivalent to the verb ָחָטא. The verb ׁשגה from the first clause of v. 13 that conveys the 
activity of sinning is replaced by the verb ָחָטא in v. 14 that refers to the same act of 
sinning. ׁשגה and ָחָטא are very neutral verbs in terms of conveying the intent of the 
activity they refer to, which means that they can refer to both intentional or unintentional 
activities. As such, ׁשגה and ָחָטא include the sinners’ awareness of the act’s sinfulness in 
case of intentional sin. In that case, sinners are aware of their act, as well. 
The remaining protases in Lev 4:2–3, 22–23, 27–28 do not have an עלם element 
and consistently use the verb ָחָטא, modified by the prepositional phrase ָגָגה ׁש   The verb .בִּ
ָגָגה gets more nuanced meaning in vv. 2–3, 22–23, and 27–28. It is the noun ָחָטא  that ׁש 
brings out nuances contained in the verb ָחָטא. Before analyzing these protases, it is 
necessary to define ָגָגה  (Num 15:24) ל   or ב   when accompanied with the preposition ׁש 
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because this prepositional phrase frequently modifies the verbs 280,ָעָׂשה 279,ָׁשַגג 278,ָחָטא 
 ָנָכה or .and 35 5 and Num 15–in Lev 4 282 ָאַכל 281
The study of ָגָגה  in relation to these verbs augments the semantic domain of the ׁש 
term ָׁשָגה/ָׁשַגג. It was demonstrated that the noun ָגָגה  only refers to the intentionality of ׁש 
the activity, but unawareness of the activity’s sinfulness in the context of Lev 5:17–19. 
However, the phrase ָגָגה ׁש   conveys some additional nuances to the nature of sins or the בִּ
activity of sinning. 
 
ָגָגה  ׁש   בִּ
As in Lev 4:13, the protasis in Lev 4:2, 27, 5:15; and Num 15:27, 28,283 where 
ָגָגה ׁש   also proposes two ways in which the sin has been ,ָחָטא modifies the verb בִּ
committed. Milgrom and others are right284 “that the verb ḥāṭāʾ can cover the entire range 
of sin from accidental misdemeanors … to deliberate crimes.”285 In addition to the 
 
278Lev 4:2, 27, 5:15; Num 15:27. 
279Num 15:28. 
280Lev 4:22, Num 15:24, 26, 29. 
281Lev 22:14. 
282Num 35:11, 15. 
283The nominal of ָחָטא functions as a verb.  
284For further list of scholars see Gane, Cult and Character, 292nn30–35. 
285Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 320.  
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modifying verb ָחָטא, the phrase modifies the verb ָעָׂשה in Lev 4:22 and Num 15:26,286 
29. 
In Lev 4:2, the protasis consists of two clauses, but the opening clause, פֶּׁש י־  נֶֶּ֗ ִֽ כִּ
יָנה ָ֑ א ֵתָעׂשֶּ ֹֹ֣ ר ל ָ֖ ה ֲאׁשֶּ הָו֔ ת י  ֹוֹ֣ צ  כֹ ל   מִּ ָגָגה   מִּ ׁש  א בִּ ֱחָטֶ֤ ָגָגה is modified by ָחָטא in which 287,תֶּ ׁש   בִּ
potentially points to both intentional or unintentional sinning. The notion of intentionality 
and unintentionality is contained in both ָחָטא and ָגָגה ׁש   However, the following clause .בִּ
introduces the alternative and more determined way of sinning, ה ָעָׂשָ֕ ֵמֵהָּנה ֵמַאַחת ו  . The 
verb ָעָׂשה in the context of God’s commandments points to intentional activity. The 
contrastive nature of these two clauses, based on their meanings, suggests that the 
conjunction   ו should be translated as “or” and the verb ָחָטא is understood to refer to 
unintentional sinning in order to avoid a mere repetition of the same meaning in the 
following clause. Thus, the two clauses should be translated as “when a person sins 
unintentionally in regards to any of the Lord’s commandments or does any them:” The 
very same pattern is seen in 4:27 with infinitival inflection of ָעָׂשה in contrast to weqatal 
in Lev 4:2. 
The context of Lev 5:15 is vague since  ָח ָגָגה ָאהט  ו  ׁש  בִּ  actually modifies the 
opening clause of the pericope, ל נֶּפֶּׁש ֹעֹ֣ מ  י־תִּ ִֽ ַעל כִּ ַמ֔  and the verb ָמַעל does not provide 
 
286It is assumed that in this text ָגָגה ׁש   since the community’s activity of ָעָׂשה modifies the verb בִּ
sinning is expressed by it in v. 24. 




many insights into the intentionality or unintentionality of the activity.288 The use of 
to very particular, intentional  sthat it often refer sPentateuch demonstratethe  ni 289 ָמַעל
sins of disloyalty, mainly towards God290 (Lev 26:40; 31:16; Deut 32:51), and 
sometimes, to other human beings (Num 5:12, 27). Theoretically, sacrilege can be 
committed intentionally and unintentionally. However, the second, contrasting clause 
ָאה ָחט  ָגָגה ו  ׁש  בִּ  suggests that ל נֶּפֶּׁש ֹעֹ֣ מ  י־תִּ ִֽ ַעל כִּ ַמ֔  points to intentional sin. Accordingly, the 
pattern of two alternative ways of sinning exists in this pericope. All three terms 
involved, ָחָטא ,ָמַעל and ָגָגה  can refer to both the intentionality and unintentionality of ׁש 
the committed activity. 
Lev 22:14. This text does not provide any new insights into the meaning of ָגָגה ׁש   בִּ
that has not been identified in other contexts. Here, ָגָגה ׁש   uniquely modifies the verb בִּ
ָגגָ  ,It seems logical to conclude that, as with the previous contexts .ָאַכל ׁש  ה בִּ  refers to both, 
intentionality and unintentionality. 
In Num 15:27, the protasis is simple, consisting of one clause, ֹ֥פֶּׁש ם־נֶּ אִּ ת  ו  א ַאַחָ֖ ֱחָטֹ֣  ּתֶּ
ָגָגָ֑ה ׁש  ָגָגה and ָחָטא ,Not much can be inferred from this context since both terms .בִּ  can ,ׁש 
refer to the intentionality and unintentionality of the committed activity. However, the 
 
288Levine, Leviticus, 30; Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 320.  
289Robin Wakely, “ָמַעל,” NIDOTTE 2:1012–13; Rolf P. Knierim, “ָמַעל,” TLOT 2:681. 
290Milgrom’s claim that מָ ַעל constitutes a sin against God in all of its occurrences is broad and 
imprecise since not just ָמַעל, but all the sins expressed by all terms for sin in OT are ultimately sins against 
God. Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 345–46. Sometimes, a human party directly suffers the consequences of 
 refers to the unfaithfulness ָמַעל Num 5:12, 27). I accept, rather, Knierim’s and Wakely’s proposal that) ָמַעל
or disloyalty mainly to God, but also to human beings.Wakely, “ָמַעל,” NIDOTTE 2:1012–13; Knierim, 
 .TLOT 2:681 ”,ָמַעל“
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major casuistic statement of this legal case further confirms the presence of the elements 
of intentionality and unintentionality related to this sin. 
The protasis in 15:22291 consists of two clauses, ּ֔גּו ׁש  י תִּ ֹ֣ כִּ ת ָכל־  and ו  א ַתֲעׂ֔שּו ֵאֹ֥ ֹֹ֣ ל ו 
ת ֹוָ֖ צ  ּלֶּה ַהּמִּ ר ָהֵאָ֑ ֹ֥ בֶּ ר־ּדִּ הָוָ֖ה ֲאׁשֶּ ה י  ִֽ ל־ֹמׁשֶּ אֶּ . The verb ׁשגה is a neutral verb and can refer to both 
intentional and unintentional activity, while refers to intentional  generally 292ָעָׂשה
activity. Milgrom rightly stated that ָעָׂשה predicates active violation.293 Thus, two 
alternative ways are potentially present in the major protasis which covers the subcases in 
15:27–29. The trend noted in Num 15:1–16, as a literary context of Num 15:22–31, 
strongly suggests that this chapter introduces innovations. The requirements for the 
sacrifices in 15:22–31 were also modified.294 Num 15:22–31 does not contain a 
subheading, which means that it belongs to the previous section, vv. 17–21, and 
ultimately, the opening section, vv. 1–16,295 which also says that dependence of this 
section to the entire chapter assumes the context of commandments. Within this context 
of expanding legislation, the verb ׁשגה is more specified, as in Lev 4, to convey breaking 
God’s commandments hypothetically, intentionally, or unintentionally. The verb ָעָׂשה 
 
291“The language of Num 15—kol-hammiṣwôt …kol-ʾăšer ṣiwwâ any of the commandments … 
anything that [the Lord] has enjoined’ (vv 22, 23)—must be understood literally: the word kol- embraces all 
of the commandments, positive and negative, performative and prohibitive.” Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 265.  
292Milgrom did not give details on the meaning of the verb ָעָׂשה in the context of Num 15:22–26 
and its importance for the interpretation of this passage other than saying that the verb is used as a technical 
term for the entire process of offering a sacrifice. Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 265–66. This is in contrast to 
his detailed analysis of this verb in the context of Lev 26:14 that provided him with appropriate and valid 
insights into the meaning of this text. 
293Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 265. 
294Levine, Numbers 1–20, 395–96. 
295Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 265.  
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governs the second clause that introduces the alternative way of sinning and, if not 
modified in the immediate context, it refers to intentional sinning. Nothing in this 
particular context indicates that  ָָׂשהע  should be taken as pointing to unintentional sinning.  
In addition, the protases of significantly longer subcases in Lev 4 all contain two 
alternative ways of sinning which is not the situation here, most likely due to the 
considerably abbreviated nature of the texts of these subcases, with emphasis on the 
sacrificial innovation and not on the precise ways of sinning. Accordingly, the protasis in 
v. 22 governs all others found in vv. 24 and 27, but not 30 since the subcase in v. 30 uses 
the verb ָעָׂשה which is further modified with the phrase ָיד ָרָמה ב   that even more 
intensifies the intentional nature of sinning presented in this subcase. In addition, it is 
punishable by capital punishment. The data from the immediate context confirm that the 
major protasis does not cover the subcase in vv. 30–31. 
Thus, the major protasis that introduces two alternative ways of sinning in v. 22 
applies to the first two subcases in vv. 24–26 and 27–29. It does not cover the last 
subcase in vv. 30–31 due to the specific, brazen nature of sin it deals with. 
That the terms ָחָטא and ָׁשָגה are being used equally is proven by their 
interchangeability in subcase 15:27–29. That is, in v. 27, ָחָטא is modified by ָגָגה ׁש   ,בִּ
while in v. 28, the activity of sinning, expressed by the verb ָׁשַגג, is modified by the 
nominal phrase  ֶּח ָאֹ֥הט  ב   that functions verbally, which is modified by the adverbial phrase 
ָגָגה ׁש   This relatedness and interchangeability proves that these terms generally share 296.בִּ
 
296Levine, Numbers 1–20, 395–96. 
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the same semantic range if not also modified by the immediate context. Both terms refer 
to the intentionality and unintentionality of the committed activities. 
The unique use of  ָגָגה ׁש   ,is found in Lev 4:22. Like the protasis in 4:2–3, 27–28 בִּ
this one consists of two clauses that introduce two alternative manners of sinning. The 
first alternative is to sin intentionally - ר  יא ֲאׁשֶּ  and the second is to sin יֱֶּחָטא ָנׂשִּ
unintentionally - .ה ָעָׂשָ֡ ת ו  ֹות   ַאַחֹ֣ צ  ָכל־מִּ ה מִּ הָו֨ יו י  ר ֱאֹלָהָ֜ ַ֧ יָנה ֲאׁשֶּ ֛ ָגָגָ֖ה לֹא־ֵתָעׂשֶּ ׁש  בִּ  However, the 
verbs used in previous protasis to refer to the intentionality and unintentionality 
exchanging place. That is, in 4:2–3, 27–28; 5:17, ָחָטא modified by ָגָגה ׁש   is used to refer בִּ
to unintentional sinning, while ָעָׂשה alone was used to refer to intentional sinning. They 
exchanged places here. However, the text still portrays two alternative ways of sinning, 
and the fact that the verbs exchanged their established places in the protasis structure 
does not affect the meaning of any of the clauses based on the fact that both ָחָטא and ָעָׂשה 
convey intentionality and unintentionality in their semantic range. It is based on the fact 
that it is modified by ָגָגה ׁש   normally conveying intentionality, is taken to ,ָעָׂשה so that בִּ
communicate unintentionality in this context, while ָחָטא conveys intentionality. 
The phrase ָגָגה ׁש  ָגָגה in 15:24, whereas ָעָׂשה modifies the verb לִּ ׁש   modifies it in בִּ
Num 15:26, 29. The preposition  297  לis uniquely attached to ָגָגה  in v. 24 to mark either ׁש 
its adverbial function to the verb ָעָׂשה or to mark it as direct object of ָעָׂשה. The latter is 
more probable since  ָעָׂשה is inflected as passive and when inflected as such, is used to 
 
297This is   ל of manner, often used in this way to form “such phrases as lārōb ‘abundantly’ and 
lāṭōhar ‘clearly.’” Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 206.  
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refer to the impersonal subject (Lev 7:9; 18:30; Deut 13:14; 17:4), which does fit this 
context since the subject of ָעָׂשה would be ֵעָדה, that is in the same clause, and ָעָׂשה in the 
following clause, assuming the same subject is active. 
ָגָגה ׁש   is used adverbially in Num 15:26, 29 to refer to the way the act of sinning בִּ
has been committed. In v. 26, it stands on its own in a verbless clause referring to the sin 
of the community. The fact that ָגָגה  is subject of the niphal passive form of the verb ׁש 
 in the protasis that introduces the subcase of the community in v. 24 reveals that ָעָׂשה
ָגָגה ׁש   since the activity of sinning of the community is conveyed ָעָׂשה modifies the verb בִּ
by that verb in v. 24. In v. 29, the phrase modifies the verb ָעָׂשה which is contained in the 
text, the ending of the verse. 
The subcases in vv. 22–26 and 27–29 are sharply contrasted with the subcase in 
vv. 30–31. The activity of killing is more closely defined by the adverbial phrase ָיד ָרָמה ב   
that even more intensifies the intentional nature of this activity. In addition, it is 
punishable by capital punishment, with no chance for the doer to received atonement and 
forgiveness. As was established earlier, this attitude of sinning is called “brazen sin”; 
then it is not just intentional in performing an illegal act, but intent on annihilating the 
party on the opposite side. 
The phrase has been used more specifically in Num 35:11, 15, where it modifies 
the verb ָנָכה, which in this context, means “to kill,”298 that refers to the act of homicide, 
the activity of killing another human being. The analysis of this law that has been done 
 
298Milgrom, Numbers, 292–93. 
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on pages 272–78 of this study shows that ָגָגה ׁש   has been used to convey both the בִּ
accidental and the unintentional activity of a human being that unfortunately resulted in 
the death of another human being. The intentional killing is defined in vv. 16–21 with the 
terms that convey prior planning of murder, while those terms are juxtaposed with 
another set of terms in the section that describes unintentional killing in vv. 22–24. Thus, 
while ָגָגה ׁש   that conveys “to kill,” a meaning that is ָנָכה directly modifies the verb בִּ
informed by another set of verbs in vv. 22–24, they all point to the fact that the act of 
homicide took place accidentally and unintentionally. Accordingly, the context of Num 
35 suggests that ָגָגה ׁש   conveys the unintentional and accidental nature of the act and is בִּ
followed by the phrase י־ַדַעת לִּ ב   in order to emphasize that it does not imply previous בִּ
mental planning of the act.299 
 
 Pattern of Uses in the Pentateuch :ָעָׂשה
Before concluding the analysis of Lev 4–5, the present study examines the pattern 
of uses of the verb ָעָׂשה since some parts of this analysis may be questioned by the claim 
that ָעָׂשה and the verbs of sinning in these chapters refers to the same verbal activity. 
It is well documented that ָעָׂשה’s semantic range is vast.300 Due to its semantic 
flexibility, ָעָׂשה often gets its meaning in a given context and can include a variety of 
 
299Botica, Concept of Intention, 34–36. For a more specific meaning related to the terms 
describing intentional homicide where one can discern various levels of intent, see Botica, Concept of 
Intention, 36–38. 
300Carpenter, “ָעָׂשה,” NIDOTTE 3:544. Vollmer, “עׂשה,” TLOT 2:945. 
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verbal activities.301 Carpenter noted the pattern in Gen 1–11 that when God is subject of 
 .it is a word whose meaning is determined by the function its context assigns to it“ ,ָעָׂשה
In itself it simply indicates activity of whatever kind its context demands, 
making/doing.”302 The same principle is detected with ָעָׂשה and a human subject.303 The 
present study also identified the same ָעָׂשה uses in BL texts and narratives. The context 
remains the key factor for determining the meaning of this verb. 
 
 in the Contexts of Verbs that ָעָׂשה
Express the Activity of Sinning 
In order to provide a more specific semantic range of ָעָׂשה I identified and 
examined the texts which contain the identical syntactical structures where the verbs ָעָׂשה 
and the verbs of sinning are found in the same context like the one found in Lev 4–5. The 
texts are listed in Table 20. 
Semantically, the statistics are indecisive. The texts can be divided into two 
groups: cultic laws (Exod 29:36; Lev. 4:2, 13, 22, 27; 5:10, 17; 6:3; Num 6:11; 15:22;) 
and narratives (Gen 20:6, 9; 39:9; Exod 5:16; 32:31; Num 32:23; Deut 9:16, 18; 20:18). 
Some of these texts contain both patterns of uses, such as when the verbs of sinning 
precede and follow the verb ָעָׂשה. 
More certainty is detected in the 10 texts where ָעָׂשה precedes the verb of sinning  
 
301Vollmer, “עׂשה,” TLOT 2:946. 
302Carpenter, “ָעָׂשה,” NIDOTTE 3:544. 
303Carpenter, “ָעָׂשה,” NIDOTTE 3:546. 
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Table 20. The verb ָעָׂשה and the verbs of sinning 
 
 Activity (ָעָׂשה) Intention Activity (sinning) Intention Sem. Overlap 
Gen. 20:6 
1, Taking Sarah 
v. 2–3 
yes 2, חָ טָ א, sex No No 
Gen 20:9 1, Lying v. 5 yes 2, ָחָטא, unknown No no 
Gen 39:9 1, Sex v. 7, 12 no 2, ָחָטא, adultery No yes 
Exod 5:16 
1, Making bricks 
v. 16 






yes 2, ָחָטא, purify Yes yes, partially 
Exod 32:31 2, Making idol yes 1, ָחָטא, idolatry Yes yes, partially 
Lev 4:2 
2, Breaking the law yes 1, ָחָטא, breaking 
the law 
No yes, potentially 
Lev 4: 13 
2, Breaking the law yes 1, ׁשגה, breaking 
the law 
No yes, potentially 
Lev 4: 22 
2, Breaking the law no 1, ָחָטא, breaking 
the law 
Yes yes, potentially 
Lev 4: 27 
2, Breaking the law yes 1, ָחָטא, breaking 
the law 




yes 2, ָחָטא, oath, vow Yes no 




yes 2,  ָחָטא Yes yes 
Num 6:11 
1, Offering a 
sacrifice 
yes 2,  ָחָטא No no 
Num 15:22 2, Breaking the law yes 1,  ָׁשַגג No yes, potentially 
Num 32:23 1, Helping to take yes 2, ָחָטא, lying Yes no 
Deut 9:16 2, Making idol yes 1, ָחָטא, idolatry Yes yes, partially 
Deut 9:18 
1, Making idol, 
idolatry 
yes 2, ָחָטא, idolatry Yes yes, Inf. 
Complementing 
verb 




in cultic laws (Exod 29:36; Lev 5:10, 22 [6:3]; Num 6:11) or narrative (Gen 20:6, 9; 39:9, 
Exod 5:16; Num 32:23; Deut 20:18). Semantically, ָעָׂשה overlaps with the verbs of 
sinning in 4/10, while in 6/10, it does not. In cultic texts, the statistics are even, 2/4 for 
semantic overlap and 2/4 for semantic distinctiveness. Semantic distinctiveness is more 
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emphasized in the narrative texts 4/6 in contrast to the overlap in 2/4 texts.304 
Less certainty is found in the 9 texts when the verbs of sinning precede ָעָׂשה in 
cultic laws (Lev 4:2, 13, 22, 27; 5:17; Num 15:22) or narrative (Exod 32:31; Deut 9:16, 
18). There is only one text, a narrative one, where ָעָׂשה unquestionably overlaps with the 
verb of sinning (Deut 9:18) while the statistics in all other texts are uncertain. This 
uncertainty is reflected in the fact that in all 6 cultic law texts where the verb of sinning 
precedes ָעָׂשה (Lev 4:2, 13, 22, 27; 5:17; Num 15:22), there is the potential that these two 
verbs might overlap semantically. In the 2/3 narrative texts, the verb ָעָׂשה semantically 
overlaps with the verb of sinning in part only, while only once (Deut 9:18) did they 
overlap certainly. 
These statistics demonstrate that certainty of the semantic overlap of the verb ָעָׂשה 
and the verbs of sinning when they occur in the same context is very low. In other words, 
the statistics of use do not provide grounds for the claim that ָעָׂשה and the verbs of 
sinning refer to the same activity. A given context remains the final determiner as to 
whether this is the case or not. 
 
Does ָעָׂשה Refer to the Same Activity 
as the Preceding Verb? 
In order to add more precision to the uses of ָעָׂשה, the present study followed the 
same syntactical pattern that is used in Lev 4–5, namely, that of any verb that is followed   
 




by weqatal of ָעָׂשה. The statistics of this search demonstrated that ָעָׂשה’s uses in the 
books of Exodus, Leviticus, and Numbers demonstrate that the verbs preceding ָעָׂשה do 
not semantically conflate with it in 61 out of 63305 texts without considering Lev 4:2, 13, 
22; 5:17. Two exceptions are Exod 20:9 and 32:31. In the former text, ָעָׂשה is 
semantically conflated with the verb ָעַבד and does not reveal additional particulars 
beyond the meaning carried by ָעַבד. In the latter text, ָעָׂשה refers to the same activity of 
sinning as ָחָטא does, but it explains exactly what the sin was. These statistics on ָעָׂשה do 
not prevent the interpretation of it in Lev 4–5 that claims that ָעָׂשה refers to the 
intentional activity except when the text explicitly marks it as unintentional activity. 
Second, there is a law possibility that ָעָׂשה semantically merges with the verbs of sinning 
and there is almost no possibility that it coalesces semantically with the verbs in the 
constructions as in Lev 4–5, that is, a verb followed by the weqatal of ָעָׂשה. 
 
Conclusion on  ָגָגה ׁש   בִּ
The literary context, grammar, syntax, and lexical terms of Lev 4:2, and 27 point 
to the existence of two alternative ways of sinning, intentional and unintentional. ָגָגה ׁש   בִּ
that modifies ָחָטא clarifies that this verb refers to unintentional sinning, while the verb 
 .expressed intentional, but non-brazen sinning ָעָׂשה
 
305Exodus 1:21; 4:21, 30; 5:9; 7:10–11; 10:25; 12:28, 48; 14:4; 17:6; 18:24; 20:9; 23:22; 25:11, 
 ,refer to two different activities), 10, 31; 35:10; 37:2 ָעָׂשה) 32:4 ;31:6 ;30:3 ;40–39 ,4–28:3 ;27:4 ;40 ,25–24
11–12, 26; 39:1, 32; Lev 9:7, 16; 10:7; 16:9, 15, 24, 34; 19:37; 20:8, 22; 22:31; 25:18, 21; 26:3; Num 5:30; 
 .refers to two different activities), 38, 39, 40; 21:34 ָעָׂשה) 24 ,15:14 ;14:12 ;11:8 ;14 ,9:10 ;8:12 ;17 ,6:16
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The same contextual elements of Lev 5:15 also point to the same conclusion. That 
is, sacrilege is done intentionally, but non-brazenly, ל נֶּפֶּׁש ֹעֹ֣ מ  י־תִּ ִֽ ַעל כִּ ַמ֔ , and 
unintentionally, out of ignorance or accident, ָאה ָחט  ָגגָ  ו  ׁש  הבִּ . 
There are two foundational points that are inferred from ָגָגה ׁש   ,contexts. First בִּ
Num 15:22–31 and its immediate context suggests that the semantic range of the phrase 
ָגָגה ׁש   is limited to non-brazen sin. The sin may or may not have been intentional, which בִּ
consequently includes the accidental nature of the act when it was committed, act, but the 
activity was not expression of a brazen attitude. The sin stands in sharp contradiction to 
ָיד הָרמָ  ב   sin which articulates brazen sin deserving of capital punishment. Second, Num 
35:11, 15 and its immediate context suggests that the semantic range of the phrase ָגָגה ׁש   בִּ
includes activities committed as a result of accident with no intentionality included on the 
sinner’s part. 
Based on the use of ָגָגה ׁש   it Num 15:22–31 and 35:11, 15, I suggest that this בִּ
phrase refers to accidental sinning and nonbrazen sinning. If the immediate context of the 
phrase does not provide arguments for a different nuance of meaning, this is the meaning 
that should be assumed by the phrase ָגָגה ׁש   .including in Lev 4–5 ,בִּ
 
 ָעַלם and ָיַדע
Lev 5:2, 3, and 4. The verb ָעַלם is closely related to the verbs ָיַדע and ָאַׁשם in Lev 
5:3, 4. That is, the Hebrew reads it ַלם נֶּע  ּמֶּ  ו  הּוא ּנּומִּ ָידע ו   in vv. 3 and 4. The phrase that 
conveys the absence of knowledge is immediately followed by the phrase that expresses 
the presence of knowledge. Wells logically asked the following question: “The question 
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then becomes whether the presence of knowledge (wehû yādaʿ) chronologically precedes 
the absence of knowledge (‘it is hidden from him, though he knew’) or whether it follows 
the absence of knowledge (‘it is hidden from him, but then he comes to know’).”306 
Accepting the latter option means that the person involved was not conscious of 
his sin. On the other hand, accepting the former option means that the person involved 
had knowledge of his sin, was aware of it, but consequently lost knowledge of it. He 
forgot about it. There are at least two valid reasons why the latter option fits the literary 
context and syntax of the text better.307 
First, the order and inflection of the verbs ָיַדע ,ָעַלם, and ָאַׁשם in vv. 3 and 4 are 
identical. The clause in which the verb ָיַדע is inflected as qatal begins with the waw 
conjunctive and is positioned between two clauses that begin with waw consecutives and 
weqatal verbs ָעַלם preceding and ָאַׁשם following the ָיַדע clause ( ַלֹ֣ם נֶּע  ּנּו ו  ָ֑ ּמֶּ ע מִּ הּוא־ָיַדֹ֥  ו 
ם ָאֵׁשָ֖  Milgrom correctly interpreted the tense of the verbs based on the syntax and 308.(ו 
grammar: “A verb in the perfect between two perfects governed by waw consecutives has 
the force of a pluperfect, giving the reading that originally he knew that he had become 
impure but subsequently he forgot (Tg. Ps.-J.).”309 The same construction with the same   
 
306Wells, The Law of Testimony, 65. 
307Wells, The Law of Testimony, 65. 
308Wells, The Law of Testimony, 65–66. The verb ָאַׁשם continued the aspect of the epexegetical 
situation. “Waw-relative suffix forms used after a suffix form do not take on that conjugation’s perfective 
aspect. Rather, in that connection wəqatalt́ signifies either a consequent (logical and/or chronological) 
situation (without aspect, in future time) to the one represented by qtl or an epexegetical situation (with an 
imperfective aspect in past or present time).” Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew 
Syntax, 530. 
309Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 298–99. 
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tense is found in Lev 13:6, 32 and in a reversed way, in Lev 26:44. Thus, contextually 
and syntactically, the clause הּוא־ָיַדע  is best translated as a pluperfect “and he had ו 
known.”310 
Such a translation finds support in v. 2 where 311 הּוא ָטֵמא הּוא־  occurs instead of ו  ו 
הּוא Employing a pluperfect sense for .ָיַדע ָטֵמא ו   leads to the “and he had become 
unclean” and logically fits the context better than the future tense that would yield, “and 
then he becomes unclean,” because the act of becoming unclean, הּוא ָטֵמא ו  , does not 
follow the absence of the knowledge, ַלם נֶּע  ּנּו ו  ּמֶּ מִּ , about it, but rather, precedes it. 
Accordingly, the act of possessing the knowledge in vv. 3 and 4 is also unlikely to follow 
the absence of the knowledge about it, but rather, precedes it.312 All aspects of this 
sentence, the grammar, syntax, and logical sequence of actions, favor this understanding. 
Second, all vv. 1–4 form protases of which the apodosis is found in vv. 5–6 where 
the confession is introduced as the remedy for the sins previously portrayed. There are 
two characteristics related to the sins listed in vv. 1–4. They are either public offenses,313 
vv. 1, 4, or forgotten failures to prevent defilement spreading and eventually defiling the 
sanctuary,314 vv. 2–3. All these particular sins affect other people and potentially, God’s 
 
310Wells, The Law of Testimony, 66. 
311“In a verbless clause of classification in which the predicate refers to a general class of which 
the subject is a member, the two parts of the clause generally occur in the order predicate-subject. Clauses 
of classification answer the question, What is the subject like?’” Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to 
Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 132. 
312Wells, The Law of Testimony, 66. 
313Herbert Chanan Brichto, The Problem of “Curse” in the Hebrew Bible, JBLMS 13 
(Philadelphia: Society of Biblical Literature, 1968), 42–45; Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 229. 
314Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 232. 
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sanctuary. I suggest that this is one of the reasons why they are separated from the sins in 
Lev 4 where the text does not treat cases in which the sin is forgotten, but presumably 
dealt with them immediately after it was committed. As such, they require confession 
since they are publicly done, vv. 1, 4, or the public/community is affected or endangered 
by them, vv. 2–3. 
It needs to be noticed that the syntax and the grammar of ָעַלם and ָיַדע in 5:2–4 are 
different from that of 4:13. In 5:2–3, as noticed, the verbs ָיַדע (vv. 3–4) and ָטֵמא (v. 2) 
are inflected as qatal which is best interpreted as pluperfect. In contrast, in 4:13 the verb 
is weqatal and follows the flow of the text. It refers to the activity taking place after the 
activity expressed by the verb ׁשגה, or here, it describes it. Thus, context, including 
grammar and syntax, proves to be determinative of the meaning of the words. 
 
Conclusion on ָׁשָגה/ָׁשַגג/ ָגָגה  ׁש  and לֹא־ָיַדע 
Milgrom’s proposal that the absence of the terms ָׁשָגה/ָׁשַגג from Lev 5:17–19 
proves that this term refers to the sinner’s consciousness of act is disproved by a fresh 
interpretation of this pericope. Along with the fact that לֹא־ָיַדע is used two times in vv. 17 
and 18, it needs to be emphasized that the terms ָׁשַגג/ ָׁשָגה  and ָגָגה  .are also used in v. 18 ׁש 
The fact that ָגָגה ׁש   in ָעָׂשה and ָחָטא does not adverbially modify the verbs of sinning בִּ
5:17, along with the use of nominal and verbal derivatives of the root ָׁשַגג/ ָׁשָגה  to describe 
sin in v. 18, does not disprove Milgrom’s claim that sinners in this pericope are not aware 
of their act nor its sinfulness. However, this claim is not based on the fact that ָׁשָגה/ָׁשַגג 
does not modify the verbs of sinning in the protasis, thus conveying the sinners’ 
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awareness of their act. The terms ָׁשַגג/ ָׁשָגה  used in v. 18 define sin in 5:17–19.  ַגָׁשג  ָׁשָגה/
are used as generic terms for sinning and for sin like ָחָטא and its derivatives. The use of 
the phrase לֹא־ָיַדע suggests that this phrase, by referring to the sinner's unawareness of sin 
prior to, after, and consequently during the act, delineates a totally unique and new type 
of sin in Lev 4–5; a sin out of ignorance. The sinner intentionally commits an act, but not 
knowing the law, they are unaware that they have sinned. Consequently, they are not 
aware of the sinfulness of their act. This argument disproves Milgrom's postulate that the 
term ָׁשַגג/ ָׁשָגה  always refers to the sinner’s consciousness of the act but not its sinfulness. 
/ָׁשַגג ָׁשָגה  carries a different meaning. That is, the use of ָגָגה ׁש   in Num 15:22–31 and בִּ
35:11, 15 suggests that the term refers to accidental and nondefiant sinning.  
Finally, the uses of this term in Lev 4–5 determine the final semantic nuance of 
this term. That is, the extra clause in 4:13, ַלם נֶּע  ר ו  ַהָּקָהל ֵמֵעיֵני ָּדָב֔ , the use of ׁשגה in the 
major casuistic statement instead of the regular ָחָטא along with the context, grammar, and 
syntax of this pericope signals that the whole protasis in 4:13–14 should be read as 
proposing two alternative ways of sinning. The first alternative, ַלם נֶּע  ר ו  ַהָּקָהל ֵמֵעיֵני ָּדָב֔ , 
conveys unintentional sin out of ignorance or accident, while the second one, ָעׂשּו  ַאַחת ו 
ֹות צ  ָכל־מִּ הָוה מִּ ר י  יָנה ֲאׁשֶּ לֹא־ֵתָעׂשֶּ , expresses intentional, but non-brazen sin. This reading 
implies ׁשגה in a major, introductory statement does not refer to consciousness of the act, 
nor to its sinfulness; rather, it is used as a general verb for sinning like ָחָטא with the 
potential of referring to all possible ways of sinning. 
The verb ָׁשָגה/ָׁשַגג, like the verb ָחָטא, expresses all types of sinning in the OT. 
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The immediate and wider context of each use clarifies whether the verb is used in a 
generic way or conveys some specific way of sinning. 
Based on the understanding of crucial terms in Lev 4–5 and Num 15, ָחָטא, 
 presented above, the final outcome is the following ,ָעַלם and ,ָיַדע ,ָאַׁשם ,ָׁשָגה/ָׁשַגג
interpretation of the nature of sins and intent in the respective chapters. 
The four subcases in Lev 4 all assume two alternative ways of sinning: 
unintentional, accidental, and potentially out of ignorance, and intentional, but non-
brazen. The next four subcases in Lev 5:1–4 are intentional, but non-brazen sins that were 
forgotten and eventually remembered. The pericope of Lev 5:14–16 is unique for that 
reason, separated from subcases in Lev 4, because it deals with sins against the sancta. 
However, in terms of the nature of sinning due to the use of a general verb ָחָטא and the 
theoretical potential, the pericope assumes the same types of sins as are in Lev 4, 
unintentional, accidental, or out of ignorance and intentional but non-brazen. Leviticus 
5:17–19 is another unique type of sinning that is only well-established here, and that is a 
sin of ignorance. The final pericope in Leviticus, 5:20–26 [6:1–7], encompasses 
exclusively intentional, but non-brazen sins. Numbers 15:22–31 deals with two types of 
sinning. The first is described in vv. 22–29 and are non-brazen sins which may include all 
types of non-brazen sins defined in Lev 4–5. The second is brazen sin that includes the 






Expiable and Inexpiable Sins in the OT 
Any sort of capital punishment or kārēt315 seems to be the determinative factor in 
dividing sins into expiable and inexpiable. In addition, the phrase ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  frequently 
points to capital punishment, which further means that it refers to inexpiable sin. Finally, 
 normally points to expiable sin, but it is conditioned by sinners’ following the ָאַׁשם
procedure to be forgiven, namely offering a sacrifice, applying blood on appropriate parts 
of the sanctuary, and taking necessary steps toward the restitution for their sin. ָאַׁשם itself 
includes some sort of punitive consequences for sinners who forget their sin or are not 
aware of it in order to make them remember their sin and take necessary actions to avoid 
punishment for it. These punitive consequences could eventually lead to capital 
punishment if the sinner refuses to offer the appropriate sacrifice and be forgiven. In 
addition, some sins that deserve capital punishment like eating the meat of a peace 
offering while impure in Lev 7:20 are forgivable if committed accidentally or out of 
ignorance and the sinner offers sacrifice and make necessary restitutions. If they refuse to 
offer sacrifice, the capital punishment that is stated in that particular law, which is kārēt, 
applies. This is also confirmed by Lev 17:11 that the atoning blood ransoms sinner’s life, 
which implies that the sinner’s life is in danger when his/her sin is unresolved.316 
In the chapter “Numbers 15:22–31 and the Spectrum of Moral Faults,” Gane 
reviewed previous work on the kinds of sin in the OT and endorsed Adrian Schenker’s 
 
315Wold, “The Meaning of Biblical Penalty Kareth,” 254; Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 13; 
Gane, Cult and Character, 200–201; Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 457–60. 
316Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 42–43. 
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understanding, however, he modified it by adding two additional qualifications.317 The 
entire debate on this topic involves the two comparative laws of the sin offering: Lev 4–5 
and Num 15:22–31. 
Gary A. Anderson has argued that Num 15:22–31 encompasses two kinds of sin, 
expiable inadvertent and inexpiable high-handed, that cover the entire spectrum of moral 
sins.318 The outcome of this interpretation, as Anderson himself stated, is that any sin 
committed advertently (intentionally) results in capital punishment: “This text singles out 
for special emphasis two facts: first, all sins committed inadvertently require sacrificial 
atonement; and, second, any sin that is committed advertently results in the banishment 
of the person in question.”319 Anderson related the second group of sins with the minority 
of sins of an “egregious nature” that are associated with the cult or ritual.320 This division 
and its rationale is disproven by the texts since Lev 4–5 and Num 15 encompass both 
intentional and unintentional sins and both are forgivable as suggested in the present 
study. 
Milgrom, following rabbinic tradition, proposed that expiable deliberate sins (Lev   
 
317In the first qualifications, Gane suggested that Lev 5:1, 5–6; 5:20–26 [6:1–7], and Num 5:5–8 
have to be taken into consideration in order to specify “non-defiant deliberate” sins that can be expiated 
through purification (sin) and reparation offerings after voluntary confession and necessary reparation. In 
the second qualification, Gane basically claimed that these kinds of sins can be undetectable by human 
beings, but God addresses them. Roy E. Gane, “Numbers 15:22–31 and the Spectrum of Moral Faults,” in 
Inicios, Paradigmas y Fundamentos: Estudios Teológicos y Exegéticos en el Pentateuco, ed. Gerald A. 
Klingbeil, Serie Monográfica de Estudios Bíblicos y Teológicos de la Universidad Adventista del Plata 1 
(Libertador San Martín: Editorial Universidad Adventista del Plata, 2004), 154–55. 
318Gary A. Anderson, “The Interpretation of the Purification Offering ( תאטח) in the Temple Scroll 
(11QTemple) and Rabbinic Literature,” JBL 111 (1992): 30–31. 
319Anderson, “Interpretation,” 30. 
320Anderson, “Interpretation,” 31. 
 
347 
5:5, Num 5:7) require voluntary confession in order to reduce them to the category of 
inadvertent, expiable sins. He assumed that Num 15:30–31 does not allow sacrificial 
expiation only for the unrepentant sinner.321 Gane rightfully critiqued this view based on 
the fact that Num 15:30–31 does not prescribe confession to provide expiation through 
repentance. The specific cases of intentional, but expiable sins in Lev 5:20–26 and Num 
5:6–8 do not provide enough grounds for the claim that all other deliberate sins can be 
expiated.322 In addition, the absence of capital punishment significantly dissociates sin in 
Lev 5:20–26 and Num 5:6–8 from the one in Num 15:30–31. In addition, contrary to 
Gane in regard to premeditation,323 it is very possible that the blasphemer acted with 
premeditation during the brawl (Lev 24:10–14, 23). Why would one, in the middle of a 
fierce, physical fight, curse God but not his immediate enemy whom he fights with and is 
most likely overpowered by? It is very possible, keeping in mind the background of this 
man,324 that he spoke out of his attitude of rebelliousness to God. 
Two scholars, Bradley McLean and Baruch Levine, defined the ָיד ָרָמה ב   sins, vv. 
30–31, as premeditated to distinguish them from the ones that are unpremeditated.325 
Gane criticized this view by claiming that ָׁשַגג/ ָׁשָגה  does not cover unpremeditated 
deliberate sins and that intent is not crucial in defining a sin as expiable or inexpiable.326 
 
321Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27, 2449. 
322Crüsemann, The Torah, 318. 
323Gane, “Numbers 15:22–31,” 152. 
324Keil and Delitzsch, The Pentateuch, 2:453; Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27, 2106–7. 
325Bradley H. McLean, “The Interpretation of the Levitical Sin Offering and the Scapegoat,” SR 20 
(1991): 348. Levine, Numbers 1–20, 398. 
326Gane, “Numbers 15:22–31,” 152. 
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However, based on the reading of Lev 4–5 proposed in this study, ָׁשַגג/ ָׁשָגה  does provide 
sufficient data for determining whether the sinner acted with intent or not. Intention only, 
along with unintentionality, is present in all four subcases in Lev 4; 5:1–4, 14–16, 17–19, 
20–26. Gane is convincing that in the end, intent itself does not necessarily define 
whether the sin is expiable or inexpiable. 
Gane also found Angel Rodríguez’s and Mark Rooker’s interpretation of Num 
15:30–31 untenable. They, like Milgrom, proposed that subsequent repentance reduces 
deliberate sin to inadvertent and thus, expiable.327 Beside good points of this 
interpretation,328 Gane criticized this approach, as well. First, Gane correctly noted that 
allowance for the expiation of some deliberate sins does not warrant expiation of all 
deliberate sins.329 This is evident in light of the fact that capital punishment is related to 
some deliberate sins. Second, Gane’s second point was informed by the ADH of the 
sanctuary, which means that inexpiable sins reach the sanctuary through the air 
automatically as they are committed. He noted that Rodríguez’s and Rooker’s claim that 
any deliberate sin of which the sinner repents is expiable through the sacrifice, based on 
the fact that in Lev 16:16, 21, rebellious sins, ים ָׁשעִּ  were purged from the sanctuary on ,פ 
the Day of Atonement. They, in Gane’s understanding, missed seeing that removal of 
these sins from the sanctuary does not imply that the sinner who committed them 
 
327Rodríguez, “Substitution in the Hebrew Cultus,” 148–49; Rooker, Leviticus, 53–55, 219. 
328Gane, “Numbers 15:22–31,” 152–53. 
329Gane, “Numbers 15:22–31,” 153. 
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experienced expiation.330 In light of the study of the term ַׁשע  ,sins in the current study פֶּ
ַׁשע  sins do not refer to sins inexpiable through sacrifice. They are expiable through the פֶּ
sacrifice at least by being part of the list of sins in Lev 5:20–26. This critique of Gane 
does not mean that ָיד ָרָמה ב   sins are expiable, but rather, that ָיד ָרָמה ב   sins cannot be 
associated with the term ַׁשע ַׁשע only, and that פֶּ ַׁשע sins are in the sanctuary because פֶּ  פֶּ
may refer to expiable sins. Third, Gane also noticed that since all sins can be expiated in 
Rodríguez’s and Rooker’s interpretation if the sinner repents, this leaves no room for 
inexpiable sins.331 I have also supported this claim with the fact that capital punishment 
speaks for the inexpiability of some sins. 
Anthony Phillips suggested that expiable deliberate sins in Lev 5 are different 
from ָיד  ,in Num 15:30–31 by being an exception to the general rule of deliberate  ָרָמה ב 
inexpiable sins. Basically, these sins are undetectable and expiable on the basis that the 
sinner themselves admit them. Leviticus 5:20–26 had the purpose of encouraging the 
sinner to do so.332 Gane rightfully corrected Phillips’ proposal by reminding that Num 
15:30–31 does not state that this kind of sin is necessarily detectable by human agents, 
but does state that the sinner experiences capital punishment administered by God.333 
Thus, Phillips’ suggestion, regardless of its appeal and possibly presence in the function 
of the law by endorsing one of the main roles of the BL to make covenant people 
 
330Gane, “Numbers 15:22–31,” 153. 
331Gane, “Numbers 15:22–31,” 153. 
332Phillips, Essays on Biblical Law, 257; Anthony C. Phillips, “The Undetectable Offender and the 
Priestly Legislator,” JTS 36 (1985): 148, 150. 
333Gane, “Numbers 15:22–31,” 154. 
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intrinsically and ethically sound, is disproven by the text. 
Gane’s own interpretation of the discrepancy between Lev 4–5 and Num 15 
agrees with Schenker’s understanding of this subject. Schenker understood that there are 
two types of deliberate sins, and it is the sinner’s attitude that differentiates them. Those 
committed in open, rebellious attitude towards God’s rulership and those that are 
deliberate, but are not committed rebelliously. He proposed that Num 15:22–31 contrasts 
the least serious types of sin, vv. 22–29, and the most serious types, vv. 30–31. This 
passage does not deal with the sins in between these two types.334 
Gane first supplemented this view with the claim that Lev 5:1, 5–6; 5:20–26, and 
Num 5:5–8 specify exactly which non-defiant deliberate sins can be expiated through sin 
and reparation offerings after voluntary confessions and necessary reparations.335 Second, 
Gane suggested that the sins are ultimately against God himself. They may not be 
detected by humans, but God is able to see them. While Gane’s latter point is profoundly 
correct, the former one needs modification. That is, it is too restrictive to delimit the non-
defiant deliberate sins to those found in Lev 5:1, 5–6 and 5:20–26 due to the fact that the 
Pentateuch lists many other sins that are deliberate, but non-defiant and thus, expiable. 
The list in Lev 5:20–26 is especially not concerned with the exact examples of 
misappropriation of the property as such, but rather, encourages individuals to confess to 
having sworn a false oath. Exodus 21:37–22:12 and Lev 19:11–13 list many other 
variations of sins that are some form of misappropriation of another’s property and are 
 
334Gane, “Numbers 15:22–31,” 154; Adrian Schenker, “Das Zeichen des Blutes und die Gewißheit 
der Vergebung im Alten Testament: Die sühnende Funktion des Blutes auf dem Altar nach Lev 17.10–12,” 
MTZ 34.3 (1983): 205. 
335Gane, “Numbers 15:22–31,” 155. 
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deliberate, but yet expiable.336 Thus, Lev 5:1, 5–6 and 5:20–26 is taken to be a 
representative procedure with regards to any kind of sin against another’s property that 
would include taking an oath before God and not only the sins that are expiable, 
regardless of being deliberate, but non-defiant. 
The outcome of Gane’s study is that there are 3 kinds of sin: (1) inadvertent sins 
represented in Num 15:22–29, (2) intentional defiant sins represented in Num 15:30–31, 
and (3) intentional non-defiant sins represented in Lev 5:1, 5–6; 5:20 [6:1–7] and Num 
5:5–8. Two of these kinds, the first and the third, can be expiated through the sacrificial 
system, while the second cannot. 
Gane’s study divides intentional sins into two categories: (1) those committed 
defiantly with the intent to break with God and (2) those that are not done with such an 
attitude; this division is correct. I came to the same conclusion, but differ with him in the 
selection of texts used to prove this. Based on the interpretation suggested in the present 
study that the protasis in Lev 4–5 and Num 15:22–31 all except of Num 15:30–31, 
present two alternative ways of sinning, intentional and unintentional, I suggest that non-
brazen, intentional, as well as unintentional sins are found in both Lev 4–5 and Num 
15:22–29. 
It has to be added that this distinction cannot be supported by the terminological 
study of the terms for sin that this study is limited to since they are used interchangeably 
in the Pentateuch as I verified above. Rather, the texts in which these categories of sin are 
found classify them as such in two ways. First, the verb ָׁשָגה is used to mark both 
unintentional and intentional sin in the procedure which discusses the expiation of these 
 
336Phillips, Ancient Israel's Criminal Law, 138, 189; Levine, Leviticus, 33. 
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sins as in Lev 4:13 and Num 15:22. The adverbial use of the nominal derivative ָגָגה ׁש   is בִּ
also used for the same purpose as in Lev 4:2, 22, 27; 5:15; 22:14 and Num 15:26, 27; 
35:11, 15.337 Second, Num 5:5–8 indicates that some intentional sins can be expiated by 
the use of the verbal and nominal forms of ָמַעל which can refer to both intentional and 
unintentional sins. Regardless of being intentional, these sins are expiable. Third, the 
general and all-encompassing verb ָחָטא used throughout Lev 4–5 refers to both 
intentional and unintentional sinning and is defined by the context. 
This view is implied by Keil and Delitzsch who expanded the category of 
expiable sins to inadvertent and deliberate: 
But sinning “in error” is not merely sinning through ignorance (vv. 13, 22, 27, 5:18), 
hurry, want of consideration, or carelessness (Lev. 5:1, 4, 15), but also sinning 
unintentionally (Num 35:11, 15, 22, 23); hence all such sins as spring from the 
weakness of flesh and blood, as distinguished from sins committed with a high 
(elevated) hand, or in haughty, defiant rebellion against God and His 
commandments.338 
 
The methodology and arguments for arriving at this understanding of types of sin 
by Keil and Delitzsch are different from those presented in the current study. Gane’s 
criticism that this approach on the account of a broad interpretation of ָׁשַגג/ ָׁשָגה  which he, 
with a majority of scholars, held to refer to inadvertence339 is not valid since this 
interpretation of the term ָׁשַגג/ ָׁשָגה  was proven to be the most accurate one in the present 
study. Consequently, this division of sins is proven to be the most accurate. 
 
337The same pattern is found in Josh 20:3, 9. 
338Keil and Delitzsch, The Pentateuch, 2:303. 
339Inadvertence in Gane’s and other scholars’ understanding never includes intentionality. Gane, 
“Numbers 15:22–31,” 151. 
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ָיד ָרָמה ב   Sins 
It is shown already in the preceding subheading that there is general agreement 
among scholars regarding the meaning of the phrase ָיד ָרָמה ב   in Num 15:30. It signifies 
inexpiable, unforgivable sin, and scholars have rightfully come to that conclusion.340 
This phrase refers to the activity done deliberately, presumptuously.341 Caspar 
Labuschagne noted that based on texts such 1 Kgs 11:26ff, Mic 5:8, Deut 32:27, and 
Exod 17:11, the phrase has military origin: “The origin of the expression is without any 
doubt the physical gesture of the raised hand, with or without a weapon in it, which 
indicates that one is triumphantly determined to fight and win.” The phrase conveys the 
attitude of readiness to fight and the will to prevail. Besides this argument, Labuschagne 
also noted three additional arguments to understand the phrase in this way: (1) in the 
remaining two occurrences of the phrase in Exod 14:8 and Num 33:3b, the human party, 
people of Israel, is the subject of the sentence, and thus, the phrase describes the posture 
or attitude of the people signifying their determination to fight and will to prevail in the 
given situation; (2) the Exodus of Israel from Egypt account contains the element of 
Israel’s readiness for the battle as they were leaving Egypt; and finally (3) Israel left 
Egypt organized as a military unit, mustered in their tribal hosts.342 These pieces of   
 
340Milgrom’s thought that this sin can also be expiated if the sinner repents, confesses, and makes 
appropriate restitution. Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 370; Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 2449. However, the 
following denied expiation of this type of sin. Keil and Delitzsch, The Pentateuch, 2:303; Schenker, “Das 
Zeichen des Blutes und die Gewißheit der Vergebung im Alten Testament,” 205; Phillips, “The 
Undetectable Offender,” 148; McLean, “The Interpretation of the Levitical Sin Offering,” 348; Anderson, 
“Interpretation,” 19, 30–31; Hartley, Leviticus, lxix–lxx.  
341Labuschagne, “The Meaning of bᵉyād rāmā,” 143; Botica, Concept of Intention, 88–89. 
342Labuschagne, “The Meaning of bᵉyād rāmā,” 146–47. 
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evidence suggest that the phrase refers to the deliberate, intentional activity of the subject 
which it modifies. Labuschagne cautioned that “in Num 15:30 the expression has a 
weakened meaning: ‘deliberately,’ but it is not impossible that here also it still retains 
something of its original force and connotes the idea ‘ready to commit rebellion,’ 
‘defiantly’”.343 Based on the fact that v. 30 expresses a personal affront to God344 and that 
the OT stipulates capital punishment for ָיד ָרָמה ב   sins the present study accepts the full 
force meaning of this phrase. Applied to this context, the phrase conveys the fact that a 
ָיד ָרָמה ב   sin is not only committed intentionally, but also represents a personal affront 
against God, rebellion against his personality, his authority, and his covenant.345 
All these points show that the OT does provide certain guidelines for identifying 
intentional, brazen sin. However, Num 15 does not relate this kind of sin to any of the 
three key terms for sin in the OT. 
 
Intentional and Unintentional Sins in the OT 
There are two types of sins in the OT, intentional and unintentional. I divided the 
former group into non-brazen and brazen intentional sin. The former is expiable through 
the sacrificial system and cult, while the latter is not, but the sinner suffers terminal 
punishment. 
In the case of intentional sin, sinners are totally aware of both elements of sin:   
 
343Labuschagne, “The Meaning of bᵉyād rāmā,” 148. 
344“He reviles Yhwh,” ף ַגֵּדָ֑ ּוא מ  הָוָ֖ה הֹ֣ ת־י   .Gane, Cult and Character, 209–10 .אֶּ
345Gane, Cult and Character, 209. Adolf Büchler, Studies in Sin and Atonement in the Rabbinic 
Literature of the First Century (New York: Ktav, 1967), 307–8, 456; Porter, Leviticus, 37. 
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(1) that they perform certain activity, and (2) that that activity breaks God’s law; they are 
committing sin. This intentionality can come out of sinner’s GHS and weakness and out 
of an attitude to deny God, his personality, and authority. 
I deliberately abstain from using any of the mass of adjectives such as wanton, 
defiant, deliberate, inexpiable, done wittingly… that refer to intentional sin, but limit 
myself to a simple “intentional sin” that comprises two distinct types: (1) non-brazen sin, 
coming out of GHS and weakness, on the one hand, and (2) brazen sin, the desire to deny 
and break with God on the other. Scholars have usually attached these adjectives to sins 
that are intentional, but not inexpiable/unforgivable, and my decision to abstain from 
using them aims to avoid a potential misunderstanding that intentional sin is 
inexpiable/unforgivable.346 The analysis of texts I proposed confirms the fact that   
 
346Compare the following quotations from Milgrom’s commentary with my emphasis added. “P 
holds that the sanctuary is polluted by Israel’s moral and ritual violations (4:2) committed anywhere in the 
camp (but not outside) and that this pollution can and must be effaced by the violator’s purification offering 
and, if committed deliberately, by the high priest’s sacrifice and confession (16:3–22).” Milgrom, Leviticus 
1–16, 48. Indeed, there are only four passages in P in which confession (hitwaddâ) is explicitly required, 
and each case deals exclusively with deliberate sin (5:1–4; 16:21; 26:40; Num 5:6–7). Milgrom, Leviticus 
1–16, 301–2. But what function does confession serve? Why must contrition of the heart be augmented by 
the confirmation of the lips? Confession must, then, play a vital role in the judicial process. Because it 
occurs only when deliberate sin is expiated by sacrifice, the conclusion is inevitable: confession is the legal 
device fashioned by priestly legislators to convert deliberate sins into inadvertences, thereby qualifying 
them for sacrificial expiation. Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 301–2. Milgrom contradicts himself greatly in the 
following quotation that qualifies deliberate sins as inexpiable and unforgivable: “In the Priestly laws, 
however, there is no sacrificial expiation for capital crime or, for that matter, for any deliberate violation. 
The presumptuous sinner is banned from the sanctuary because he ‘acts defiantly (bĕyād rāmâ) … reviles 
the Lord … has spurned the word of the Lord and violated his commandment’ (Num 15:30–31; contrast vv. 
24–29).” Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 710. Also, see Noorditzij’s limitations to define the intention of the 
sinner in statements on Lev 4:3–12 where he clearly defined sin as unintentional only:. “If the high priest 
sinned by doing ‘what was forbidden in any of the Lord’s commands’ (v. 2; cf Gen 29:26; 34:7; 2 Sam 
13:12), i.e., if he unintentionally transgressed an express prohibition (cf. Lev 5:17)—for sins committed 
‘defiantly,’ and thus deliberately, there was only one penalty, viz., death (Num 15:30)—he thereby brought 
guilt on the people.” Noordtzij, Numbers, 57. Compare his comments on Lev 5:20–26 where he refrains 
from expressing the type of this sin: “These verses (MT 5:20–26) no longer deal with the unintentional 
violation of what belonged to the Lord, but rather with unlawful appropriation of what one knew to belong 
to one of his countrymen.” Noordtzij, Numbers, 72–73. Emphasis mine. In addition, see his inability to 
include this pericope in his comparison of Lev 4–5, that in his words present unintentional sins, and Num 
15:30, which discuss intentional sin. Noordtzij, Numbers, 55. 
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intentional, non-brazen sins are expiable/forgivable, as are unintentional ones. 
In the instance of unintentional sin, sinners are totally aware of only one element 
of the sin: that they have intentionally done a certain activity, but not the sinful element, 
that that activity breaks God’s law, and that they are thereby committing sin. 
Unintentional sins are always expiable/forgivable, but yet, some do include diminished 
punishment. 
I also intentionally refrain from using a variety of adjectives that refer to 
unintentional sin such as negligent, unwitting, or inadvertent because the majority of 
them present a complex definition attached to them by MLS that do not or just partially 
match the descriptions of sins in the Pentateuch. As was shown in the case of Milgrom’s 
work on Lev 4–5 and Num 15, applying these strictly defined terms of MLS to sins as 
they are described in the Pentateuch produces incoherence between the terminology and 
the concepts they are supposed to signify. In order to avoid miscommunication and 
terminological confusion, I use the simple term, “unintentional sin,” meaning “out of 
ignorance” or “by accident.” This terminology comes out of the interpretation of Lev 4–5 
and Num 15 presented in the current study and ָחָטא, ֶּפַׁשע, and 347.ָעֹון Other texts do 
provide more comprehensive descriptions of sins such as homicide laws (Exod 21:12–25, 
Num 35:9–34), but they are attached to specific sins and are not introduced as all-
encompassing and comprehensive legal cases that cover sin in general like Lev 4–5 and 
Num 15. Table 21 demonstrates these sin types visually, while Table 22 demonstrates the  
 
347Gane, Sklar, and Hartley have the same understanding of sin types, but based on a different 
methodology which I suggest is not consistent, since all of them, except Hartley, do not see any sort of 
intentional sin in Lev 4. Gane, “Numbers 15:22–31,” 154; Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 42–
44; Hartley, Leviticus, 55.  
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Intentional but non-brazen 
(GHS/weakness) 
Intentional brazen 
(Desire to break with God) 




Table 22. The sinner’s awareness 
 
 Unintentional Intentional 
Accident Ignorance Non-brazen Brazen 
Intent to act Yes Yes Yes Yes 




separation of a sinner’s awareness in relation to these sin types: 
This simple terminology allows for inclusion of all other sins in the Pentateuch 
some of which are thoroughly described, but also the ones that lack context that would 
define them under all-encompassing legal cases of Lev 4–5 and Num 15. Thus, sin in the 
Pentateuch is simply described as expiable/forgivable and inexpiable/unforgivable which 
does not correlate with another simply division of sins as intentional and unintentional 
because some intentional, but non-brazen sins are expiable/forgivable, as some 
unintentional sins for which the sinner chooses not to offer sacrifice are not. The 
sacrificial system offered a way of reconciliation with God to any sinner for the majority 
of sins, but it was God only who granted forgiveness. In other words, any sinner could 
offer a sacrifice for any sin, but God was the one who decided whether the sin would be 
forgiven or not. 
Some intentional sins are inexpiable/unforgivable in the OT due to the fact that 
the sinner is punished by capital punishment either by God or a human agency. These are 
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ָיד ָרָמה  sins (Num 15:30–31).348 Some intentional sins are expiable/forgivable, but ב 
expiation of them is conditioned by obedience to divine regulations of bringing a 
sacrifice for them. This same principle is also applicable to the cases of unintentional sin 
(Lev 4–5). If the sacrifice is not offered, then the sinner who commits intentional 
expiable/forgivable and unintentional expiable/forgivable sins experiences terminal 
punishment. Thus, the status of expiable/forgivable or inexpiable/unforgivable sins in 
great part rests on the sinner’s response. The terminology is not helpful in determining 
whether a sin belongs to one or another category, but context is. 
 
Interpretation of Leviticus 16:21 
Leviticus 16:21 is a known, twofold, interpretative crux, and scholars rightfully 
relate it to Lev 16:16. First, the crux is the function of the prepositional phrase lekol and 
the second one is the interpretation of the Hebrew terms used in these texts. Gane has 
collected major scholarly proposals on how to interpret it, and he himself proposed a 
solution to both the cruxes.349 
Milgrom made a difference between the last two terms which are the same in both 
texts, ַׁשע ָאה ,and understood the first term in each text ,ָחָטא and פֶּ  .in v ָעֹון in v. 16 and ֻטמ 
21, as encompassing the latter two.350 Rolf Rendtorff proposed a similar interpretation. 
The opening ָאה ַׁשע ,explains the following two terms ֻטמ   He assigned an .ָחָטא and פֶּ
 
348Based on the canonical understanding of the plan of salvation, especially by the input of the NT, 
this type of sin may be forgiven by God through Jesus Christ. This would be an anti-typical augmentation 
of the typical OT sacrificial system in Jesus Christ and forgiveness could be achieved through it. 
349Gane, Cult and Character, 285–91. 
350Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 1033–34, 1044. 
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explicative meaning to the   ו attached to ַׁשע  impurities—that is, brazen sins and other“ ,פֶּ
sins.”351 Gane criticized this approach because assigning an explicative meaning to the   ו 
“raises the suspicion of circular reasoning.”352 It implies that ֻטמ  ָאה includes moral sins, 
and vice versa. Even though present in a limited number of texts, these two terms 
overlap, at least ָאה  353.ָחָטא includes ֻטמ 
Büchler also considered that ַׁשע ָאה qualify ָחָטא and פֶּ  in v. 16 on the basis of ֻטמ 
intent. ָאה ַׁשע ,includes defilement done deliberately ֻטמ   354.ַחָּטאֹות ,and done unwittingly ,פֶּ
Noting that the   ו impacts the interpretation he proposed, he stated that all three terms are 
synonyms and that, in v. 21, they refer to the same evils from a different perspective.355 
Thus, moral and ritual sins are equal in this interpretation. 
Kiuchi took Büchler’s route, but still, in arguing in a reversed order that moral 
and ritual impurity in Lev 16:16 is identical. ָאה  ritual impurity, does not refer to ritual ,ֻטמ 
impurities themselves, but is rather, a moral fault that originates from breaking laws 
concerning ritual impurity. Consequently, ַחּטֹאָתם, which he translated “with respect to all 
their sins,” modifies both ַׁשע ָאה that replaced the opening ָעֹון sins.356 ֻטְמֹאת and פֶּ    in ֻטמ 
 
351Rendtorff, Leviticus, 3:220. 
352Gane, Cult and Character, 287. 
353This was demonstrated under the subheading Relevant Terms for Moral Impurity in the OT of 
the present study. 
354Büchler, Studies in Sin and Atonement (1967), 265. 
355Büchler, Studies in Sin and Atonement (1967), 267. 
356Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 154–55. 
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v. 21 refers to a guilt/consequence of the ritual and moral impurity. Based on the same 
syntax of the phrase ָכל ַחּטֹאָתם ל   in v. 16, Kiuchi proposed that ָעֹון refers to different 
nuance of 357.ַחּטֹאָתם Kiuchi’s interpretation points to a fruitful direction since he took 
into account what none of the previous scholars did, the fact that ַחּטֹאָתם is separated 
from the first two terms, ָאה ַׁשע and ֻטמ  ַׁשע and ָעֹון in v. 16, and פֶּ  in v. 21. However, his פֶּ
understanding of ָאה  is a summarizing ַחּטֹאָתם is questionable. Gorman also noted that ֻטמ 
term, but with the meaning of “sin.” This term, then, encompasses sins expressed by the 
previous two terms.358 
Schwartz has given proper attention to the fact that   ו attached to ַׁשע  is a פֶּ
conjunction and suggested that ָאה ַׁשע and ֻטמ   are two distinct sins.359 However, he took פֶּ
ַׁשע  ,sins in general.360 For Schwartz ,ַחּטֹאָתם deliberate sins, to be a subcategory of ,פֶּ
these two texts point to two types of sin, ritual and moral impurity, with the addition of a 
subcategory of moral impurity, ַחּטֹאָתם in both texts. This interpretation suffers because it 
is based on the assumption that ַׁשע  are inexpiable/unforgivable sins. Based on the same פֶּ
assumption Schwartz made a distinction between ַׁשע  This assumption is .ַחּטֹאָתם and פֶּ
proven to be unsupported by texts.  
 
357Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 155–56, 188n57. 
358Frank H. Gorman, The Ideology of Ritual: Space, Time and Status in the Priestly Theology, 
JSOTSup 91 (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1990), 82. 
359Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 6–7, 17. 
360Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 18. 
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Gane’s Proposal on Function of 
the Prepositional Phrase  ָכל  ל 
Gane also proposed his own interpretation of these two texts. He first criticized 
Schwartz on the grounds of his understanding of the phrase ָכל־ַחּטֹאָתם  That is, Gane .ל 
wanted to establish whether ָכל־ַחּטֹאָתם  .can be taken to encompass items preceding it ל 
He established the fact that two patterns of uses of lekol occur. First, “elsewhere in 
Leviticus, when לכל (lit., “to all”) is placed just before a final item in a list, if this item 
includes all of the previous terms in its semantic range, it is a summarizing category, as in 
11:42.” Second, “if the final item following לכל does not include all of the previous ones, 
it represents a separate item to which the list is extended, as in v. 46.”361 
Based on these two patterns, Gane proposed that ַחּטֹאָתם in Lev 16:16, 21 is not a 
summarizing item, but rather, a separate item added to the list.362 He added another 
reason for ַחּטֹאָתם’s distinctiveness: “Returning to 16:16, the usage is like that of 11:46 in 
that ַחּטֹאָתם, the final item following לכל, cannot be an overall summarizing category 
because it does not include in its semantic range the earlier ֹאת ֵני ֻּטמ  ָרֵאל ב  ׂש  יִּ  and 
ם ֵעיהֶּ ׁש   363”.פִּ
Gane’s first pattern of uses of ֹכל is well supported in contrast to the second one. 
That is, Lev 11:46 differs significantly from Lev 16:16, 21 since in the former, the 
 
361Gane, Cult and Character, 289. 
362Gane, Cult and Character, 289. 
363Gane, Cult and Character, 289. Also, the form ֹאת  should be without dagesh forte of the ֻטמ 
preposition min in the initial  ט. See Lev 16:16; Ezek 36:25, 29.  
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conjunction   ו is attached to the ֹכל, which is not the case in the latter. Thus, it is natural 
that the   ו introduces another new item in the list. However, that is not the case in Lev 
16:16, 21. Consequently, the inferences from Lev 11:46 to Lev 16:16, 21 are not 
justifiable since they are grammatically and syntactically different.  
Regarding his second argument, Gane is partially correct. That is, in reference to 
16:16, he is right that ָאה  as it was established ַחּטֹאָתם is outside the semantic range of ֻטמ 
under the subheading, “Relevant Terms for Moral Impurity in the OT,” in the present 
study. ָאה  generally refers to ritual impurity. Yet, there are several contexts where root ֻטמ 
ָאה out of which the noun ,ָטֵמא  is derived, encompasses moral impurity. The fact that ֻטמ 
 was presented under the subheading ָטֵמא may belong to the semantic range of ַחּטֹאָתם
“Impurity in the OT in Modern Studies, Jonathan Klawans” of the present study. Yet, it 
does not affect the interpretation of 16:16 because the last item in the list is not  ָאה ֻטמ  but 
 .ַחּטֹאָתם
However, Gane incorrectly assumed that ַׁשע  semantically do not ַחּטֹאָתם and פֶּ
overlap. Applying the terminological/contextual/intertextual method for studying sin 
established in the present study demonstrated that they do semantically overlap. 
The fact that ָאה  in v. 21 removes any obstacle to understand ָעֹון is replaced by ֻטמ 
 .semantically overlaps with both terms ַחּטֹאָתם as a summarizing category since ַחּטֹאָתם
The findings of the present study confirm that three key terms for sin, ֶּפַׁשע ,ָחָטא , 
and ָעֹון, do overlap in the Pentateuch but they also uniquely refer to certain sinful 
activities. There are a considerable number of scholars who consider these three terms as 
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complimentary to describe sin in its totality when they are found in the same context.364 
 
Gane’s Proposal on the Interpretation 
of Hebrew Terms 
Gane proposed that ׁשַ ּפֶ ע ,ָחָטא , and ָעֹון all have distinct meanings in Leviticus 1–
16, and others have followed him.365 This claim is based on the use of these terms in 
various parts of the OT.366 
Attempting to be more specific on the nature of the ַחּטֹאָתם sins, Gane suggested 
that the ָחָטא sins in the Pentateuchal ritual law are restricted to non-defiant expiable sins. 
He listed the 3 following types of sin that ָחָטא refers to: (1) expiable, non-defiant sins, 
including inadvertent sins (Lev 4:3, 14, 23, 26, 28), (2) sins of forgetting to perform a 
duty to God (Lev 5:6), and (3) some deliberate sins (Lev 5:6, cf. v. 1; Num 5:6–7; also 
Lev 5:21–23 [6:2–4]), but excluding sins committed defiantly, ָיד ָרָמה ב  , for which there is 
no opportunity for expiation, but rather, the sinner suffers kārēt punishment.367 This view 
of the ָחָטא sin in Leviticus and the rest of the Pentateuch will be evaluated below, and it 
will be suggested that the ָחָטא in Leviticus and the rest of the Pentateuch refers to 
expiable and inexpiable, as well as intentional and unintentional sins. 
First, it is necessary to note that Gane based his claims about ָחָטא on the   
 
364Sklar, “Sin,” 2:298; Knierim, “חטא,” TLOT 1:410. For a more extended list of sources, see 
Gane, Cult and Character, 285n1. 
365Wells, “Liability in the Priestly Texts,” 5. 
366Gane, Cult and Character, 292–98. 
367Gane, Cult and Character, 292. 
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Pentateuchal ritual laws only. However, it seems that Gane restricted the term 
Pentateuchal ritual laws to the Leviticus texts and Num 5:6–7, even though the term 
occurs in the texts of the entire Pentateuch, and not just Leviticus and Num 5:6–7. Gerald 
A. Klingbeil suggested the list of ritual texts in the Pentateuch that covers the entire 
corpus of the Pentateuch. This list emphasizes the fact that ritual texts in the Pentateuch 
are spread over chs. 1–23 in the book of Leviticus, as well as in the entire Pentateuch.368 
Singling out some Leviticus texts and Num 5:6–7 as the only Pentateuchal ritual texts is 
not hermeneutically sound since these texts are some, but not all, the Pentateuchal ritual 
texts. Inclusion of all Pentateuchal ritual texts would bring a significantly different 
definition of ָחָטא sin in the Pentateuchal ritual texts. It is attested that Num 9:13 is a ritual 
text,369 dealing with exceptions in regards to Passover regulations. These details, 
demonstrating the syntactical connection between the ָחָטא sin and the verb ָכַרת, and ָחָטא 
and the verb מּות, the term ָחָטא refers to inexpiable, intentional sin (Num 9:13 and Lev 
22:9, respectively), which was shown in more detail earlier (pp. 194–98). 
Second, Gane excluded Lev 26:18, 21, 24, 28 from Pentateuchal ritual law texts 
most likely because he agreed with Levine that this section does not belong to legal or 
ritual texts, but is rather considered as the climax of the entire book of Leviticus.370 
Levine himself, however, claimed that ch. 26 is the epilogue of the Holiness code.371 
 
368Klingbeil, Bridging the Gap, 245–52. 
369Klingbeil, Bridging the Gap, 250. 
370Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 451. 
371Levine, Leviticus, 182.  
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Milgrom also held this position about ch. 26.372 
Singling out chs. 1–6 in Leviticus and Num 5:6–7 would not be viable 
hermeneutics even if one accepted the presence of two priestly sources, H and P, in the 
book of Leviticus. That is, both of these two sources are tightly connected and frequently 
intermingled in terms of content and form. It is suggested that H, the latter source, was a 
redactor of P, the earlier source. In terms of ritual texts, it is attested that both of these 
sources dealt with the same laws. At this point, it is vital to emphasize that both of them 
deal with the same ritual laws. Milgrom showed that the law concerning the ingestion of 
meat of the offering found in Lev 7:18373 (P source) was reworked in Lev 19:7–8 (H 
source). Accordingly, both sources contain ritual texts that deal with the same laws.374 
This law is just one that is worked out in both sources.375 
This close connectedness of P and H in content suggests that both of them should 
be considered if one studies rituals laws in the Pentateuch. In other words, the presence of 
two sources should not prevent one from deriving implications from each of them to form 
a functionally integrated system.376 The same principle is applicable to many given   
 
372Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27, 2304. 
373Wright, “The Spectrum of Priestly Impurity,” 162. 
374Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 13–35; Henry T. C. Sun, “Holiness Code,” ABD 3:254–57. 
375Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1615–19. 
376This point was eloquently demonstrated by Gane on the functional, systematic nature of 
Leviticus 16. Gane, Cult and Character, 31–42.  
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elements of a broader religious system of Ancient Israel.377 This suggestion points to the 
fact that Lev 26:18, 21, 24, 28 should be taken into consideration when one studies the 
nature of the ָחָטא sin in Leviticus. In addition to the first point above, this reasoning 
would also create a very different understanding of ָחָטא sin than the one Gane proposed. 
That is, scholars have recognized that the punishments in Lev 26 are God’s response to 
the sins of his people, and that their unresponsiveness to those punishments represents 
people’s stubbornness to God’s dealing with them.378 The term ָחָטא is used in all these 
texts to refer to their sins. The context indisputably suggests that these sins are both 
brazen intentional and inexpiable sins. 
Third, Milgrom379 and others380 correctly claim that sin in Lev 5:1 is an 
intentional sin. In his monograph “The Problem of “Curse” in the Hebrew Bible,” 
Herbert Brichto noted that the institution of public proclamation, ʾālâ, of eliciting 
information regarding the status of property, commission of crime, and so on was 
common in ANE and Israel.381 In Israel, ʾālâ took the form of a conditional imprecation   
 
377It should be noted that some basic premises of the atonement process are not taken from P or H, 
but rather, belong to the wider literary context of the entire OT. Milgrom for instance, confirmed the fact 
that God will abandon his sanctuary if not cleansed by quoting Lam 2:7; Ezek 11:22; 2 Kgs 18:4. Milgrom, 
Leviticus 1–16, 258–59. The meaning of ר פֶּ  in Milgrom’s system is also taken from poetic parts of the ,כִּ
OT. Jacob Milgrom, “Atonement in the OT,” IDBSup 78. 
378Levine, Leviticus, 186–89; Rooker, Leviticus, 315–19; Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 452–53; Keil 
and Delitzsch, The Pentateuch, 2:473–76. 
379Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 295. 
380Noordtzij, Numbers, 63; Snaith, Leviticus and Numbers, 48; Noth, Leviticus, 44; Kiuchi, 
Leviticus, 99; Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 80; Gane, Cult and Character, 146. 
381Brichto, The Problem of “Curse,” 42. Also followed by Walton, Matthews, and Chavalas, 
“Leviticus,” 123; Wells, The Law of Testimony, 20–21; Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 293. For alternative 
views see Hartley, Leviticus, 68–70. 
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against the perpetrator of a crime, and against accessories after the fact and witnesses 
withholding material evidence. In addition, it requires the awareness that every adjuration 
involves a contingent curse. Brichto suggested that the translation of the ʾālâ in Lev 5:1, 
which has the lexical form qôl ʾālâ, would be “a public summons backed by a contingent 
curse.” Besides Lev 5:1, which is one of the key ʾālâ texts Brichto referred to in the OT, 
he also listed Prov 29:24 and Judg 17:2.382 Milgrom listed more texts dealing with the 
ʾālâ, along with examples of it from the ANE contexts, and rabbinic and historical 
sources.383 
Fourth, uses of nominal and verbal derivatives of the root ָחָטא show a different 
nature of ָחָטא sin. Of 25 uses of nominal derivatives of ָחָטא when it refers to sin, it 
describes intentional sin 14 times, and it refers to either unintentional (4:3, 14, 23, 26, 
28x2, 35) or sin in general (Lev 16:30, 34) 9 times. Two times the context is not clear 
where intentional or unintentional sin is in view. Of 30 verbal uses of the term ָחָטא, there 
are 25 uses when the verb refers to the activity of sinning; 11 times it is in designate 
intentional (5:1, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 13, [6:2] 21, [6:3] 22, [6:4] 23; 19:22), whereas 14 times, 
it is designated unintentional sinning (4:2, 3x2, 14, 22, 23, 27, 28x2, 35; 5:15, 16, 17).  
Having established this, Gane’s definition of the ָחָטא as an expiable unintentional 
sin in Leviticus 1–16 seems not to be supported by the Pentateuchal texts. This term is 
defined in the wider context of the book of Leviticus and the Pentateuch as intentional   
 
382Brichto, The Problem of “Curse,” 42–43. 
383Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 294. For possible scenarios of this case, see Noordtzij, Numbers, 64; 
Hartley, Leviticus, 68–72. 
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and unintentional, as well as expiable and inexpiable. In addition, isolating only the uses 
of ָחָטא from ch. 1–24 of the book of Leviticus and deducing the meaning for this term 
only from them is hermeneutically unsound. 
With regard to the term ַׁשע  Gane proposed that it conveys inexpiable sin in ,פֶּ
contrast to expiable ָחָטא. Gane’s definition of ַׁשע  .sin rests on two erroneous arguments פֶּ
First, the term is mentioned only 2 times in the Pentateuchal ritual law (Lev 16:16, 21). 
This term is never used to denote any sin in the book of Leviticus. Second, the serious 
nature of wrongs is conveyed by the nominal and verbal forms of ַׁשע  elsewhere in פֶּ
OT.384 
In regards to Gane’s first point, it is important to note again that the Pentateuchal 
ritual law is limited to Leviticus in Gane’s interpretation. However, since the use of ַׁשע  פֶּ
is quite limited in the Pentateuch, Gane’s understanding of it would stand the test even if 
all Pentateuchal ritual law texts had been considered since outside of Lev 16:16, 21, ַׁשע  פֶּ
is never used differently in the Pentateuch. All other uses are found in the narrative 
sections of Genesis, Exodus, and Numbers, and one legal text in Exod 22:9. Considering 
all these usages radically changes the understanding of ַׁשע  385.פֶּ
Regarding Gane’s second point, it is significant to observe that the understanding 
of ַׁשע    as an inexpiable sin is based mainly on the insights about this term from the rest פֶּ
 
384Gane, Cult and Character, 295–96. 




of the OT and not the Pentateuch. The verbal form of ַׁשע  out of which the idea of ,פֶּ
breaking with God was derived which points to the most severe sin in the OT, is never 
used in the Pentateuch. All the contexts where the nominal form of ַׁשע  is used in the פֶּ
Pentateuch were discussed above and they confirmed that ַׁשע  is not inexpiable sin, but פֶּ
to the contrary is expiable sin in the Pentateuch and in the rest of the OT. The latter claim 
was demonstrated by scholarly research above, as well. This hermeneutical unsoundness 
that can be detected in this point was already mentioned in the present study. Barr called 
it root fallacy, and it refers to the belief that in biblical Hebrew, there is a root meaning 
that is effective throughout all the variations of a given root, and as such, is taken as a 
part of the actual semantic value of any form of that root.386 Study of the ַׁשע  by פֶּ
applying the terminological/contextual/intertextual approach brought a totally different 
understanding of the term. That is, it covers intentional and unintentional sin which is 
both expiable and inexpiable. 
The most ambiguous meaning of ָעֹון is found in Lev 16:21 where context does not 
provide a clue as to which of the 3 potential meanings or all three is intended. Scholars 
have suggested various proposals on the meaning of ָעֹון in these two texts. Milgrom 
suggested that ָעֹון is a key term for sin overall.387 Gane suggested that ָעֹון in Lev 1–16 
refers to culpability.388 He stated that it can stand for “any part of the process of wrongful 
 
386Barr, Semantics, 100. 
387Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 25, 1043. 
388Gane, Cult and Character, 294, 299–300. 
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act-blame-punishment, whether the act is intentional or not.”389 However, he suggested 
that its meaning is restricted to culpability in the sense of consequential liability to 
punishment which the offender must bear, the understanding formulated by Schwartz.390 
However, based on the evidence presented in the current study, ָעֹון does not refer to any 
specific sin in terms of being intentional/unintentional or expiable/inexpiable, but rather, 
along with the ַחָּטאֹות and ַׁשע  contributes to the understanding of totality of sin which ,פֶּ
was intended to be conveyed in this text. 
As was suggested above, a fair interpretation of Lev 16:21 would imply that ָעֹון 
along with ַׁשע  in this text point to the totality of sins, rather than to any ַחָּטאֹות and פֶּ
specific sin. 
Some theologians have suggested that even though each of these three terms has 
particular meaning, not much attention should be placed on the differences in their 
meaning since they were used as synonyms.391 
The research of these terms presented above demonstrates that the following 
quotation by Rolf Knierim summarizes a fair approach when it comes to the precise 
meaning of these terms: “Even though this triad is formulaic and systematically expresses 
the mass of all possible errors, one may not simply view the three terms in the triad as 
synonyms. Each disqualifies ‘sin’ in its own way. Nevertheless, where they are used 
 
389Gane, Cult and Character, 294. 
390Gane, Cult and Character, 298. 
391Georg Fohrer, History of Israelite Religion (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1972), 193–94. 
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together as a formula, they are intended to represent all other terms for ‘sin.’”392 
Crüsemann suggested that the repetition of “all” (all) in this chapter (vv. 16, 17, 21, 30, 
34) in connection with a variety of important terms for sin emphasizes the 
comprehensiveness of the atonement and the elimination of the nation’s sins.393 Other 
major scholars of ancient Israel’s cult have also agreed that ֶּפַׁשע ,ָחָטא , and ָעֹון are used as 
synonyms.394 This triad was frequently used in the OT to refer to the totality or 
completeness of sin (Exod 34:7; Lev 16:21; Job 13:23; Ps 32:5; Isa 59:12; Ezek 21:24 
[29]; Dan 9:24).395 
 
William H. Shea’s Proposal 
William Shea proposed a viable proposal for the understanding of this verse. In 
contrast to many scholars, he proposed that the Hebrew term ַחָּטאֹות in Lev 16:16 and 21 
does not refer to the sins, but rather to the sin offerings of the sons of Israel.396 His 
proposal is semantically possible since the term is found in both singular (Lev. 4:3, 8, 14, 
20–21, 23–26, 28–29, 32–35; 5:6–13; 6:17, 25, 30; 7:7, 37; 8:2, 14; 9:2–3, 7–8, 10, 15, 
22; 10:16–17, 19; 12:6, 8; 14:13, 19, 22, 31; 15:15, 30; 16:3, 5–6, 9, 11, 15, 25, 27; 
19:22; 23:19) and plural (Lev. 16:16, 21, 30, 34; 26:18, 21, 24, 28) forms to refer to both 
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sins and sin offerings. Shea’s syntactical and contextual approach to study which 
meaning is intended in context is hermeneutically very sound. However, limiting the data 
of research to Lev 16 in the first part of his method, which he called “a direct lexical 
approach,” disturbs his hermeneutical soundness and is unnecessary. The plural is 
uniquely used in Lev 16:16, 21, ָכל־ַחּטֹאָתם  since all other plurals in the entire ,ל 
Pentateuch have different prepositions including (16:30, 34: ֹכל ם מִּ ַחּטֹאֵתיכֶּ ָכל/  ,26:18 ;מִּ
24, 28; Num 5:6: ם ם :26:21 ,ַעל־ַחּטֹאֵתיכֶּ ַחּטֹאֵתיכֶּ ם :Lev 26:21 ;כ  ַחּטֹאֵתיכֶּ  :Num 16:26 ;כ 
ם ַחּטֹאֵתיכֶּ  .and the context does not leave any doubt that the meaning “sins” is implied (כ 
However, one could ask whether the number of the noun affects its semantic choice in a 
given context. Thus, while this argument is a good starting point, a more elaborate 
approach is needed to establish such a claim. 
The second part of Shea’s method is more complex since he examined the 
relationship of various patterns of uses of the verb ר פֶּ ָאה in relation to כִּ ַׁשע ,ֻטמ   and ,פֶּ
 the use of these three nouns themselves, related prepositions, conjunctions, and ,ַחָּטאֹות
adjectives. I will examine Shea’s most relevant arguments for the present study. 
 
Related Nouns 
Shea proposed that ָאה ַׁשע and ֻטמ   represent two terms that summarize all sins פֶּ
discussed in Lev 1–15. The former covers sin in Lev 1–7, while the latter represents 
uncleanness in Lev 11–15. This inference makes ַחָּטאֹות redundant. It would just provide 
another shade of meaning for the term ַׁשע  He noted the same redundancy in v. 21 .פֶּ
where ָעֹון replaced  ָאה  .follows two terms for sin in both verses ַחָּטאֹות and ֻטמ 
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Redundancy is even more intense since all these terms would refer to moral sins.397 
Shea’s recognition, that ַחָּטאֹות is redundant if taken to mean sin like the previous 
two terms in vv. 16 and 21, is logical. A semantic overlap between ׁשַ ּפֶ ע ,ָחָטא , and ָעֹון is 
demonstrated in the present study,398 thus it would not be surprising if the author 
intentionally used semantic overlaps of the terms. In terms of intent, ֶּפַׁשע ,ָחָטא , and ָעֹון, 
all refer to intentional and unintentional sins, and in terms of expiability, the former two 
refer to both expiable/forgivable and inexpiable/unforgivable sin, whereas ַׁשע  always פֶּ
refers to expiable sin. Thus, on the one hand, all of them refer to expiable/forgivable sins, 
while on the other hand, all of them designate inexpiable/unforgivable sins. 
 
Related Prepositions 
Shea’s argument based on the use of prepositions   ל and ֹכל when they modify the 
noun ָחָטא is more solid. Again, taking into consideration only Lev 16, Shea identified 
that ָחָטא is modified by the preposition   4 ל times in vv. 3, 5, 16, 21 and 2 times by the 
prepositions ן  refers ָחָטא in 16:30, 34. Based on these uses, he identified the pattern that מִּ
to sin offering when it is modified by   ל. When it is modified by the preposition ן  it ,ָחָטא מִּ
signifies sin.399 With the delimitations to Lev 16, this argument is without weaknesses 
and it remains without weaknesses when one examines these two constructions in all of 
Leviticus.  
 
397Shea, “Literary Form,” 160–61. 
398See pages 187–250 of the present study. 
399Shea, “Literary Form,” 162. 
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That is, ָחָטא refers to sin offering when it is modified by   15 ,ל more times in 
Leviticus (vv. 4:3, 14, 20, 32, 33; 5:6, 7, 8, 11; 7:37; 9:2, 3; 12:6, 8; 23:19). The meaning 
of sin is never intended by this grammatical construction. When ָחָטא is modified by the 
preposition ן  it refers to sin in 4 other occurrences (4:26; 5:6, 10; 19:22). In another 4 ,מִּ
occurrences, ן  never modifies the sin offering directly. In 3/4 occurrences, it modifies מִּ
the noun “blood” that is in a construct relationship with “sin offering” (4:25, 34: 5:9). In 
one instance in 9:10, it modifies “sin offering” directly, but that one occurrence is 
actually highly questionable since the author of Leviticus did not have any other choice 
but to use ן  to modify “sin offering” as a secondary, indirect object. The clause reads מִּ
“ ת־ַהֵחלֶּב אֶּ ָלֹית ו  ת־ַהכ  אֶּ ת ו  רֶּ ת־ַהֹּיתֶּ אֶּ ן־ַהָכֵבד ו  ן־ַהַחָּטאת מִּ יר מִּ טִּ ק  ֵבָחה הִּ ז  ַהּמִּ , The fat and the 
kidneys and the lobe of the liver of the sin offering, he then offered up in smoke on the 
altar.” 
When all the other five patterns of uses of ָחָטא are taken into consideration in 
Leviticus, the statistics still greatly favor Shea’s arguments, but some grammatical 
constructions should be acknowledged. Thus, when ָחָטא is accompanied by the direct 
object marker, it refers to the sin offering in 21/21 occurrences (4:8, 29; 8:2, 14; 9:7, 8, 
15; 10:16, 17, 19; 14:13, 19, 31; 15:15, 30’ 16:6, 11x2, 15, 25, 27). This grammatical 
construct never refers to sin. When ָחָטא is associated with the preposition   כ, it refers to 
sin offering in 3/4 occurrences (6:10 [6:17]; 7:7; 14:13), while in 1/4 (26:21) occurrences, 
it signifies sin. When ָחָטא is modified by a definite article, it refers to the sin offering in 
3/4 occurrences (4:21; 6:18 [25]; 9:22) and to sin in 1/4 (4:14) instances. When ָחָטא 
stands without any modifiers, it refers to sin offering in 12/14 occurrences, while in 2/14 
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occurrences, it refers to sin. In addition, out of 86 nominal uses in Leviticus, ָחָטא refers to 
sin offering 61 times, which leaves 25 times for the meaning of sin. This statistic still 
supports Shea’s argument. These 4 additional patterns of use greatly favor Shea’s 
suggestion. 
Statistics of the 5th pattern does not favor Shea’s proposal, since when ָחָטא is 
associated with the preposition ַעל, it refers to sin offering 4/13 times (4:33, 29, 33; 8:14), 
while in 9/13 times (4:3, 28, 35; 5:6, 13; 19:22; 26:18; 24, 28), it designates sin. 
However, ַעל never modifies ַחָּטאֹות in Lev 16, thus not greatly affecting his proposal. 
 
Related Conjunction 
It is most likely that this argument and the following are Shea’s strongest 
arguments for his proposal. This argument is based on the use of the conjunction   ו. That 
is,   ו links ָאה ַׁשע and ֻטמ  ןָעֹו in v. 16 and פֶּ  and ַׁשע  is ַחָּטאֹות ,in v. 21, but the third term פֶּ
preceded by the preposition   ל and the adjective ֹכל. If ַחָּטאֹות were to represent the third 
term in the row, to be connected with the previous two in order to form a triad or triplet, 
then it would be necessary for it to be preceded by   ו, like the second term always is.400 
 
Related Adjective 
The adjective ֹכל only precedes ַחָּטאֹות in 16:16, whereas the first two terms are 
modified by the preposition ן  Shea stated: “If the meaning of the latter word is ‘sin .מִּ
offerings’ rather than ‘sins,’ then that meaning could encompass very well all of that 
 
400Shea, “Literary Form,” 163. 
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which has been treated from the former two categories through their sacrifices. In this 
case the term would not be simply another category of evil.”401 
The distinction between the first two and the third term is threefold: (1) the first 
two terms are modified by the preposition ן  is modified by the preposition ַחָּטאֹות while ,מִּ
 (is not, and (3 ַחָּטאֹות whereas ,ו   the first two terms are linked by the conjunction (2) ;ל  
 while the ֹכל is the more encompassing term since it is modified by the adjective ַחָּטאֹות
first two terms are not. Consequently, Shea concluded that ַחָּטאֹות is a separate category 
with a distinct or specific meaning than the former two.402 
Shea proposed that a similar syntactical relationship is also found in v. 21 where 
ָאה  The former two terms are not modified by any preposition .ָעֹון is replaced by the ֻטמ 
while ַחָּטאֹות retains its   ל preposition. The former two are modified by the direct object 
marker while ַחָּטאֹות is not. Finally, the former two are linked by the conjunction waw 
whereas ַחָּטאֹות is not, thus standing as a separate item from the two. Shea ultimately 
proposed: “Our conclusion from these considerations is that it is possible that our word 
could be translated as ‘sin offerings’ in Leviticus 16:16, 21 rather than ‘sins.’”403 
The order of the arguments Shea used to support his proposal is followed by the 
growth of their probability and accuracy. The first argument based on the inference that 
ַׁשע    covers sins in Lev 1–7 is possible since the current study demonstrated that these פֶּ
 
401Shea, “Literary Form,” 163. 
402Shea, “Literary Form,” 163. 
403Shea, “Literary Form,” 164. 
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two terms semantically overlap. The second one, based on the use of the prepositions   ל 
and ֹכל, stated that  ַחָּטאֹות consistently refers to sin offering when it is modified by the 
preposition   ל, and sin when it is modified by the preposition ן  in Lev 16. This pattern מִּ
remains valid and solid even when tested within all of Leviticus, which makes Shea’s 
second argument firm. The third argument, based on the use of the conjunction, is highly 
convincing. That is, the first two terms in both texts are linked with the conjunction   ו, 
while the third term is modified by the preposition   ל and the adjective ֹכל which 
grammatically and conceptually separate it from the previous two. Building a triad of 
terms that would refer to the conceptually same phenomenon would imply the use of the 
conjunction   ו as is the case with the second term. The fourth argument is the most 
convincing since the adjective ֹכל modifies the third term ַחָּטאֹות in Lev 16:16, while the 
first two terms are modified by the preposition ן  The first two terms, in this case, would .מִּ
refer to sin that was dealt with via all the sin offerings offered for them. 
Thus, to summarize, there is a threefold distinction between these terms: (1) the 
first two terms are modified by the preposition ן  is modified by the ַחָּטאֹות while ,מִּ
preposition   2) ,ל) the first two terms are linked by the waw conjunction, whereas ַחָּטאֹות is 
not, and (3) ַחָּטאֹות is a more encompassing term since it is modified by the adjective ֹכל, 
while the first two terms are not, which makes Shea’s proposal take better account of the 
biblical context and meaning. 
The syntax in 16:21 is little bit different, but it still greatly favors the grammatical 
and conceptual distinctiveness of ַחָּטאֹות from the first two terms. ַחָּטאֹות is again 
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modified by a preposition   ל and adjective ֹכל in contrast to the two former terms that are 
not modified by any preposition, but rather, are accompanied by a direct object marker 
and adjective ֹכל. Finally, the former two are linked by the conjunction   ו whereas ַחָּטאֹות 
is not, thus standing as a separate item from the two. 
Gane’s interpretation of the ַחּטֹאָתם, and ם ֵעיהֶּ ׁש  ֹאת ,פִּ  and ,ַחּטֹאָתם in v. 16 and ֻּטמ 
ׁש   םֵעיהֶּ פִּ  in v. 21, rests on the two rules he identified regarding the uses of the ֲעֹוֹנת ,
prepositional phrase ָכל  alone “is a very relative word” and ֹכל Moskala recognized that .ל 
establishing its precise meaning depends on the context.404 Adding the preposition   ל to it 
makes it even more complicated. 
Building on Milgrom’s remark on the use of this phrase,405 Gane established his 
first rule regarding ָכל ָכל When .ל        is placed before the final word in the list and (1) ל 
(2) the final item includes all of the previous terms in its semantic range, then it is a 
summarizing word. An example of this is Lev 11:42.406 In his second rule, Gane stated 
that the adjective ָכל  introduces a separate item or category when (1) it is placed before ל 
the final word in the list and (2) it presumably does not include, semantically, all the 
previous items. An example of this is Lev 11:46. Common for both rules is that the ָכל  is ל 
always placed before the last item in the list and in order to be a summarizing word, the 
last word has to include all the previous items in the list semantically or to be a separate 
 
404Jiri Moskala, “The Laws of Clean and Unclean Animals of Leviticus 11: Their Nature, 
Theology, and Rationale (An Intertextual Study)” (PhD diss., Andrews University, 1998), 240. 
405Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 668, 683. See also Kiuchi, Leviticus, 201. 
406Gane, Cult and Character, 289. 
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item or category, the last word does not semantically include all the previous terms in the 
list. 
The outcome of these rules is that the ַחּטֹאָתם in vv. 16 and 21 is a separate, rather 
than summarizing item in the list. In other words, it is just another term for sin like the 
previous two. Gane stated that the use of ֹכל followed by the phrase ָכל  in v. 16 ל 
resembles the use of this construction in Lev 11:46 since ַחּטֹאָתם cannot be an overall 
summarizing category of ָאת ֵעי and ֻטמ  ׁש   because the latter two terms are outside the פִּ
semantic range of ָחָטא. Gane stated: “Even if it could be argued that חטאֹות include 
 because elsewhere in Pentateuchal law חטאֹות the former clearly do not include פׁשעים
ָאה  ;is only physical ritual impurity (5:3; 7:20, 21; 14:19; 15:3, 25, 26, 30, 31; 18:19 ֻטמ 
22:3, 5; Num 5:19; 19:13).”407 Finally, Gane translated ָכל ַחּטֹאָתם  as “as well as all their ל 
sins.”408 
Kiuchi, on the other hand, introduced another syntactical rule that takes the 
meaning of this phrase to be totally different than the one Gane suggested. He stated that 
ָכל  basically means “with respect to all,”409 which, based on the present study, is a step ל 
in the right direction. The preposition   ל has a function of specifying what precedes it,410   
 
407Gane, Cult and Character, 289. 
408Gane, Cult and Character, 289. 
409Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 187n50. See also BDB, s.v. “ ל”; Harry M. Orlinsky, ed. Notes on 
the New Translation of the Torah (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1969), 30. 




while ֹכל conveys the totality of what follows it. Kiuchi suggested thus that “ָכל  as a ל 
whole functions to specify what precedes it from a different viewpoint.”411 A simple, yet 
consistent, rule can be established based on Kiuchi’s definition of this prepositional 
phrase: when ָכל  is attached to the noun at the end of a summative list, whether ל 
accompanied by modifiers or not, it always specifies those preceding nouns in the list 
from a different perspective. Pentateuchal texts that support this rule include the 
following: Gen 9:10; Exod 14:28; 26:2; 27:3; 36:9; Lev 5:4; 11:42; 13:12; 22:5; Num 
3:25, 26; 4:31, 32; and Deut 22:3. This rule is foundational to the syntactical and 
grammatical analysis of Lev 16:16, 21 that follows below. 
The present study also finds Gane’s translation unjustifiable for the following 
reasons: First, the structure of Lev 11:42 differs from the one in Lev 16:16. The 
preposition ן  does not precede any terms in the list in the former, while it precedes the מִּ
first two terms and is absent before the last term in the latter text. Thus, these two texts 
cannot be compared at the syntactical level in order to derive a valid syntactical rule. The 
present study agrees with Gane that in Lev 11:42, the phrase ָכל  is placed before the ל 
summarizing term, but the syntax of this verse is different than the one in Lev 16:16 and 
thus, not valid to make a general rule for uses of  ָכ לל  . The exact syntactical/grammatical 
construction found in Lev 16:16 never replicates itself in the Pentateuch. 
A study of the uses of ֹכל followed by phrase ָכל  ,similar to the one in Lev 16:16 ,ל 
21, points to the rule that does not favor Gane’s conclusion. Namely, the uses of ֹכל in the 
 
411Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 187n50. 
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Pentateuch followed by phrase ָכל ָכל demonstrate that when ל   is placed before a ל 
summarizing term, it is never preceded by the conjunction   ו (see Gen 9:10; Exod 35:24, 
36:1; Lev. 11:42, 13:12; 22:5, Num 4:32, 5:9, 14:29, 18:15; Deut 3:13). On the other 
hand, the uses of ֹכל in the Pentateuch followed by phrase ָכל ָכל demonstrate that when ל   ל 
is placed before a separate term, it is always joined with the conjunction   ו (see Gen 1:30; 
2:20; 9:10; Exod 35:21; Lev. 11:46, 22: 18; Num 4:27, 18:9; Deut 19:15; 29:1[2], 34:11–
12). Since ָכל  it does not,ו   in both Lev 16:16 and 21 is not joined with the conjunction ל 
mark a separate item, but the term that somehow is related or summarizes both the 
previous terms. 
Second, Gane is correct in claiming that the nominal derivative of ֹאת ,טמא  is ֻּטמ 
never in the semantic range of ַחּטֹאָתם and ם ֵעיהֶּ ׁש   Yet, the verbal derivative of the root .פִּ
 frequently refers to moral impurity as the present study provided textual evidence for טמא
in subheading ָחֵנף. The verbal derivative of the root טמא refers to moral defilement in 
Lev 18:20, 23, 24, 30, 31; 20:3; Num 5:13, 14, 20, 27, 28, 29, Deut 24:4. Textual proof 
that טמאה refers to moral impurity does not exist in the Pentateuch, but inasmuch as it 
originates from the root טמא that does refer to moral impurity, this eliminates the 
exclusively ritual nature of   ֹאתֻּטמ . This is in spite of the fact that the text never defines it 
as moral in nature. However, the understanding that ַחּטֹאָתם refers to sin offering does not 
claim nor need ֹאת ֹאת but rather, that ,ַחּטֹאָתם to be in the semantic range of ֻּטמ   is ֻּטמ 
related to ַחּטֹאָתם, sin offering. This claim is strengthened even more with the fact that the 
sin offering was offered for certain ritual impurity (Lev 12–15). 
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Third, Gane’s second rule states that the last word in the list that follows ָכל  does ל 
not semantically include all the previous terms. Gane found that the use of ָכל  in Lev ל 
16:16 resembles the one in Lev 11:46. The present study agrees with Gane that in the 
latter text, ָכל ָכל ,has the role of marking a separate item. However, in Lev 11:46 ל   is ל 
preceded by the conjunction   ו, while it is not in Lev 16:16 and 21. The presence or the 
absence of the conjunction   ו changes the meaning of the phrase. Its presence before ָכל  ל 
conveys adding another item to the list of items as it is in Lev 11:46, while its absence 
points to the fact that the word following it is not just another item in the list, but rather, 
is related to all the items previously listed from a different viewpoint (as noted in the rule 
by Kiuchi). 
An additional argument for the interpretation of Lev 16:16, 21, where the first two 
terms are considered to express totality and completeness of the concept of sin, can be 
confirmed by the fact that these terms semantically overlap. In addition, ַחָּטאֹות as a 
distinct term always keeps its final position, thus pointing to the fact that it is separate in 
both texts. 
Shea’s proposal is supported by more solid arguments and rests on the more 
detailed methodology. Therefore, this study accepts Shea’s proposal as a more probable 
one. Thus, the phrase ָכל־ַחּטֹאָתם  in Lev 16:16, 21 is taken to mean “for all their sin ל 
offerings,” instead of a variety of other suggestions such as “as well as all their sins,”412   
 
412Gane, Cult and Character, 290. 
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and “including all their sins”413 and others. 
This translation also correlates with the trajectory of sins presented in the present 
study. Shea expressed it in the following way: 
Such a translation strongly indicates that the Day of Atonement sin offering ritual 
functioned to cleanse the sanctuary from only the confessed sins of the penitent 
Israelites. That is, it functioned to remove the sins that had been confessed and 
transferred to it by means of the sin offerings that had been offered previously during 
the year.414 
 
This meaning of ַחָּטאֹות is limited to Lev 16:16, 21 only in contrast to all the other 
places where it is a part of the triad equal to all other terms that, as a grammatical and 
syntactical composition, designates totality or comprehensiveness of sin. Besides the 
arguments presented in the present study, ַחָּטאֹות in Lev 16:16, 21 separates itself 
syntactically, grammatically, and contextually from all other uses in the texts where it is 
an equal part of the triad. The terms are separate grammatical and syntactical units in all 
other texts (Exod 34:7; Lev 16:21; Job 13:23; Ps 32:5; Isa 59:12; Ezek 21:24 [29]; and 
Dan 9:24), while in Lev 16:16, 21 ַחָּטאֹות serves as a summarizing term, sin offerings. 
 
 
413Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 689. 











THE MEANING OF ר פֶּ  IN PENTATEUCH כִּ
 
 
Having established the concept of sin, the present study transitions to its second 
section, which also consists of two parts. I first present major scholarly suggestions on 
the concept of atonement and then, based on a thorough analysis of this concept which 
primarily consists of the examination of the uses of the Hebrew verb ר פֶּ  in the כִּ
Pentateuch, evaluate them in order to suggest a new proposal on the understanding of 
atonement in the Pentateuch. 
 
The Meaning of ר פֶּ  Review of Scholarly Research :כִּ
The Hebrew root ר פֶּ  takes a significant place in biblical debates on the כִּ
atonement1 and it has generated a considerable amount of research2 regarding its 
etymology. However, there is no scholarly consensus regarding its origin. Philologists   
 
1Sidney O. Hills, “A Semantic and Conceptual Study of the Root KPR in the Hebrew Old 
Testament with Special Reference to the Accadian Kuppuru” (PhD diss., Johns Hopkins University, 1954), 
1. 
2Janowski, Sühne als Heilsgeschehen, 1–26; F. Maass, “כפר,” TLOT 2:624–35; Baruch A. Levine, 
In the Presence of the Lord: A Study of Cult and Some Cultic Terms in Ancient Israel, SJLA 5 (Leiden: 
Brill, 1974), 56–114; Milgrom, “Atonement in the OT,” 78–83; Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 94; Wright, 
The Disposal of Impurity, 291–99; Schwartz, “The Prohibitions,” 34–66, (p. 51n3); Richard E. Averbeck, 
 ,NIDOTTE 2:681–701; Gane, Cult and Character, 106–43; Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice ”,כפר“
Atonement, 1–9. The references for the previous research can be found in Maass, “כפר,” TLOT 2:624–25; 
Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 1; Levine, In the Presence of the Lord, 123–27. 
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have established two alternatives, both well supported from Semitic cognates, which are 
well attested to in the scholarly dialogue.3 The first proposal is that the Hebrew ר פֶּ  is כִּ
related to the Arabic kaffara, and the other relates it to the Akkadian kuppuru. In its base 
(I) stem, kafara means “cover, conceal, deny, disbelieve, be ungrateful,” while in the 
intensive (II) stem (kaffara) it means “conceal, annul, expiate, do penance.” The 
Akkadian kapāru refers to “wipe off, smear on” in the base (B) stem and “wipe off, 
clean, rub, ritually purify” in the intensive (D) stem, kuppuru.4 
Milgrom was correct in his assertion that the basic idea of both etymologies is “to 
rub.” In the case of Arabic, it is “to rub on,” that is, “to cover” or “to rub off,” that is, “to 
wipe” in Akkadian.5 Thus, Milgrom established that from the point of etymology: 
“Because a substance may either be “rubbed on” or “rubbed off,” the derived meanings, 
“cover” and “wipe,” may be complementary and not contradictory.”6 Richard E. 
Averbeck also stated that these two along with the meaning of “to ransom,” are not 
mutually exclusive.7 The dispute of whether kaffara or kuppuru is to be taken as a 
starting point to determine the foundational meaning of the Hebrew ר פֶּ  was a matter of כִּ
lengthy debates. Some scholars tried to determine its meaning by examining the usage 
and internal OT evidence and concluded that the etymology is not decisive.8  
 
3Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 1080. 
4Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 1080; Averbeck, “כפר,” NIDOTTE 2:681–82. 
5Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 1080. 
6Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 1080. 
7Averbeck, “כפר,” NIDOTTE 2:683–84. 
8Averbeck, “כפר,” NIDOTTE 2:682. 
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The difficulty of relating the Hebrew ר פֶּ  to Semitic cognates is complicated by כִּ
the polysemous nature of the root kpr in all Semitic languages.9 In addition, insights from 
comparative studies are also confusing since, as Milgrom stated, both cognates contain 
the same idea, “to rub.” The Arabic kafara, I stem, does not correspond to the Hebrew 
ר פֶּ  piel, and the Akkadian kuppuru, D stem. The Akkadian D stem means “to wipe” and ,כִּ
always in the sense of “to wipe off, wipe away,” not “to wipe on or smear on.”10 
Furthermore, making the etymology even more complicated is the fact that in addition to 
the meaning “to cover,” the Arabic kafara has the same meaning “to expiate” that 
corresponds to the Akkadian D stem, “to remove, to erase.”11 Finally, the Akkadian D 
stem is repeatedly used in medical and ritual texts. It seems that the Akkadian cognate 
corresponds more closely to the Hebrew ר פֶּ  than the Arabic, at least in OT cultic כִּ
contexts.12 However, many still heavily rely on the comparative and etymological 
evidence.13 
The question that also impacted the debate on the ר פֶּ  was the nature of the כִּ
atonement communicated by this verb. The scholars of the 19th and the beginning of the 
20th centuries argued that ר פֶּ  is related to the Arabic kaffara and claimed that atonement כִּ
 
9Benno Landsberger, The Date Palm and Its By-Products According to the Cuneiform Sources, 
AfO 17 (Graz, Austria: Weidner, 1967), 30–34; Paul V. Mankowski, Akkadian Loanwords in Biblical 
Hebrew (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2000), 71. 
10Averbeck, “כפר,” NIDOTTE 2:684. 
11Levine, In the Presence of the Lord, 126; An Arabic-English Lexicon: Derived from the Best and 
the Most Copious Eastern Sources, s.v. “ ََكفَّر.” 
12Averbeck, “כפר,” NIDOTTE 2:684. 
13Averbeck, “כפר,” NIDOTTE 2:682. 
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refers to the covering over the sin or the sinner.14 Some recognized the connection 
between ר פֶּ ר and כִּ  ransom) and claimed that the atonement should be viewed as a) ֹכפֶּ
payment of the ransom or appeasement that results from it.15 Some also viewed the ר פֶּ  כִּ
as a symbolic dedication of the worshiper’s life to the holy.16 Regardless of these 
differences in the understanding of atonement, scholars agreed on the fact that ר פֶּ  כִּ
indicates the repairing of the relationship between God and humans that was interrupted 
by sin.17 Sklar’s following statement explains this claim: 
That this is plausible understanding of ר פֶּ  is self-evident in the priestly literature, for כִּ
it is used in sin contexts to describe taking care of the negative effects of sin in order 
to bring about reconciliation between the sinner and the Lord. For this reason, it is 
often said that a person is forgiven after atonement has been effected of their behalf: 
“And the priest shall make atonement for [the leader] in regard to his sin, and he shall 
be forgiven” (Lev 4:26b).18 
 
However, this understanding of atonement becomes problematic because ר פֶּ  is כִּ
used in contexts where sin was never committed, indicating that no forgiveness is needed   
 
14Yitzhaq Feder, “On kuppuru, kippēr and Etymological Sins that Cannot be Wiped Away,” VT 60 
(2010): 537. The notable proponent of this view is Johann Jakob Stamm, Erlösen und Vergeben im Alten 
Testament (Bern: A. Francke, 1940), 61–66; Kurtz, Offerings, 67–71; Ellinger, Leviticus, 71. For a more 
complete list, see Janowski, Sühne als Heilsgeschehen, 20–22, 99–100; Schwartz, “The Prohibitions,” 
54n2. 
15Johannes Herrmann, Die Idee der Sühne im Alten Testament: Eine Untersuchung über Gebrauch 
und Bedeutung des Wortes kipper (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1905), 99, 101–2; Herbert Chanan Brichto, “On 
Slaughter and Sacrifice, Blood and Atonement,” HUCA 47 (1976): 19–55, especially 26–27, 34–35; Adrian 
Schenker, “kōper et expiation,” Bib 63.1 (1982): 32–46. For a more complete list see Sklar, Sin, Impurity, 
Sacrifice, Atonement, 46nn8–13, especially. 
16Janowski, Sühne als Heilsgeschehen, 185–276; Hartmut Gese, “The Atonement,” in Essays on 
Biblical Theology (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1981), 93–116. 
17Hills, “A Semantic and Conceptual Study,” 287; Frank H. Gorman, Divine Presence and 
Community: A Commentary on the Book of Leviticus, ITC (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1997), 16; Gane, 
Cult and Character, 106; Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 2. 
18Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 2–3. 
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in contexts like these, but rather, purification. Some such cases are the birth of a child 
where a new mother receives ר פֶּ  by a sin offering (Lev 12) or the sanctuary receives כִּ
ר פֶּ  ,where “sanctuary” is the indirect or direct object of this verb (Lev 16:16, 20 ,כִּ
respectively).19 
As a result of the problems caused by translating ר פֶּ  with “to cover” at least in כִּ
some contexts, some scholars, relying on the Akkadian kapāru, have suggested that ר פֶּ  כִּ
should be translated as “to purify, purge, effect purgation.”20 
Two studies that began to turn the attention from the Arabic kaffara to Akkadian 
kuppuru are G. B. Gray’s Sacrifice in the Old Testament: Its Theory and Practice21 and 
S. V. Driver’s articles in the Journal of Theological Studies.22 There are four principal 
arguments that favor this understanding of ר פֶּ ר ,First .כִּ פֶּ  is used as a parallel synonym כִּ
in biblical poetry with māḥâ “to wipe” (Jer 18:23b) and hēsîr “to remove” (Isa 27:9), 
suggesting that it refers “to purge.”23 Second, Priestly texts often use words for 
purification, such as ָטֵהר and ָחָטא, in the same contexts with ר פֶּ  ;Lev 14:52–53) כִּ
16:30…).24 Third, this understanding of ר פֶּ  would fit contexts where sin is not כִּ
 
19Jay Sklar, “Sin and Impurity: Atoned or Purified? Yes!,” in Perspectives on Purity and 
Purification in the Bible, eds. Baruch J. Schwartz, et al., LHB/OTS 474 (New York: T&T Clark, 2008), 22. 
20Feder, “On kuppuru, kippēr and Etymological Sins,” 537. 
21George Buchanan Gray, Sacrifice in the Old Testament: Its Theory and Practice (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1925), 67–76. 
22Godfrey R. Driver, “Studies in the Vocabulary of the Old Testament V,” JTS 34 (1933): 34–38; 
Godfrey R. Driver, “Studies in the Vocabulary of the Old Testament II,” JTS 32 (1931): 255n20. 
23Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 1080; Averbeck, “כפר,” NIDOTTE 2:687. 
24Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 1080; Averbeck, “כפר,” NIDOTTE 2:687. 
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committed, but emphasis is on the ritual purification.25 Fourth, the Akkadian kapāru, in 
the D stem is not just similar to ר פֶּ  but is also used in cultic texts in a similar way as ,כִּ
ר פֶּ  was.26 כִּ
The proponents of this understanding of ר פֶּ  do not claim that it should always be כִּ
translated as “to purify,” since, as with kaffara, there are contexts where this 
understanding is not functional. Thus, they kept the translation “to expiate/atone” in some 
contexts and “to purify” in others. However, the decision of which understanding to 
apply to a given text is not an easy task. The works of certain notable scholars in the area 
of Ancient Israel cult have proved this to be the case.27 
 
ר  פֶּ  Baruch A. Levine :כִּ
In attempting to separate these two understandings of ר פֶּ  Baruch A. Levine ,כִּ
proposed that ר פֶּ ר :in biblical cultic texts reflects two distinct verbal forms כִּ פֶּ  I, the כִּ
primary piel form derived from the Akkadian kuppuru, and ר פֶּ  II, a secondary כִּ
denominative from the nominal ר ר ransom, expiation gift).28 Levine held that) ֹכפֶּ פֶּ  I כִּ
means “to purify”29 when it is followed by a direct object or “to make expiation” when it 
 
25Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 4. 
26Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 4. 
27Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 4. 
28Levine, In the Presence of the Lord, 67.  
29Levine, In the Presence of the Lord, 60. 
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is followed by a preposition such as ַעל or ר 30.ַבַעד פֶּ  II carries the same meaning “to כִּ
expiate,” but the additional element that differentiates the “to make expiation” meaning 
of I with the prepositions and ר פֶּ ר II is the fact that כִּ פֶּ  II does not refer to cleansing כִּ
primarily, as with ר פֶּ  ,I, but rather, to the ransom of a life.31 Expiation in Priestly texts כִּ
as Levin understood it, possesses a functional or technical sense and means “to perform 
rites of expiation.” ר פֶּ  can refer to a relations ,ַעל associated with the preposition ,כִּ
process and means “to perform rites of expiation with respect to” places, persons, and so 
on. It points to the fact that the indirect object, marked by the preposition ַעל, is a 
beneficiary of the rite’s effects, and no physical contact is implied. An example of this 
sense is Lev 16:33: “and make atonement for the holy sanctuary, and he shall make 
atonement for the tent of meeting and for the altar (ר פֶּ  direct object). He shall also + כִּ
make atonement for the priests and for all the people of the assembly (ר + ַעל פֶּ  The ”.(כִּ
sanctuary compartments all received physical action resulting in their purification, while 
no physical action was directly performed over the Israelites. They were just beneficiaries 
of the expiation.32 
ר פֶּ  can also refer to a spatial process and means “to perform rites ַעל linked with כִּ
of expiation in proximity to or upon” sacrificial animal, places, persons, and so on. This 
process implies physical contact or, at least, proximity. In Levine’s understanding, the   
 
30Levine, In the Presence of the Lord, 64–65. 
31Levine, In the Presence of the Lord, 67. 
32Levine, In the Presence of the Lord, 64–65. 
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expiation rites do not automatically produce purification, but rather, God himself is the 
one who accomplishes it.33 The ר פֶּ  I in cultic texts refers to the separation or riddance of כִּ
impurity from individuals.34 In regards to the kōper, Levine saw it as (1) the payment 
made for the purpose of “erasing or “wiping away” guilt incurred by the offense,”35 and 
(2) “a substitute for a life (Exod 30:12, Isa 43:3), one’s own or another’s (Prov 21:18).”36 
In cultic texts, it becomes an expiatory payment.37 Finally, kōper refers to substitution in 
light of Lev 17:11.38 
Averbeck seems to be correct when he observed, “Do we really have the same vb. 
reflecting two different original derivations that have fallen together? At least 
historically, one of them must have been antecedent to the other.”39 In addition, this 
distinction between the two translation of the  ר פֶּ  to purify” or “to expiate,” proved to“ ,כִּ
be untenable in Levine’s own interpretation of certain Priestly texts. Levine implied that 
the expiation in Lev 4:20 has the meaning of cleansing, (ר פֶּ ר) I) rather than ransom כִּ פֶּ  כִּ
II).40 Assuming that the ר פֶּ  I meaning is operating in this text can be maintained even כִּ
though there is no major impurity involved in this legislation. Levine applied ר פֶּ  I כִּ
 
33Levine, In the Presence of the Lord, 65. 
34Levine, In the Presence of the Lord, 63. 
35Levine, In the Presence of the Lord, 61. 
36Levine, In the Presence of the Lord, 62. 
37Levine, In the Presence of the Lord, 62. 
38Levine, In the Presence of the Lord, 69. 
39Averbeck, “כפר,” NIDOTTE 2:688. 
40Levine, Leviticus, 23. 
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because he understood sinfulness as a form of impurity41 and thus, his distinction still 
stands the test even though the context of Lev 4 is inadvertent sin. The following 
statement demonstrates this:  
The Akkadian kuppuru, which corresponds to the Hebrew ר פֶּ  ,means “to wipe off ,כִּ
burnish, cleanse.” In cultic terms, this means that expiation is conceived as cleansing, 
as wiping away impurity, contamination, and, by extension, sinfulness itself. Levitical 
texts use the verb ר פֶּ  to express the concept that through expiation, one is “wiped כִּ
clean” of impurities that adhere or cling to a person, infect him, we might say.42 
 
However, the element of an inadvertent sin found in the context of Lev 4 strongly 
suggests that the expiation should be understood as ransom, rather than cleansing.43 
Commenting on the phrase, “to atone for your lives” ( ַכֵפָ֖ר ָ֑ם ל  ֹׁשֵתיכֶּ ַעל־ַנפ  ) in Lev 17:11, 
Levine stated that expiation in this text refers to atonement based on the ר  as the ֹכפֶּ
following quotation shows: “Literally, this formula means “to serve as kofer (ransom) for 
your lives.” God accepts the blood of the sacrifices in lieu of human blood.”44 This form 
of atonement is carried by Levine’s ר פֶּ  II and is allowed only in the case of כִּ
inadvertence.45 Lev 4 exactly fits this context since the sin involved is the one of 
inadvertence. It seems that one or the other understanding needs to be eliminated or 
perhaps both are operative in this text.  
 
41Levine, Leviticus, 105. 
42Levine, Leviticus, 23. 
43Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 5. 
44Levine, Leviticus, 115. 
45Levine, Leviticus, 115. 
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ר  פֶּ  Jacob Milgrom :כִּ
Milgrom delineated four meanings of the ר פֶּ  based on the contexts in which the כִּ
verb is found.46 In the first context, ר פֶּ  is associated with the sin offering, which in כִּ
Milgrom’s atonement theory cleanses the sanctuary rather than a worshiper, and it is to 
be translated exclusively as “to effect purgation.”47 
In the second group of texts, ר פֶּ  bears a meaning of “to rub on”48 or as cover.49 כִּ
However, Milgrom claimed that this meaning for ר פֶּ  cannot be established based on the כִּ
cultic texts since the only two examples of this use, paschal lamb and scale-diseased 
person, come from the texts where a sin offering was not used (Exod 12:27; Lev 14:18, 
20, 29, 31).50 The only potential proof text of this use is Num 16:46–47,51 but this 
understanding of ר פֶּ  .is rarely considered in Milgrom’s works כִּ
In the third group of texts that deal with averting God’s wrath, ר פֶּ  is based on the כִּ
kōper principle (Exod 30:12–16). This meaning includes the notion of substitution; the 
guilty party is substituted by the innocent party or their ransom.52 
In the fourth context, ר פֶּ  has a more abstract or figurative notion of “atone” or כִּ
 
46Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 1079–84; Milgrom, “Atonement in the OT,” 78–81. 
47Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 1080–81. 
48Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 1081–82. 
49Milgrom, “Atonement in the OT,” 80. 
50Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 1081. 
51Milgrom, “Atonement in the OT,” 80. 
52Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 1082. See Sklar for the clarification of Milgrom’s quotation he used in 
his Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 47n15. 
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“expiate” (Lev 16:10, 21; 17:11). “The meaning here is that the offerer is cleansed from 
his impurities/sins and becomes reconciled, ‘at one,’ with God.” Milgrom further stated 
that “Such is also the kippēr role of all of the other sacrifices whose blood is not daubed 
on the altar’s horns like the ḥaṭṭāʾt.” He stated that this meaning is also found in ʿōlâ 
(Lev 1), minḥâ (Lev 2), milluʾı̂m (Exod 29:33), and ʾāšām (Lev 5:16, 18, 26) offerings.53 
Regardless of Milgrom’s more elaborate contextual work, he relied heavily on the 
comparative texts, and his interpretations of texts, like Levine’s, also show tensions. That 
is, Num 35:31–33 states that no act of ר פֶּ  can be done for the land polluted by כִּ
bloodshed, except the shedding of the murderer’s own blood. Milgrom stated that the ר פֶּ  כִּ
in this text refers to the ransom principle,54 which is in accordance with vv. 31–32, but 
the text clearly speaks about the pollution of the land through the shedding of blood (ָחֵנף, 
v. 33 and ָטֵמא, v. 34), which implies that the ר פֶּ  of the land should include cleansing כִּ
element as well.55 Milgrom emphasized moral defilement alone in this text.56 
 
ר  פֶּ  Jay Sklar :כִּ
Sklar proposed that this tension can be solved by understanding that ר פֶּ  includes כִּ
both conceptions: purification and ransom.57 He has suggested this by demonstrating that   
 
53Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 1083. 
54Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 1082. 
55Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 6. 
56Milgrom, “Atonement in the OT,” 81. 
57Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 187. Sklar, “Sin and Impurity,” 18. 
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ר פֶּ  in the contexts of sin requires both elements, ransom and purification. Ransom כִּ
delivers the guilty party, the sinner, from the punishment of his/her sin while purification 
is needed in this context to cleanse the sanctuary that was automatically defiled by the 
sinner’s sin.58 He stated that purification is needed in the contexts of ritual impurity to 
purify the individuals from their impurity or consecrate them for a certain ministry, while 
ransom is required in cases of major ritual impurities since those individuals would defile 
the sanctuary or, in the context of consecration, need ransom on account of the “general 
impurity of the people relative to the holy.”59 
 
ר  פֶּ  Roy Gane :כִּ
Gane’s study on the ר פֶּ  formulae confirmed F. Maass’s claim that in the context כִּ
of a sin offering, “ר פֶּ  always indicates the goal of activity rather than prescribing a כִּ
specific physical activity.”60 Gane also noted that another point that separates Hebrew 
ר פֶּ  and Akkadian kuppuru is the physical act by which the goal of the verb is כִּ
accomplished. Generally, Akkadian kuppuru in ritual contexts includes physical wiping 
of the objects or person from evil which was removed which is rarely the case in biblical 
corpus.61 Gane proposed that ר פֶּ ן formulae in biblical texts include the preposition כִּ  מִּ
 
58Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 183–85. 
59Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 185–86. 
60Maass, “כפר,” TLOT 2:626; Gane, Cult and Character, 192. 
61Gane, Cult and Character, 192; Wright, The Disposal of Impurity, 291–92. This point is also 
affirmed in Yitzaq Feder’s recent article where he proposed, besides this claim that lexically and 
syntactically Akkadian kuppuru and Hebrew ר פֶּ  cannot be related, that this connection cannot be כִּ




indicating that evil has been removed from the offerer. This fact suggests that ר פֶּ  כִּ
includes a purgatory element in reference to the offerer.62 Gane moved the dialogue on 
the meaning of ר פֶּ   :in the right direction by stating כִּ
Whether the origin of the verb ר פֶּ  should be sought outside Hebrew, within Hebrew כִּ
as a denominative of the noun ר  ,.ransom” or “compository payment” (see e.g“ ֹכפֶּ
Exod 30:11–16) or both, it seems impossible to explain the semantic range of ר פֶּ  כִּ
without allowing for the possibility that some meanings of the word are derived by 
extension or metaphorical usage, a factor that diminishes the relevance of 
etymology.63 
 
S. R. Driver suggested that: “it does not greatly signify, in explaining it, whether 
we start from the idea of covering over or from that of wiping out: in either case, the idea 
which the metaphor is intended to convey is that of rendering null and inoperative.”64 
Having in mind the variety of usages of ר פֶּ  in the biblical text, scholars tend to כִּ
agree that there is no English word that encompasses all of them.65 Biblical usages of ִּכֶּפר 
in the ritual texts and non-ritual texts indicate that some sort of obstacle has been 
removed from the offerer or relationship between the two parties.66 Gane affirmed 
Driver’s claims that ר פֶּ  is a part of the atonement process, but does not express כִּ
atonement in its entirety. The sequence of activities related to sin and reparation offerings   
 
the kuppuru/kippēr relationship to the largely analogous case of Akkadian salāḫu (“sprinkle”) and Hebrew 
sālaḥ (“forgive”). Feder, “On kuppuru, kippēr and Etymological Sins,” 537–38, 535. 
62Gane, Cult and Character, 193. 
63Gane, Cult and Character, 193–94. 
64S. R. Driver, “Propitiation,” DBDL 4:128. 
65Driver, “Propitiation,” DBDL 4:131; Hills, “A Semantic and Conceptual Study,” 287–91; David 
P. Wright, “Day of Atonement,” ABD 2:72–73; Gane, Cult and Character, 194. 
66Gane, Cult and Character, 194–95. 
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confirms this, since the priest performs ר פֶּ  which is followed by forgiveness granted by כִּ
God (Lev 4:20, 26, 31, 35; 5:16, 18, 26. Accordingly, ר פֶּ  must precede atonement and כִּ
has something to do with the obstacle in the divine-human relationship.67 ר פֶּ  is a כִּ
prerequisite for forgiveness.68 However, God is the one who grants forgiveness, not the 
rite itself.69 Finally, Gane correctly stated that “the nature of the כפר in a given sacrifice 
depends, of course, upon the goal of that ritual.70 
 
ר  פֶּ  Yitzhaq Feder :כִּ
Feder elaborated even more on the point already noted by Gane that the Akkadian 
kuppuru conveys a concrete use versus purely abstract meaning of the Hebrew ר פֶּ  He .כִּ
stated: “The Akkadian uses of kuppuru refer specifically to the physical act of purifying 
by means of wiping a person or object with a purificatory substance. Occasionally, this 
verb can be used to refer to the rite as a whole, but it is never used as a general term 
meaning ‘to purify.’71 The Hebrew ר פֶּ  occurs in the formulas that refer to the overall כִּ
function of a ritual, instead of to any specific physical act (e.g. Lev. 4:20, 26, 31, 35; 5:6, 
10). In addition, the majority of cultic uses of ר פֶּ    are related to sin offering contexts כִּ
 
67Gane, Cult and Character, 194. 
68Levine, Leviticus, 23; Averbeck, “כפר,” NIDOTTE 2:683; Gane, Cult and Character, 50, 80, 
82–83, 92, 100, 150, 154, 162, 194, 196, 204. 
69Levine, In the Presence of the Lord, 65–66; Levine, Leviticus, 23–24; Gane, Cult and Character, 
51–2. 
70Gane, Cult and Character, 65.  
71Feder, “On kuppuru, kippēr and Etymological Sins,” 538. 
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where the central act is the daubing and sprinkling of blood. However, this ritual is fairly 
different from the rubbing rites described by the Akkadian term. That the Hebrew ר פֶּ  is כִּ
best understood as referring to the abstract effect of the ritual is reinforced by the vast 
majority of cultic and non-cultic uses of the ר פֶּ ר ,nominal derivative כִּ  as well as ,ֹכפֶּ
verbal uses.72 Feder concluded: “Thus, the non-cultic and cultic sources are in accord that 
kippēr refers to the abstract effects of a person’s actions (‘to appease,’ ‘to expiate’), not a 
concrete action such as that described by kuppuru (‘to rub, wipe’).”73 He correctly stated 
that none of the ר פֶּ  occurrences carry concrete sense “to wipe.”74 כִּ
Feder also pointed to the fact that scholars never proposed that the meaning of the 
Hebrew ָסַלח should be informed by the Akkadian salāhu̮. This is peculiar since salāhu̮ is 
frequently used in ritual texts to refer to aspersions with water or other liquids, usually for 
the purpose of purification and the notion that ritual cleansing provides compellingly 
enough ground for the proposal that this term is a “concrete etymological predecessor to 
the Heb. term’s sense ‘to forgive,’ deriving perhaps from the notion that the person is 
thereby cleansed of guilt.”75 It is exactly in these contexts that the Hebrew ָסַלח appears 
(Lev 4:26, 31, 35; 5:10, 13, 16, 18, 26). This is never proposed since the Hebrew ָסַלח in 
 
72“In non-cultic sources, one finds כפר derivatives in reference to placating anger (e.g. Gen 32:21; 
Exod 32:30; Num 25:13; Prov 16:14) or expiation of sin (e.g. 2 Sam 3:14; Isa 6:7). A distinct subgroup of 
the latter category pertains to the expiation of blood-guilt (e.g. Exod 21:30; Num 35:33; Deut 32:43). Since 
the two basic contexts which govern these various forms are 1) appeasement of anger, and 2) compensation 
for guilt, one can hardly ignore the semantic continuity which connects these forms with cultic kippēr.” 
Feder, “On kuppuru, kippēr and Etymological Sins,” 538. 
73Feder, “On kuppuru, kippēr and Etymological Sins,” 538. 
74Feder, “On kuppuru, kippēr and Etymological Sins,” 539. 
75Feder, “On kuppuru, kippēr and Etymological Sins,” 543. 
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both cultic and non-cultic contexts always refer to the abstract sense “to forgive.” Very 
often it follows the ר פֶּ ר when כִּ פֶּ  is accomplished by the sin offering and it does not כִּ
appear in contexts where ritual impurity is implied.76 Both, Akkadian kuppuru and salāhu̮ 
refer to the concrete, literal, physical cleansing, while Hebrew ר פֶּ  designate ָסַלח and כִּ
abstract effects of the terms whose etymological origin is not definite. 
Feder himself proposed that “it seems clear that the only lexicographically 
prudent approach requires an analysis of kippēr primarily, and perhaps exclusively, on 
the basis of the inner-Biblical evidence.” Feder’s suggestion was anticipated three 
decades ago, since Gorman, in 1990, suggested the same method for a proper 
understanding of ר פֶּ  Once again it is necessary to grant that kipper has a broad range“ :כִּ
of meaning that must be determined in each case by its specific ritual context.”77 This 
seems to become the scholarly consensus after countless attempts to relate ר פֶּ  with כִּ
various ANE cognates. The present study attempts to begin this process by analyzing ר פֶּ  כִּ
contexts in the Pentateuch. Before proceeding to this task, the present study introduces a 
critical element in the ר פֶּ ר process, the states of the כִּ פֶּ  .recipients כִּ
 
Various States of the Creation 
In order to understand properly ר פֶּ  with all its syntactical variations when it כִּ
deals with human beings and inanimate objects, their states needs to be addressed.   
 
76Gane, Cult and Character, 123ff. Also, Feder, “On kuppuru, kippēr and Etymological Sins,” 
543. 
77Gorman, The Ideology of Ritual, 173. 
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Creation, including people, physical objects, and places, is defined by four states. They 
can be holy, profane, pure, and impure, and as such, these states can be viewed as two 
pairs of opposites: holy versus profane, and pure versus impure. Further, even though 
impure is opposite to holy, profane is its antonym. Finally, these states are often 
combined with each other, forming four possible pairs. An entity can be profane and 
pure, profane and impure, holy and pure, but not holy and impure.78 The following 
quotation explains the pairs of state:  
“Profane and pure” is a neutral and basic state since it lacks dynamic elements of 
holiness and impurity. Most laws that talk about becoming holy or impure assume a 
person or object starts with this combined state. Being profane and impure is the 
concern of most of purity legislation. “Holy and pure” is the state of most persons, 
object, and places considered holy. Only the last, ostensibly contradictory pairing of 
holiness and impurity demands attention. While this is not an expected or desired 
state, it is legitimate, even demanded, in case of purgation offerings.79 
 
It has to be emphasized that the holy and impure state appears in a very limited 
way. Namely, it is the priesthood, sanctuary, and sin offering that can encompass both of 
these mutually exclusive states. 
 
Duality of Human Nature 
The Creation account separates humanity from the rest of creation. The two 
Hebrew nouns that define human nature as God created them, מּות לֶּם and ּד   point to two ,צֶּ
basic aspects of human nature. Regardless of the semantic overlaps between them, לֶּם  צֶּ
emphasizes concrete, while מּות    stresses the abstract aspect of human beings. The ּד 
 
78David P. Wright, “Holiness (OT),” ABD 3:246. 
79Wright, “Holiness (OT),” ABD 3:247. 
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former aspect includes the outward, physical, while the latter emphasizes the inward, 
moral, spiritual, mental resemblance between human beings and God, which establishes 
the duality80 of human beings as perceived by the OT. However, the use of these two 
nouns in the Creation account suggests that the human being as a whole, including these 
two components, is created in God’s image.81 This duality of human beings is an 
important observation in light of the fact that human impurity in the OT corresponds to it. 
That is, ritual impurity, as one aspect of GHS, finds its expression in the outward, 
physical component of human nature, while moral impurity, as another aspect of GHS, 
finds its expression in the inward, moral, spiritual element of human nature. 
 
Human Sinfulness 
Besides these four basic states, human beings exclusively experience additional 
state of sinfulness.82 Scholars use various phrases such as “universal sinfulness of the 
human race,”83 “basic sinfulness,”84 “the rebellious disposition of humanity”85 “common 
 
80Duality does not refer to dualism, as the well-known term that refers to the belief that human 
beings consist of two separate entities: material and mortal body and immaterial immortal soul. It is based 
on the premise that “there are two irreducible, substances in the universe (i.e., matter vs. nonmatter; body 
vs. soul).” The beginning of such a perception of reality is credited to “Plato’s doctrine of the sensible and 
the intelligible worlds, which the Hellenistic Jewish exegete Philo of Alexandria adopted.” Bennie R. 
Crockett Jr., “Dualism,” EDB 358. See also Aecio E. Cairus, “The Doctrine of Man,” in HSDAT, ed. Raoul 
Dederen, CRS 12 (Hagerstown, MD: Review & Herald, 2000), 212–13, 223–26. 
81Richard M. Davidson, “The Nature of Human Beings from the Beginning: Genesis 1–11,” in 
“What are Human Beings that You Remember Them:” Proceedings of the Third International Bible 
Conference NOF Ginosar and Jerusalem June 11–12, 2012, ed. Clinton Wahlen (Silver Spring, MD: 
Review and Herald, 2015), 18. See also Cairus, “The Doctrine of Man,” 212–13. 
82Kurtz, Offerings, 422. 
83Kurtz, Offerings, 134. 
84Hartley, Leviticus, 18, 24. 
85Leigh M. Trevaskis, Holiness, Ethics and Ritual in Leviticus, HBM 29 (Sheffield: Sheffield 
Phoenix Press, 2011), 206. 
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human sinfulness,”86 and “general sinfulness”87 to refer to it. Kurtz coined an eloquent 
term for it: “the sinful habitus, which is inherent in human nature generally.”88  
The OT proposes that “things began as perfect from God’s hand and then grew 
steadily worse through man’s sinfulness.”89 The understanding of GHS was a commonly 
shared concept by other ANE cultures.90 
The following lines from Sumerian religious texts demonstrate this claim. “Never 
has a sinless child been born to its mother, . . . a sinless workman has not existed from of 
old” (ANET, 590, lines 102–3).” An Akkadian incantation for pacifying an angry deity 
uses similar reasoning: “Who is there who has not sinned against his god? Who that has 
kept the commandment for ever? All humans who exist are sinful.”91 
Cover noted that “rhetorical questions of this sort were popular forms of 
expression for this universally acknowledged dogma, reminding the gods that they should 
not expect too much.” Some of them follow: “Mankind, as many as there are, Which one 
of them comprehends his faults? Who has not transgressed, and who has not committed 
sin? Which one understands the way of the god?”92 “Whoever was there so on his guard 
 
86Maass, “טהר,” TLOT 3:485. 
87Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 46; Kurtz, Offerings, 36; Mathews, Genesis 1–11:26, 164; 
Wenham, The Book of Leviticus, 63, 95, 148–49. 
88Kurtz, Offerings, 205. 
89Thorkild Jacobsen, “The Eridu Genesis,” JBL 100 (1981): 529. Followed by G. J. Wenham, 
“Cain and Seth,” NIDOTTE 4:454. 
90W. G. Lambert, “DINGIR.ŠÀ.DIB.BA Incantations,” JNES 33.3 (1974): 305. 
91Lambert, “DINGIR.ŠÀ.DIB.BA Incantations,” 281–83, lines 132–43; Marie Joseph Seux, 
Hymnes et Prières aux Dieux de Babylonie et d’Assyrie, LAPO 8 (Paris: Le Cerf, 1976), 207, lines 12–14. 
92Erich Ebeling, Die Akkadische Gebetsserie “Handerhebung,” DAWBIO 20 (Berlin: Akademie-
Verlag, 1953), 72–73, lines 8–11; Seux, Hymnes et Prières aux Dieux de Babylonie et d’Assyrie, 170. 
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that he did not sin? Whoever was so careful that he did not incur guilt?”93 “Where is the 
wise person who has not transgressed and [committed] an abomination? Where is he who 
has checked himself and thus not ba[ckslid]?”94 Egypt literature also reflects the same 
concept: “Say not:’ I have no wrongdoing.’”95 
The OT abounds with statements that show a similar attitude about human 
nature.96 Biblical scholars of various genres of biblical literature recognized and 
confirmed the concept of general sinfulness of human nature.97 David Daube proposed 
that BL is formed with GHS in the background. This does not mean that BL condones sin 
in any form, but is aware that it deals with “fallible people.”98 This concept is also 
 
93W. G. Lambert, “Three Literary Prayers of the Babylonians,” AfO 19 (1959–1960): 57, lines 
105–6; Seux, Hymnes et Prières aux Dieux de Babylonie et d’Assyrie, 176. 
94Stephen Langdon, Babylonian Penitential Psalms to Which are Added Fragments of the Epic of 
Creation from Kish in the Weld Collection of the Ashmolean Museum OECT 6 (Paris: Geuthner, 1927), 23, 
lines 15–18. 
95John H. Walton, Victor H. Matthews, and Mark W. Chavalas, “Psalms,” in IVPBBCOT 
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2000), 532. 
96Cover, “Sin, Sinners,” ABD 6:33. 
97Anthony Tomasino, “ ָיַחם,” NIDOTTE 2:429; A. H Konkel, “ָיַצר,” NIDOTTE 2:499; Eugene H. 
Merrill, “ָאַלף,” NIDOTTE 1:409; Anthony Oliver, “ָאַבל,” NIDOTTE 1:244; Christopher J. H. Wright, 
ץ“ רֶּ  ”,NIDOTTE 1:513; John N. Oswalt, “Rest,” NIDOTTE 4:1129; Elmer A. Martens, “Numbers ”,אֶּ
NIDOTTE 4:986; Hill, “ָׁשַגג,” NIDOTTE 4:42; Robert B. Chisholm, “ָבַׂשר,” NIDOTTE 1:976; Stephen M. 
Hooks, “יֹוֵצר,” NIDOTTE 2:423; Terence E. Fretheim, “ ַדעיָ  ,” NIDOTTE 2:404; Nobuyoshi Kiuchi, “ֵביָצה,” 
NIDOTTE 1:643; Cleon L. Rogers, Jr., “ן טֶּ  ;TLOT 1:57 ”,אוה“ ,NIDOTTE 1:640; E. Gerstenberger ”,בֶּ
Maass, “טהר,” TLOT 3:485; G. Gerleman, “ ָבָׂשר,” TLOT 1:285; Kurtz, Offerings, 416; Gordon J. Wenham, 
“Genesis,” in New Bible Commentary: 21st Century Edition, eds. G. J. Wenham, et al. (Downers Grove, 
IL: Inter-Varsity, 1994), 44; Walter C. Kaiser, “Exodus,” in The Expositor’s Bible Commentary: Genesis–
Numbers, vol. 2 of The Expositor’s Bible Commentary: With the New International Version of the Holy 
Bible, ed. Frank E. Gaebelein (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1990), 333–560; Keil and Delitzsch, The 
Pentateuch, 2:283, 302–3, 339; Keil and Delitzsch, The Pentateuch, 3:115–16, 431. 
98“By concessions to sinfulness we do not mean exhortations that one should forgive and help the 
transgressor, as God forgives and helps him. Such exhortations are in no way intended to legalize sin. Nor 
do we mean the mere fact that in Judaism, as everywhere, law proper is not co-existensive with morality or 
whatever ideal order may prevail. Certainly all codes, including the Jewish, since they deal with fallible 




extensively debated outside of biblical studies.99 Reflecting on biblical ritual and purity 
laws, Childs stated: 
At the heart of the biblical laws lies a profound sense of human sinfulness as a 
powerful destructive force which calls forth forms of institutional protection in an 
effort to check its power. Although the concept of sin in the Old Testament at times 
seems almost mechanical, when viewed as a whole, sin remains basically an offence 
against the God of the covenant.100 
 
Gen 1–11 contains the account of the human fall (Gen 3:1–8),101 understood to be 
the introduction of sin into the perfect world. Even though no term for sin is mentioned in 
the Fall account of Gen 3, this text is the best representation of what sin is.102 Cover 
stated: “Sin ruptured the relationship between the creator and the creature, and set in 
motion a series of consequences which, if unchecked, would eventuate in the ‘death’ of 
the individual sinner.”103 A multitude of expressions of human sinfulness, that is, sins by 
 
example, impose the death-penalty for each and every kind of fraud or oppression. But we would not in 
general, because a lawgiver remains within these limitations, speak of a deliberate giving in to sin. For that, 
the lawgiver has to be aware of, even concerned about, the shortcomings of his code. What we mean, then, 
is conscious building into the law, the full recognition by the lawgiver, in spheres where in principle he 
would want to enforce the ideal order, of institutions or practices in conflict with it—the kind of thing Jesus 
declared to have happened in the case of divorce, tolerated by Moses ‘for the hardness of your heart.’” 
David Daube, “Concessions to Sinfulness in Jewish Law,” JJS 10 (1959): 1. 
99Marc A. Clauson, “Human Nature and the Christian,” GFP (2015): 7–21, esp. 8–9. 
100Childs, Old Testament Theology, 87. A similar understanding was suggested by Phyllis A. Bird: 
“Canonically, the understanding of human nature expressed or implied in the laws, wisdom literature, 
narratives, prophetic texts, and other genres of the Hebrew Scriptures may be viewed as commentary on the 
creation texts… The Bible’s first statement concerning humankind remains the normative statement that 
governs all others.” Phyllis A. Bird, “‘Bone of My Bone and Flesh of My Flesh,’” ThTo 50 (1994): 525, 
527. 
101Eugene H. Merrill, “Fall of Humankind,” NIDOTTE 4:637; Wright, “Unclean and Clean,” 
6:739; Ringgren, Israelite Religion, 109–11; Jiri Moskala, “Origin of Sin and Salvation according to 
Genesis 3: A Theology of Sin,” in Salvation: Contours of Adventist Soteriology, eds. Martin F. Hanna, 
Darius W. Jankiewicz, and John W. Reeve (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University Press, 2018), 120. 
102Moskala, “Origin of Sin and Salvation,” 122. 
103Cover, “Sin, Sinners,” ABD 6:38. 
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humanity, further caused God’s judgment.104 First, the couple was expelled from the 
garden of Eden because of their sin.105 R. Van de Walle captured the progression of evil: 
“Sin increased and evil action multiplied during primeval history: Cain murdered his 
brother, the sons of god fornicated with the daughters of man, the hubris of those who, 
built the Tower of Babel is a collective transgression parallel to the eating of the fruit and 
followed by a parallel lasting punishment, i.e. the confusion of tongues.”106 
Later almost all of creation was destroyed, and God granted Noah and his family 
a new beginning (Gen 6:5–7). However, the statement in Gen 8:21 witnesses that the 
catastrophic event did not alter the fundamental human problem, that is, the intrinsic 
sinfulness of humanity.107 
The OT texts by some extent define the concept of GHS. First, it affects all 
human beings (Gen 8:21; Prov 20:9; Eccl 7:20, 29).108 Second, it is inherited and a 
permanent, life-long condition (Ps 51:7 [51:5]; 58:4 [58:3]; Isa 48:8; Job 15:14; 25:4; 
14:1, 4; Isa 6:1–7).109 Three, it includes the inclination or determination of human mind 
 
104Davidson, “The Nature of Human Beings,” 28–29. 
105Wright, “Unclean and Clean,” 6:739. 
106René Van de Walle, “The Sin in the Garden and Sinfulness of the World,” IJT 18 (1969): 140. 
107Cover, “Sin, Sinners,” ABD 6:33; Wenham, New Bible Commentary, 56, 65; Wenham, 
Numbers, 18. 
108Kurtz, Offerings, 134; Niels-Erik A. Andreasen, “Death: Origin, Nature, and Final Eradication,” 
in HSDAT, ed. Raoul Dederen, CRS 12 (Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald, 2000), 321–22; Richard G. 
Swinburne, “Original Sinfulness,” NZSTR 27 (1985): 249–50. 
109Tomasino, “ָיַחם,” NIDOTTE 2:429; Cover, “Sin, Sinners,” ABD 6:33; Moskala, “Origin of Sin 




towards sin (Gen 6:4; 8:21; Deut 31:21).110 Four, it involves the experience of 
death/mortality (Gen 2:16–17; 3:14–19, 22–23).111 
David R. Blumenthal provided a convenient definition: “Sinfulness is a very deep 
dimension of human existence and dealing with it calls upon all our spiritual, intellectual, 
emotional, and moral resources—even when we recognize that ceasing to sin is the base 
line of repentance.”112 
Several events in the Pentateuch show that the consciousness of GHS caused 
God’s people or individuals not to approach God and have direct communication with 
 
110Konkel, “ ָיַצר,” NIDOTTE 2:499; Davidson, “The Nature of Human Beings,” 38. 
111Scholars’ opinions on when death became reality for humanity are opposed. A number of them 
think that it entered creation following the sin of the first couple. Kurtz, Offerings, 134; Keil and Delitzsch, 
The Pentateuch, 1:105; Wenham, The Book of Leviticus, 90; “Genesis,” in SDABC, ed. Francis D. Nichol, 
CRS 1 (Washington, DC: Review and Herald, 1976), 225; Wright, “Unclean and Clean,” 6:739; Gerleman, 
 :TLOT 1:285; John M. Fowler, “Sin,” in HSDAT, ed. Raoul Dederen, CRS 12 (Hagerstown, MD ”,ָבָׂשר“
Review and Herald, 2000), 253; Cairus, “The Doctrine of Man,” 206. For the basic arguments that God did 
not intend death to be a part of his creation, but is a punishment for human sin, see Eun-Jung Kim, 
“Reconsidering Eternal Life in the Old Testament: The Idea of Resurrection Rooted in the Torah” (PhD 
diss., The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 2015), 130–34; Cairus, “The Doctrine of Man,” 217; 
Fowler, “Sin,” 253; Andreasen, “Death,” 318; Kent Harold Richards, “Death,” ABD 2:109; Randall W. 
Younker, “A Look at Biblical and Ancient Extra-Biblical Perspectives on Death,” JATS 16 (2005): 31–32. 
Cairus neatly stated: “The Paradise narrative explains the rise of death and affliction in the world through 
man’s disobedience.” Cairus, “The Doctrine of Man,” 206. He also noted multiple ways the OT emphasizes 
that death is the penalty for human sin: “Death as the penalty for sin is emphasized throughout the 
Scriptures. The unrepentant soul ‘person’ will die (Ezek 18:4), will be ‘cut off’ (Ps 37:9, 34) or destroyed 
 same Hebrew term as in Jeremiah 11:19), will perish (Ps 68:2) or ‘be no more’ (Ps 37:10; cf. verse ,ָכַרת)
20).” Cairus, “The Doctrine of Man,” 218. Arguments presented by scholars in this line of reasoning seem 
to be more biblically informed than those of the other group who claim that death was a part of original 
creation. Sarna, Genesis, 18–19; Lloyd R. Bailey, Biblical Perspectives on Death (Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1979), 4, 109; Bernard L. Ramm, The Christian View of Science and Scripture, 1st ed. (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1954), 233; Karl Rahner, On the Theology of Death (New York: Seabury Press, 
1973), 34; John Goldingay, Old Testament Theology: Israel’s Gospel, Old Testament Theology, 3 vols. 
(Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2003), 1:120; Terence E. Fretheim, God and World in the Old 
Testament: A Relational Theology of Creation (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2005), 77. For a further 
exposition of the argument related to the former understanding of death, see Lazarus Castang, “A 
Comparative Analysis of the Origin and Divine Causation of Death in Ancient Near Eastern Literature and 
in the Old Testament” (PhD diss., Andrews University, 2011), 100–29. 




him or to feel fatally endangered in God’s presence (Exod 20:19, Isa 6).113 Thus, a human 
being can potentially embody two conditions that both point to their mortality. First, 
mortality through general sinfulness, and second, as a punishment for a particular sin.114 
The Apocryphal books extensively reflect on GHS in the books of 2 Esd, Wis, 
and Sir taking the OT traditions of the Fall, the Mosaic law, and the moral teachings of 
the prophets as their source materials. According to them sin began in Eden, but is 
attributed variously either to Eve (Sir 25:24), Adam (2 Esd 3:21–22), or Satan (Wis 2:23–
24).115 Later on, Judaism and Christianity, based on the OT texts developed their own 
beliefs about the sinfulness of human nature.116 Christianity, especially, has a long 
tradition of debates on the GHS.117 
 
Sinfulness as Reflected in Human Experience 
Günter Röhser recognized a distinction between the act of sin and the state of sin 
in his Metaphorik und Personifikation der Sünde,118 conveying more precision regarding 
 
113Kurtz, Offerings, 36; Trent C. Butler, Isaiah, HOTC 15 (Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 
2002), 57; John N. Oswalt, The Book of Isaiah: Chapters 1–39, NICOT (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 
1986), 182–83. Judges 13:21 can also be considered as one of the texts. I suggest that the awareness of his 
own sinfulness forms the backdrop for Manoah’s fear of dying after seeing God and the temporary lack of 
sanity expressed in his statement that they would die because of the intense feelings of unworthiness 
characteristic for the context of theophany throughout the OT. 
114Kurtz, Offerings, 134. 
115David G. Clark, “Apocrypha: Theology,” NIDOTTE 4:404. 
116Gerstenberger, “אוה,” TLOT 1:56. 
117Darius W. Jankiewicz, “Sin and Human Nature: Historical Background,” in Salvation: Contours 
of Adventist Soteriology, eds. Martin F. Hanna, Darius W. Jankiewicz, and John W. Reeve (Berrien 
Springs, MI: Andrews University Press, 2018), 91–118. 
118Günter Röhser, Metaphorik und Personifikation der Sünde: Antike Sündenvorstellungen und 
Paulinische Hamartia, WUNT II/25 (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1987), 73. Followed by Glen S. Martin, 
Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, HOTC 2 (Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 2002), 243. 
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the different the stages of the human experience of sin. On one the hand, the activity of 
sinning can be both a conscious and responsible act of human free will and choice;119 on 
the other hand, it can be unconscious or unintentional.120 The state of sin can further be 
understood in two different ways: (1) the state of having sinned, and (2) the human 
inclination to commit sin.121 The former is also referred to as guilt. While the state of 
having sinned is a specific one in the sense that it is a result of a particular sin being 
committed, the human inclination to commit sin, along with other characteristics of GHS, 
is ever present in human experience as it was shown above. 
 
Burnt Offering: A Solution for General Human Sinfulness 
As such, human sinfulness needs to be addressed in the divine-human 
relationship. Any form of it, the act or the state of sin, represents an obstacle in divine-
human relationship. The offering fitting to overbridge GHS, the ever-present inclination 
to commit sin, and other characteristics of GHS in a divine-human relationship is burnt 
offering. Kurtz identified clear textual support for the difference between burnt and sin 
offering: “Sinfulness tied to burnt and well-being offerings. Also, sin offering does not 
deal with this since the sin is specifically mentioned.”122 The development of the burnt 
offering constructed from biblical texts confirms this role of the burnt offering. 
Its antiquity is well established by biblical texts (e.g., Gen 8:20; 22:2, 7, 8, 13;  
  
 
119Eichrodt, Theology of the Old Testament, 2:383. 
120Cover, “Sin, Sinners,” ABD 6:35. 
121Lam, “Metaphorical Patterning,” 107. 
122Kurtz, Offerings, 177. 
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Exod 10:25; 18:12; Num 23:15; Judg 6:26; 13:16; 1 Sam 7:9; 1 Kgs 18:38; 2 Kgs 3:27; 
10:24; Job 1:5; 42:8).123 The burnt offering is considered to encompass initially the 
purposes of expiation and propitiation.124 This function is retained to some extent after 
the coming of the entire sacrificial system (Lev 9:7; 14:15, 17: 16:24). However, the 
regulation of the cult assigned specialized expiation to the sin and reparation offerings.125 
They were introduced to mend the divine-human relationship when the human party 
interrupted that relationship by committing certain kinds of sins. The burnt offering may 
have retained the function of entreating God and included a wide range of motives such 
as homage, thanksgiving, appeasement, and expiation, as the OT narratives recount.126 
Schwartz’s comment on the motives standing behind the offering of the burnt offering is 
even more specific: “They [gift offerings, Lev 1–3] could be made at will—in fulfillment 
of vows, at private visits to the sanctuary, in supplication in times of distress, in gratitude 
for deliverance from danger or harm, or simply in a spontaneous urge to pay homage to 
God.”127 Wenham summed up all these motives in the following way: “In these phrases 
the general aim of the sacrifice is indicated. It is that the offerer may be accepted (rātsāh) 
by God. Peace with God is the goal of sacrifice.”128 
 
123Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 143. For additional pieces of evidence for the antiquity of the burnt 
offering, see the same source. 
124Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 144. 
125Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 144; Gary A. Anderson, “Sacrifice and Sacrificial Offerings,” ABD 
5:880–81. 
126Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 144. 
127Schwartz, “Leviticus,” (JSB), 196. 
128Wenham, The Book of Leviticus, 54. Emphasis mine. 
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The introduction of the cult assumed specific directions for the burnt offering to 
be offered in the morning as the first and in the evening as the last offering of the day 
(Exod 29:38–42; Num 28:3–8). Exodus 29:42 states that the burnt offering was to be 
offered continually (tāmı̄d) and as such, it symbolized the deity’s presence among and in 
relationship with the covenant people.129 It was included in many festivals and special 
days (the New Moon, each day of the Feast of Passover, the Feast of Weeks, the Feast of 
Booths, the Day of Atonement).130 The phrase, “burnt offerings and peace offerings,” is 
used as a merism to represent the entire sacrificial system.131 Hartley stated that “the 
frequent presentation of whole offerings enabled the covenant community, despite the 
human proneness to sin, to maintain fellowship with the holy God.”132 
I agree with Hartley and Klingbeil that the burnt offering specifically retained the 
purpose of atoning GHS which would enable the offerer to worship in God’s presence 
regardless of the unfavorable state of his/her general sinfulness. Kurtz also stated that 
“burnt offering atones for sinfulness, while sin and guilt offering atone for particular 
sin.133 In this way, it serves constantly to provide reconciliation between God and sinful 
human beings.134 Some rabbinic sources seem to be in accord with the claim that the 
purpose of the burnt offering, among others, was to deal with sinful thoughts,135 that is, 
 
129Anderson, “Sacrifice,” 5:878. 
130Hartley, Leviticus, 17–18. 
131Anderson, “Sacrifice,” 5:878. 
132Hartley, Leviticus, 88. 
133Kurtz, Offerings, 352. 
134Hartley, Leviticus, 88–89. 
135Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 175, 858. 
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the ever-present inclination to commit sin. 
 
Neglect of GHS in Scholarly Works on Atonement 
Leading scholars of ancient Israel’s cult and particularly, of the book of Leviticus 
did not include the concept of GHS in their understanding of atonement. When they 
infrequently used the noun “sinfulness,” they referred to the state of sin after a sin had 
been committed. 
In his monumental three-volume commentary on Leviticus of more than 2700 
pages, Milgrom rarely used the noun “sinfulness”136 or the adjective “sinful.”137 When he 
did, it was a reference to the state of an individual or humanity who had committed sin or 
a sin as an act. He never used these terms to refer to a state of human sinful nature as 
described above. There is one reference that most likely is an exception, where, he 
possibly referred to human sinful nature.138 Milgrom never considered human sinful 
nature in his understanding of atonement, and that seems to be a lapse in his 
hermeneutics, bearing in mind that atonement of human beings is one of the key topics in 
the book of Leviticus. 
Wright advanced the concept of human sinfulness to some extent in his Anchor 
 
136Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 177, 705. 
137Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27, 2015, 2178, 2275, 2307, 2341, 2459; Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 
1372, 1490, 1498, 1577, 1633, 1649, 1676; Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 175, 317, 342, 357, 662, 705, 711, 
858, 868, 1005. 
138Commenting on the element of demonic in the OT, he seems to be making a claim that impurity 
consists of moral mistakes humans make, but are also caused by human physical weakness. He does not use 
the term sinfulness, but infirmity, as the following quotation shows: “To be sure, the demons disappeared 
from the official religion, but not the demonic—it continued in man. Impurity was now given an added 
component: moral failing as well as physical infirmity.” Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 766. Milgrom’s use of 
the term “physical infirmity” is limited to menstrual infirmity only in the second and third volumes of his 
Bible Anchor Commentary on Leviticus. 
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Bible Dictionary article “Unclean, Clean.”139 His basic understanding of human 
sinfulness seems to be contradictory. Basically, in his interpretation of Gen 2–3, 
becoming sinful is a desirable condition for humans. He called it “growing-up:”  
Before eating the woman and man are like children: without wisdom or knowledge, 
sexually immature, unashamed of nakedness, immortal (i.e., as children who are not 
entirely cognizant of their mortality), and not responsible for or aware of sin. After 
eating the couple becomes wise and knowledgeable, sexually mature (in the J story 
only after the eating does the subject of reproduction come up, 3:16, and naming the 
woman Eve “life,” the “mother of all the living” occur, v 20), ashamed of their 
nakedness, mortal, and sinful. This suggests that the latent reason for the pair’s 
expulsion from the garden is their acquisition of a mature, mortal, human nature.140 
 
Eating forbidden fruit slightly changed human condition, causing women’s 
pregnancy to be painful and men’s agricultural activity to be more difficult.141 The major 
and key difference in the human condition that eating from the Tree of Knowledge of 
good and evil brought was the separation between humans and animals due to a newly 
acquired divine knowledge, wisdom, discernment after they ate from it.142 Since God did 
not want humans to possess this knowledge, he banished them from the Garden of 
Eden.143 This explains why the concept of human sinfulness is totally absent in his other 
works dealing with ר פֶּ  or portions dealing with it144 that one would certainly expect to כִּ
 
139Wright, “Unclean and Clean,” 6:729–41.  
140Wright, “Unclean and Clean,” 6:739. 
141David P. Wright, “Holiness, Sex, and Death in the Garden of Eden,” Bib 77 (1996): 315; David 
P. Wright, “Sex and Death in the Garden of Eden,” Sunstone (1998): 34. 
142Wright, “Holiness, Sex, and Death,” 319–20; Wright, “Sex and Death,” 35. 
143Wright, “Holiness, Sex, and Death,” 319–20; Wright, “Sex and Death,” 36. 
144The following works never include the noun “sinfulness” nor the adjective “sinful.” David P. 
Wright, “Purification from Corpse-Contamination in Numbers XXXI 19–24,” VT 35 (1985), 213–23; 
Wright, “The Gesture of Hand Placement”; David P. Wright, “The Hermeneutics of Ritual Innovation: 
Hand Placement in Leviticus 24” (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Biblical Law of the SBL, 
Atlanta, GA, 23 November 2015); Wright, The Disposal of Impurity. 
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be taken into consideration. In his interpretation of the Fall in Gen 2–3, the human 
condition was not degraded, but on the contrary, had progressed.145 
Even though Schwartz’s area of expertise is wide, some of his work related to 
atonement presented an influential contribution to the topic. However, he did not use the 
noun “sinfulness” in his works related to the topic of atonement.146 Gane also 
infrequently used the noun “sinfulness”147 or the adjective “sinful”148 in his Cult and 
Character. Uses of both words do not refer to the state of GHS, but always to a state of 
committing a sin. 
Gane’s detailed analysis of human nature in Leviticus portrays it in a series of 
disparities—alive vs. dead, holy vs. common, pure vs. impure, and male vs. female. His 
introductory remarks on human nature resonate with the understanding of human nature 
offered in the present study. That is, humans are mortal, not inherently holy, and prone to 
commit moral faults. This is in contrast to God who is eternal, holy, pure, and just. 
Realization of this fundamental difference between God and humans is important in the 
context of “the protection and positive growth relationship between the radically different 
 
145For a contrasting view on the degrading condition of humanity after eating of the forbidden fruit 
related to nudity, see Akua Darkoa Frimpong, “Purity and Impurity: Menstruation and Its Impact on the 
Role of Akan Women in the Church” (PhD diss., Vrije Universiteit, 2011), 98–99. Also on the basic debate 
of menstruation potentially being a result of eating forbidden fruit, see Frimpong, “Purity and Impurity,” 
115–18. For the arguments for menstruation being a result of the curse from the creation account, 
especially Gen 3:16, see Janice Delaney, Mary Jane Lupton, and Emily Toth, The Curse: A Cultural 
History of Menstruation, rev. ed. (Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 37. 
146Schwartz, “Leviticus,” (JSB); Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin.” 
147Gane, Cult and Character, 50, 142, 316. 
148Gane, Cult and Character, 150 (2x), 154, 239, 297, 336, 352. 
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divine and human party.”149 He published this study a full decade after publishing his 
Cult and Character, which might be reflected in the exclusion of this aspect of human 
nature from his understanding of the atonement. Certainly, if the human being, defined as 
such, wants to approach God, some sort of mediation is needed, even if no particular sin 
is committed by the human party. Gane’s atonement articulated in his Cult and Character 
does not address this element of GHS. In Gane’s understanding of atonement, at least as 
expressed in his Cult and Character, human beings are in need of atonement only when 
they commit sin or contract defilement. Gane did not show much concern for a 
disadvantage of GHS as being constant impediment on human part in divine-human 
interactions aside from being represented in the states of ritual or moral impurity. 
“Physical ritual impurities, on the other hand, are generated by an existing human state of 
mortality that must be kept separate from Yhwh.”150 It is not certain if Gane's 
understanding of mortality is the same concept as GHS as described in the present study. 
In his article, “Sin and Impurity: Atoned or Purified? Yes,” Sklar never used the 
terms sinfulness and used the adjective “sinful” only once to refer to moral impurity.151 
The foundation for this article is his dissertation, and in it, Sklar dealt extensively with 
ritual and moral impurity, but never discussed nor defined the concept of human 
sinfulness.  
 
149Roy E. Gane, “The Nature of the Human Being in Leviticus,” in “What are Human Beings that 
You Remember Them?” Proceedings of the Third International Bible Conference NOF Ginosar and 
Jerusalem June 11–21, 2012, ed. Clinton Wahlen (Silver Spring, MD: Review and Herald, 2015), 43. 
150Gane, Cult and Character, 201. 
151Sklar, “Sin and Impurity,” 27. He did not include this concept in Jay Sklar, “Sin and 




Both of these points regarding the state of creation, the four basic states of 
creation, and the additional state of sinfulness associated with creation, particularly of 
human beings, are important for a proper understanding of ר פֶּ  since various physical ,כִּ
objects and particularly human beings, are frequently recipients of ר פֶּ  .in the Pentateuch כִּ
These states define human beings, and physical entities thus need to be considered in the 
process of developing the understanding of ר פֶּ  .in the Pentateuch כִּ
The concept of human sinfulness underlines both conditions related to the human 
experience of sin, the act, and the state. Human sinfulness is a permanent condition of all 
human beings which needs to be addressed in any study of divine-human interaction. 
While major scholars of ancient Israel cult devoted adequate attention to the four 
states of creation when they researched ר פֶּ  ,in the OT, human sinfulness, remarkably כִּ
was totally ignored. This concept did not seem to have an impact in the process of their 
formation of the ר פֶּ  .כִּ
Having established the neglect of the concept of GHS in the works of major 
scholars of the Ancient Israel cult and the states applicable to human beings and other 
physical entities, the present study proceeds to the study of the ר פֶּ  .כִּ
 
The Meaning of ר פֶּ  in the Pentateuch כִּ
The frequent use of the verb ר פֶּ  in the Pentateuch provides solid grounds for כִּ
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gathering insights to form the meaning/s this verb conveys.152 Inferences from cognate 
languages or etymological considerations are not conclusive.153 For this reason, the 
current study proceeds to suggest the meaning of ר פֶּ  based on its uses in the Pentateuch כִּ
and pointers found in the relevant contexts. 
The present study of ר פֶּ  takes three critical steps in order to form the proper כִּ
understanding of this verb. First, the uses of internal syntactical structure ִּכֶּפר contexts 
demonstrate that the verb is used with the direct object or without any object, and with 
the indirect object (with the preposition  ַדַבע , with the preposition ַעל, and others). The 
analysis of these contexts is conducted in the same order in the present study. Second, 
since the application of blood is frequently used in ר פֶּ  contexts, the analysis includes כִּ
examination of (1) the origin of blood in a given context, which reveals (2) the type of 
offering the blood was obtained from, that further disclosed (3) who the offerer was,154 
(4) the reason for offering, and (5) the location the blood was applied to. These elements 
are often absent in non-cultic contexts and therefore, are not included in the analysis. In 
other words, ר פֶּ  in non-cultic contexts is often achieved without some or all the כִּ
 
152The verb is used 78 times in the Pentateuch 74 times of which in piel, 2 times in pual, 1 time 
each in qal and hithpael. Personal search, Concordance. By addressing various weaknesses of studying 
Hebrew ר פֶּ פֶּ  against Akkadina kuppuru, Feder also suggested studying כִּ רכִּ  within the biblical corpus. 
Feder, “On kuppuru, kippēr and Etymological Sins,” 544. 
153Averbeck, “ר פֶּ  NIDOTTE 2:688; Emile Nicole, “Atonement in the Pentateuch,” in The Glory ”,כִּ
of the Atonement: Biblical, Historical & Practical Perspectives: Essays in Honor of Roger R. Nicole, eds. 
Charles E. Hill and Frank A. James III (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2004), 47. 
154The sacrificial process is comprised of two parts. In the initial part, the offerer is a person who 
owns, brings, lays his hand on, and slaughters, if animal, a sacrifice. The second part of sacrificial process 
begins after the sacrifice is handed to an officiating priest or, in the case of the animal, is slaughtered. From 
this point on the owner of the animal is not involved in the sacrificial process, but the entire process 
through to its end, is solely the responsibility of the officiating priest. 
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elements listed in the second step. Third, the analysis focuses on identifying certain 
Hebrew verbs in ר פֶּ  contexts that, besides this verb, contribute to or convey the meaning כִּ
of a given ritual. Some texts, mostly non-ritual texts, will not contain data to answer these 
questions raised in steps two and three. Before proceeding with the ר פֶּ  contexts, I first כִּ
analyze Lev 17:11 to test whether this text can be taken as a foundational text for the 
meaning of blood application by which ר פֶּ  .is achieved כִּ
 
Analysis of Leviticus 17:11: The Role of Blood and  ר פֶּ  כִּ
Leviticus 17:11 is one of the critical texts that sheds light on the role of blood in 
the sacrificial process by which ר פֶּ  is achieved, and it was extensively debated in the כִּ
history of interpretation. It is enclosed by the two prohibitions concerning blood 
consumption in vv. 10 and v. 12 and forms the center of this pericope, Lev 17:10–12, 
providing a rationale for the prohibition.155 Scholars traditionally held that this text is 
unique “in that it explicitly assigns sacrificial blood the function of ransoming human 
life,”156 including blood obtained from the sin offering.157 Gane noted that some scholars 
maintained that ר פֶּ  .is included or not נֶּפֶּׁש always implies the idea of ransom whether כִּ
He also eloquently challenged this idea with the fact that ransom is not a possible 
 
155Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1469, 1472. 
156Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 304. 
157Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 101; Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 163; Gane, Cult 
and Character, 170–71. 
 
418 
understanding of ר פֶּ  when it is related to inanimate objects or parts of the sanctuary כִּ
(Lev 16:16, 18).158 
Milgrom, however, claimed that blood manipulation in Lev 17:11 is associated 
with the well-being offering only.159 In addition, this text poses a question as to whether 
substitution can be inferred in the sacrificial ritual.160 Due to the critical importance of 
this text for the ר פֶּ  process, the grammatical and theological analysis of the present כִּ
study includes four elements to understand properly the meaning of this text. The proper 
understanding of these four elements is necessary for a sound interpretation of the entire 
text. The first element is the meaning of the ר פֶּ  in this text. The second element is כִּ
related to the type/s of sacrifice by whose blood ר פֶּ  is achieved. The third element is the כִּ
meaning of the second   ב preposition attached to the noun נֶּפֶּׁש by which ר פֶּ  is כִּ
accomplished. The fourth element is examining whether ר פֶּ  includes the concept of כִּ
substitution. 
 
Leviticus 17:11: The Meaning of the  ר פֶּ  כִּ
A consensus exists among scholars regarding the first element. Leading scholars 
of the ancient Israel cult recognized that ר פֶּ  refers to ransom in this text.161 This is כִּ
 
158Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 304. 
159Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1474–75. 
160Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 101. 
161Wenham, The Book of Leviticus, 115; Rodríguez, “Substitution in the Hebrew Cultus,” 244–57; 
Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 106–7; Levine, Leviticus, 115; Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 707–8; Milgrom, 
Leviticus 17–22, 1474; Schwartz, “The Prohibitions,” 17, 55n1; Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 303; Gane, Cult 
and Character, 170. 
 
419 
supported by the use of the phrase ַכֵפר ם ל  ֹׁשֵתיכֶּ ַעל־ַנפ   found in v. 11 which reoccurs only 
two more times (Exod 30:15–16; Num 31:50). Both occurrences of this phrase mean “to 
ransom your lives.” Milgrom noted that this is especially explicit in Exod 30:15–16: 
Moreover, the verb kippēr must be related to the expression found in the same 
pericope kōper napšô ‘a ransom for his life’ (Exod 30:12). The same combination of 
the idiom kōper nepeš and the verb kippēr is found in the law of homicide (Num 
35:31–33). Thus in these two cases, kippēr is a denominative from kōper, whose 
meaning is undisputed: “ransom” (cf. Exod 21:30). Therefore, there exists a strong 
possibility that all texts that assign to kippēr the function of averting God’s wrath 
have kōper in mind: innocent life spared by substituting for it the guilty parties or 
their ransom.162 
 
Sklar has compellingly suggested that the concept of ר  informs the concept of ֹכפֶּ
ר  פֶּ  of (נֶּפֶּׁש) of the offerer is ransomed by means of the life (נֶּפֶּׁש) In this regard the life“ :כִּ
the animal, which is a payment that the offended party (the Lord) has agreed to (and 
indeed, provided), which is less than the penalty the offerer originally expected (viz. their 
own life), and which both rescues the offerer and restores peace to their relationship with 
the Lord.”163 
This definition of ר פֶּ ר is based on Sklar’s extensive research of the term כִּ  That .ֹכפֶּ
is, “Sklar used two steps to define kop̱er. The first step is to search for the meaning by an 
exegetical analysis of the texts where kop̱er is found, and the second is to compare kop̱er 
with other terms in its semantic field.”164 He detected the following pattern in the ר  ֹכפֶּ
 
162Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 707–8. 
163Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 173–74. 
164Janković, “The Rationale,” 101. Sklar labeled the first step the concept-oriented approach 
where he studied ר  :within its own context. He was aware of the major weakness of this approach ֹכפֶּ
distinguishing the actual lexical sense of the word from concepts that are present in any given context in 
which a word is used. Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 48. The second step Sklar named was the 




texts: “(1) there is a guilty party, (2) there is an injured party, (3) the guilty party is being 
rescued, (4) peace is being established to the damaged relationship between the guilty and 
injured party, and (5) the guilty party is totally dependent on the reaction of the injured 
party and on the acceptance or rejection of the kop̱er.”165 
“Sklar identified two more roots that, along with their derivatives, share the same 
meaning and contexts with the term kop̱er. The first root is pāḏāh, along with its four 
derivatives (pᵉḏuyim , pᵉḏuṯ, piḏyom, and piḏyon). … The second root is gāʾal and its 
derivatives gᵉʾullāh and goʾel. Regardless of the overlap in meaning in some contexts, 
there are cases in which the meaning of kop̱er differs from the meaning of the 
terms…”166 The contexts with these two roots show slight different semantic nuances that 
differ from the  ֹרכ פֶּ  contexts. 
That is, in some ָּגַאל contexts, the person being redeemed has not done any wrong. 
In others, the person who redeems has the automatic right to do so and does not need 
approval from the person who possesses the person or object that is being redeemed. In 
these contexts, “redemption” or “to redeem” makes more sense, since in ר  contexts, the ֹכפֶּ
party that does the ransoming needs and depends on the acceptance of ר  by the party to ֹכפֶּ
 
similar semantic field, pāḏāh and gāʾal. Other forms could be considered in this analysis, but these two 
occur in contexts that are the most similar to kop̱er. Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 61. 
165Janković, “The Rationale,” 101. For some insignificant exceptions to this pattern in some texts 
which Sklar detected, see Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 48–64. 
166Janković, “The Rationale,” 103. For the insignificant differences, see Sklar, Sin, Impurity, 
Sacrifice, Atonement, 62–66. 
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whom the wrong has been done. Some contexts with ָפָדה carry a meaning identical or 
very similar to that of ר  167.ֹכפֶּ
The conclusion that comes out of this understanding of ר פֶּ  is that animal’s blood כִּ
serves as a ר ר of human life. The foundation of the ֹכפֶּ פֶּ רפֶּ כֹ  is the concept of כִּ , ransom. 
The broken relationship between God, as an injured party, and the sinner, as a wrong 
party, is resolved by God’s acceptance of animal’s blood-life as ransom for the offerer’s 
blood-life. The decision as to whether to accept the ransom or not rests solely on the 
wronged party, God. 
 
Leviticus 17:11: The Type/s of Sacrifices 
The second element generated considerable debate among scholars. It is 
traditionally understood that this text proposes a rationale for the function of blood of all 
animal sacrifices.168 Milgrom and Brichto argued that this text explains the function of 
the blood of the well-being sacrifice only.169 The answer to this question significantly 
impacts the understanding of ר פֶּ  .in the OT כִּ
Milgrom first established that the offerer envisaged in Lev 17:11 is guilty of a 
capital offence and therefore, the sacrificial blood they offer serves as their ransom.170 He   
 
167For more details on the findings of these two steps see Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, 
Atonement, 61–67. 
168Füglister, “Sühne durch Blut,” 197; Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 101; Sklar, Sin, Impurity, 
Sacrifice, Atonement, 174; Rodríguez, “Substitution in the Hebrew Cultus,” 241.  
169Jacob Milgrom, “A Prolegomenon to Leviticus 17:11,” JBL 90 (1971): 93–103. Slightly 
modified in Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 706–13; Brichto, “On Slaughter and Sacrifice,” 19–28. 
170Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 708. 
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found three lines of evidence for arriving at this conclusion. First, Milgrom stated that “in 
a legal context, moreover, nepeš specifically connotes capital crime or punishment (e.g., 
Exod 21:23; Lev 24:15; Deut 19:21), and expressions compounded with it often imply 
that life is at stake (e.g., Judg 5:18; 12:3; 1 Sam 19:5).”171 Second, he further confirmed 
this by the fact that the other two occurrences of the phrase ַכֵפר ם ל  ֹׁשֵתיכֶּ ַעל־ַנפ   in addition 
to v. 11, have capital punishment in view, namely census (Exod 30:11–16; Num 
31:48).172 Third, Milgrom noted that the verb ר פֶּ  in Exod 31:11–16 “must be related to כִּ
the expression found in the same pericope kōper napšô ‘a ransom for his life’ (Exod 
30:12). The same combination of the idiom kōper nepeš and the verb kippēr is found in 
the law of homicide (Num 35:31–33).”173 
Second, he argued that the sacrifice in this pericope is a nonexpiatory, well-being 
offering, supporting this in two points.174 First, he understood the phrase “you will not eat 
blood” as a reference to eating the meat with blood in it.175 The only sacrifice of which 
the offerer would eat is the well-being offering; thus, Lev 17 deals with this offering. 
Second, noting that 17:10–14 consists of two laws (vv. 10–12, and vv. 13–14) which 
form a unity, Milgrom inferred that “because the second deals with wild animals—
hunted, obviously, for their meat and not for sport (ʾăšer yēʾākēl)—the first law 
undoubtedly also speaks of the flesh of edible animals; these, however, are not game but 
 
171Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 707. 
172Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 708. 
173Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 708. 
174Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 708–9. 
175Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 709. 
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domestic animals, which, according to H, must be sacrificed at the altar.”176 The only 
meat from the altar that the offerer is permitted to eat is of the well-being offering.177 
Milgrom showed awareness in claiming that the well-being offering only in view 
in Lev 17:11 creates two crucial problems. First, the well-being offering would have an 
expiatory role which contradicts the fact that it “never functions as a kippūr.”178 The 
expiatory sacrifices in Leviticus are sin, guilt, and burnt offering. Second, in Milgrom’s 
opinion, the sin that needs to be expiated is a capital offense against God. The following 
quotation depicts his course to get to this claim: 
As noted, lĕkappēr ʿal-nepeš must mean that the Israelite is guilty of a capital offense 
against God, and unless he brings sacrificial blood to the altar, he is subject to the 
death penalty. In the Priestly laws, however, there is no sacrificial expiation for 
capital crime or, for that matter, for any deliberate violation. The presumptuous sinner 
is banned from the sanctuary because he “acts defiantly (bĕyād rāmâ) … reviles the 
Lord … has spurned the word of the Lord and violated his commandment” (Num 
15:30–31; contrast vv. 24–29).179 
 
Milgrom found the resolution for both of these contradictions in the opening law 
of this chapter, Lev 17:3–4. He first argued that the “animal slaughter is murder except at 
an authorized altar (vv. 3–4).”180 This is further confirmed in 17:4a. Milgrom stated that 
the law “ordains that any Israelite who slaughters a sacrificial animal (for its meat) 
without bringing it to the Tabernacle altar as an offering of well-being, dām yēḥašēb lāʾîs 
hahûʾ dām šāpāk ‘blood guilt shall be reckoned to that man: he has shed blood’ (v 
 
176Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 709. 
177Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 709. 
178Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 709. 
179Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 710. 
180Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 710; Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1474. 
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4ba).”181 Finally, he found the support for this claim in the fact that 
the idiom šāpāk dām is the well-attested accusation of murder (in P, Gen 9:6; Num 
35:33; so in all sources: e.g., narrative, Gen 37:22; 1 Sam 25:31; 1 Kgs 2:31; 2 Kgs 
21:16; 24:4; legal, Deut 19:10; 21:7; wisdom, Prov 1:16; 6:17; prophetic, Isa 59:7; Jer 
22:3, 17; esp. Ezek 16:38; 18:10; 22:3, 4, 6, 9, 12) and the niphal of ḥšb “be 
reckoned,” is the declaratory statement in P and H for designating a cultic act as 
either acceptable or unacceptable to God (Lev 7:18; Num 18:27, 30; cf. Ps 106:31).182 
 
Second, Milgrom proceeded to conclude that “the blood ransoms the offerer’s life 
and clears him of the charge of murder.”183 Accordingly, his resolution is that the well-
being offering atones in terms of ransoming the offerer who is guilty of murder, that is, 
unauthorized killing of an animal. 
Milgrom’s thesis that Lev 17 is limited to the well-being offering which atones as 
a ransom was extensively critiqued by Kiuchi, Gane, and Sklar.  
In the first place, Milgrom’s interpretation depends on v. 10 being restricted to the 
well-being offering.184 Yet, the text seems to be more inclusive since the phrase ֲאׁשֶּ ר יֹאַכל
 .refers to any blood, not just the blood of well-being offering ָכל־ָּדם
Milgrom’s comment on this phrase in Lev 17:10 seems to contradict his thesis in 
great measure. 
Since the blood of game is the topic of the next law (vv. 13–14), one might argue that 
“any blood” in this verse refers to only sacrificial animals. The rabbis, however, claim 
that this blood prohibition is total: it includes nonsacrificial animals as well (Sipra 
Aḥare, par. 3:3; b. Ker. 4b). This view is corroborated by the occurrence of the same 
phrase in another attestation of the blood prohibition (7:27), which contains the added 
 
181Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 710. 
182Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 710. 
183Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 710–11; Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1474. 
184Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 177. 
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words lāʿôp wĕlabbĕhēmâ ‘of birds and beasts’, a phrase intended to include every 
nonsacrificial category: game, blemished animals, and carcasses.185 
 
However, Milgrom made a difference between the phrases where they refer to 
“eating meat with blood” and which refer to “eating over blood,”186 that is, some form of 
illicit practice such as divination or soothsaying (Lev 19:26).187 Even this seems unlikely 
for two reasons. 
First, there is a lexical difference when “eating meat with blood” is intended or 
when “eating over blood” is intended. In the former phrase, blood is syntactically linked 
with the adjective ֹכל or with and without direct object marker, but blood remains the 
direct object of the verb ָאַכל, as it is in Lev 17:10, 12, while the latter phrase places the 
preposition ַעל before ָּדם which never appears in Lev 17. 
Second, blood is related to worship in vv. 1–9, but it seems that the shift takes 
place from v. 10 where it is emphasized that blood has an atoning role.188 For that reason, 
it seems unlikely that, lexically, the very general regulation189 regarding the handling of   
 
185Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1470–71. 
186Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1471. 
187Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1490–91. 
188The phrase  ם תֹוָכ֔ ן־ַהֵּגר   ַהָּגֹ֣ר ב  ל ּומִּ ָרֵאֶ֗ ׂש  ֵנֹ֣י יִּ ב  יׁש מִּ יׁש אִָּ֜ אִּ֨  (divides Lev 17 into three sections: (1 ו 
illegitimate sacrifice (vv 2–9), (2) handling blood (vv 10–14), and (3) eating from an animal’s carcass (vv 
15–16). Hartley, Leviticus, 264–65. Hartley emphasized the difference between topical and literary 
structure since vv. 8–9 are separated from vv. 3–7 by the phrase ם ֹ֣ ר ַוֲאֵלהֶּ יׁש ּתֹאַמ֔ ֹ֥ יׁש   אִּ ית אִּ ֵבֹ֣ ל מִּ ָרֵא֔ ׂש  ן־  יִּ ּומִּ
ּור ַהֵּגָ֖ר ר־ָיגֹ֣ תֹוָכָ֑ם ֲאׁשֶּ ב  , thus dividing this chapter into 4 sections. However, it may be argued that the 
addition of ם ֹ֣ ר ַוֲאֵלהֶּ ּתֹאַמ֔  to the latter phrase points to the subcategory of the previous section since they 
both deal with sacrifices, while 10–14 deals with blood. Even though, for a different overall conclusion, 
Milgrom correctly understood that vv. 8–9 belongs to the previous section, vv. 1–7, due to this expanded 
dividing formula. Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1475. 
189Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 102. 
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blood in v. 11 should be limited to the well-being offering in vv. 3–7. Finally, v. 8 
expands the list of sacrifices to either all sacrifices, in which case, the phrase ם ּתֹאַמר ַוֲאֵלהֶּ  
functions as a merism referring to all sacrifice,190 or just the peace sacrifices. The former 
alternative makes more sense in light of the overarching topic in vv. 3–9, that is, 
illegitimate sacrifice.191 
Sklar noted two reasons that suggest that a general tone of blood consumption 
prohibition in v. 10 was transferred to v. 11. First, based on v. 11a, blood contains life 
which cannot be factual of the animals offered as a well-being offering only, but for all 
animals, not just sacrificial ones, and even more unlikely for the well-being offering. 
Second, based on v. 11b, God himself as the owner of life, prescribed an atoning role to 
the blood. It is not to be eaten.192 Consequently, v. 11 states two reasons that stand behind 
this prohibition: (1) the blood of animals contains its life and cannot be consumed, and 
(2) the animals’ blood can be used only to make atonement on the altar.  
Besides postulating that the general language in v. 11 does not warrant the 
conclusion that the context of this text should be well-being offering,193 Kiuchi pointed to 
another inconsistency with Milgrom’s thesis. That is, v. 4 prescribes a kārēt penalty for 
the one guilty of slaughtering the animal except at the altar. The same punishment is also 
prescribed for blood consumption in v. 10. However, no remedy is given for these sins in 
Lev 17. Kiuchi correctly stated:  
 
190Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1467. 
191Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 102; Hartley, Leviticus, 138.  
192Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 177. 
193Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 101. 
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If the offerer brought a sacrificial animal to the sanctuary and slaughtered it, this act 
would constitute a totally legitimate act. It is not a sin; he has not committed a 
murder. In other words, vv. 3–4 do not imply any capital offence to be expiated, and 
there is no reason to mention the fact that the blood may not be consumed. On the 
other hand, if the offerer killed his animal outside the sanctuary this passage offers no 
ritual remedy. In either case the comment in Lev 17:11 is irrelevant on Milgrom's 
interpretation.194 
 
He also noticed that Milgrom interpreted the phrase ַכֵפר ם ל  ֹׁשֵתיכֶּ ַעל־ַנפ   as if it 
implies a capital offense partly by the meaning of the independent noun נֶּפֶּׁש and partly 
by analogy with Exod 30:11–16 and Num 31:48ff. He found it methodologically 
incorrect to infer that the use of the identical phrase implies the identical offense. To 
argue that ר פֶּ  refers to the same sense would be possible, but not that the phrase refers to כִּ
the same offence. The context of Lev 17 does not provide a basis for this suggestion.195 
Being an offering that includes blood application, the well-being offering seems to be an 
expiatory offering based on Lev 17:11. Kurtz was correct regarding the expiatory role of 
a well-being offering when he stated that “if the sprinkling of blood in connection with 
the burnt-offering and trespass-offering served as an atonement ( ַכֵפר ָעָליו  ל  ), the 
sprinkling of the blood of the peace-offering, which was performed in precisely the same 
way, must necessarily have had the same significance.”196 
In his final comment on Lev 17:11, that is, the phrase ַכֵפר ם ל  ֹׁשֵתיכֶּ ַעל־ַנפ  , 
Milgrom raised two more points against the traditional understanding of this text: 
Why should the blood of the ḥaṭṭāʾt and ʾāšām, the exclusive expiatory sacrifices 
brought for inadvertent wrongs, ransom the offerer’s life? What capital crime has he 
 
194Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 102–3. 
195Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 102–3. 
196Kurtz, Offerings, 74. 
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committed to warrant the forfeit of his life? In particular, as I argued thirty years ago 
(Milgrom 1970), is the new mother, whose ʿōlâ and ḥaṭṭāt offerings expressly expiate 
on her behalf (wĕkipper ʿālêhā, 12:7, 8), deserving of death because she had a 
baby?197 
 
There are two underlying assumptions in this quotation which are incorrect. The 
first assumption is related to the first two questions, and it is that one’s life is never at risk 
in the case of inadvertent sin. Based on Lev 4–5 and Num 15:22–29, which both state that 
ר פֶּ  is possible for inadvertent sin, it would be more correct to say that one ָסַלח and כִּ
never has to face death punishment in case of inadvertent sin. Inadvertence does not 
mean that there is no punishment for such sin. Rather, as Sklar put it, “the  ֶ֤ פֶּ רכִּ -rite in 
contexts of inadvertent sin is characterized by the ransoming of the sinner, that is, the 
giving of a legally legitimate ransom payment (ר  .that acts as a mitigated penalty (ֹכפֶּ
Within this context, forgiveness functions as an expression of agreement to and 
acceptance of the ransom payment (ר  198”.(ֹכפֶּ
The second assumption is that the new mother is not at risk after having a baby. 
Based on the overall understanding of ritual impurity, she seems to be at risk because her 
impurity is considered severe and requires ר פֶּ  Lev 12:7–8) or she would be deserving) כִּ
of capital punishment for not following God’s regulations for ritual cleansing (Lev 15:31, 
Num 19:13, 20).199 According to Milgrom, the goal of the ר פֶּ  in Lev 12 was to remove כִּ
 
197Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1475. 
198Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 178–79. 
199Gane, Cult and Character, 175–76.  
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impurity from the new mother and bring her back to the state of purity.200  
Brichto, like Milgrom, argued that Lev 17:11 should be restricted to a well-being 
offering and that the slaughter of a domestic animal anywhere else but at the tabernacle 
constitutes a murder.201 However, Brichto uniquely understood   ב in the phrase י־ַהָּדם הּוא ִֽ כִּ
ׁש ַכֵפר ַבּנֶּפֶּ י   to be beth pretii or “bet of price/exchange,” rather than beth essentiae since 
this preposition is often interchanged with ַּתַחת in talionic formulas.202 Accordingly, a 
general prohibition against blood eating in v. 10 is not limited to a well-being offering, 
but refers to burnt, sin, and reparation sacrifices that all have an atoning function.203 
 
Leviticus 17:11: The Nature of the Preposition 
י־ַהָּדם in ב   ַכֵפר  ַבּנֶּפֶּׁש הּוא כִּ י   
The third element includes answering a fundamental question: What is the nature 
of the preposition   ב in י־ַהָּדם ַכֵפר ַבּנֶּפֶּׁש הּוא כִּ י  ? Consequently, the answer to this question 
also sheds light on the referent of the noun נֶּפֶּׁש, the animal that is offered, or the offerer 
who offers it.  
There are three proposals regarding the nature of the preposition   ב. First, if   ב is 
beth pretii, the noun נֶּפֶּׁש refers to the offerer’s life as opposed to the life of the sacrificial 
animal. The whole phrase is translated as “it is the blood that makes atonement for one’s 
 
200Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 221–22, 224. 
201Brichto, “On Slaughter and Sacrifice,” 24. 
202Brichto, “On Slaughter and Sacrifice,” 28. 
203Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 177; Schwartz, “The Prohibitions,” 44–45. 
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life.”204 Second, if   ב is beth essentiae, נֶּפֶּׁש refers to the life of the animal. In this case, the 
phrase is translated as “it is the blood, as life, that effects expiation.”205 Third, if   ב is beth 
instrumentii, נֶּפֶּׁש also refers to the life of the animal. In this case the phrase is translated 
as “for it is the blood that makes atonement, by reason of/means of the life.”206 
 
Beth Pretii 
If   ב is beth pretii, the preposition is translated with the English preposition “for/in 
exchange of,” and it occurs in contexts where one item is given for/in exchange of the 
other. To support this understanding of   ב, scholars usually point to the interchangeability 
of   ב and ַּתַחת in texts that convey the talionic principle. Exodus 21:23 and Lev 24:18 use 
פֶּׁש while Deut 19:21 uses ,נֶּפֶּ ׁש ַּתַחת ָנפֶּׁש נֶֶּ֗  Applied to Lev 17:11, this would 207.נֶּפֶּׁש ב 
mean that the blood of the animal is given for/in exchange of/in place of the offerer’s life. 
The animal’s blood-life becomes the substitute for the offerer’s blood-life. This 
understanding would further indicate that the animal’s blood-life serves as a substitution 
in place of the offerer’s blood-life.208 
 
204NIV, Henri Cazelles, Le Lévitique (Paris: La Sainte Bible, 1958), 84–85; Noordtzij, Numbers, 
177. 
205JPSV, Füglister, “Sühne durch Blut,” 145. For a more extensive list, see Sklar, Sin, Impurity, 
Sacrifice, Atonement, 169n20. 
206RSV, NASV, Adalbert Metzinger, “Die Substitutionstheorie und das Alttestamentaliche Opfer 
mit besonderer Berücksichtigung von Lv 17:11,” Bib 21 (1940): 270–72; Janowski, Sühne als 
Heilsgeschehen, 245; Paul Garnet, “Atonement Constructions in the Old Testament and the Qumran 
Scrolls,” EvQ 46 (1974): 139; Kurtz, Offerings, 71–72; Hartley, Leviticus, 261; Kiuchi, Purification 
Offering, 105–6. For a more extensive list of authors who held this understanding of be, see Sklar, Sin, 
Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 169n21. 
207Cazelles, Le Lévitique, 85n[1]; Brichto, “On Slaughter and Sacrifice,” 28. 
208Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 170. 
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There are four points of critique of this understanding of   ב. First, the appeal to the 
use of   ב in talionic formulas (Deut 19:21) is not decisive because the only use of this 
phrase in priestly literature does not use   ב, but ַּתַחת (Lev 24:18).209 Second, the formulas 
in Exod 21:23 ( ָנפֶּׁש ַּתַחת נֶּפֶּׁש ), Lev 24:18 ( ָנפֶּׁש ַּתַחת נֶּפֶּׁש ), and Deut 19:21 ( נֶּפֶּׁש נֶּפֶּׁש ב  ) 
differ from the one in Lev 17:11 ( י־ַהָּדם ַבּנֶּפֶּׁש הּוא כִּ ). That is, the two nouns preceding 
and following the preposition are the same in the former formula and different in the 
latter one.210 Third, the substitutionary element, based on the phrase ם ׁשֹ ֵתיכֶּ ַכֵפר ַעל־ַנפ   ל 
where ר פֶּ  functions as ransom, that supports the beth pretti understanding is not decisive כִּ
since beth essentiae and beth instrumenti are also compatible with the idea of 
substitution.211 Fourth, נֶּפֶּׁש in v. 11 most likely refers to the life of the sacrificial animal 
and not of the offerer. That is, נֶּפֶּׁש in 11aa ( י ם ַהָבָׂשר נֶּפֶּׁש כִּ וא ַבּדֹ֣ הִּ ) and ר פֶּ ) in 11ab כִּ י  ַוֲאנִּ
יו ַתּתִּ ם נ  ַכֵפר ָלכֶּ ֵבַחל  ז  ם ַעל־ַהּמִּ ֹׁשֵתיכֶּ ַעל־ַנפ  ) are combined together in 11b ( י־ַהָּדם ַבּנֶּפֶּׁש הּוא כִּ ), 
implying that the נֶּפֶּׁש in 11ab is the same as the one in 11aa, that is, of the animal.212 
Kiuchi, via Janowski, also noted chiasmus of נֶּפֶּׁש and ָּדם in 11aa and in 11b.213 Even 
though this understanding of the preposition   ב in Lev 17:11 is grammatically and 
semantically possible none of the arguments scholars presented seems to be strong 
 
209Füglister, “Sühne durch Blut,” 145. 
210Janowski, Sühne als Heilsgeschehen, 244. 
211Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 170. 
212Schwartz, “The Prohibitions,” 46–48. 
213Janowski, Sühne als Heilsgeschehen, 244; Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 105. 
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enough, especially when keeping in mind that  ׁש  .refers to the sacrificial animal נֶּפֶּ
 
Beth Essentiae 
The following quotation is educational on the beth essentiae: 
This old, rather unclear expression probably means that the noun introduced by the ב 
belongs to the essence (in the broad sense) of the thing which is being talked about, or 
it may point to the function of the preposition as a link between the subject and 
predicate of an equational clause. The expressions Beth of identity and pleonastic 
Beth are also found.214 
 
In other words, what follows the preposition   ב, beth essentiae, is equivalent to or 
explains that which precedes it. Applied to Lev 17:11, י־ַהָּדם ַבּנֶּפֶּׁש הּוא כִּ , this would mean 
that blood is equated with life. There are three arguments to support beth esssentiae. 
First, Jenni noted that this equation takes place in Lev 17:14b ( י וא ָּדמֹו ָכל־ָבָׂשר נֶּפֶּׁש כִּ הִּ ) 
and informs the understanding of both   ב in v. 11a and 11b. Accordingly, 11a,  נֶּפֶּׁש יכִּ 
ם ַהָבָׂשר וא ַבָּדֹ֣ הִּ , should be translated as “for the life of the flesh is blood,” and 11b,  י־ כִּ
ַכֵפר  for it is the blood, as life, that effects expiation.”215 Second, this“ ,ַהָּדם הּוא ַבּנֶּפֶּׁש י 
understanding of   ב is in conformity with the fact that נֶּפֶּׁש in 11b refers to the life of the 
sacrificial animal. Third, the idea of substitution is implied due to the ransom meaning of 
the ר פֶּ    in v. 11. That is, the life of the animal is substituted for the life of the offerer.216 כִּ
 
214Paul Joüon and T. Muraoka, A Grammar of Biblical Hebrew, 2nd ed. (Roma: Editrice Pontificio 
Istituto Biblico, 2006), 462n10. 
215Ernst Jenni, Die Präposition Beth, vol 1 of Die Hebräischen Präpositionen (Stuttgart: W. 
Kohlhammer, 1992), 84. 
216Schwartz, “The Prohibitions,” 56–57. Schwartz did not apply this understanding of ר פֶּ  כִּ
anywhere else but in Lev 17:11. Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 171. 
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Accordingly, beth essentiae is a viable option from the grammatical standpoint. It is 
consistent with the understanding that נֶּפֶּׁש in 11b refers to the life of the sacrificial 
animal. It fits the ransoming nature of ר פֶּ  in this text. It has to be added that the equation כִּ




The beth instrumentii is the most widely accepted understanding of   ב in Lev 
17:11b.218 The preposition   ב indicates the instrument with which or the means by which 
something is done.219 
The primary support for the beth instrumentii emanates from the fact that   ב is 
mainly instrumental when it is syntactically linked to the verb ר פֶּ  Gen 32;21; Exod) כִּ
29:33; Lev 5:16; 7:7; 19:22; Num 5:8; 35:33; 1 Sam 3:14; Isa 27:9; Prov 16:6) except in 
the two texts in which it is locative (Lev 6:23; 16:17, 27).220 The other two arguments 
coincide with the same argument presented in favor of beth essentiae. It is consistent with 
the understanding that נֶּפֶּׁש in 11b refers to the life of the sacrificial animal and to the 
 
217Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 172. 
218See footnote that begins with RSV, NASV in the present study. 
219Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 197; Wilhelm Gesenius, 
Gesenius' Hebrew Grammar, ed. E. Kautzsch, trans. A. E. Cowley (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1910), 380; Jenni, Die Präposition Beth, 118–49. 
220Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 105; Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 706; Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 
1478; Schwartz, “The Prohibitions,” 47; Füglister, “Sühne durch Blut,” 145–46n11. 
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ransom nature of the  ר פֶּ  Rodríguez viewed beth pretii as a form of beth essentiae.221 .כִּ
 
Conclusion on the Preposition   ב 
To summarize, from the grammatical stand point, the preposition   ב in Lev 17:11b 
could be any of the following options: beth pretii, beth essentiae, or beth instrumentii. 
However, two last alternatives, beth essentiae and beth instrumentii, are favored since 
they agree with the understanding that the referent of נֶּפֶּׁש in 11b is the life of the 
sacrificial animal. Of the last two, beth instrumentii seems to have stronger grammatical 
and intertextual support, namely, the construction   ר + ב פֶּ  is mainly instrumental, rarely כִּ
locative, but never beth essentiae.222 
Sklar noted that either of the last two options, beth essentiae or beth instrumentii, 
basically conveys the same meaning to Lev 17:11. He stated: 
Indeed, whether one states that blood atone by the means of the life it contains, or 
whether one states that the blood atones as life, it is clear that the atoning function of 
the blood is grounded in its relation to the life of the animal, that is, the blood is able 
to atone because of the life it contains.223 
 
Thus, Sklar suggested the following translation of Lev 17:11: “For the life of flesh 
is in the blood, and I myself have bestowed it to you upon the altar to ransom your lives, 
 
221Rodríguez, “Substitution in the Hebrew Cultus,” 249; Gesenius, Gesenius' Hebrew Grammar, 
380. However, Rodríguez’s emphasis on the beth pretii rests on an incorrect argument. That is, the absence 
of 3ms pronominal suffix on the noun נֶּפֶּׁש follows the general tone of vv. 10–11. In addition,   ב attached to 
 does not always refer to human life (Gen 9:4). Finally, the last point discredits Rodríguez’s נֶּפֶּׁש
understanding that the beth pretii should be translated “in exchange for the person,” thus referring to the 
life of the offerer, whose life is saved at the cost of the sacrificial animal’s. Rodríguez, “Substitution in the 
Hebrew Cultus,” 250, 256. These irregularities in Rodríguez’s argumentation diminish the strength of his 
suggestion. Beth pretii is not the best solution in this verse. 
222Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 173. 
223Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 173. 
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for it is the blood that ransoms by means of/as the life.”224 
 
Leviticus 17:11: Probability of the Idea of Substitution 
As emphasized above, the idea of substitution is widely recognized and affirmed 
in Lev 17:11 and it does fit the two choices that are favored by the grammar and syntax 
of the text. The life of the sacrificial animal takes the place of the offerer on the altar.225 
As argued above, inadvertence related to a sin does not mean that the life of the sinner 
was not endangered. As Kiuchi stated, “it seems arbitrary to hold that the sin in Exod 30: 
12ff. put a person's life in jeopardy whereas the sin in Lev 4–5 does not.”226 As it was 
argued on pages 395–96 of the present study, the life of a person is always in need of 
ransom from death from the point of committing sin and receiving forgiveness.227 Kiuchi 
has shown that  
uncleanness, which symbolizes death or the aura of death, is ascribed not only to 
corpses or carcasses but to things and persons which have contact with them. The 
same is true for an inadvertent sin. Though it does not deserve the death penalty, the 
sinner is regarded as being in the realm of death. … Because if nothing is done to 
uncleanness or sin that will lead to a person’s death, so it could be posited that a 
sacrifice indeed saves the life of a sinner or an unclean person, and that the exchange 
of נֶּפֶּׁש in Lev 17: 11b should be understood in this sense.228 
 
Thus, it is more correct to say that sinners do not experience death because of the   
 
224Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 173. An almost identical rendering of this text is 
suggested by Milgrom: “For the life of the flesh is in the blood and I have assigned it to you upon the altar 
to ransom (kpr) your lives, for it is the blood that ransoms by means of life.” Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 417. 
225Rodríguez, “Substitution in the Hebrew Cultus,” 259–60; Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 107. 
226Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 107–8. 
227Kiuchi argued this based on the conceptual relationship between ר פֶּ  ,Kiuchi .ָנָׂשא ָעֹון and כִּ
Purification Offering, 96–7. 
228Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 108–9. 
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privilege of ר פֶּ  that ransoms their lives by moving them from the aura of death and the כִּ
forgiveness that God bestows on them. Kiuchi is also correct in suggesting that the term 
death penalty should be avoided in the context of inadvertent sin in Lev 4–5, since 
neither the phrase יּוָמת מֹות  nor the kārēt penalty is mentioned in these chapters, which 
further points to the fact that these sins do not deserve the death penalty.229 Actually, 
none of a variety of capital punishments is implied in Lev 4–5. 
Finally, as argued above, the idea of substitution is present in Lev 17:11 because 
in itself, it includes the idea of a substitution and because the sacrificial animal instead of 
the offerer is slaughtered at the altar in the sanctuary.230 
 
Conclusion on Lev 17:11 
The analysis above confirms the fact that the most compelling understanding of 
Lev 17:11 is a traditional one which argues that this text encompasses general theological 
principles which apply to all atoning sacrifices; the life-blood of the sacrificial animal, as 
a ר ר ,ֹכפֶּ פֶּ ר ,atones for the offerer’s life. Thus ,כִּ פֶּ ר to atone for is founded on the ,כִּ  ,ֹכפֶּ
rather than on other suggestions, including “to cover,” since it avoids misconceptions 
related to all other suggestions. This understanding of Lev 17:11 is based on the 
following four points. First, ר פֶּ  in Lev 17:11 is achieved by the animal’s blood that כִּ
serves as a ר  of human life. God accepts the animal’s life-blood as a ransom instead of ֹכפֶּ
the offerer’s life-blood. ר פֶּ ר ransoms in Lev 17:11 based on the כִּ  This insight is .ֹכפֶּ
 
229Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 107–8. 
230Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 108–9. 
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supported by the ever-present unfavorable status of human beings before God due to their 
sinfulness. Consequently, humans constantly need atonement.231 Second, based on the 
fact that a general prohibition against blood eating in v. 10 is not limited to a well-being 
offering, but refers to burnt, sin, and reparation sacrifices that all have an atoning 
function, the present study accepts the traditional understanding that Lev 17:11 envisions 
all sacrifice by whose blood ר פֶּ  .is achieved. In other words, all expiatory sacrifices כִּ
Third, although all three alternatives, beth pretii, beth essentiae, or beth instrumentii, are 
valid for the meaning of the second   ב preposition attached to the noun נֶּפֶּׁש by which ר פֶּ  כִּ
is accomplished, beth essentiae and beth instrumentii are favored since they agree with 
the understanding that the referent of נֶּפֶּׁש in 11b is the life of the sacrificial animal and 
have stronger grammatical and intertextual support. Fourth, the fact that ר פֶּ  in itself כִּ
includes the idea of substitution and because the sacrificial animal instead of the offerer is 
slaughtered at the altar in the sanctuary, the idea of substitution is implied in Lev 17:11. 
This analysis and understanding of ר פֶּ ר greatly helped in identifying the meaning of כִּ פֶּ  כִּ
in some vague contexts below. 
 
ר פֶּ  with the Direct Object Marker כִּ
Two potential meanings found in three texts emerge when ר פֶּ  is found with a כִּ
direct object marker in the Pentateuch (Gen 6:14; Lev 16:20, 33). The first one is “to 
cover” or “to rub on” (Gen 6:14) and the verb is in qal stem. This use corresponds to 
 
231See the following subheadings in the present work: Various States of the Creation, Duality of 
Human Nature, Human Sinfulness, Sinfulness as Reflected in Human Experience, Burnt Offering: A 
Solution for General Human Sinfulness, and Neglect of GHS in Scholarly Works of Atonement. 
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Akkadian B stem kapāru.232 This is identical to the Arabic kaffaru as stated above. The 
second meaning is “to rub off, wipe, purify” (Lev 16:20, 33), and the verb is in piel stem 
which corresponds to the Akkadian D stem kuppuru.233 These two meanings are based on 
their literary contexts and are confirmed by their correspondence with ANE languages. 
 
Non-Cultic Contexts 
Regarding Gen 6:14, commentators believed that the hapax legomenon ר  is to ֹכפֶּ
be translated with “bitumen,” and the verb referred to the sealing of the bark outside and 
inside to make it watertight.234 ר  is uniquely used in this way in the OT235 and this ֹכפֶּ
understanding is well confirmed from ANE lexical, conceptual, and contextual 
correspondence where Hebrew ר  ”,corresponds with the Akkadian kupru, “bitumen ֹכפֶּ
that is used in the Hebrew and Akkadian flood stories.236 Harold R. Cohen emphasized a 
critical point that proved that “to smear”237 is the foundational meaning of the Akkadian 
kaparu that corresponds to the Hebrew ר פֶּ  :כִּ
The parallels from Atrahasis, however, are somewhat closer than those usually cited 
from the eleventh tablet of the epic of Gilgamesh, since the former demonstrate the 
use of the bitumen for caulking the boat, obviously what is implied in Gen 6:14 as 
 
232Chaim Cohen, Biblical Hapax Legomena in the Light of Akkadian and Ugaritic, SBLDS 37 
(Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1978), 33–34; Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 1080. 
233Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 1080. 
234Keil and Delitzsch, The Pentateuch, 1:142; Sarna, Genesis, 52; Mathews, Genesis 1–11:26, 
364; Victor P. Hamilton, Genesis 1–17, NICOT 1 (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1980), 281.  
235Usually, OT uses the nominal ḥēmār for pitch, bitumen (Gen 11:3, 14:10, Exod 2:3). Sarna, 
Genesis, 52; Hamilton, Genesis 1–17, 281. 
236Cohen, Biblical Hapax Legomena, 33. 




well. Furthermore, in context outside the flood story, Akkadian kupru is often used 
with its denominative verb kapāru “to smear” and this too is precisely the case in Gen 
6:14.238 
 
However, Gen 6:14 is the only place in the OT where the verb ָכַפר is used in the 
qal stem with the meaning of “to smear, rub on, cover.” Therefore, it is misleading to 
think that the piel verbal form is a denominative of ר  since, in this single instance, the ֹכפֶּ
noun was used with the verbal root that is in qal not piel.239 Avoiding the erroneous 
linguistic concept (habit) called “root fallacy,” one should not take the meaning of qal of 
ר and apply it to the piel stem ָכַפר פֶּ  especially if the former is found only once in the ,כִּ
Pentateuch and in the entire OT. As Averbeck stated, “Linguistically the same root in a 
different stem is a different word.”240 The same syntax pattern between the use of qal of 
 in Gen 6:14 and piel in Gen 32:20241 does not change this since the argument can be ָכַפר
made that, in the latter text, the ר פֶּ  can be translated as “to wipe clean”242 that כִּ
corresponds to the Akkadian D stem. 
Based on contextual insights from Gen 6:14, along with comparative insights that 
are lexically, contextually, and conceptually controlled, the qal of ָכַפר means “to cover, 
smear on, rub on.” In addition, this meaning should not be transported onto the piel stem 
 
238Cohen, Biblical Hapax Legomena, 33–34. 
239Averbeck, “ר פֶּ  .NIDOTTE 2:684 ”,כִּ
240Averbeck, “ר פֶּ  .NIDOTTE 2:685 ”,כִּ
241In both texts, the verb is followed by a direct object (the ark and the face of Esau, respectively), 
and by the instrumental preposition   ב (“with pitch” and “with the gift,” respectively). Averbeck, “ר פֶּ  ”,כִּ
NIDOTTE 2:684. 
242Pedersen, Israel: Its Life and Culture, 2:361–62; Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 1084. 
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of the same verb, but rather one should seek hints from the immediate context to 
determine the most plausible meaning of the piel uses. 
 
Cultic Contexts 
The piel form of ר פֶּ ר is found in Lev 16:20, 33. The direct recipients of כִּ פֶּ  in כִּ
these two texts are the most holy place, the holy place and the sacrificial altar since they 
are all presided over by the direct object marker, and the last two are joined with the waw 
conjunction. The context of these texts is the Day of Atonement. 
It is important to note that the first blood application that these objects receive by 
which the ר פֶּ  of the compartments of the sanctuary is achieved is mentioned in Lev כִּ
16:16. Verses 14–15 state that blood for the blood application to achieve ר פֶּ  is taken כִּ
from the sin offerings of both the priest/s and the people, and v. 16 confirms that ר פֶּ  has כִּ
to do with ritual and moral impurities of the people of Israel as a whole, the priestly tribe 
included, as well. Three distinct words convey ritual and moral impurity ( ֹאת ֻּטמ  ֵני מִּ  ב 
ל ָרֵא֔ ׂש  ם יִּ ֵעיהֶּ ׁש  פִּ ָכל־ַחּטֹאתָ  ּומִּ םל  ). What follows after the sanctuary receives ר פֶּ  is the high כִּ
priest’s laying on of hands on and confessing the sins of the sons of Israel over the goat 
for Azazel to transfer those impurities onto it (16:21). Scholars have generally reached a 
consensus that the laying on of hands in Lev 16:21 means the transfer of sins from the 
high priest to the Azazel goat.243 Two points derived from the ר פֶּ  process in Lev 16 כִּ
 
243Kurtz, Offerings, 98; Koch, “עון,” TDOT, 10:559; Hartley, Leviticus, 20, 241; Kiuchi, 
Purification Offering, 113; Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 638, 1040–45; Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 196, 273–
74; Gane, Cult and Character, 57–8, 103–4, 161; Wright, “The Hermeneutics of Ritual Innovation,” 7. 
Kiuchi also added the idea of substitution. Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 118–19. 
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suggest that the verb in this context should be translated “to cleanse” in terms of the sin 
removal from the sanctuary to outside the camp. 
First, the blood of the high priest’s and people’s sin sacrifices was applied to the 
tree compartments of the sanctuary, on and in front of mercy seat, in the first 
compartment, and on the altar. The sins were absorbed by that application of the 
sacrificial blood and transferred to the high priest himself and then, from the high priest 
to the Azazel goat.244 They were relocated, removed from the sanctuary onto the Azazel 
goat, thus leaving the sanctuary clean. 
Second, the meaning of ר פֶּ  can possibly contribute to inauguration, purgation or כִּ
sanctification when the recipients of it are physical, inanimate objects. The sanctuary as 
an inanimate object cannot commit, but just receive ritual and moral impurity onto 
itself.245 The context is clear in Lev 16; the sanctuary compartments are being rid of the 
impurity of the people of Israel, thus implying purgation/cleansing.246 The sins were 
cleansed, removed, and the sanctuary is clean again. Scholars agree that ר פֶּ  in the כִּ
context of Lev 16, when the compartments of the sanctuary are the recipients of it, refers 
to purgation.247 
 
244Milgrom, “Sacrifices and Offerings, OT,” 767; Gorman, The Ideology of Ritual, 81. Milgrom 
stated that sin offering blood defiles those who handle it, in this case, the high priest. Milgrom, “Sacrifices 
and Offerings, OT,” 767. 
245Milgrom, Studies in Cultic Theology and Terminology, 67–69; Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 96; 
Gane, Cult and Character, 50. 
246Gorman, The Ideology of Ritual, 73. 
247Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 1009–59; Hartley, Leviticus, 65; Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 272; 
Gane, Cult and Character, 82–3; Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 129, 146; Kiuchi, Leviticus, 301; Averbeck, 
ר“ פֶּ  .NIDOTTE 2:688; Gorman, The Ideology of Ritual, 91; Sklar, “Sin and Impurity,” 23 ”,כִּ
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ר פֶּ ר + ֵאת in כִּ פֶּ  contexts is achieved by the application of the blood obtained כִּ
from the priests’ and people’s sin offering onto the most holy place, the holy place, and 
the sacrificial altar. Verses 20, 33 and the immediate context of Lev 16 suggest that the 
meaning of ר פֶּ  .here is to remove, cleanse the sanctuary in its totality כִּ
 
ר פֶּ  Without Object Marker כִּ
There are three texts where ר פֶּ  ,is lexically used without direct object marker כִּ
even though syntactically, the noun/s following the verb constitute its direct object (Gen 
32:20 [21]; Lev 16:32; Deut 32:43). They will be treated under separate subheadings 
based on their contexts. 
 
Non-Cultic Contexts 
Scholars have ascribed multiple meanings to the verb ר פֶּ  such as “to cover,”248 כִּ
“to purify, wipe off,”249 “to remove,”250 or “to appease”251 in Gen 32:20 [21].252 Relying 
on Godfrey R. Drivers’s linguistic comparative work, Levine concluded that “to wipe 
off” is the best meaning in this context. The present Jacob sent had a role of wiping off 
the wrath from Esau’s face. In addition, Levine noted that Prov 16:14, “The wrath of a   
 
248Mathews, Genesis 11:27–50:26, 554. 
249Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 1082. 
250Gane, Cult and Character, 194. 
251Keil and Delitzsch, The Pentateuch, 1:303. 
252Some suggest “to appease.” Keil and Delitzsch, The Pentateuch, 1:303. Some, on the other 
hand, incorporate multiple meanings in this context. Pedersen, Israel: Its Life and Culture, 2:361; Gerhard, 
Genesis: 313–14; Hamilton, Genesis 18–50, 326. 
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king is like messenger of death, but a skillful man will wipe it off,” supports this meaning 
of ר פֶּ  Finally, Levine found that “to rub, wipe off the face” is a well attested idiom in .כִּ
Akkadian and Aramaic texts.253 However, Yitzhaq Feder has recently suggested that ר פֶּ  כִּ
in this context cannot be interpreted in a concrete sense, “to wipe off.” The idiom “to rub, 
wipe off the face” is not an idiom at all since it is used in actual situations where a baby 
rubs his/her face. Thus, it is not an idiom but rather describes actual activity.254 On the 
other hand, Claus Westerman translated ר פֶּ  as “to cover,” suggesting that covering כִּ
Esau’s face will prevent him from seeing Jacob’s guilt.255 The context undoubtedly 
suggests that the ר פֶּ  of Esau’s face precedes the reconciliation Jacob desired,256 but it כִּ
does not contain hints to the precise meaning of the verb. Both of these alternative 
meanings could fit the context of Gen 32:20 [21] but never in a concrete sense of real 
“wiping off” or “covering” Esau’s face, but rather, in an abstract, immaterial sense of “to 
assuage.”257 The face is used to represent anger or negative emotions in a common case 
of metonymy where the face is substituted with the emotions it represents.258 Two points 
are certain in this context: ר פֶּ  precedes and lays the foundation for the reconciliation כִּ
between the two brothers and conveys activity that is purely immaterial, abstract. Thus, it   
 
253Levine, In the Presence of the Lord, 60–61. Milgrom also noted Akkadian parallels of the idiom 
“to wipe off the face.” Milgrom, “Atonement in the OT,” 81. 
254Feder, “On kuppuru, kippēr and Etymological Sins,” 539–40. 
255Westermann, Genesis 1–11, 510. 
256Gane, Cult and Character, 194. 
257Feder, “On kuppuru, kippēr and Etymological Sins,” 539–40. 
258Feder, “On kuppuru, kippēr and Etymological Sins,” 539–40. 
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is best understood as “to assuage” or “to appease.” 
The text in Deut 32:43 is one of the several texts that relate ר פֶּ  with the land as כִּ
its direct object. Defilement of the land is dealt in a very limited number of texts in the 
OT (Lev 18:25, 28; 20:22 by sexual immorality, Num 35:33–34 by murder, Deut 21:23 
by letting the human corpse hang overnight).259 The same applies to the ר פֶּ  of the land כִּ
which is mentioned only in a single text (Num 35:33), and there is no prescribed 
ceremony for the ר פֶּ  ritual of the land.260 Milgrom’s claim regarding the limited defiling כִּ
force of the blood points in the right direction: “Blood never defiles, except if spilled 
illicitly (Num 35:33–34); otherwise it only purifies and sanctifies (e.g.,16:19).”261 
The critical question in the context of land defilement is whether the land is 
defiled ritually or morally, and this question is partly answered on page 78 of the present 
study. Klawans clearly stated: “Indeed, in biblical law or narrative the land is never a 
source of or a means of transmitting ritual defilement. Rather, the land suffers a 
noncontagious degradation. The ultimate result of this defilement, if it remains 
unchecked, is the exile of the land’s inhabitants.”262 Milgrom also interpreted the 
defilement of the land in terms of being moral in its nature.263 The idiom šāpak dām is the 
well-attested accusation for murder in Gen 9:6 and Num 35:33, as it is in other biblical 
 
259Milgrom, “Atonement in the OT,” 81; Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 33. 
260Milgrom, “Atonement in the OT,” 81. 
261Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 749. The exception to this rule is Lev 6:20 [27] where the blood of the 
sin offering which is legitimately slaughtered defiles. Gane, Cult and Character, 91. 
262Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 30.  
263Milgrom, “Atonement in the OT,” 81; Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1438. Gane also seems to side 
with Milgrom in believing that the land defilement is moral in nature. Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 795–96.  
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genres, and undoubtedly is a moral sin (genres such as narrative, Gen 37:22; 1 Sam 
25:31; 1 Kgs 2:31; 2 Kgs 21:16; 24:4; legal texts, Deut 19:10; 21:7; wisdom texts, Prov 
1:16; 6:17; prophetic texts, Isa 59:7; Jer 22:3, 17; Ezek 16:38; 18:10; 22:3, 4, 6, 9, 12).264 
Leviticus 18:25, 28; 20:22, Num 35:33–34, and Deut 21:23; 32:43 all refer to moral sins 
as the defiling agency which produces non-contagious defilement. Paul Garnet accurately 
stated that “Yahweh’s wrath against the polluted land, however, is clearly a metaphor for 
punishing Israel through the land for her corporate sin in tolerating evil in her midst (cf. 
Deut 21:9).”265 
The claim that the nature of land defilement is moral is strengthened by the 
commandment in Num 5:1–4 that urges Israelites to send away people who were the 
source of defilement (lepers and persons with a discharge) or who had contracted some 
sort of defilement (unclean because of a dead person). The presence of those individuals 
in the land did not defile the land, but rather, the commandment seeks to prevent their 
stay in the camp and potential spreading of the contagion in the camp, and eventually, to 
the sanctuary. The commandment does not envision danger of land defilement, but of the 
people, sanctuary, and holy things. 
This trend that the defilement of the land should be considered to be moral in its   
 
264Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 710. 
265Garnet, “Atonement Constructions,” 142. 
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nature is also adopted in the Qumran266 and tannaitic literature.267 
These insights regarding the land defilement leave even fewer clues regarding the 
meaning of ר פֶּ  when it takes the land as a direct object. If the defilement of the land כִּ
were ritual, then at least the only text that mentions ר פֶּ  of the land, Num 35:33, would כִּ
contain very limited, but still some, guidelines regarding the ר פֶּ  of it. Shedding the כִּ
murderer’s blood onto the ground would in some way ר פֶּ  the land. Even if one accepted כִּ
the fact that the land defilement in Num 35:33 were ritual in nature, the ritual procedure 
for the ר פֶּ  ;of the land would not be applicable to other contexts (Lev 18:25, 28; 20:22 כִּ
Deut 21:23, 32:43). However, the fact that the defilement of the land is always moral in 
nature (Lev 18:25, 28; 20:22; Num 35:33–34; Deut 21:23) leaves no clues concerning the 
meaning of the ר פֶּ  in this text. None of the most frequent alternatives for the meaning of כִּ
ר פֶּ ר fits these contexts. These are perhaps the reasons why Milgrom suggested that כִּ פֶּ  in כִּ
the context of the land refers to “general moral expiation.”268 The current study also 
accepts this understanding.  
 
266Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 88–89. Klawan’s interpretation of 1QS VIII that 
discusses that defilement of the land is preceded by E. P. Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism: A 
Comparison of Patterns of Religion, 40th anniversary ed. (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2017), 302–3; A. R. 
C. Leaney, The Rule of Qumran and Its Meaning: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary 
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1966), 217; Michael Newton, The Concept of Purity at Qumran and in 
the Letters of Paul, SNTSMS 53 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 48; Paul Garnet, 
Salvation and Atonement in the Qumran Scrolls, WUNT 3 (Tübingen: Mohr, 1977), 66–67. 
267Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism, 120–21, 126–27. 




The emphasis of Lev 16:32 is on the legitimacy of the high priest to perform ר פֶּ  כִּ
on the Day of Atonement along with the importance of being dressed in proper 
vestments,269 ר פֶּ  is used here in a very general way. However, the waw consecutive כִּ
attached to the opening verb ר פֶּ  in Lev 16:33 has a copulative force270 and makes verbal כִּ
activity of the ר פֶּ  conceptually and temporally related to the preceding verse, v. 32. In כִּ
Lev 16:33, ר פֶּ  ,takes the direct object, the three compartments of the sanctuary. Thus כִּ
based on the syntactical and conceptual relationship, the inferences one finds in Lev 
16:33 regarding ר פֶּ ר should be applied to the כִּ פֶּ ר ,in v. 32. In other words כִּ פֶּ  conveys כִּ
purgation in this verse, as it does in v. 33. 
ר פֶּ ר + ֵאת in כִּ פֶּ  in this text is achieved by the application of the blood obtained כִּ
from the priests’ and people’s sin offering onto the most holy place, the holy place and 
the sacrificial altar. The syntactical and grammatical connection of v. 32 to v. 33 and the 
immediate context of Lev 16 suggest that the meaning of ר פֶּ  here is cleansing of the כִּ
sanctuary in its totality. 
 
ר פֶּ  with Prepositions כִּ
The prepositions used to express the indirect object of the verb ר פֶּ    and ַבַעד are כִּ
 
269Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 1057. 
270All the ר פֶּ  ,verbal forms with the waw consecutive in Lev 16 have the same role (16:6, 11, 16 כִּ
17, 18, 24, 32, 33). A resulting nuance is also present in vv. 16 and 17. Waltke and O’Connor, An 
Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 547–48. 
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ר The instances with both .ַעל פֶּ  .constructions will be examined respectively כִּ
 
ר פֶּ  ַבַעד  with כִּ
The preposition ַבַעד is syntactically related to ר פֶּ  seven times in the Pentateuch כִּ
(Exod 32:30; Lev 9:7x2, 16:6, 11, 17, 24) as the following table displays. The analysis of 
texts is divided to cultic and non-cultic contexts (see Table 23). 
 
 
Table 23. The preposition ַבַעד in relation to ר פֶּ  כִּ
 
Ref. Stem Aspect Type of impurity Benefiter  Lexical construction 
Exod 32:30 piel Imperfect Sin text/sinf. implied Human ה ם ְּבַעֹ֥ד ֲאַכְּפָרֶ֖ ׃ ַחַּטאְתֶכֶֽ  




1. sinfulness/sin poten. 
2. sinfulness/sin poten. 
1. human 
2. human 
ֹ֥ר ַעְדךֶ֖  ְוַכּפ  1. ָהָעָ֑ם ּוְבַעֵ֣ד ַּבֶֽ  
ֵ֣ר ם ְוַכּפ  ֲעָדָ֔ 2. ַּבֶֽ  
Lev 16:6 piel Perfect sin/sinf. Implied Human  ֹֹ֥ו רְוִכֶּפ ֹו  ּוְבַעֹ֥ד ַּבֲעדֶ֖ יתֶֽ ּב   
Lev 16:11 piel Perfect sin/ sinf. Implied Human ֹו ְוִכֶּפֹ֥ר ֹו  ּוְבַעֹ֥ד ַּבֲעדֶ֖ יתֶֽ ּב   
Lev 16:17 piel Perfect sin/ sinf. Implied Human ֹו ּוְבַעֵ֣ד ַּבֲעדֹו   ְוִכֶּפֶ֤ר יתָ֔  ּב 
ל ּוְבַעֶ֖ד ל ָּכל־ְקַהֹ֥ ֶֽ ִיְׂשָרא   





Exod 32:30. ר פֶּ  is used in 32:30 to express Moses’s attempt to reconcile the כִּ
Israelites and God after their act of idolatrous worship (Exod 32:19–20). Milgrom, one of 
the strongest voices of “to purge” translation for ר פֶּ ר correctly stated that ,כִּ פֶּ  conveys כִּ
ransom in this context: “This kippēr must be sharply distinguished from that of the 
sanctuary. In the latter instance, the impurities are purged to keep them from provoking 
the indwelling God to leave. In the ransom cases, however, kippēr has the immediate goal 
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of preventing the divine anger from incinerating innocent and guilty alike.”271 
The ר פֶּ  in this text is very ambiguous. It does not include sacrifice nor blood כִּ
manipulation. However, the Levites killed three thousand individuals among the people, 
most likely the initiators and those directly involved in idolatry and resisted being 
corrected. Those who committed idolatry but later became sorry for their sin waited to 
see the resolution of their case as Moses wanted to intercede for them on the mountain.272 
Moses attempted to achieve ר פֶּ  through his intercession on behalf of the people of the כִּ
community. However, God’s response in vv. 33–34 followed by his activity towards the 
people in v. 35 suggests that God did not grant ר פֶּ  but just suspended the ,כִּ
punishment.273 Even though the verb ָסַלח is never mentioned in this text, ר פֶּ  כִּ
undoubtedly implied it.274 However, as ר פֶּ  was related to the delay of the punishment, so כִּ
was forgiveness a temporary stage. 
 
Cultic Contexts 
Lev 9:7. The context of Lev 9:7 is the inauguration of the sanctuary.275 Observing   
 
271Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 1082. 
272Stuart, Exodus, 684; Peter Enns, Exodus, NIVAC (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2000), 577; 
Durham, Exodus, 432–33. 
273Sarna, Exodus, 210; Stuart, Exodus, 684; Enns, Exodus, 577–78; Durham, Exodus, 432–33. 
274Sarna, Exodus, 209; Stuart, Exodus, 684–85. 
275Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 177. 
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that neither sin276 nor forgiveness277 is mentioned in Lev 9 along with the fact that it is 
very unlikely that Aaron’s sin offering is related to his sin with the golden calf in Exod 
32,278 Milgrom abandoned the meaning of “to wipe off, purge” for the one in this verse, 
and suggested “to atone.” In this context, in Milgrom’s opinion, it refers to the 
reconciliation between God and the individual/community.279 He accurately stated that 
“the more inclusive rendering is clearly implied here,” suggesting “to atone.”280  
Why reconciliation was needed between Aaron and his sons, on one the hand, and 
God, on the other, is not indicated in Milgrom’s comments on Lev 9:7 as there is no 
comment on the meaning of ר פֶּ  in this context. Since this was the eighth day,281 the day כִּ
after their 7-day consecration time period began, Aaron and his sons underwent a 
complex and rigorous process of consecration; it is very unlikely that ר פֶּ  had to deal כִּ
with a sin Aaron or his sons had committed, but rather, ר פֶּ  has a different role, as כִּ
Milgrom indicated reconciliation. The intense 7-day consecration process could 
theoretically prevent Aaron and his sons from breaking the law, but they were still 
 
276The nominal  ַחָּטאֹות always refers to the sin offering in 9:2–3, 7–8, 10, 15, 22, while the verbal 
form of 9:15) ָחָטא) does not convey the activity of sinning, but rather, “to offer a sacrifice.” Gane 
repeatedly understood that ר פֶּ  in Lev 9:7 cleanses Aaron from moral fault/s which finds no support in the כִּ
text of Lev 9. Gane, Cult and Character, 66, 123; Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 109.  
277Kiuchi, Leviticus, 169. 
278Liane Merquis Feldman, “Ritual Sequence and Narrative Constraints in Leviticus 9:1–10:3,” 
JHS 17 (2017): 20. However, the more compelling reason why this is unlikely can be found in the fact that 
Moses’s intercession brought atonement of Aaron’s and the people’s sin. Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 1083; 
Hartley, Leviticus, 148. In other words, the sin offerings Aaron offered during his seven-day time period of 
consecration ר פֶּ  .for his sin כִּ
279Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 578. 
280Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 578. 
281Feldman, “Ritual Sequence,” 1. 
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humans burdened with permanent, ever present GHS282 translated in their tendency to sin 
and being mortal. “To atone,” as the meaning of ר פֶּ  fits this particular context better ,כִּ
than “to wipe off.” Due to the nature of GHS, it cannot be purified from the humans, but 
rather be atoned for in order to be tolerated by God. Metaphorically, “to cover” is also 
possible meaning of ר פֶּ  in this context so that the GHS is covered and not be seen by כִּ
God. The present study prefers “to atone” since it is the verb that in the piel stem conveys 
immaterial activity, which better fits the dynamics of the reconciliation between humans 
and God that takes place on an immaterial level. In contrast, the meaning, “to cover,” can 
be used as referring to a material activity which is not contained in the piel stem, but 
rather qal (Gen 6:14) and a limited number of piel contexts (Lev 16:20, 33 and 16:32 via 
v. 33, respectively). The figurative meaning “to cover” brings a misconception in the 
mind of the reader as if sin can be covered and thereby hidden from God. Rather, God 
accepts humans as they are on the basis of the sacrifice they offer. Nothing can preclude 
(cover, hide, remove) God from seeing human sinfulness. He chooses to accept it based 
on the atonement achieved through a sacrifice. 
In addition, the use of the verb ָכָסה, “to cover,” is frequently used in the rest of 
the OT with the figurative meaning in reference to the sins,283 but never in the 
Pentateuch. Out of 47 uses of ָכָסה, only two uses have a figurative meaning (Num 22:5,   
 
282Hartley, Leviticus, 18; Rooker, Leviticus, 152; Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 179–80. Kiuchi 
referred to the state of creation before the common becomes holy. He termed it the state of uncleanness. He 
clarified that that state is sinfulness. Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 42–44; Kiuchi, Leviticus, 168–69; 
Wenham, The Book of Leviticus, 148. 
283W. R. Domeris, “ָכָסה,” NIDOTTE 2:667–68. 
 
452 
11) and three have the meaning “to hide” (Gen 18:17, 37:26; Deut 13:8), while all the rest 
have the literal meaning “to cover” (Gen 7:19–20; 9:23; 24:65; 38:14–15; Exod 8:6; 10:5, 
15; 14:28; 15:5, 10; 16:13; 21:33; 24:15–16; 26:13; 28:42; 29:13, 22; 40:34; Lev. 3:3, 9, 
14; 4:8; 7:3; 13:12–13; 16:13; 17:13; Num 4:5, 8–9, 11–12, 15; 9:15–16; 16:33, 42; Deut 
 .is never used in reference to sins in the Pentateuch ָכָסה .(23:13 ;22:12
ר פֶּ ר + ַבַעד in this כִּ פֶּ  context is achieved by the application of the blood obtained כִּ
from the priests’ and the people’s sin offerings, burnt offerings, and the people’s peace 
offering on the sacrificial altar. The offerers are both the priests and the people. Since 
Lev 9 does not mention ritual or moral impurity, ר פֶּ  .deals with the GHS of the offerers כִּ
Lev 16:6, 11, 17, 24. Texts in Lev 16 contain a syntactical construction: ַבַעד + 
ר פֶּ  referring to Aaron and his household in vv. 6, 11, 17, 24 while the people of Israel כִּ
are included in vv. 17, 24. The last part of v. 15, “and bring its blood inside the veil and 
do with its blood as he did with the blood of the bull, and sprinkle it on the mercy seat 
and in front of the mercy seat,” confirms that the blood applied to those items was the 
same blood obtained from the people’s and Aarons’ sin offering, as stated in v. 14. It 
cleanses the sanctuary.284 Milgrom’s point that  ר פֶּ  accompanied by “ʿal can only refer to כִּ
persons other than the subject, but when the subject wishes to refer to himself he must 
use bĕʿad (e.g., 9:7; 16:6, 11, 24; Ezek 45:22).”285 This is not confirmed by Lev 9:7 and 
16:6, 11, 24. Aaron does not refer to himself only, but also to all the whole people, as 
 
284Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 1009–59; Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 129, 146; Gorman, The 
Ideology of Ritual, 91; Hartley, Leviticus, 65; Averbeck, “ר פֶּ  ,NIDOTTE 2:688; Gane, Leviticus ”,כִּ
Numbers, 272; Gane, Cult and Character, 82–3; Kiuchi, Leviticus, 301; Sklar, “Sin and Impurity,” 23. 
285Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 255.  
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already noticed by Janowski286 and Kiuchi.287 
Analogous to the previous ritual in Lev 9, the ritual in Lev 16 does not disclose 
that any particular sin is committed by Aaron or the people in the immediate context, but 
in contrast to the ritual in Lev 9, the ritual of Lev 16 deals with the cleansing of the 
sanctuary compartments from the sins committed by both Aaron and the people (Lev 
16:16–20, 33). The ר פֶּ  of Aaron and the people was accomplished by the sin offerings כִּ
(vv. 6, 11, 17) and burnt offering (v. 24). The preposition ַבַעד is best translated as “on 
behalf of or for.”288 Accordingly, Aaron and the people are offerers—not direct, but 
rather, indirect or final recipients of ר פֶּ  289.כִּ
The ר פֶּ ר  cleansing of the sanctuary is, in part, the/כִּ פֶּ  atonement of Aaron and/כִּ
the people because it was their sins from which the sanctuary was ר פֶּ  .cleansed ,כִּ
Milgrom’s comment on Lev 16:17 reflects the same conclusion: “The waw introduces the 
purpose of the high priest’s rites in the shrine, thereby making it similar in function to 
wĕkipper in v 16, which stated the purpose of the high priest’s rites in the adytum.”290 
Thus, the following pattern can be detected. When ר פֶּ  is associated with Aaron כִּ
and/or the people, the texts always use the preposition 24 ,17 ,11 ,16:6) ַבַעד) and the 
reference is to the cleansing of the sanctuary on their behalf. The same pattern is detected 
 
286Janowski, Sühne als Heilsgeschehen, 188n23. 
287Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 88–89. 
288HALOT, s.v. “ַעד ַעד“ .BDB, s.v ;”ַבַ֫ ַעד“ .CDCH, s.v ;”ַבַ֫  .Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 117 ;”ַבַ֫
289Kiuchi, Leviticus, 168–69. 
290Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 757. 
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in non-cultic texts, Exod 32:30. The sacrifices from which the blood was obtained do 
change. That is, in all other texts except v. 24, the blood is obtained from the sin offering, 
while in v. 24, it was obtained from the burnt offering. The blood of the sin offerings was 
used to cleanse the sanctuary’s compartments, but the blood of the burnt offering was 
offered only on the sacrificial altar. Its blood was not used to cleanse the sanctuary. 
However, ר פֶּ  is used in all four texts marking Aaron and the people as the indirect כִּ
object of this verb.  
This means that ר פֶּ  .in Lev 16 encompasses two distinct, but yet, united goals כִּ
One goal is the cleansing of the sanctuary on behalf of Aaron and the people (16:6, 11, 
17, 24) and it is achieved by the application of the blood obtained from Aaron’s and 
people’s sin offerings. The other goal is achieved through the offering of Aaron’s and the 
people’s burnt offerings (16:24) and does not deal with sins. They were already ר פֶּ  .v) כִּ
16), and their sins were sent away from the camp on Azazel’s goat (v. 22). The present 
study suggests that the second goal of ר פֶּ  is to atone for GHS of Aaron and the people of כִּ
Israel whom he represents in God’s presence. This exclusive goal of the ר פֶּ  is achieved כִּ
by the burnt offering. As established above, GHS is an ever-present condition causing 
human beings to be in constant need of ר פֶּ ר ,in God’s presence. Thus כִּ פֶּ  accomplishes כִּ
two goals when it is syntactically associated with the preposition 1) :ַבַעד) it refers to the 
cleansing of the sanctuary from the committed sins which simultaneously bring ultimate 
ר פֶּ  to those who committed those sins (Aaron, the priests, and the people), and (2) it כִּ




ר פֶּ  with Other Prepositions כִּ
There are two more prepositions that are syntactically associated with the verb 
ר פֶּ  ;Exod 29:33; Lev 5:16; 6:23 [6:30]; 7:7; 16:17, 27; 17:11) ב   ,in the Pentateuch כִּ
19:22; Num 5:8) and   ל (Num 35:33; Deut 21:8x2). 
 
Non-Cultic Contexts 
Two texts, Num 35:33 and Deut 21:8, contain the construction   ר + ל פֶּ  Numbers .כִּ
35:33, in regards to the ר פֶּ ר of the land, gives no clues as what כִּ פֶּ  means in this text. As כִּ
discussed on p. 445 of the present study, none of the most frequent meanings, “to wipe 
off” or “to cover,” or others fit this context. It seems that ר פֶּ  should be understood here כִּ
as Milgrom suggested as “general moral atonement.” The preposition   ל marks the agent 
of a passive verb.291 
The construction   ר  + ל פֶּ  is used two times in Deut 21:8, and the context suggests כִּ
that ר פֶּ  includes the purging away/elimination of the culpability for murder from the כִּ
people of the nearest city to the place the murder took place.292 This can partly be 
inferred by the lexical choice for the meaning of the preposition.   ל marks the indirect 
 
291Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 210n84; Joüon and 
Muraoka, A Grammar of Biblical Hebrew, 456. 
292Wright’s interpretation “that the rite is a reenactment of the murder which transfers bloodguilt 
from the inhabited land and the people to an innocuous locale” seems to be well supported. David P. 
Wright, “Deuteronomy 21:1–9 as a Rite of Elimination,” CBQ 49 (1987): 393–94; Tigay, Deuteronomy, 
472, 475, 476; Gane, Cult and Character, 61–62. 
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object in this text with a datival goal.293 This text is considered non-cultic, In other words, 
the killing of the red heifer is not sacrifice since it is not sacrificed on the sacrificial altar, 
nor does the ritual include a gesture in the direction to the sanctuary as the Num 19 ritual 
does (v. 4).294 However, the guilt elimination does not seem to include the entire semantic 
range of ר פֶּ  in this context. Since the people of the closest city provided the animal that כִּ
served to reenact the murder and atone for the people’s guilt of murder, the red heifer 
served as their ransom. Milgrom summarized ר פֶּ  in this context as follows: “In cases in כִּ
which the murderer is unknown, the community closest to the corpus delicti must 
disavow complicity by breaking a heifer’s neck over a perennial stream so that its blood 
is washed away. In this case the heifer serves as the substitute for the slain and a ransom 
for the suspected community.” Accordingly, ר פֶּ  in Deut 21:8 encompasses two כִּ
meanings: (1) it atones the guilt of the people of the city closest to the place of murder 
and (2) it ransoms the people of the closest city for their suspected guilt. 
 
Cultic Contexts 
The preposition   ב in   ר + ב פֶּ  constructions in Exod 29:33; Lev 5:16, 7:7; Lev כִּ
17:11b; 19:22 and Num 5:8 is beth instrumenti, conveying the means by which the ר פֶּ  כִּ
has been achieved.295 Exodus 29:33 lays out the details concerning the consecration of 
 
293“The goals here include a thing made.” Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical 
Hebrew Syntax, 209. 
294Gane, Cult and Character, 61. Additional argument can be found in Wright, “Deuteronomy 
21:1–9,” 390–92; Tigay, Deuteronomy, 473. 
295Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 89–90; Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 706–7; Milgrom, Leviticus 17–
22, 1478; Gane, Cult and Character, 130, 137, 262.  
 
457 
the sanctuary, altar, and priesthood. This text demonstrates that ר פֶּ  is related to the verbs כִּ
 to ordain. Kiuchi ,ָמֵלא to consecrate and the ordination offering,296 that is, the verb ,ָקַדׁש
suggested, among others, that ר פֶּ  ,includes the concept of consecration297 and ordination כִּ
based on this text. What ר פֶּ  exactly conveys here is analyzed at length under the כִּ
subheading, “The Consecration of the Priests: Aaron and His Sons,” on pp. 492–96 of the 
present study. The blood in the ר פֶּ  of this text was obtained from three sacrifices and כִּ
applied differently. Blood from the sin offering was applied on the altar’s horns and       
its base. Blood from the burnt offering was applied around the altar. Blood from the 
ordination offering was applied to Aaron’s and his sons’ right ears, the thumbs of their 
right hands, on the big toes of their right feet, and blood, along with the anointing oil, was 
sprinkled on their garments. Finally, the rest of the blood was applied around the altar. 
Moses was officiating at the entire ritual and offered all the sacrifices.  
Leviticus 5:16 shows that ר פֶּ  is achieved by the reparation offering.298 Milgrom כִּ
noted that the ר פֶּ  achieved by the reparation offering, along with the burnt offering, the כִּ
well-being offering, and the ordination offering refers to the general expiation.299 This 
text also exhibits a syntactical relationship between the ר פֶּ  achieved by the reparation כִּ
offering and the verb 300.ָסַלח In this regard, the reparation offering is like the sin 
 
296Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 95. 
297Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 97–8. 
298Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 709; Gane, Cult and Character, 143.  
299Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 331, 1083.  
300Hartley, Leviticus, 80; Gane, Cult and Character, 194.  
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offering.301 It atones for the offerer since he/she has committed sin. Gane compellingly 
noted the abstract nature of this process by stating that this ר פֶּ  removes the hindrance כִּ
that prevents the divine-human relationship.302 However, this atonement, removal of the 
hindrance, is based on the concept of ransom, as discussed in the analysis of Lev 17:11. 
God accepts ransom in the form of the animal’s life-blood instead of the offerer’s life-
blood, and the offerer is atoned for, which includes the removal of the hindrance from 
their relationship with God. The reparation offering is offered in the cases of offences 
which includes literal/quantifiable debt.303 These offences include misappropriation of the 
property belonging to God or another human being and is expressed by the verb 304.ָמַעל 
The property is restored first, along with a 20% (one fifth) penalty, and then blood from 
this offering is applied around the altar (Lev 7:2). 
The construction of   ר + ב פֶּ  in Lev 6:23 [6:30] and 16:17, 27 is beth loci and כִּ
marks the location of the verbal action.305 Like the previous group of texts where   ב 
functions as beth instrumenti, this group of texts where   ב acts as a beth loci also does not 
lend much insight into the meaning of ר פֶּ  .כִּ
The construction   ר + ב פֶּ  in Lev 7:7 is a part of the regulation regarding the part כִּ
of the sacrificial animal that belongs to the priest. The officiating priest who performs the 
 
301Gane, Cult and Character, 130; Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 410. 
302Gane, Cult and Character, 196.  
303Gane, Cult and Character, 66.  
304Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 132. 
305Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 89–90; Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 706–7; Gane, Cult and 
Character, 137.  
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ritual that achieves ר פֶּ  by the reparation offering keeps the sacrificial portion of it. The כִּ
sameness of the reparation and sin offering is limited to which part of the sacrificial 
animal belongs to the priest. The phrase, “there is one law for them,” does not imply 
generalization306 since the difference between the two sacrifices is implied in the blood 
application of the two offerings. With the reparation offering blood is applied around the 
altar, while with sin offering, it is applied to the altar’s horns (Lev 7:2). The offerer is not 
stated since chapters 6–7 focus on the details regarding the sacrificial process that 
concern the priesthood, rather than the laity; this is reversed in chs. 1–5.307 
The only new element inferred from Lev 19:22 and Num 5:8 is found in the latter 
text which regulates to whom the restitution of the defrauded property will be given if the 
person of a defrauded property dies and leaves no kinsman. It belongs to the officiating 
priest.308 
Finally, the analysis above of the role of   ב in Lev 17:11b confirmed that be is beth 
essentiae or beth instrumentii. The blood in this text is obtained from all sacrifices, as it is 
traditionally believed that this is what the text deals with. This further implies that ר פֶּ  in כִּ
this text is achieved for situations where sin in the sense of act (sin and reparation 
offering) was or was not involved (burnt and well-being offering). The general language 
of this text suggests that it is a general statement309 and the offerer and the exact way 
 
306Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 410.  
307Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 382. 
308Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 382; Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 520. 
309Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 105–6. 
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blood is applied to the altar (around the altar or on the altar’s horns) remains unspecified. 
This text depends on the previous material in Lev 1–7 for the ritual flow of each sacrifice. 
 
ר פֶּ  ַעל  with כִּ
This grammatical construction of everything analyzed so far is the most 
frequently used in the Pentateuch. It occurs 56 times, always in cultic contexts. A detailed 
study of all occurrences is not necessary since the current study accepts that ַעל of 
advantage is operative in 47 of them310 as scholarly research shows. However, some texts 
in particular, Exod 29:36–37; 30:10; Lev 8:15; 14:53; and16:10,16, 18 do require a 
detailed analysis since the meaning of the construction in them is debated and affects the 
meaning of ר פֶּ  .The only non-cultic context of these is Lev 14:53 .כִּ
Milgrom has postulated the following proposition regarding the ר פֶּ  followed כִּ
with ַעל and other prepositions that accompany it: 
When the object is nonhuman, ר פֶּ  .takes the preposition ʿal or b or a direct object כִּ
For example, all three usages are attested to in the purging of the adytum on the Day 
of Purgation (Lev 16:16, 20), and they must be understood literally, for the kipper rite 
takes place on (ʿal) the kappōret and on the floor before it, in (b) the adytum, or it can 
be said that the entire room (ʾet) is purged (kipper; cf. also 6:23; 16:10, 33; Exod 
30:10), (Janowski 1982: 185 n. 5, who claims that kipper ʿal always means “expiate 
for,” must entertain the absurd idea that sancta [and the scapegoat, 16:10] are capable 
of sinning [see Milgrom 1985d: 302–4].)311 
When the object of kipper is a person, however, it is never expressed as a direct 
object, but requires the prepositions ʿal or beʿad. Both signify “on behalf of” (16:6, 
24, 30, 33; Num 8:12, 21), but they are not entirely synonymous. The difference is 
that ʿal can only refer to persons other than the subject, but when the subject wishes 
 
310Cultic contexts include: Exod 30:15–16; Lev 1:4; 4:20, 26, 31, 35; 5:6, 10, 13, 16, 18, 26 [6:7]; 
8:34; 10:17; 12:7–8; 14:18–21, 29, 31; 15:15, 30; 16:30, 33–34; 17:11; 19:22; 23:28; Num. 5:8; 6:11; 8:12, 
19, 21; 15:25, 28; 17:10–11[16:46–47], 28:22, 30, 29:5, 31:50. The only non-cultic context is Num 25:13. 
311Gyung-Yul Kim, “The Hattat Ritual and the Day of Atonement in the Book of Leviticus” (PhD 
diss., University of Pretoria, 2013), 26. 
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to refer to himself he must use bĕʿad (e.g., 9:7; 16:6, 11, 24; Ezek 45:22). This 
distinction is confirmed by Job 42:8: “Offer a burnt offering for yourselves 
(bĕʿadkem) and Job, my servant, will intercede on your behalf (ʿălêkem)” (Milgrom 
1970b). This means the purgation rite of the ḥaṭṭāʾt is not carried out on the offerer, 
but only on his behalf.312 Milgrom translates the former with “to effect purgation for” 
and “to effect purgation on” for the latter.313 
 
I first highlight what is correct and then, the assertions that are partially or totally 
incorrect. First, Milgrom correctly stated that ֵאת never marks the object of ר פֶּ  when that כִּ
object is human. Second, his criticism of Janowski314 is valid since the present study also 
maintains the idea that the nature of ר פֶּ  s object affects its meaning, and that that’כִּ
inanimate object is not capable of committing sin. Third, Milgrom is right that the ַעל + 
ר פֶּ  of ַעל construction means “on behalf of or for” when the object is human. It refers to כִּ
advantage.315 
First, Milgrom’s claim that the preposition ַעל and the direct object marker ֵאת 
“must be understood literally” is misleading, since his literal meaning of ַעל and   ב refers 
only to their spatial, locational sense, which singles out one meaning from their multiple 
meanings. The instrumental meaning is a possibility in Lev 16:10, which makes more 
sense since the goat for Azazel’s role was to receive the sins on itself and take them away 
from the camp, and that was just part of the ר פֶּ ר process. The כִּ פֶּ  process includes כִּ
crucial blood manipulation in the sanctuary. Accordingly, the instrumental sense of ַעל 
 
312Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 255.  
313Kim, “The Hattat Ritual,” 26. 
314That Janowski also noted the sameness of פֶּ ר  .for the people and inanimate entities is strange כִּ
Janowski, Sühne als Heilsgeschehen, 231–32. 
315Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 217. 
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would have a more precise meaning and fitting choice in this context, since it would refer 
to the specific role of this goat and not the entire process.  
More important, some texts with ר + ַעל פֶּ  ,include may both a locational sense כִּ
but also mark the direct object of ר פֶּ  and the ֵאת The fact that the direct object marker .כִּ
preposition ַעל are interchangeable in ר פֶּ  contexts is detected in several texts316 (Exod כִּ
29:36=Lev 8:15, Exod 13:19=Lev 5:22, Lev 3:3, 9, 14; 7:3=Lev 4:8, Lev 16:20 =v. 33, 
also in Lev 4:14, 5:5, 22, 24, 7:12, 8:9 ַעל functions as ֵאת, which disproves Milgrom’s 
claim that ַעל should be understood literally as referring to spatial, locational meaning. 
Accepting the fact that these two prepositions are sometimes equivalents removes the 
illogical reading of Lev 16:16. If a spatial, locational sense of ַעל is accepted the 
beginning of this verse should read, “thus he shall purge on the sanctuary.”317 Taking ַעל 
in 16:16 to function as the direct object marker of ר פֶּ  harmonizes this verse with Lev כִּ
16:20 in which ר פֶּ  to the express logical translation, “when he has ֵאת is associated with כִּ
finishes purging the sanctuary,” the sense of a direct object. Both texts refer to the 
cleansing of the sanctuary. Regardless of claiming that ַעל must be translated “literally,” 
meaning spatially, locationally, Milgrom could not avoid translating ַעל in the ר + ַעל פֶּ    כִּ
 
316This has been noted by Joshua Vis which I came across after I submitted my dissertation. 
Joshua M. Vis, “The Purgation of Person through the Purification Offering,” in Sacrifice, Cult, and 
Atonement in Early Judaism and Christianity: Constituents and Critique, eds. Henrietta L. Wiley and 
Christian A. Eberhart., RBS 85 (Atlanta: SBL Press, 2017), 33–34. 
317Kiuchi also noted this incongruity. However, he noted that ַעל can also function as a direct 
object marker, but missed applying this inference to other texts where that is the case as is done in the 
present study. Rather, he suggested that there is no difference between ר + ַעל פֶּ ר + ַבַעד and כִּ פֶּ  which ,כִּ




construction in Lev 16:16 as a direct object marker.318 Texts in Lev 14:53319 and 16:18320 
also imply the direct object sense of ַעל. The purely spatial, locational sense of ַעל is 
definitely found in Exod 30:10 as Milgrom claimed, but not in all other text cited. 
Exodus 29:36 and Lev 8:15 use the ר + ַעל פֶּ  construction in a unique way. That כִּ
is, both functions, spatial and locational indicator, and direct object marker, of the 
preposition ַעל are found in these two corresponding texts, the former being prescriptive, 
and the latter being descriptive. The first clause of v. 36 is a transitional clause. The noun 
ים ֻפרִּ ר encompasses both the ַהכִּ פֶּ  ,atoning of the priests and cleansing of the altar. Thus ,כִּ
the temporal infinitive of the ר + ַעל פֶּ ָך ,construction כִּ ר  ַכפֶּ ָעָליו ב  , contains both: ר פֶּ  ,כִּ
atoning of the priests, where ַעל functions as ַעל of advantage, and ר פֶּ  cleansing of the ,כִּ
altar, where ַעל functions as the direct object marker. 
To confirm his literal locational sense of   ב to mean “in,” he cited only one text, 
Lev 6:23, which is definitely the correct meaning. He could also have cited 16:17, 27. 
However, other texts that have the   ר + ב פֶּ    construction definitively convey the כִּ
 
upholds the crucial difference of the nature of ר פֶּ  ,between human and inanimate entities. Kiuchi כִּ
Purification Offering, 89–90, 92–93. 
318Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 1009–10.  
319Not recognizing that ַעל and ֵאת are equivalents in the ר פֶּ  ,context with nonhuman objects כִּ
Milgrom supplied the following translation of the beginning of this verse which retains the spatial, 
locational sense of ַעל,.“Thus he shall perform purgation upon the house,” instead of a more logical and 
fluid, “Thus he shall purge/cleanse the house,” with the direct object sense of ַעל. Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 
829. 
320He took the similar route for translating this text: see Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 876.  
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instrumental sense: Exod 29:33;321 Lev 7:7;322 and Num 5:8.323 Thus Milgrom’s postulate 
regarding the preposition   ב’s spatial, locational sense is not textually proven and excludes 
the instrumental sense that is the natural choice in more texts than the spatial, locational. 
Second, the distinction that ר + ַעל פֶּ  is used when reference is made to persons כִּ
other than the subject and that ר + ַבַעד פֶּ  refers to the subject of the phrase itself is כִּ
disproved by Lev 9:7; 16:6; 11; 24 where ר + ַבַעד פֶּ  is used and the texts refers to Aaron כִּ
and all the people.324 In addition, ר פֶּ  is.325 ָפַלל is not mentioned in Job 42:8 at all, but כִּ
The use of a different verb does not mean that certain structural patterns cannot be 
established and applied to different contexts that include different verbs, but a passing 
note, as Milgrom did, is not sufficient to make a sound case. More texts that contain the 
same structural pattern need to be cited with verbs that contain the same verbal type. 
Besides these nine occurrences of the ר + ַעל פֶּ  construction that have these כִּ
specific meanings, the rest of the 47 occurrences (Exod 30:15, 16; Lev 1:4; 4:20, 26, 31, 
35; 5:6, 10, 13, 16, 18, 26 [6:7]; 8:34; 10:17; 12:7, 8; 14:18, 19, 20, 21, 29, 31; 15:15, 30; 
 
321Milgrom, contradicting himself, affirmed the instrumental sense of the preposition   ב. Milgrom, 
Leviticus 1–16, 528, 534, 540–41, 707–8. 
322Milgrom’s translation, “it shall belong to the priest who performs expiation therewith,” again 
shows that he was not able to avoid the instrumental sense of   ב, again contradicting himself here. Milgrom, 
Leviticus 1–16, 380–81. Emphasis mine. 
323In this text, Milgrom again affirmed the instrumental sense of the preposition   ב. Milgrom, 
Leviticus 1–16, 707–8. 
324Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 88–89. 
325Piel: judge, execute judgment, expect (H7136); ָפַלל (pālal I B), hithpael: pray (Prayer: 
Theology); יל יָלה ;(pālı̂l), nom. judge, (H7130) ָפלִּ לִּ י ;(pᵉlı̂lâ), nom. decision (H7131) פ  ילִּ לִּ  .pᵉlı̂lı̂), nom) פ 
calling for judgment (H7132); ָּיה ילִּ לִּ ָּלה ;(pᵉlı̂lı̂yâ), nom. decision, judgment (H7133) פ  פִּ  .tᵉpillâ), nom) ּת 
prayer (related to ָפַלל B; H9525; Prayer: Theology). Richard Schultz, “ָפַלל,” NIDOTTE 3:624. 
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16:30, 33, 34; 17:11; 19:22; 23:28; Num 5:8; 6:11; 8:12, 19, 21; 15:25, 28; 16:46, 47; 
25:13; 28:22, 30; 29:5; 31:50) provide a large variety of ways in which ר פֶּ  is כִּ
accomplished. There are two points common for all of them: (1) ַעל in ר + ַעל פֶּ  marks כִּ
the indirect object that receives the advantage of the verb it is associated with, and (2) the 
indirect object of ַעל is always human. An analysis of the ways in which ר פֶּ  is כִּ
accomplished in ר + ַעל פֶּ  .detects seven distinct contexts כִּ
First, in a significant number of texts, ר פֶּ ר + ַעל in כִּ פֶּ  constructions is achieved כִּ
through a sin offering only, which means that the blood is obtained from this offering 
(Lev 4:20, 26, 31; 5:6, 11; 10:17; 12:7, 8; 15:15, 30; 16:10, 16, 18). Most of these texts 
imply that the offerer is somehow associated with ritual (Lev 12:7–8; 15:15, 30) or moral 
(Lev 4:20, 26, 31) impurity or that ר פֶּ  atones for GHS (Lev 10:17). Location of the כִּ
blood application in this context is prescribed in Lev 4 and depends on the offerer’s 
societal status. In the case of the priest or the entire community, it takes place either in 
the first compartment of the sanctuary (blood is sprinkled in front of the veil that 
separates the two compartments, applied on the horns of the incense altar, and the rest is 
poured out at the base of the sacrificial altar) or on the sacrificial altar (blood is applied 
on its horns and the rest is poured out at its base). 
Second, ר פֶּ ר + ַעל in כִּ פֶּ  constructions is achieved by burnt offering only (Lev כִּ
1:4; Num 28:30), implying that the blood is obtained from this offering. These contexts 
do not relate any impurity to the offerer and thus, ר פֶּ  refers to atoning for the offerer’s כִּ
GHS. The blood is applied around the sacrificial altar regardless of the societal status. 
Third, ר פֶּ ר + ַעל in כִּ פֶּ  constructions is also achieved by the reparation offering כִּ
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only in some texts (Lev 5:13, 18, 26; 19:22; Num 5:8). The procedure of making a 
reparation offering was presented in Lev 7:1–7. The blood obtained from this offering is 
applied around the altar regardless of societal status, just like the burnt offering. These 
texts always relate moral impurity to the offerer who makes this sacrifice. They come to 
the sanctuary with the reparation offering in order to achieve ָסַלח via ר פֶּ  .כִּ
Fourth, in most of the ר + ַעל פֶּ ר  ,constructions כִּ פֶּ  is accomplished through both כִּ
sin and burnt offering (Exod 29:33, 36, 37; Lev 8:15, 34; 10:17, 16:10, 16, 18, 30, 33, 34; 
23:28; Num 8:12, 21; Num 15:25, 28; 28:22, 30; 29:5). Based on their contexts, these 
texts can be divided into groups: (1) consecration ritual, (2) cleansing ritual, and (3) 
forgiveness ritual. All of them are analyzed below under the subheading ר פֶּ  and related כִּ
concepts, and for that reason, they are not analyzed here. 
Fifth, the ר פֶּ ר + ַעל in כִּ פֶּ  constructions are sometimes achieved through the triad כִּ
of sin, burnt, and reparation offering (Lev 14:18, 19, 20, 21, 29, 31; Num 6:11). These are 
also comprehensively analyzed below under the subheading ר פֶּ  ,and related concepts כִּ
and for that reason they are not analyzed here. 
Sixth, in some texts, the ר פֶּ ר + ַעל in כִּ פֶּ  construction does not involve making a כִּ
sacrificial offering, but rather, (1) bringing the money to the sanctuary (Exod 30:15–16), 
(2) Aaron’s mediation with the censer and incense among the people (Num 17:11–12 
[16:46–47]), (3) killing an Israelite and Midianite woman (Num 25:13), or (4) bringing 
articles of gold and other valuable items (Num 31:50). 
Seventh, some texts totally depend on other texts for the ways in which ר פֶּ  is כִּ
achieved (Exod 30:10). 
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ר פֶּ ָעֹון ָנָׂשא and כִּ : Leviticus 10:17 
Eating of the sin offering meat by the officiating priest in the context of offering 
the sin offering is an inseparable element of the ר פֶּ  on the behalf of the offerer and is כִּ
embedded in the relationship between the ָעֹון  ָנָׂשא  and ר פֶּ  Since several questions that .כִּ
surround this text, beside the relationship between ר פֶּ ָעֹון ָנָׂשא and כִּ , are relevant for the 
present study, they are all studied here.  
 
The Meaning of Priests’ Eating of Sin Offering Flesh 
That is, Lev 6:19 [26], 22 [29] and 7:6 state that an officiating priest receives and 
is obligated to eat the remaining flesh of sin offering when he offers it on behalf of 
another Israelite. The meaning of this ritual has also generated a significant amount of 
attention by scholars.326 Two key questions that permeate the scholarly discussions 
concerning the ritual gesture of the priests’ eating of the flesh of the outer altar sin 
offering are (1) does this gesture contribute to the expiation process, and (2) if it does, 
whether it plays an additional or simultaneous role in the process of expiation?327 
 
Does Eating of the Sin Offering Flesh Contribute ר פֶּ  ?כִּ
As to the first question, the history of the interpretation of the sin offering shows 
that the majority of scholars who stripped the priests’ eating of the edible sin offering 
flesh of any expiatory significance claim that sin offering flesh is just a priest’s reward 
 
326Levine, In the Presence of the Lord, 103–4; Gane, Cult and Character, 91–105; Wright, The 
Disposal of Impurity, 132–35; Kurtz, Offerings, 228–30; Rodríguez, “Substitution in the Hebrew Cultus,” 
130–36; Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 46–52. 
327Gane, Cult and Character, 91; Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 624. 
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for his ministry.328 This was Milgrom’s position initially, but an extensive scholarly 
dialogue made Milgrom change his position on the meaning of this ritual gesture in the 
course of his scholarly career.329 
This was irrefutably one of the reasons, but not the only, nor the major one.330 I 
trace the change of Milgrom’s understanding of this activity since it includes relevant 
arguments for the position that eating of the sin offering is crucial in the ר פֶּ  .process כִּ
He used to follow A. Ehrlich who suggested a different meaning of Lev 10:17b, 
namely, “and he has given it to you for bearing the responsibility of the community by 
performing purgation rites on their behalf before the Lord.”331 In this case, the phrase ָעֹון 
 would not refer to the priests’ bearing the sins of the people, but rather, to bearing ָנָׂשא
the responsibility of the entire community through their performing of expiatory rites on 
their behalf before the Lord. The flesh of edible ַחָּטאת, based on such an understanding of 
this verse, would be just a reward or wage for the priests’ service.332 Two arguments are 
crucial for the change of Milgrom’s opinion on both of these points.  
 
328Kurtz, Offerings, 228; Janowski, Sühne als Heilsgeschehen, 239n272; Kiuchi, Purification 
Offering, 47, 51; Jacob Milgrom, “Two Kinds of Ḥaṭṭāʾt,” VT 26 (1976): 333–34. For a more elaborate list 
of proponents of this view see Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 47n33, especially. 
329Milgrom, “Two Kinds of Ḥaṭṭāʾt,” 333–34; Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 261–64. 
330Rad, Old Testament Theology, 1:248; Rodríguez, “Substitution in the Hebrew Cultus,” 131. 
331Arnold B. Ehrlich, Randglossen zur Hebräischen Bibel: Textkritisches, Sprachliches und 
Sachliches (Leipzig: J. Hinrichs, 1908–14), 2, 37; A. W. Knobel, Die Bücher Exodus and Leviticus 
(Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1880); Wright, The Disposal of Impurity, 133; Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 623. Others 
also follow this interpretation of eating of the ַחָּטאֹות meat. Gerstenberger, Leviticus, 86; Noth, Leviticus, 
58. 




First, he recognized that the praxis of the elimination of impurity by the means of 
ingestion was known in some cultures.333 Yet, the argument streaming out of the 
comparison of the two geographically distant cultures is quite methodologically unsound. 
Second, a natural next step for Milgrom was to reconsider his understanding of 
the function of edible ַחָּטאת, which he used to think was a priestly reward for their 
service.334 The change of his opinion on this point seems to be adequately established in 
contrast to the first point. He pointed to Rodríguez’s dissertation335 where the following 
quotation by Knierim is found as the initial source for his change of opinion: 
Eine Übertragung auf denʿāwōn Begriff ist aber kaum möglich; denn 
“Verantwortung” ist ein wertneutraler, unqualifizierter Begriff. Das aber ist beiʿāwōn 
nie der Fall. ʿāwōn ist immer qualifiziert. In den gennanten Stellen (Numb 18:1. 23; 
Ezek 18:19) wird man darum nśʾʿāwōn nicht allgemein mit “verantwortlich sein,” 
sondern mit “für die ʿāwōnōt verantwortlich sein, sie zu tragen haben” übersetzen.336 
 
Biblical texts do not give grounds for ָנָׂשא ָעֹון to be translated as “bear 
responsibility” since responsibility is value-neutral and unqualified term. On the contrary, 
 
333In his previous works he used to claim that such a ritual gesture was never known in the Ancient 
Near East. Milgrom, “Two Kinds of Ḥaṭṭāʾt,” 333–34. Later, supposedly upon more extensive research, he 
claimed that such praxis was known in other cultures such as Hinduism and in England. Milgrom, Leviticus 
1–16, 624. Such cases did not exist in ancient Greece. Parker, Miasma: Pollution and Purification in Early 
Greek Religion, 283. Milgrom also cited a slightly different case found in the incantation tablet from 
Nimrud, Iraq, tablet number ND.5577 found in the ruins of the Ezida Temple, in a pit in N.T. 12 in 1956, 
where the sick man ate dough which evidently absorbed his illness and thereby eliminated it from his body, 
bringing his health back. E. E. Knudsen, “An Incantation Tablet from Nimrud,” Iraq 21 (1959): 54–55, 59. 
In this case, it is an inanimate object, not another human being, that absorbs the illness, not an impurity, 
from the sick man’s body. 
334Wright, The Disposal of Impurity, 133n22. 
335Rodríguez, “Substitution in the Hebrew Cultus,” 134n2. 
336Knierim, Die Hauptbegriffe für Sünde im Alten Testament, 220. Cited in Rodríguez, 
“Substitution in the Hebrew Cultus,” 134. My translation: “A transfer [of the meaning] to the ʿāwōn term is 
hardly possible however. For responsibility is a value-neutral, unqualified term. Yet this is never the case 
with ʿāwōn. ʿāwōn is always qualified. In the mentioned places (Num 18:1, 23; Ezek 18:19) nśʾʿāwōn will 
therefore not be generally translated as “be responsible,” but as “be responsible for the ʿāwōnōt, to have to 
carry them.” Kiuchi also follows Knierim on this. Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 50–51. 
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 ,ֲעֹוֹנת is always a qualified term and should be translated as “to be responsible for the ֲעֹוֹנת
to have to carry them.” Thus, it seems that the priests are not merely to bear 
“responsibility,” but “responsibility for the sins of the Israelites,” which they would take 
upon themselves via ingesting the flesh of the edible sin offering. 
Milgrom himself discovered additional and very critical points to support his 
newly accepted position. If the flesh of the edible sin offering were just to be a reward for 
their ministry, then Moses’s anger at Aaron’s sons would be difficult to explain. 
Leviticus 10:17–18 actually encloses the requirement of eating the sin offering flesh, 
which would further indicate that there is an expiatory significance in that ritual 
gesture.337 He also correctly noted that the frequency of eating of the sin offering flesh by 
the priests would be much higher than burning it up outside the camp. Two sets of 
stipulations found in the Pentateuch would most likely happen rarely in the life of Israel, 
that is, the case of the anointed priest committing a sin that would put the entire 
community, including himself, (Lev 4:3–21) and the annual cleansing of the sanctuary on 
Yom Kippur (Lev 16:27) in jeopardy. In all other instances the priest would eat the flesh 
of the sin offering.338 
The priest had to eat, at least a part of, the sin offering flesh and/or by the help of 
his fellow priests. Milgrom found that rabbis in their dictum also confirmed this (Sipra, 
Shemini 2:4b; Pesah 59b; Yoma 68b; Yebam 40a, 90a). He also rightfully pointed out the 
fact that cultic legislation demands that laypersons burn the rest of their sacrifices which   
 
337Wright, The Disposal of Impurity, 133n22. 
338Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 637. 
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they were not able to eat for the duration of the holy feasts: the Passover (Exod 12:10a, 
12b; 23:18, 34:25; Num 9:12; Deut 16:4), the thanksgiving offering (Lev 7:15; 22:30), 
the well-being offering (Lev 7:17; 19:6), the ordination offering (Lev 8:32; Exod 29:34–
the priests were still lay persons here). Absence of such an implicit command in regards 
to sin offering flesh points to the fact that the priest had to eat its flesh in order to 
complete the process of expiation.339 
 
Incident in Lev 10 
The scholars who stripped the priests’ eating of the sin offering flesh of any 
expiatory value point to the fact that the priests’ not eating of the sin offering flesh in the 
incident in Lev 10 did not invalidate the people’s sin offering.340 However, Lev 10:19 
suggests that failure to follow the ritual procedure was not an accident, but rather, a 
deliberate decision by Aaron.341  
The rationale for the failure to follow the ritual procedure is stated in the text, but 
at least two valid responses were suggested, besides others which are not defensible.342 
First, Aaron possibly felt that he and his sons were not worthy of ingesting the flesh of 
the sin offering since they were the object of severe condemnation by God,343 or the death 
 
339None of the sets of instructions concerning expiatory sacrifices, namely the cereal offering 
offered as a sin offering, sin offering and reparation offering (Lev 6:9, 11, 19, 22; 7:6; 10:12–13, 17–18) 
include the rule about burning their leftovers. They obviously had to be eaten. Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 
638. 
340Ellinger, Leviticus, 139; Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 47; Gane, Cult and Character, 92. 
341Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 635–36; Gane, Cult and Character, 92. 
342Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 636. 
343Gane, Cult and Character, 92. 
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of Nadab and Abihu before the Lord–within the sanctuary,344 contaminated both the sin 
offering by severe impurity, making it unsafe for the priests to ingest it, and the entire 
sanctuary which needed immediate cleansing.345 
Gane added that the sole incident in which the priest did not eat the meat of the 
sin offering or in other words, did not follow ritual procedures in exceptional and unique 
circumstances, does not give grounds for the claim that eating of the sin offering meat 
does not have an expiatory role.346 
 
The Role of ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  in the ר פֶּ  ?Process כִּ
Regardless of the weaknesses of Ehrlich’s view, he seems to be right in his 
understanding of the verb נׂשא in the sense of “bear” rather than “remove,” since Knierim 
noticed that the Hebrew does not make a terminological distinction between bearing 
consequences of one’s actions and bearing them for someone else. He claims that “dieser 
Wechsel des Trägers wird nicht durch eine andere Begrifflichkeit, sondern nur durch 
Subjektwechsel ausgedrückt.”347 Thus, when coupled with ָעֹון, it means the bearing of 
culpability, and this immediately asks for the response to the question: “What happens to 
the priest as a result of bearing the people’s culpability?”348 
Schwartz’s work on how the priest is freed from bearing the people’s culpability 
 
344Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 600. 
345Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 639. 
346Gane, Cult and Character, 92. 
347“This change of the bearer is not expressed by a different terminology, but only by change of 
subject.” Knierim, Die Hauptbegriffe für Sünde im Alten Testament, 53. 
348Gane, Cult and Character, 101. 
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is helpful. That is, as it was presented on p. 197 of the present study, based on his study 
of the phrase ָנָׂשא ָעֹון and its equivalents349 in the Pentateuch, he strongly argued against 
the traditional understanding that in the contexts dealing with the consequences or 
forgiveness of sin, these phrases do not convey two distinct meanings, that is, suffer 
punishment or forgive sin, respectively. Rather, they were employed to express 
metaphorically the objective fact of legal guilt in terms of bearing or carrying sin, 
conceiving the wrongdoing as an object to be dragged around as a burden.350 The first 
usage identified by Schwartz is a sinner who himself bears his own sin, and these phrases 
indicate that he/she deserves and may suffer the consequences, if there are any. In this 
case, it is a metaphor of sinner liability/culpability. The second usage is associated with 
the situations when another party, God or other human being, bears the sinner’s burden; 
that is, it does not rest on the sinner’s shoulders anymore. In this case the phrases are a 
metaphor for the sinner’s release from his/her liability/culpability. Thus, the phrases do 
not have two different meanings, but rather two different uses with only one meaning.351 
Schwartz’s study shows that the two uses of these phrases differ not only by their 
subject, but also by the sense in which they employ נׂשא. In case of a consequential 
bearing of sin, the sinner carries it, which may kill him/her by human or divine agency if 
it remains unsolved. If someone else bears the sinner’s sin, the second party does not bear 
 
349The two equivalents are נׂשא פׁשע and נׂשא חטא. Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 8. 
350Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 15; Gane, Cult and Character, 102. 
351Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 9–15. 
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it for it disappears. In this case נׂשא means “carry off, take away, remove.”352 
Following this pattern and keeping in mind the fact that the carriers of sin in Lev 
10:17b are the priests, Schwartz then translates ת־ֲעֹון ָלֵׂשאת ָהֵעָדה אֶּ  as “to carry away the 
transgressions of the community.”353 The priests take away the culpability of the people 
so that the people do not carry it. In spite of the strength of his arguments, Schwartz’s 
study fails to explain adequately how culpability, transferred to someone else from the 
sinner who is liable for it, simply disappears. The consequences for the secondary sin-
bearer are not explicitly stated, but that does mean that the secondary sin-bearer does not, 
at least temporarily, carry them.354 
Koch claims that the priests were to remove ָעֹון from Israel or from the sanctuary, 
bear it as God’s representatives, and by virtue of their own inherent quality, render it 
harmless (Exod 28:38; Lev 10:17; Num 18:1, 23).355 Koch believed that the priest’s 
inherent quality, which makes them immune to culpability of the people, is divinely 
derived holiness conferred on the priests and their vestments at their consecration 
ceremony.356 Koch also found that the high priest, through confession and laying on of 
hands on the head of the scapegoat, transfers the culpability onto it so that the scapegoat 
is now the one who bears the culpability (Lev 16:21f).357 Contrary to Schwartz’s 
 
352Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 10. 
353Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 16. 
354Gane, Cult and Character, 103. 
355Koch, “עון,” TDOT 10:559. 
356Koch, “עון,” TDOT 10:560. 
357Koch, “עון,” TDOT 10:559. 
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understanding of the meaning of these phrases based on the points presented by Koch, it 
could be argued that these phrases do have distinct meanings, that is, (1) to suffer 
punishment or (2) to forgive sin. 
W. Zimmerly made a difference between bearing sin with God himself as a 
subject, which is found in non-cultic contexts, and cultic usage in which the priests ingest 
the sin offering flesh.358 It seems that the fact of God’s bearing sin without an after-effect 
on him would potentially pave the path for the possibility of the priest’s bearing another 
person’s ָעֹון in order to achieve expiation that is prerequisite to divine forgiveness.359 The 
close linguistic parallel between Exod 34:7 in which God ַׁשע ָעֹון ֹנֵׂשא ַחָּטָאה ָופֶּ ו  , “bearing 
iniquity and transgression and sin,” and Lev 10:17, in which the priest bears ָעֹון, seems to 
confirm this possibility. Consequently, the priest’s eating of the sin offering flesh also 
conveys his participation in the process of God’s granting forgiveness to the sinner.360 
 
How Is Sin Offering Both Holy and Impure? 
A number of scholars have denied any expiatory significance to the ritual of 
priestly eating of sin offering meat361 based on the claim that the sin offering is holy (Lev 
6:18 [25], 22 [29]; 10:17). They have not accepted the potential impure status of the sin 
offering flesh.362 In other words, impurity and holiness cannot coexist in the sin offering. 
 
358Zimmerli, “Zur Vorgeschichte von Jesaja LIII,” 239. 
359Gane, Cult and Character, 104. 
360Gane, Cult and Character, 104. 
361Kurtz, Offerings, 240; Dillmann and Ryssel, Die Bücher Exodus and Leviticus, 463–64, 517. 
362Noordtzij, Numbers, 79–80; Kurtz, Offerings, 228–30, 240–41; Dillmann and Ryssel, Die 
Bücher Exodus and Leviticus, 463–64; Budd, Leviticus, 116; Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 119. 
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Based on Lev 4:20, 26, 31, 35, Dillmann claimed that expiation was achieved 
with no further aid by the priest’s eating of sin offering flesh. Eradication of sin is not 
needed after forgiveness is granted. Nevertheless, this claim disregards important 
supplementary regulations of the sin offering sacrifice found outside of Lev 4, namely in 
Lev 6:19 [26], 22 [29]; 10:17; and 16:26–28. Based on these texts, eradication of sin, 
after forgiveness has been granted, is a required element of the expiation process and is 
accomplished either via eating of the sin offering flesh by a priest or burning it outside of 
the camp.363 It has been rightfully argued that sacrificial regulations found in Lev 1–5 are 
written from the offerer’s perspective and Lev 6–7 from the priest’s perspective, which 
explains why a priest’s eating of the sin offering is not listed among other sin offering 
regulations in Lev 4.364 The complete range of the sin offering regulations found in the 
OT includes eradication of sin, as well as forgiveness. 
In addition, Milgrom pointed out that the priest’s ingestion of sin offering flesh 
becomes even more crucial due to the fact that sin offering was associated with impurity. 
The priest was the embodiment of holiness, while ַחָּטאת, to the contrary, was the 
embodiment of impurity. An occasion of the priest’s consuming the sin offering delivers 
an insightful theological statement, that is, “holiness has swallowed impurity, life can 
defeat death.”365 The priest’s invulnerability to impurity stands in apparent contrast to the 
sanctuary’s vulnerability to any form of it. As long as he is within that same sanctuary,   
 
363Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 624–25; Wright, The Disposal of Impurity, 133. 
364Gane, Cult and Character, 91–92; Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 134. 
365Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 638. 
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the priest is resistant to impurity. As soon as he leaves it, his immunity is revoked. Thus, 
Milgrom reasoned: “Impurity pollutes the sanctuary, but it does not pollute the priest as 
long as he serves God in the sanctuary.”366 
Milgrom finally pointed to the fact that the laws of impurity (Lev 11–15) 
intentionally follow the incident of Nadab and Abihu. This speaks about the seriousness 
of impurity since the entire tent had to be cleansed after this incident, but at the same 
time, it speaks for the fact that, through uninterrupted service of the priests, holiness is 
more powerful than impurity.367 
Kiuchi also further noted that it would be inadequate to assume that the 
congregation somehow defiled the sanctuary in the context of Lev 9 before the sin 
offering ritual.368 In addition, he recognized that the plain sense of the preposition ל in 
 Lev 10:17b) “to bear/remove” is that of purpose,369 conveying that the eating of) לׂשאת
sin offering flesh serves as the activity vehicle for priestly ָנָׂשא ָעֹון, rather than simply as 
a prerequisite for the earlier bearing of officiating responsibility.370 This means that the 
sin offering retains its holiness besides the fact that it contains impurity. 
 
Does Sin Offering Refer to the Sin Offering 
Flesh or the Entire Sacrifice? 
Kiuchi echoed the claim of Kurtz, who agreed with Hoffman that the phrase “he 
 
366Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 638–39. 
367Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 639. 
368Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 50. 
369Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 48. 
370Gane, Cult and Character, 101. 
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has assigned it to you” does not refer to the eating of the sin offering flesh, but to the 
entire sin offering.371 He arrived at this conclusion by claiming that Lev 6:19 [26]; 6:23 
[30] sin offering refers to the whole offering, not just flesh of it.372 Janowski also claimed 
that “to remove iniquity of the community,” clarified by “to effect purgation on their 
behalf,” refers to the priestly mediatory role for Israel through effecting expiation for 
them via sin offering as a whole.373 
However, in this context, it does not refer to the entire sin offering ritual, which 
would include blood application, but rather, to the flesh of the sin offering, the remainder 
of the sacrificial animal, which can be eaten. Here, החטאת is accompanied by the direct 
object marker which makes it the direct object of the verb אכל as the Hebrew text shows. 
Also, at this point of the event in Lev 10, לכם נתן  could not refer to God’s assigning the 
victim to the priest so they could apply blood to the altar since the animal was already 
God’s property by the time of the blood application and he, consequently, assigned the 
flesh to the priests Lev 6:10 [17]; 7:32, 34, 36.374 It is not the entire sin offering in 
question here, but rather, the flesh portion of it which God allotted to the priest.  
Contrary to Kurtz’s understanding, Gane presented a structural analysis of Lev 
10:17b where he found that the first part of the bipartite structure begins with the 
interrogative ( ַַמּדּוע) and the second, with the motive clause particle (י  and concludes ,(כִּ
 
371Hofmann, Der Schriftbeweis, 2:281. Cited in Kurtz, Offerings, 242. 
372Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 48. 
373Janowski, Sühne als Heilsgeschehen, 239n272. 
374Gane, Cult and Character, 95. 
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with the parallelism defined by infinitives ( ַכֵפר ...ל   as the Hebrew text ,(ָלֵׂשאת … 
shows.375 
ם  ּתֶּ ת־ַהַחָּטאת לֹא־ֲאַכל  אֶּ   
קֹום מ  ׁש בִּ ַהֹּקדֶּ   
ׁש  ים ֹקדֶּ וא ָקָדׁשִּ הִּ   
ֹאָתּה ם  ָנַתן ו  ָלכֶּ   
ת־ֲעֹון  ָהֵעָדה  אֶּ   
ם  ֵני ֲעֵליהֶּ פ  הָוה  לִּ ׃ י    
 
In addition, there is also chiastic correspondence between the two parts of the 
structure, namely the verb ם ּתֶּ ם ָנַתן A) and the verbal phrase) ֲאַכל  ָלכֶּ  (A1): both parts 
contain a verb and a second-person address referring to the priests, and the noun  ַׁשה ֹּקדֶּ  
(B) and the nominal phrase ים ׁש ָקָדׁשִּ  B1), a repetition of the terms.376) ֹקדֶּ
ם ּתֶּ   A ֲאַכל 
ׁש   B ַהֹּקדֶּ
ים  ׁש ָקָדׁשִּ   B1 ֹקדֶּ
ם    A1 ָנַתן ָלכֶּ
 
Thus, Gane concluded: “So A1 ָנַתן ָלכֶּ ם, ‘he has assigned it to you,’ serves as the 
structural functional equivalent of A ם ּתֶּ  did you eat.’”377‘ ,ֲאַכל 
Finally, Gane found another chiasm in the opening texts of the two parts of the 
structure, namely, that the verb ם ּתֶּ ם ָנַתן is the equivalent of the verbal phrase ֲאַכל  ָלכֶּ , 
while the direct object marker ֹאָתּה ת־ַהַחָּטאת is the antecedent of ו   378.אֶּ
 
375Gane, Cult and Character, 94. 
376Gane, Cult and Character, 94. 
377Gane, Cult and Character, 94. 
378Gane, Cult and Character, 95. 
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ת־ַהַחָּטאת  ם אֶּ ּתֶּ   ֲאַכל 
 
ם  ֹאָתּה ָנַתן ָלכֶּ   ו 
 
 
Thus, it seems plausible that the last part of the verse is related to the eating of the 
sin offering flesh. The context of the text makes it clear that the eating of the sin offering 
is in question here, so repetition of the verb ָאַכל is not necessary.379 
The placement of the particle י ׁש before and not after the phrase כִּ ים  ֹקדֶּ וא ָקָדׁשִּ הִּ  
does not support the claim that this part of the verse affirms the holy status of the sin 
offering due to its contribution to the expiation process. It has been suggested that its holy 
status is determined by the place of its ingestion, that is, within the tent of meeting.380 
However, it seems that ַחָּטאת, besides other cultic objects that are not inherently holy,381 
receive its ׁש ים ֹקדֶּ ָקָדׁשִּ  status through particular ritual procedures or theophany. It also 
seems that once they have received their ׁש ים ֹקדֶּ ָקָדׁשִּ  status, these objects increase their 
holiness via contact with the holy tabernacle.382 
Accordingly, the sin offering did not receive its ׁש ים ֹקדֶּ ָקָדׁשִּ  status by being eaten 
in the tent of meeting, but rather, its ׁש ים ֹקדֶּ ָקָדׁשִּ  status was preserved, maintained, and 
increased by its being ingested in the tent of meeting. It was considered ׁש ים ֹקדֶּ ָקָדׁשִּ  as 
soon as it was devoted to the Lord; God has assigned it with that status. This is 
 
379Gane, Cult and Character, 95. 
380Gane, Cult and Character, 95. 
381Tabernacle and the most holy furniture and offerings. Wright, “Holiness (OT),” 3:244. 
382Wright, “Holiness (OT),” 3:244. 
 
481 
particularly emphasized in Exod 30:10383 and Num 18:19. The initial קדׁש קדׁשים status 
of the sin offering was assigned to it even before the tent of meeting (ritual spatiality) 
existed. 
This is also true for the outer, sacrificial altar recorded in Exod 29:37: the ׁש  ֹקדֶּ
ים  .status of the outer altar was achieved by the rites of consecration ָקָדׁשִּ
The guidelines in Exod 30:22–29 suggest that the tent of meeting itself including 
the ark of the covenant, the table and all its utensils, the lampstand and its utensils, the 
altar of incense, the altar of burnt offering with all its utensils, and the basin with its 
stand, which were all labeled as ׁש ים ֹקדֶּ ָקָדׁשִּ , all received their ׁש ים ֹקדֶּ ָקָדׁשִּ  status through 
the consecration service–ritual procedures performed by Moses (Exod 40). 
The object within the tabernacle preserved their ׁש ים ֹקדֶּ ָקָדׁשִּ  by remaining in it 
and its courtyard. The initial sanctification of the tabernacle was consummated by God’s 
arrival into the most holy place and continuance of the sanctifying effect of the tabernacle 
was also conditional on God’s presence in the most holy place.384 
The incense, Exod 30:34–38, seems to get  ֶּים ׁשֹקד ָקָדׁשִּ  status by being produced 
following particular procedures God has revealed. The same applies to the bread of 
presence, based on ritual procedures for its production found in Lev 24:9. 
Consequently, it seems that cultic objects, in this case תַחָּטא , received  ׁש ים ֹקדֶּ ָקָדׁשִּ  
status through particular ritual procedures they would undergo directed by God and 
 
383The entire process of expiation on the Day of Atonement was summed under one, collective sin 
offering and is labeled “sin offering” in this text. Gane, Cult and Character, 20. 
384Wright, “Holiness (OT),” 3:245. 
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preserved and potentially increased their status by remaining in the holy tabernacle. 
Some correctly maintain both elements, that is, the sin offering flesh was a 
compensation to the priests for their service, but also essential to the expiation process.385 
 
How Does Eating of the Sin Offering Flesh Contribute to 
the ר פֶּ  Process: Simultaneously or כִּ
Separately/Additionally? 
Besides some scholars who did not see any expiatory significance in the priest’ 
eating of the sin offering flesh,386 some who accept the expiatory function of the priest’ 
eating of the sin offering flesh assume, based on the phrase ת־ֲעֹון ָלֵׂשאת ָהֵעָדה אֶּ  found in 
Lev 10:17, that this ritual activity actually removed of the evil absorbed in the sin 
offering flesh.387 
Y. Kaufmann suggested that the priest’s eating and incinerating the sin offering 
flesh are alternative ways of eliminating impurities.388 Milgrom followed this, as well, 
but suggested that the rationale for the two types of elimination of the sin offering flesh 
was due to the amount of impurity accumulated in it as the following quotation shows: 
By requiring that the ḥaṭṭāʾt be eaten, Israel’s priests were able to affirm that the 
power to purge the sanctuary does not inhere in a ritual but is solely dependent on the 
will of God. Moreover, they backed up their conviction by their act: they ate the 
ḥaṭṭāʾt and were willing to suffer the consequences if their conviction proved wrong. 
 
385Gane, Cult and Character, 94–95; Levine, Leviticus, 62; Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 622–25, 
635–40; Snaith, Leviticus and Numbers, 56, 80; Yitzhaq Feder, Blood Expiation in Hittite and Biblical 
Ritual: Origins, Context, and Meaning, WAWS 2 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2011), 70–71. 
386Noordtzij, Numbers, 79, 114–15. 
387Keil and Delitzsch, The Pentateuch, 2:355; Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 623–25, 637–39; Budd, 
Leviticus, 156; Levine, Leviticus, 62–63. 
388Gane, Cult and Character, 97; Yeḥezkel Kaufmann,  תולדות  האמונה הישראלית [Toldot 
HaEmunah HaYisraelit The Religion (Belief) of Israel], 4 vols. (Jerusalem: Bialik, 1937–56), 1:568. 
Strongly opposed understanding by Snaith, Leviticus and Numbers, 56, 80. 
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Yet their faith was not without its limits: the ḥaṭṭāʾt prescribed for the deep pollution 
of the sanctuary, when its blood was brought into the shrine, continued to be burned. 
The pollution incurred by Israel’s brazen sins and impurities, which had infested the 
very seat of the Godhead in the Holy of Holies … was just to lethal to be ingested.389 
 
The outer altar sin offering contained a low level impurity and was safe for the 
priests to ingest it, while the outer sanctum sin offering, which supposedly contained 
Israel’s brazen sins and impurities which penetrate to the holy of holies, was too harmful 
for the priest to ingest.390 This claim by Milgrom also conveys the change of his opinion 
on the transferability of impurity, since he previously held that impurity was not 
transferable to the sin offering and that it was just as a reward to the priests for their 
ministry.391 
However, Gane correctly noted that there is a weakness in the claim that the 
reason for not eating the sin offering flesh of a higher-level impurity was because of the 
priest’s fear, due to limitations of their faith.392 Based on the principle that the priests 
could not benefit from their own expiatory sacrifices,393 the outer sanctum sin offering 
flesh could not be eaten even though their blood sometimes was only applied to the outer 
altar and not to the outer sanctum (Exod 29:14; Lev 8:17; 9:11).394 
Gane also pointed to the fact that the inner-sanctum sin offering on the behalf of   
 
389Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 637. 
390Wright, The Disposal of Impurity, 132–33. 
391Gane, Cult and Character, 97; Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 637.  
392Gane, Cult and Character, 97–98. 
393Milgrom, “Two Kinds of Ḥaṭṭāʾt,” 337; Rodríguez, “Substitution in the Hebrew Cultus,” 135–
36; Hasel, “Studies in Biblical Atonement-I,” 103. 
394Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 264. 
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the community on the Day of Atonement (Lev 16) was not eaten, but burned up outside 
of the camp even though the high priest was not included in the offering party, contrary 
to the regular outer sanctum sin offering in Lev 4:12–21. The high priest performed a 
separate sacrifice for himself and his household. The fact that he did not eat the sin 
offering flesh of the community’s sacrifice points to the fact that, potentially, the 
“consumption of the purification offering flesh serves to involve the officiating priest in 
the process by which Yhwh extends forgiveness to the offerer.”395 
Before expanding this proposal, Rodríguez’s unique interpretation of the priest’s 
eating of the sin offering flesh should be mentioned here. Rodríguez claimed that the 
priest’s eating of the sin offering flesh of the edible sin offering is equivalent to the 
sprinkling of the outer sanctum sin offering blood.396 His claim results from the fact that 
the outer sanctum sin offering ritual contains a sevenfold sprinkling in front of the veil, 
while the priests ingest the outer altar sin offering flesh. Gane stated that Rodríguez’s 
understanding that these two ritual activities as equivalent was based on the fact that, in 
Lev 9:8–11, the inauguration offering on behalf of Aaron (and his sons) involved only the 
application of the blood to the outer altar, but yet, was incinerated outside the camp. Gane 
did not provide a reference from Rodríguez’s work for such a claim.397 The blood was not 
sprinkled inside the tent of meeting, but the sin offering flesh was properly burned up 
 
395Gane, Cult and Character, 98; Rodríguez, “Substitution in the Hebrew Cultus,” 135–36; 
Milgrom, “Sacrifices and Offerings, OT,” 766. 
396Gane, Cult and Character, 98; Rodríguez, “Substitution in the Hebrew Cultus,” 133–35; 
Milgrom, “Sacrifices and Offerings, OT,” 766; Wright, “The Spectrum of Priestly Impurity,” 133n22. 
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instead of eaten.398 On the other hand, the sin offering of the community was also offered 
at the outer altar with no sprinkling in the tent of meeting but, it was Nadab’s and 
Abihu’s tragic death that caused it not to be eaten (Lev 10:16–20). Otherwise, the priest 
would have eaten it, since Moses expected it to be eaten by the surviving priest.399 
Gane claimed that eating or not eating the sin offering flesh was not due to the 
presence or absence of sprinkling of the blood in the outer sanctum, but rather, if the 
offerer was a priest or layperson. The reason for the incineration rather than eating of the 
priest’s inaugural sin offering is based on the principle that a priest who officiates at his 
own expiatory sacrifice cannot benefit from it.400 Gane stated that the rule in 6:23[30] 
which states that no sin offering of which blood was brought into the Tent of meeting 
may be eaten by the priest excludes the priestly ingestion of outer sanctum or inner 
sanctum sin offering flesh. It does not, as Rodríguez assumed, say that every outer altar 
sin offering must be eaten. According to Gane, the sin offering flesh was not necessarily 
to be eaten by the priest according to the regulation in Lev 6:23[30], but because Moses 
thought that it should be, as the following quotation shows: “When Moses cites this rule 
in 10:18 to assert that the priests should have eaten the inaugural offering of the 
community because its blood was not brought inside the sanctuary, he is saying that an 
 
398Gane, Cult and Character, 98; Rodríguez, “Substitution in the Hebrew Cultus,” 135–36.  
399Gane, Cult and Character, 99. 
400Rodríguez, “Substitution in the Hebrew Cultus,” 135–36; Snaith, Leviticus and Numbers, 56; 
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outer altar (not outer sanctum) purification offering of the community (not of the priests) 
should be eaten.”401 
These two arguments are unsound. First, one of the crucial differences between 
the two types of sin offering is the absence or presence of the blood sprinkling inside of 
the sanctuary. The first two cases in Lev 4:2–21, for the high priest and the entire people, 
include sprinkling of blood inside of the outer sanctum, and the sacrifice is incinerated 
outside the camp, while the last two cases in Lev 4:22–35, the leader or a commoner, do 
not include it, and the officiating priest eats the flesh of the sin offering. 
Milgrom’s rationale for the comprehensiveness of the regulation in Lev 6:23[30] 
and its impact on Lev 10:17 is sound: 
Some commentators feel that this rule applies only to the previously mentioned 
purification offerings (4:1–21; Ibn Ezra, Ramban), but its generalized formulation 
argues for greater comprehensiveness. This rule also explains Moses’ rebuke of 
Aaron for not eating the purification-offering goat sacrificed on the day the regular 
Tabernacle cult was initiated (10:17): even though the goat was brought by the 
community—in a previously cited case the community’s purification offering was not 
eaten but was incinerated (4:13–21)—because its blood was daubed on the outer altar 
and not taken inside the Tent (9:9 [see the NOTE], 15), it should have been eaten by 
the priests.”402 
 
Neither of the two reasons Gane proposed above—(1) that the absence or 
presence of blood sprinkling is not the crucial difference between outer altar and outer 
sanctum sin offering and (2) that Lev 6:23[30] does not imply that every outer sanctum 
sin offering must be eaten—diminishes the principle that the priests do not eat the meat 
portion of their sin offerings because they cannot benefit from their own sacrifice. Even   
 
401Gane, Cult and Character, 99. 
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more, the present study upholds that the priest, by bearing the sin of the leader and the 
commoner, is integrated in the process of ר פֶּ  and of which the final result is divine 403,כִּ
 .on the behalf of the offerer ָסַלח
 
Is Eating of Sin Offering Flesh a Way of Eradication of the ַחָּטאת? 
In his dissertation on the disposal of impurity, Wright pointed to the fact that the 
priest’s eating of the edible sin offering cannot be taken as equivalent to the burning of 
the outer sanctum 404;ַחָּטאת he found support for this claim in Lev 10:17, which states 
that the purpose of eating the edible sin offering is (1) bearing of the iniquity of the 
congregation and (2) doing expiation for them before the Lord.405 Wright suggested that 
“had the concession to eat not been given to the priests, the carcass would have been 
burned like the sanctuary-priestly ḥaṭṭāʾt.”406 
Gane suggested further support for the claim that the priests participate with God 
in bearing the culpability of the people. He based his claim on the syntax of Lev 10:17 
which discusses the purpose of God’s assigning the sin offering flesh to the priests as the 
Hebrew text shows: 
 
העדה  את־עון לׂשאת  
׃ יהוה  לפני עליהם לכפר  
 
 
403Rodríguez, “Substitution in the Hebrew Cultus,” 131, 133. 
404Budd, Leviticus, 117; Snaith, Leviticus and Numbers, 80. 
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That is, the preposition ל + infin. cstr. + reference to the community in 
 strongly conveys the impression that the two ideas are intended, to (-הם .pron. suff/העדה)
be synonymous.407 Thus, the priests’ eating of the sin offering flesh is necessary for the 
priests to remove the iniquity from the people in order to effect ר פֶּ  on behalf of the כִּ
people. Even though the priests’ offering of the sacrifices in Lev 9:7, 15 made a vital 
contribution to the overall process of ר פֶּ  nothing is said about priests removing iniquity ,כִּ
from the people until Lev 10:17b where this aspect of expiation is accomplished by the 
priests’ eating of the sin offering flesh.408 
It has to be emphasized that the priests’ eating of the sin offering flesh is not 
essential for the achievement of the expiation/atonement in every kind of sacrifice. The 
outer altar offerings of the priests and the outer sanctum offerings are incinerated, rather 
than eaten, and they also accomplish expiation/atonement of impurity on behalf of the 
offerer, while in the sacrifices which the priests offer for the benefit of others, a special 
kind of priestly participation by eating the sin offering flesh is added in achieving 
expiation/atonement.409 
It seems that the phrase ת־ֲעֹון ָלֵׂשאת אֶּ  in Lev 10:17 is applicable only to the sin 
offering for moral impurity. In cases of outer–altar sin offering for severe ritual 
 
407Olaffson, “The Use of nśʾ in the Pentateuch,” 263; Ángel Manuel Rodríguez, “Transfer of Sin 
in Leviticus,” in The Seventy Weeks, Leviticus, and the Nature of Prophecy, ed. Frank B. Holbrook, Daniel 
and Revelation Series Committee 3 (Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald, 1986), 187; Gane, Cult and 
Character, 99. 
408Gane, Cult and Character, 99; Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 194–95. 
409Gane, Cult and Character, 99–100; Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 190, 194–95. 
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impurities, where presumably no ָעֹון would be involved, the remaining sin offering flesh 
would have a function of a priestly reward only.410 
Lev 10:17 conveys double identification by the priests. By eating of the sin 
offering flesh, the priests serve as a mediatorial bridge between the people and God: 1) by 
taking their iniquity, they identify with the people (Lev 5:1), and 2) by removing their 
iniquity, they identify with God (Exod 34:7).411 Consequently, Rodríguez’s claim is 
textually established that the sprinkling of the blood of the sin offering inside the 
sanctuary (Lev 4:2–21) and the priest‘s eating of the sin offering flesh (Lev 4:22–35) 
have the same function of transferring sin from the offering to the sanctuary or the 
officiating priest, respectively, is textually established. 
 
Summary of Leviticus 10:17 
Based on the more comprehensive study of the Pentateuch texts, the eating of the 
sin offering flesh does contribute to the ר פֶּ  process. The moral impurity is transferred כִּ
from the offerer to the priest via the sin offering sacrifice. ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  in this context refers to 
the priest's bearing of the leader's or commoner's moral impurity, instead of the latter 
bearing their own. The sin offering sacrifice has the unique feature of being holy and 
impure at the same time. The impurity that it received from the offerer does not nullify its 
holy status. The incident in Lev 10 in which the priest did not eat the sin offering of the 
people did not annul the basic regulation that eating of the sin offering flesh is imbedded   
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in the ר פֶּ  ,process. This eating of the sin offering flesh is irrefutably food for the priests כִּ
but also more important, an integral part of the ר פֶּ  process and, as such, cannot be כִּ
understood as a way of eradicating the sin offering animal. 
In addition, the relationship between ר פֶּ ָעֹון ָנָׂשא and כִּ  in this unique context 
suggests that the latter is crucial in achieving ר פֶּ  This claim is based, among others, on .כִּ
the syntactical relation between the two infinitives that introduce both verbs. 
Accordingly, ר פֶּ  in 10:17 is limited to the people and is achieved by the blood of כִּ
the sin, burnt, and peace offerings which were offered by the priest on behalf of the 
people (Lev 9:15–16, 18–21). The blood was applied around the altar. The specific 
reason why these sacrifices were offered was to conclude the eight-day-long process of 
the consecration of the priests and the institution of the sanctuary by offering sacrifices in 
it for the first time. Ritual or moral impurity terminology is not found in the chapter, 
suggestive of the absence of any of the two possible impurities. I suggest that ר פֶּ  in this כִּ
context deals with the GHS of the people. 
 
ר פֶּ  and Conceptually Related Concepts כִּ
There are five other verbs that appear in ר פֶּ  (ָרָצה ,ָסַלח ,ָטֵהר ,ָקַדׁש ,ָחָטא) contexts כִּ
along with one verbal phrase ( ָעֹון ָנָׂשא ). The following Table 24 lists them along with 
references and stems. The analysis begins with the texts in which ר פֶּ  is related to two כִּ
other verbs, Exod 29:33, 36–37; Lev 8:15; Lev 14:49–53; 16:19, 30; Num 8:21; Lev 
12:7–8; 15:13, 28; Num 6:11, and then resumes in the following order Lev 4:20, 26, 31, 
35; 5:10, 13, 16, 18, 29 [6:7]; 12:7–8; 19:22; Num 15:25, 26, 28; Lev 1:4; and 10:17. 
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Table 24. The verb ר פֶּ  and related verbs כִּ
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The following pages demonstrate that Hartley’s following statement can be seen 
as correct: 
Sometimes another verb in the [כפר] context emphasizes an aspect accomplished by 
 be clean” (qal 12:7, 8; 14:20, 53; cf. Num 8:21) or“ ,טהר :or an attending result כפר
“cleanse” (piel 16:30),  נסלח לו, “be forgiven” (4:20, 26, 31, 35; 5:10, 13, 16, 18, 
ֵדׁש ,(19:22 ;[6:7]26  ,piel) “sanctify, consecrate” (8:15; 16:18–19; Exod 29:33, 36) קִּ
37; Num 6:11), and ֵטא  piel) “purge, de-sin” (8:15; 16:18–19; Exod 29:36).412) חִּ
 
In such contexts, ritual activities that achieve  ר פֶּ  deal with certain aspects related כִּ
to the ritual participants who contribute to the overall goal of those rituals. ר פֶּ  in those כִּ
cases represents a sub-ritual, that is, is just a part to reach the overall goal expressed by 
 
412Hartley, Leviticus, 64. 
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the other verbs. These contexts are analyzed below.  
 
ר פֶּ  Exodus 29:33, 36 :ָקַדׁש and ָחָטא and כִּ
The verbs ָחָטא and 413 ָקַדׁש along with ר פֶּ ר  appear in Exod 29:33, 36, and כִּ פֶּ  כִּ
with ָקַדׁש, only in v. 37. The context is the consecration of the priests, Aaron and his 
sons, and the sacrificial altar. 
 
The Consecration of the Priests: Aaron and His Sons 
Exodus 29:1 makes it clear what the main purpose of its ritual is: “Now this is 
what you shall do to them to consecrate them to minister as priests to Me.” However, at 
the same time, it does not make any mention of ritual or moral impurity in reference to 
the priests or the altar. This means that the priests were profane and pure before the ritual 
of their sanctification began, which is in accordance with Wright’s assertion that most of 
ritual laws deal with such a state of human beings.414 Milgrom also correctly stated that 
the priests were profane at this point of the ritual415 and that they did not offer sin 
offering to purge themselves, but the altar.416 Only ritually clean people could participate 
in public or familial cultic functions.417 
 
413“In Hebrew the simple verb form focuses attention on the pivotal change that occurs when the 
‘not-holy’ becomes ‘holy.’” Baruch A. Levine, “The Language of Holiness: Perceptions of the Sacred in 
the Hebrew Bible,” in Backgrounds for the Bible, eds. Michael Patrick O’Connor and David Noel 
Freedman (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1987), 244. Also, Wright. Wright, “Unclean and Clean,” 6:735. 
414Wright, “Holiness (OT),” 3:247. 
415Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 545. 
416Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 279. This is incorrect since the ר פֶּ  of the priests is expressed by the כִּ
noun ֻכַפר in v. 33 of which only the priests could eat. 
417Averbeck, “ר  .NIDOTTE 2:337 ”,ָטה 
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Accordingly, ר פֶּ  in v. 33 deals with something other than purifying, cleansing of כִּ
the priests to which I return after presenting the flow and certain details of the 
consecration ritual. The ר פֶּ  .of the priests is accomplished in two phases כִּ
As vv. 33–34 state, the first phase of consecration was accomplished through the 
ordination offering, not the sin offering, since that is the only sacrificial meat that the 
priests ate.418 It is not specified who provided the sacrificial animal, but the text states 
that Moses offered the sacrifice with the priests acting as the offerers since they laid their 
hands on the sacrificial animal and ate the sacrificial meat. The blood from the ordination 
offering was applied “on the lobe of Aaron’s right ear and on the lobes of his sons’ right 
ears and on the thumbs of their right hands and on the big toes of their right feet,”419 and 
the rest was sprinkled around the altar (vv. 19–20). 
Second, Moses was to take blood that was on the altar and anointing oil and 
sprinkle the mixture on Aaron and his sons and their garments in order to consecrate 
them (v. 21). Two points of difference between the ר פֶּ  in phase two from phase one כִּ
emerge as the instructions are compared: (1) blood that was sprinkled on the priests and 
their garments was obtained from the sin and burnt offering (vv. 10–14, 15–20, 
respectively) in contrast to the blood that was obtained from the ordination offering, and 
(2) the mixture of blood was applied on the priests and their garments without specifying 
the spot on their bodies, in contrast to the blood of the ordination offering whose blood 
 




was applied on the lobes of the priests’ right ears, the thumbs of their right hands, and on 
the big toes of their right feet. 
Keeping in mind the fact that the ever-present characteristic of human sinfulness 
was also the priests’ disadvantage in God’s presence, the present study essentially agrees 
with Hartley who made a general statement regarding the sacrifice of the consecration 
ritual in Exod 29: “These sacrifices daily cleansed the priests from the pollution of human 
sinfulness. This period of separation brought to completion the consecration of these men 
to the priestly task.”420 In the same vein, Kurtz explained the difference between dealing 
with sin or GHS: 
For the forgiveness of sin, or justification, might be defined in precisely the same 
way. And the definition is all the more inappropriate here, from the fact that the sin-
offering had regard not to sinfulness in general, or to the sinful habitus, which is the 
object exterminated in the case of sanctification, but to certain acts of sin, the 
extermination of which is effected not by sanctification, but by justification.421 
 
Based on the four states related to creation and the fifth related to human beings 
and the flow of the ritual in Exod 29, the present study adds more nuances to this general 
statement. That is, the ordination offering solely served to change the profane and pure 
state of the priests into the holy. Holiness is not inherent with creation, but is imparted by 
God.422 As regards the ordination offering, that is, in his terms, “the Filling Ram,” 
William H. Propp stated: “It seems, therefore, that the rite simply raises one’s state of 
 
420Hartley, Leviticus, 115. See also Wenham, The Book of Leviticus, 148. 
421Kurtz, Offerings, 232. 
422Wright, “Holiness (OT),” 3:237. 
 
495 
purity, making the impure pure and the already pure super-pure.”423 Wright also came to 
the same conclusion regarding the ritual process of the sanctification of the priests in his 
ABD article on “Holiness, OT.”424 
Milgrom incorrectly stated that the sin offering is not included in the ר פֶּ  of the כִּ
priests, but was right in suggesting that the meaning of ר פֶּ  is more general in this כִּ
context and should be translated as “to atone.”425 The blood of the sin and burnt offering, 
along with anointing oil, was sprinkled on the priests and their garments (v. 21), which 
means that the sin offering was included in the process of consecration. Accordingly, ר פֶּ  כִּ
cannot mean “to purify, to cleanse,” since the priests’ presence in the sanctuary implies 
their pure state, and the ordination offering was used to change their pure state into holy. 
Only clean people could participate in public or familial cultic functions.426 There is 
nothing on the priests that needs to be purified/cleansed. The only element that sin and 
burnt offering could deal with is the GHS, as Hartley suggested, but partially erroneously 
that it is related to all the sacrifices in the consecration ritual. The present study suggests 
that ר פֶּ  brought about by sin and burnt offerings especially has to do with the GHS in כִּ
accordance with the ר פֶּ  ,function of both of these sacrifices (Lev 1, 4–5). In other words כִּ
ר פֶּ  atones for ritual participants, which by being sinful human beings were naturally כִּ
 
423Propp, Exodus 19–40, 530–31. Followed by Arnold B. Ehrlich, The Pentateuch, vol. 1 of Mikrâ 
ki-Pheschutô: The Bible According to Its Literal Meaning (New York: KTAV, 1969), 193. 
424Wright, “Holiness (OT),” 3:244. Milgrom incorrectly stated that the objective of ordination 
offering was purgation. Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 540–41. 
425Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 540–41. 
426Averbeck, “ר  .NIDOTTE 2:337 ”,ָטה 
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considered unacceptable in God’s presence, protecting them to reside safely and perform 
various services in God’s presence. The present study agrees with Milgrom that ר פֶּ  כִּ
should be translated as “to atone for” in this particular context. 
ר פֶּ  in the consecration ritual is a part of the broader sanctification כִּ
process/ritual.427 It is just a phase, a subprocess of a broader consecration process/ritual 
within which it, by atoning for the GHS of the participants, enables and protects them to 
reside safely and perform other rituals in God’s presence. Accordingly, it is distinct from 
consecration. Consecration implies a change of status in terms of the rite of passage. 
 
The Consecration of the Sacrificial Altar 
ר פֶּ  .in v. 36, where it refers to the cleansing of the altar ָחָטא overlaps with the כִּ
The infinitive ר פֶּ ר should be understood with the temporal sense when one כִּ פֶּ  on it.428 כִּ
The consecration of the priests which includes offering of multiple sacrifices depends on 
a properly operating sacrificial altar. For that reason, the consecration of the altar is 
interwoven in the ritual of priestly consecration. However, based on the flow of the ritual, 
the main emphasis is on the consecration of the priests, while the ritual for the 
consecration of the altar is briefly stated in vv. 36b and 37. 
Assuming that the sin offering purifies/cleanses the altar from sins and impurities 
on the behalf of the offerer, that is, the priests, Milgrom and Wright concluded that the 
blood of the sin offering applied to the altar purifies/cleanses it in order to prepare it for 
 
427Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 96. 
428Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 95. Contra Milgrom. Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 226. 
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its consecration.429 However, at the same time, both of them understood that the verb ָחָטא 
purifies the altar in v. 36 as a preparation for consecration.430 Milgrom correctly stated 
that “purging must precede consecration, not follow it.”431 
Thus, two different verbs in the same verse have the same meaning. This tension 
that two different verbs are used in the same verse with the identical meaning is relatively 
easily resolved by realizing that these two verbs are synonyms.432 It is redundant, but still 
possible. However, the claim that the purification of the altar is a preparatory stage before 
its consecration is not warranted by the text, and thus, opens room for a different 
explanation. 
Milgrom and Wright are inconsistent concerning the anointing of the altar. They 
held that the anointing of it is effected by the application of the anointing oil on it, which 
takes place at the beginning of each day of the 7-day-long ritual.433 The present study 
agrees with this since this is the most natural sequence of events related to the altar in 
Exod 29 and 40, and Lev 8. However, they also both viewed the altar as impure and in 
need of cleansing. The text never labeled the altar as being impure. It is, rather, in the 
 
429Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 278–79; Wright, “Holiness (OT),” 3,244. 
430Milgrom’s translations of “to effect or to perform purgation” reflect his assumption that the 
blood of a sin offering purifies/cleanses what it is applied to, and thus, the altar as well. Milgrom, Leviticus 
1–16, 278–79, 290, 400, 520–24, 528–29, 540–41, 582–83, 881, 1036. “The purgation sacrifice in 
particular cleanses and sanctifies the outer altar, readying it for ensuing sacrificial activity (Exod 29:36–37; 
Lev 8:15; Ezek 43:18–22, 25–26).” Wright, “Holiness (OT),” 3:244; Wright, “Unclean and Clean,” 6:731. 
431Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 523–24.  
432There are other contexts, as shown below, that ר פֶּ  are synonyms in certain texts (Lev ָחָטא and כִּ
1). Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 1039–40, 884, 289–90. 
433Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 290; Wright, “Unclean and Clean,” 6:731, 733. 
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basic profane state. As such, it was anointed, which resulted in its consecration (Exod 
40:11; Lev 8:11). 
Following the four states related to creation, the altar is pure and profane at the 
beginning of the ritual, and since it is in this condition, it does not need to be purified. Its 
consecration is achieved by applying anointing oil on it, which takes place before the 
priests were anointed. However, later in the ritual, Exod 29:36 states that the altar needs 
to be cleansed, and the present study agrees with Milgrom and Wright that the altar’s 
state changed during the ritual and needs to be purified/cleansed, but disagrees with by 
what and how it got defiled.  
Milgrom asked valid questions: “Why is it [the altar] singled out, and what is its 
purpose?”434 or in another place “… the newly erected altar can hardly have become 
polluted; why then need it be purged? And why for seven days?”435 After correctly 
refuting several suggestions as to why the altar would need purification/cleansing, 
Milgrom suggested that the priests themselves, because of their proximity to it, defiled 
the altar by “unavoidable physical impurities (e.g., a nocturnal emission, 15:16–17)” and 
subsequently, their laying on of hands on the sin offering meant that they were making 
this offering to purify/cleanse the altar from their sin.436 This reasoning is not possible 
based on the logic Milgrom himself proposed. Direct contact between impurities, even 
minor ones, and the sancta would cause the carrier of impurity to die.437 This translates to 
 
434Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 520–21. 
435Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 278–79. 
436Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 522–23. 
437Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 307–8, 930, 993, 1050. 
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the immediate death of the priests. In addition, nocturnal emissions in married men, 
which Aaron was (Exod 6:23) and his sons438 most likely were,439 are very rare.440 
Another assertion that invalidates this interpretation is the fact that Exod 29 does 
not mention defilement of the sanctuary, even though the priests were in its proximity as 
much as they were in the proximity of the altar. It never actually used any term for ritual 
and moral impurity in reference to the priests, altar, or sanctuary. In addition, if the sin of 
Aaron and his sons was the issue these sacrifices dealt with, then it would be expected 
that the blood of their sin offerings would be applied in the first compartment of the 
sanctuary before the veil as the regulations prescribe (Lev 4:3–12), and not on altar. 
However, that did not happen in Exod 29. Because of these points, the present study 
suggests another interpretation. 
The altar needed to be cleansed from the priests’ GHS. That is, vv. 10–12 and vv. 
15–16 state that the priests laid their hands on the heads of both sacrificial offerings and 
their blood was applied on the altar’s horns and the base in the case of the sin offering 
and around the altar in the case of the burnt offering. No ritual or moral impurity that was   
 
438Eleazar was married based on Exod 6:25. 
439It was commonly widespread in the Ancient Near East that people would marry very young and 
that custom is maintained even today. Roland de Vaux calculated that king Jehoiachin married at the age of 
16, and Amon and Josiah at the age of 14. Roland de Vaux, Ancient Israel: Its Life and Institutions (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1997), 29. 
440“For males who have experienced nocturnal emissions the mean frequency ranges from 0.36 
times per week (about once every three weeks) for single 15-year-old males to 0.18 times per week (about 
once every five-and-a-half weeks) for 40-year-old single males. For married males the mean ranges from 
0.23 times per week (about once per month) for 19-year-old married males to 0.15 times per week (about 
once every two months) for 50-year-old married males.” “Nocturnal Emission,” Wikipedia, released 24 
July 2018, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nocturnal_emission#In_males; American Academy of Sleep 




related to the priests is mentioned in this chapter. However, the fifth state of GHS related 
to humans remains a disadvantage for the priests in God’s presence even during this 
ritual. Both of these sacrifices deal with the status of humans before God. The blood was 
offered on the altar to God in order to achieve  ר פֶּ ר on behalf of the priests. The כִּ פֶּ  in כִּ
this case cleanses the priests’ GHS that defiled the altar, while at the same time, atoned 
for the priests’ GHS, granting them the right to stay safely in God’s presence regardless 
of their GHS. 
In addition, Milgrom claimed that the blood of the sin offering has a prophylactic 
function. It was to protect the altar from future defilement.441 This statement is erroneous 
in its totality. The very purpose of the altar was to receive the impurity which is one of its 
fundamental functions (Lev 4:22–35), and it was not intended to be protected from it. The 
infinitive of ר פֶּ  should be understood as temporal, “when you atone for,” and has a dual כִּ
function in v. 36. It encompasses atoning for the priests and simultaneously cleanses the 
altar from the impurity. 
To conclude, the sequence of the processes related to the priests’ consecration is 
the following: (1) the priests were anointed (Exod 29:7) which resulted in (2) their 
ordination (Exod 29:9), then (3) the mixture of the blood of all sacrifices and oil was 
 
441“The blood rites therefore had both a purgative and an apotropaic function. It is not too difficult 
to conclude that in Israel these rituals originally had the same dual purpose: to purge the altar of pollution 
and to protect it from future pollution.” Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 279. It is very difficult to imagine that the 
application of the blood during this ritual protected the altar from future pollution against the laws in Lev 
4:22–35; 16:18–19, which all speak of the defilement of the altar and its cleansing. 
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sprinkled on them ר פֶּ  for their GHS (Exod 29:10–12, 15–16, 19–21) which resulted in כִּ
(4) their consecration (Exod 29:21).442 
The blood in this ritual was obtained from three sacrifices: sin, burnt, and 
ordination offerings. The offerers of these sacrifices were Aaron and his sons, but since 
this was the introduction of the priestly ministry, Moses acted as the officiating priest. 
There are two reasons for offering these sacrifices. First, the sin and burnt offerings 
atoned for the priests’ GHS and they were applied to the altar. Second, the ordination 
offering, along with sin and burnt offerings, ordained/consecrated the priests and was 
applied to the lobes of the priests’ right ears, the thumbs of their right hands, and on the 
big toes of their right feet. 
The chronological sequence of the processes related to the altar during the priests’ 
consecration is the following: (1) the altar is being anointed (Exod 40:9–10; Lev 8:10–
11), which resulted in (2) the altar’s consecration (Exod 40:9–10; Lev 8:10–11). 
The blood for this ritual was obtained from sin, burnt, and ordination offerings. 
The offerers are the same as in the previous ritual, the priests. The reason was the 
cleansing of the GHS of the priests. The blood of sin and burnt offerings was applied 
according to the protocol established in Lev 1, 4, while the blood of the ordination 
offering was applied around the altar. 
The phrase ָך ר  ַכפֶּ ָעָליו ב   is used in v. 36 to refer back to the ר פֶּ  atoning of the ,כִּ
priests, contained in the noun ים ֻפרִּ ר in the first clause of v. 36, and the ַהכִּ פֶּ    cleansing ,כִּ
 
442Gane provided a more comprehensive flow of the ritual that is parallel to the flow of the ritual 
sequences mentioned here. Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 162–65. 
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of the altar in the second clause of v. 36, where ר פֶּ  The application .ָחָטא is equivalent to כִּ
of the blood of all sacrifices achieved ר פֶּ  for the priests to protect them in God’s כִּ
presence as anointed representatives, while the altar’s ר פֶּ  ,is referred to as cleansing כִּ
since it was defiled by the priests’ GHS. The noun ים ֻפרִּ ר encompasses ַהכִּ פֶּ  .of both כִּ
First, the cleansing of the altar is expressed by the verb ָחָטא in v. 36 and synonymously 
by the temporal infinitive of the ר פֶּ  Second, the atoning of the priests is contained in the .כִּ
temporal infinitive of ר פֶּ ר Consequently, the temporal infinitive of .כִּ פֶּ  in v. 36 refers to כִּ
the entire ר פֶּ  .ritual that was performed on behalf of the priests and the altar כִּ
ר פֶּ  done on the priests and the altar differs due to their different natures and כִּ
status. Humans are sinful and need ר פֶּ  to atone for their GHS, thus protecting them in כִּ
God’s presence in order to prepare them for holy status. ר פֶּ  for the altar, since it is כִּ
inanimate, is different than ר פֶּ ר .for the priests, and refers to its cleansing כִּ פֶּ  ָחָטא and כִּ
are synonyms in this case.443 Anointing with oil consecrates the altar, and it functioned as 
an authorized altar from the beginning of the ritual. Based on the anointing of the altar 
that Lev 8:11 places before the anointing of the priests, it can be assumed with Milgrom 
that Lev 8:11 and Exod 40:9–13 assume that this first initial anointing of the altar was 
also meant between the sequences of Exod 29:7a and 29:7b.444 The altar in this context 
 
443There are other contexts, as shown below, that ר פֶּ  are synonyms in certain texts (Lev ָחָטא and כִּ
1). Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 290, 882–83, 1039–40. 
444Milgrom also provided a compelling explanation of the altar’s double anointing and the form of 
the second one. Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 515. 
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needed ר פֶּ  in the sense of purifying/cleansing from the priests’ general human sinfulness כִּ
that was transferred to it during the 7-day consecration ritual for the priests. 
This is the first time in my analysis of ר פֶּ  that I encountered the phenomenon of כִּ
the dual function/meaning of the same ritual activity, in this case, blood manipulation. 
This phenomenon is well established in biblical rituals445 and in this case, the GHS of the 
priests is transferred to the altar by the blood application and at the same time, the blood 
application purifies the altar. This is in agreement with the biblically-based principle that 
most of the laws deal with entities that are profane and pure as contrasted to the state of 
holiness and impurity.446 
 
ר פֶּ  Leviticus 8:15 :ָחָטא and כִּ
There are certain differences between the ritual flow in Exod 29 and Lev 8, and 
Milgrom conveniently discussed them.447 However, the ritual flow is essentially the 
same. The priests were first anointed (Exod 29:7, 21; Lev 8:12)448 in order to be ordained 
 
445Gorman noticed that through blood application on the Day of Atonement, blood absorbs sins 
that were located in the sanctuary and thus, cleanses it (Lev 16:16). The same blood serves to consecrate 
the altar in the following ritual sequence (Lev 16:19). Gorman, The Ideology of Ritual, 82, 87–89; Gane, 
Cult and Character, 5. It was emphasized before that the high priest, as a handler of the sin offering blood, 
also gets defiled by the sins he absorbed. Accordingly, the sins are carried by both the blood of the sin 
offerings and the high priest himself, and are later transferred to the Azazel goat. In the meantime, the same 
blood consecrates the altar.  
446See p. 400 in the present study. 
447Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 545–49.  
448In Lev 8, anointing is mentioned in v. 12 and results in Aaron’s consecration, while Exod 29:7 
does not state that Aaron is consecrated after being anointed because Exod 29 seems to present 
consecration as complete only after both blood and oil were sprinkled on Aaron. I agree with Milgrom’s 
understanding that this is a more sensible sequence, but disagree with him that the priest has to be purified 
before being consecrated; I rather propose that Aaron has to be ר פֶּ  atoned for in the sense of protected ,כִּ
before being consecrated. Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 545.  
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(Exod 29:19–21; Lev 8:12),449 and sprinkled with the mixture of blood of all offerings 
from the altar and oil (Exod 29:21; Lev 8:12, 30)450 in order to be consecrated (Exod 
29:21; Lev 8:12, 30).451 Though present, the differences do not seem to affect the basic 
ritual processes and their essence. Accordingly, everything that was said regarding the 
ר פֶּ  in the previous subheading is assumed in relation to ָקַדׁש and ָחָטא and its relation to כִּ
the ritual of Lev 8. 
There is a significant difference between Exod 29:36–37 and Lev 8:15 in the use 
of prepositions. That is, ָחָטא is syntactically related to the preposition ַעל in Exod 29:36, 
while ַעל is replaced by the direct object marker in Lev 8:15. As suggested in the analysis 
of ר + ַעל פֶּ  functions as a direct object marker. This is not ַעל ,constructions above כִּ
established based on the interchangeability of the two particles in these two texts, but the 
same pattern is detected in other texts as shown above. 
The sameness of the sequence of ritual processes in Exod 29 and Lev 8 in relation 
to the consecration of the priests and the altar suggests the same relationship between   
 
449They were daubed with the blood of ordination offering together in Exod 29:20, while in Lev 
8:23–24, separately. Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 545. 
450“Aaron is not sprinkled together with his vestments, his sons, and their vestments (v. 30) 
because he has already been sanctified by the anointment oil (v. 12). Yet Exod 29 insists that he be 
sprinkled together with his vestments, his sons, and their vestments (v 21) for it is this aspersion with blood 
and oil that simultaneously sanctifies Aaron and his sons.” Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 545. The sprinkling 
rite precedes the consecration of the elevation offering in Exod 29:21–26, while the order is reversed in Lev 
8:30, 25–26. Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 545. I follow Milgrom who favors the Exodus’ more logical ritual 
flow with small modifications as proposed above. 
451Lev 8:12 declares Aaron sanctified/consecrated by the anointing of oil only, but then in v. 30, it 
follows Exodus in stating that now both Aaron and his sons along with their vestments were anointed and 
consecrated by sprinkling the mixture of the blood from the altar with oil. Exodus 29 insists that sprinkling 
all the priests along with their vestments takes place at the same time, and then declares them 
consecrated/sanctified. Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 545. 
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ר פֶּ ר .in Lev 8:15 ָקַדׁש and ָחָטא ,כִּ פֶּ  in the consecration ritual is a part of the broader כִּ
sanctification process/ritual.452 Consecration, as a broader process/ritual, includes ר פֶּ  as כִּ
the phase, subprocess, which atones human participants enabling and protecting them to 
reside safely and perform other rituals in God’s presence. ר פֶּ  also overlap in ָחָטא and כִּ
Lev 8:15 as they did in Exod 29:36453 and they refer to the cleansing of the altar. 
The sameness of the ritual also implies the same inferences regarding the origin of 
the blood, sacrifices included, the identity of the offerer, location of the blood 
application, and its function. It is plausible that through the laying on of hands and the 
application of the blood of these two sacrifices, the priests’ GHS was transferred to the 
altar from which it later needed to be removed in the sense of purified/cleansed. 
 
ר פֶּ  Leviticus 14:20, 49–53 :ָטֵהר and ָחָטא and כִּ
There are two sets of stipulations in Lev 14. The first passage presents the ritual 
for purification after ָצַרַעת person is healed, vv. 1–32, whereas the second passage deals 
with fungus in houses, vv. 33–53. ר פֶּ  in the ָטֵהר and ָחָטא is associated with the verb כִּ
second and ָטֵהר in the first one. 
Lev 14:1–32. There is a sequence of appearances of ָטֵהר on the first, seventh, and 
eighth day (vv. 8, 9, 20) that mark various levels of cleanness that the  ת עַ ָצַר  person 
 
452Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 96. 
453Because the purpose of the ritual process is consecration, the preposition   ל is used in the sense 
of instrumental, “by means of,” rather than   ל of purpose. Wenham, The Book of Leviticus, 135; Kiuchi, 
Purification Offering, 129. Contra Gorman who equated  ֶּפ ר כִּ  not just with the cleansing but also with 
consecration. Gorman, The Ideology of Ritual, 87. 
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obtains during the ritual in the first passage. ר פֶּ  which appears in vv. 18, 19, 20, is ,כִּ
achieved by various means in this ritual. The first syntactical connection between ר פֶּ  כִּ
and ָטֵהר is mentioned in v. 20. However, previously in v. 18,  ִּרכ פֶּ  is accomplished by the 
application of the blood of the reparation offering and oil on ָצַרַעת person’s lobe of the 
right ear, thumb of the right hand, and big toe of the right foot. In v. 19, ר פֶּ  is achieved כִּ
by the priest’s offering of a sin and burnt offering on behalf of the affected person. The 
text does not state that the blood of the sin offering was applied to the ָצַרַעת person, so 
accordingly, it was not. Had the blood been applied on the ָצַרַעת person, the text would 
indicate that, since it would be a different use of the sin offering blood as it was in the 
case of the reparation offering in vv. 12–18. In v. 20, on the eighth day, the priest’s 
offering of the burnt and grain offerings finalizes the ritual of cleansing of the ָצַרַעת 
person. Again, the text does not state that the blood of these two offerings was applied to 
the ָצַרַעת person. Milgrom correctly noted that the last appearance of ָטֵהר in v. 20 
“signifies the completion of the process,” which reinstates the healed and now purified 
 person into his community and its worship.454 In contrast to Milgrom who claimed ָצַרַעת
that the presence of ָטֵהר in these verses does not play an essential role, but only refers to 
the effects of the sacrifices,455 ָטֵהר is essential and signifies a newly acquired and 
acceptable state of the healed ָצַרַעת person at every new stage of cleanness. It represents 
 
454Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 859. 
455Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 858–59.  
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the pinnacle of the cleansing and restoring process.456 
This text presents 3 basic semantic domains of the verb ָטֵהר that are analogous to 
the three stages the  ָצַרַעת person undergoes. F. Maass correctly classified the semantic 
domains of the verb ָטֵהר: “In the OT, ṭhr refers to physical, ethical, and religious (cultic) 
purity.”457 This text exemplifies all three of them. 
A crucial point in regaining the ָצַרַעת person’s ָטֵהר state of the first stage, besides 
the two birds’ ritual, is restoration of his physical health (v. 3). The priest examines him 
and verifies that his ָצַרַעת is healed. Based on this text, ָטֵהר of the first stage 
includes/refers to physical health. After the priest verifies that he is healthy and performs 
the two birds’ ritual, the ָצַרַעת person performs ablutions and is allowed to enter the camp 
(vv. 7–8). However, he still remains unclean in the sense that he is not allowed to enter 
his tent. In other words, he can still defile other persons or objects by direct touch or by 
overhang.458 At this point, the stage of the healed ָצַרַעת person is equivalent to the one of 
the new mother when she delivers a son, the ָזב/ָזָבה , the menstruant, and the corpse-
defiled person at the beginning of his/her purification period. The ָצַרַעת person still 
 
456Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 247–48. The same sequence of ritual activities is presented in the 
subcase of this pericope, vv. 21–31, for the ָצַרַעת person whose means are insufficient. 
457Maass, “טהר,” TLOT 3:483. 
458Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 983; Hannah K. Harrington, The Impurity Systems of Qumran and the 
Rabbis: Biblical Foundations, SBLDS 143 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1993), 32. 
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contaminates by direct contact and must wait seven days for the next stage of his/her 
purification.459 
The second stage of ָטֵהר refers to the ritual purity as indicated by the seven-day 
period of abstinence from directly touching or overhanging other persons or objects. The 
passage of seven days along with shaving of all of his hair, washing his clothes and body 
makes the ָצַרַעת person ritually pure (v. 9). At this point he can come into his tent and 
does not transmit any defilement any more. He is ritually clean.460 
The third stage of ָטֵהר refers to moral/ethical purity. The ablutions that were 
present in the ritual of the first and second day are not present in the eight-day ritual, but 
the set of sacrifices which guilt, sin, and burnt offering are achieving ר פֶּ  .for him (vv כִּ
18–20) are. ר פֶּ  is mentioned only in the third stage of ritual and refers to the moral כִּ
purity of the ָצַרַעת person. Thus, Milgrom correctly concluded: “The initial ṭāhēr at the 
end of the first day admits him to the camp (v 8); the second, to his tent (v. 9); and the 
third, to his God (v. 20). The first two are preceded by ablutions that, as pointed out (vv. 
8, 9), execute the rites of passage.”461 Even though he did not comment on how, Maass 
recognized that some sort of guilt was present in the situations where no fault is explicitly 
mentioned in the text, such as Lev 12, 15.462 This element was missed by Milgrom and   
 
459Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 842–43. 
460Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 844. 
461Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 859. Also followed by Averbeck, “ר  .NIDOTTE 2:337 ”,ָטה 
462Maass, “טהר,” TLOT 3:483. He also noted that the rest of the OT explicitly understands the 
purification as moral in its nature. Maass, “טהר,” TLOT 3:485. 
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Averbeck who recognized the physical and ritual domain of ָטֵהר, but not the moral. 
ר פֶּ  in this pericope which refers to the state of a now purified ָטֵהר precedes כִּ
person as he/she passes from one level of cleanness to the next. This sequence of verbs 
leads to the conclusion that ר פֶּ  that ,ָטֵהר is a means or a part of the process of achieving כִּ
is, reinstating one into ָטֵהר condition that is acceptable for the community of God’s 
people. 
As pointed out above, ָטֵהר in the final phase of reinstating the healed ָצַרַעת 
person that consists of ר פֶּ  that is achieved by offering the reparation offering, by כִּ
application of the oil, and by offering the sin, burnt, and grain offerings. The ritual 
instructions in v. 11 which include placing the affected person “before the Lord at the 
doorway of the tent of meeting,” that is, inside the tabernacle,463 implies that the person is 
not in an impure state anymore because his coming in an impure state to the confines of 
the sanctuary would initiate his death as the punishment for making contact between 
impure and holy. He is ָטֵהר from his uncleanness at the point that he is brought to the 
sanctuary. The reason for the ritual of the eighth day which results in his restoration into 
the community cannot be impurity from ָצַרַעת, but rather, is comprised of multiple 
reasons. 
First, the guidelines of ritual in the third pericope present an innovative use of the 
blood of the reparation offering. Instead of dashing it on the sides of the altar, as Lev 7:2 
prescribes, the priest applied it on the healed ָצַרַעת persons’ lobe of the right ear, thumb 
 
463Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 850–51. 
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of the right hand, and big toe of the right foot, which resembles the body parts to which 
Moses applied blood from the ram of ordination during the consecration of the priests 
(Lev 8:23–24).464 This unique application of the blood of the reparation offering, among 
other reasons,465 makes it a key offering in the ritual.466 ר פֶּ  achieved by it, due to its כִּ
similarity with the ordination offering and the change of status of the individuals that are 
involved in the ritual, enables the transition from the ָצַרַעת person, outcast, to a clean, 
healthy person, full member of his/her community.467 As Hartley noted, “it indicates that 
a radical change has taken place in the person’s status before God. Now that this person 
is being restored to the community, it is imperative that his whole being be consecrated to 
God, his ears to hear God’s word and his hands and feet to do God’s will.”468 
Second, the ָצַרַעת person might have done a sin for which he/she was punished by 
God with the 469 ָצַרַעת or he/she might have sinned during the duration of the ָצַרַעת. Sin 
offering in this ritual deals with those sins. An additional reason for making the sin   
 
464Hartley noted other similarities as well. Hartley, Leviticus, 194.  
465Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 850–51. 
466Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 850–51; Kiuchi, Leviticus, 256.  
467Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 852–53.  
468Gorman, The Ideology of Ritual, 173; Hartley, Leviticus, 197–98.  
469Both, Milgrom and Hartley assumed that the affected person did some sort of sin against the 
holy (Lev 5:15–17). Milgrom, looking at other biblical accounts in which individuals were punished with 
leprosy due to their encroaching upon sancta (Num 12:9; 2 Kings 5:27; 2 Chron 26:18–21), concluded that 
the affected person did the same sin. Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 820–22; Milgrom, Cult and Conscience, 80–
81. Followed by Wright, “Unclean and Clean,” 6:736. Hartley claimed that reparation offering is required 
because of transgressing the holy property which, in this case, is the affected person himself since, as 
Hartley stated, “the disease marred a person who bears the very image of God (Gen 1:27; Ps 8:6[5]) and 
separated him from free access to God at the central sanctuary.” Thus, a reparation offering is needed to 
fully restore a person recovered from a deadly skin disease. Hartley, Leviticus, 196–98.  
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offering is found in the fact that all skin disease, characterized by the fact that the body of 
a person affected “is wasting away,” and as such, is strongly associated with death in the 
OT.470 Because of the processes taking place in the leper’s body, Kurtz stated that a leper 
was “a living death, the destruction of all the vital powers, a dissolution and putrefaction 
even in the living body, a death before death; so that, as Spencer says, the leper was a 
‘walking tomb.’”471 Miriam’s leprosy reflects this idea (Num 12:12).472 
The sin offering also had a ransoming role, since the healed ָצַרַעת person was 
given a new life and was required to ransom it (Exod 22:28–29; 34:19–20).473 Milgrom 
stated: 
The bodily impurities enumerated in the impurity table … focus on four phenomena: 
death (4, 5, 7, 11), blood (2, 3, 8), semen (3, 10), and scale disease (1). Their common 
denominator is death. Vaginal blood and semen represent the forces of life; their 
loss—death … In the case of scale disease, this symbolism is made explicit: Aaron 
prays for his stricken sister, “Let her not be like a corpse” (Num 12:12). Furthermore, 
scale disease is powerful enough to contaminate by overhang, and it is no accident 
that it shares this feature with the corpse (Num 19:14). The wasting of the body, the 
common characteristic of all biblically impure skin diseases, symbolizes the death 
process as much as the loss of blood and semen.474  
 
Even though the set of sacrifices offered on the eighth day all have distinctive 
functions, they collectively contribute to a healed ָצַרַעת person’s reconciliation with God 
 
470Feldman, Biblical and Post-Biblical Defilement and Mourning, 34; Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 
820, 995–96. Also, Gorman, The Ideology of Ritual, 162. 
471Kurtz, Offerings, 417. 
472Gane reminded me of this text in the course of my research. See also Richard M. Davidson, 
“The Living Death: Typology of Leprosy and Its Cleansing,” in Festschrift Honoring Merling Alomía, ed. 
Benjamin Rojas, et al. (Lima, Peru: Peruvian Union University, 2015), 45–58. 
473Stuart, Exodus, 522. 
474Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 999. 
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and his/her full restoration into the community.475 The blood for this ritual was obtained 
from reparation, sin, and burnt offerings. The offerer of these sacrifices was the priest (v. 
11–20), but they were offered on the behalf of the affected person (v. 10). All the blood 
of the other sacrifices was applied to the locations in the previously established 
procedures (Lev 1–5), except for the modified blood application of the reparation 
offering on a person’s lobe of the right ear, thumb of the right hand, and big toe of the 
right foot, instead of around the altar. 
Lev 14:33–53. The verb ָחָטא is used in vv. 49, 52 to refer to the cleansing of the 
house affected by fungus by the ritual of the two birds that resembles the ritual of the first 
day for a ָצַרַעת person in the previous passage.476 The verb ר פֶּ  is used in v. 53 after the כִּ
priest lets the live bird free outside the city into the open field to finalize the ritual of 
cleansing. Subsequently, if the house is pronounced clean, ר .ָטֵהר פֶּ  refers to the removal כִּ
of the fungus from the house477 and is a part of the process of achieving ָטהֵ ר status for the 
house as was the case in the previous passage in regards to the ָצַרַעת person. No moral 
impurity is mentioned nor assumed in this case. 
The priest is the officiant in this context. The birds involved in the cleansing 
process are not labeled as sacrifice, but the blood obtained from one of them, along with 
the water, the other live bird, and other ritual items, was directly sprinkled on the house. 
The live bird would then be let go, thus completing the cleansing of the house. The 
 
475Richard E. Averbeck, “Sacrifices and Offerings,” NIDOTTE 4:1003; Kiuchi, Leviticus, 257. 
476Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 864; Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 248.  
477Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 249–50. 
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function of this ritual was the cleansing of the house from ritual impurity. 
 
ר פֶּ  Leviticus 16:19, 30 :ָקַדׁש and ָטֵהר and כִּ
The triad of verbs is conceptually related in vv. 18–19 while v. 30 mentions ר פֶּ  כִּ
and ר .ָטֵהר פֶּ  .is introduced at the beginning of the ritual that pertains to the altar in vv כִּ
18–19, which is contrary to the majority of ritual requirements that include ר פֶּ  in which ,כִּ
ר פֶּ ר is mentioned at the end of the ritual procedures. This leads to the conclusion that כִּ פֶּ  כִּ
is either an overarching process that is comprised of sub-rites of ָטֵהר and ָקַדׁש, or is 
identical to these two sub-rites. That ר פֶּ  in vv. 18–19 is the same as these two sub-rites כִּ
is supported by the fact that the direct object/beneficiary is the same with ר פֶּ  on the one ,כִּ
hand and ָטֵהר and ָקַדׁש, on the other hand, that is, the sacrificial altar.478 However, it is 
very unlikely to equate ר פֶּ  since they are separated processes, as was pointed ָקַדׁש and כִּ
out on pp. 492–503 of the present study. ר פֶּ  ָקַדׁש in this context, is a sub-rite in the ,כִּ
process as it was in Exod 29:36–37. The same sequence of ritual activities related to the 
sacrificial altar in this pericope is found in Exod 29:36–37, although different verbs are 
used, ָחָטא to mark purification of the altar, and ָקַדׁש, preceded by 479.ָמַׁשח Verses 18–19 
state that there are two blood applications. The first one, daubing on the altar’s horns, is 
recorded in v. 18. The second one, sevenfold sprinkling, is recorded in v. 19. The role of 
 
478Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 96–97. 
479Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 1036. 
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the dual blood application was to cleanse and reconsecrate the altar.480 ר פֶּ  is v. 18 is כִּ
equivalent to ָטֵהר in v. 19.481 It refers to both blood applications with two different 
effects on the altar as was the case with the blood application during the sacrificial altar 
consecration in Exod 29:36–37 and Lev 8:15. The first blood application cleanses the 
altar in v. 18 and is achieved by daubing the blood of the sin offerings on the altar’s 
horns. The second blood application reconsecrates the altar482 by sevenfold sprinkling of 
the blood on the altar.483 
Verse 30 is less complex since it plainly states that ר פֶּ  ָטֵהר is the subprocess of כִּ
and it results in the latter. In other words, the rite of ר פֶּ  ָטֵהר precedes and actualizes the כִּ
state of the people.484 It is obvious that this ָטֵהר does not refer to a literal cleansing, even 
though the main purpose of the Day of Atonement ritual was to cleanse the sanctuary. 
The sanctuary is polluted by people’s ritual and moral impurities; thus, the people also 
are being cleansed morally or spiritually through their self-denial and abstaining from 
work. In other words, all the people reconcile with the Lord through the cleansing of the 
sanctuary and in participating self-denial and abstaining from work.485 
ר פֶּ    in Lev 16:18–19, 30 is achieved by the blood of sin offerings of the priests כִּ
 
480Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 1036, 1039–40. 
481Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 1039–40. 
482Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 1039–40. 
483Gorman, The Ideology of Ritual, 84, 87–88. 
484Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 97; Hartley, Leviticus, 332; Gorman, The Ideology of Ritual, 63.  
485Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 254–55, 1056–57; Gane, Cult and Character, 317. 
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and the people. The offerer is exclusively the high-priest. However, one of the sin 
offerings was from and for the people. The reason for this ritual was the cleansing of the 
sanctuary, including the sacrificial altar that eventually results in the cleansing of the 
people. The cleansing and reconsecration of the altar includes the application of the blood 
on the altar’s horns and sprinkling on it (vs. 18–19). The cleansing of the people 
originated from the cleansing of the sanctuary, as well, which is achieved by the 
sprinkling of the blood on and in front of the ark cover. 
 
ר פֶּ  Numbers 8:21 :ָחָטא and ָטֵהר and כִּ
Numbers 8 presents the installation of the Levites so that they can perform 
previously assigned duties. The previous texts in Numbers first present the Levites as the 
ones who have replaced the Israelite first-born (3:11–13, 40–51) and have been assigned 
the duty of guarding (3:14–39) and removing (1:1–33) the tabernacle.486 The verb ָטֵהר 
expresses the desired state of the Levites (vv. 6, 7, 1, 5, 21). Milgrom noticed that the 
repetition of ָטֵהר in v. 21, which is the end of the ritual, forms an inclusion with this verb 
in v. 6, which marks the beginning of the ritual.487 The installation of the Levites is 
essentially different488 from that of the priests in Exod 29, 40 and Lev 8 since the priests 
 
486Milgrom, Numbers, 61. 
487Milgrom, Numbers, 306. 
488The priests were consecrated (ָקַדׁש) with anointing oil in order to have access to the sacred 
objects and officiate at the alter and in the tabernacle. On the other hand, the Levites were purified (ָטֵהר) in 
order to be able to transport the dismantled tabernacle and its sacred objects after the priest covered them, 
but they did not have access to the sanctuary nor were allowed to officiate at the altar. Milgrom, Numbers: 
61; Timothy R. Ashley, The Book of Numbers, NICOT 4 (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1993), 169; 
Levine, Numbers 1–20, 273. In addition, the main officiant of the ritual in the priestly consecration is 
Moses while Aaron leads most of the ritual activities in the Levites’ purification. Milgrom, Numbers, 61. 
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were sanctified while the Levites were purified. However, the use of ר פֶּ  in vv. 12 and 21 כִּ
adds to the meaning of this purificatory ritual.489 
Based on v. 6, the first level of ָטֵהר is achieved by three ritual activities: (1) 
sprinkling of the water of purification ( ַחָּטאת ֵמי ) onto the Levites, (2) complete shaving 
of their bodies, and (3) washing their clothes. On the one hand, some scholars understood 
that the water of purification refers to the water of lustration, mei niddah ( ָּדה ֵמי נִּ ) (Num 
19:9) that is used to purify the person who incurred corpse defilement.490 On the other 
hand, “other scholars allow uncertainty to remain since no specific ritual of mixing the 
water with some other element is delineated in the context of 8:5–22.”491 The current 
study agrees with the latter view. Ceremonial cleanness is the goal of the section in        
vv. 5–8492 because the Levites themselves were considered as an offering to God.493 
Based on the flow of the entire ritual of the Levites’ installation,494 Milgrom was right in 
stating that bathing in v. 7 cleansed Levites from minor impurities, but incorrectly 
 
489The meaning of the verb in v. 19 is not included in this part of the current research since it 
refers to the activity of the Levites after their installation. 
490Milgrom, Numbers, 62; Budd, Numbers, 93; Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 555. An opposing 
position is held by Levine, Numbers 1–20, 274–75. 
491Cole, Numbers, 149. The following are some of them Ashley, Numbers, 170; Levine, Numbers 
1–20, 274–75, 464; George Buchanan Gray, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Numbers, 
ICCHSONT 4 (New York: Scribner's Sons, 1903), 79. 
492Ashley, Numbers, 169–70. 
493Cole, Numbers, 149; Levine, Numbers 1–20, 274. 
494“The ceremonial installation of the Levites involved several ritual acts: (1) purification via 
sprinkling of the ‘water of cleansing,’ (2) shaving of the body,200 (3) washing of clothes, (4) selection of 
sacrificial animals, (5) presentation of the Levites before the Israelites at the Tent of Meeting, (6) laying on 
of hands, (7) presentation of Levites to Yahweh as a wave offering, (8) sacrifice of the bull of the sin 
offering then the bull of the burnt offering for Levite atonement, (9) presentation to Yahweh as a wave 
offering.” Cole, Numbers, 148–49. 
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claimed that the function of the water of purification and the sin offering was to “cleanse 
them of severe impurities that impinged on the sanctuary and polluted its altar.”495 This 
understanding requires an adjustment since severe ritual impurity required seven days of 
time to pass by, and lustration with the water of purification on the third and seventh day 
in order to be removed from the person defiled by it (Num 19:11–12). The ritual 
portrayed in Num 8:5–26 does not mention or assume seven-day time passage, which 
leads to the conclusion that the ritual impurities implied concerning the Levites’ ritual 
impurity are not major, but rather minor ones. 
Milgrom also understood that the Levites were presented as an elevation offering 
to God in v. 11,496 but missed realizing that it would be unlikely that they would have any 
kind of ritual impurity on themselves carried over to v. 12 to be purified by the ר פֶּ  כִּ
achieved by the offering of the sin and burnt offerings.497 He was also inconsistent in his 
comments on v. 8 that sin offering cleansed severe ritual impurities from the Levites,498 
but in commenting on v. 12, he limited the cleansing function of the sin offering to 
“moral cleansing” and purging of the sanctuary.499  
Based on the ritual flow outlined in v. 21, there are four stages of the Levites’ 
installation: (1) purification of the Levites, (2) presenting them as an elevation offering, 
 
495Milgrom, Numbers, 63. 
496Milgrom, Numbers, 62. 
497Cole, Numbers, 151. 
498Milgrom, Numbers, 62. 
499Milgrom, Numbers, 63. 
 
518 
(3) performing פֶּ ר  on their behalf which all results in (4) their state of purity.500 Ritual כִּ
cleanness is expressed by ָטֵהר in v. 7, which is definitely the semantic scope of this term, 
and ָחָטא in v. 21.501 ר פֶּ  in v. 12 is interpreted variously. Milgrom, following his theory כִּ
that the sin offering cleanses the sanctuary, claimed that it was “to purge the sanctuary of 
the impurities caused by any of the Levites’ moral (and physical) lapses.”502 However, 
the text does not imply or mention any moral sin committed by the Levites. Budd 
suggested a more viable option “to give protection” from divine wrath.503 ר פֶּ  does not כִּ
deal with any moral sin of the Levites, which is in accordance with the text and the flow 
of the ritual, but rather, atones for the Levites, enabling them to perform certain duties 
safely in the sanctuary. In a similar vein, Levine suggested  ֶּפ רכִּ  to be translated with “to 
ransom,” because the phrase ַכֵפר ַעל ל   is often associated with the notion of ransom (Exod 
30:15; Lev 17:11).504 The complementary suggestions by Budd and Levine fit the ritual 
flow since at the point ר פֶּ  is performed on the behalf of the Levites in v. 12, they are כִּ
ritually clean and no sin is associated with them. The study of the states of creation and 
human sinfulness presented in the present study confirms this understanding of ר פֶּ  .כִּ
The sequence of verbs in v. 21 correctly reflects a natural progression of the   
 
500Cole, Numbers, 153n214, especially. 
501Hithpael of ָחָטא in all other instances in the Pentateuch refers to the cleansing from ritual 
impurity (Num 19:12–13, 20; 31:19–20, 23). 
502Milgrom, Numbers, 63, 369–71. 
503Budd, Numbers, 93. 
504Levine, Numbers 1–20, 276–77.  
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Levites’ state. They are first cleansed (ָחָטא), then ר פֶּ  is performed on their behalf which כִּ
resulted in their becoming ָטֵהר. Thus, both ָחָטא and ר פֶּ  in this ritual are part of a כִּ
broader process of becoming ָטֵהר. 
ר פֶּ  .is achieved by the offering of the sin and burnt offerings made by the priest כִּ
The offerers were the Levites since they laid hands on the sacrificial animals (v. 12). The 
reason for the offerings was installation/enabling of the Levites for the service in the 
sanctuary. The blood of the sin and burnt offerings was applied according to the protocol 
established in Lev 1, 4. 
 
ר פֶּ  Leviticus 12:7–8; 15:13, 28 :ָטֵהר and כִּ
Lev 12:7–8. Leviticus 12 emphasizes the fact that the mother is ritually impure 
 for seven + thirty-three days if she delivers a son (v. 2–4) or fourteen + sixty-six (ָטֵמא)
days if she delivers a daughter (v. 5). For the first seven, in the case of a boy, or fourteen 
days, in the case of a daughter, her ritual impurity is of the same force as menstrual 
impurity, which means that it is communicable by the contact. The force of her impurity 
is being reduced during the last thirty-three or sixty-six days, and it is not communicable, 
yet, she is restricted from contacting the holy and entering the sanctuary (v. 4).505 During 
this period, the mother is gradually healed from childbirth and totally cleansed, which 
means that normal discharge after the childbirth that lasted for two to six weeks had 
totally ceased.506 The verb ָטֵהר is used two times in vv. 7 and 8 to convey the mother’s 
 
505Noordtzij, Numbers, 132; Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 221–22. 
506Noth, Leviticus, 98. 
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pure state. Thus, the final goal of the ritual is mother’s reaching the state of purity. The 
verb ר פֶּ  .in both verses and enables her to reach desired purity ָטֵהר precedes the verb כִּ
Scholars have reached a consensus that the mother has regained her ritual purity when 
she is able to make her offerings in the sanctuary.507 Milgrom’s comment is explanatory 
here: “Now that forty (or eighty) days have elapsed and she has brought her requisite 
sacrifices to the sanctuary, she is purified completely and is eligible to make contact with 
sacred objects.”508 
There is no indication in the text that the mother was involved in any moral 
impurity.509 The verb ָסַלח which marks the resolution of moral impurity contexts is not 
used in this chapter.510 Thus, the text of Lev 12 indicates that just before offering burnt 
and sin sacrifices, the mother has reached a pure state again and was not involved in any 
kind of moral impurity. Following Milgrom’s influential hypothesis that the sin offering 
purges the sanctuary and its part, scholars have accepted the fact that the ר פֶּ  in this verse כִּ
purifies the sanctuary/altar from the mother’s impurity which reached the altar from a 
 
507Porter, Leviticus, 95; Wenham, The Book of Leviticus, 186–87; Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 759–
60. Levine, Leviticus, 74; Hartley, Leviticus, 168–69; Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 221–22. 
508Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 759–60. There many more instances where Milgrom made it clear that 
the mother is ritually pure at the time she offers sacrifices. “That these sacrifices are brought after the 
impurity has totally disappeared is irrefutable proof that their function is not apotropaic or medicinal.” 
Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 756. Also, “Nevertheless, the fact that the parturient is purified by the action of 
both sacrifices (vv 7a, 8b) indicates that the purpose of the burnt offering, like that of the purification 
offering, is expiatory (see the NOTE on “effect expiation,” v 7), but it addresses other matters than 
pollution.” Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 757–58. 
509Porter, Leviticus, 94; Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 759–60; Hartley, Leviticus, 168–69; Rooker, 
Leviticus, 184; Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 221–22; Richard S. Hess, “Leviticus,” in The Expositor’s Bible 
Commentary: Genesis–Leviticus, vol. 1 of The Expositor’s Bible Commentary, rev. ed., ed. Tremper 
Longman III and David E. Garland (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2008), 689.  
510Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 759–60; Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 221–22.  
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distance.511 Gane, in contrast, claimed that ר פֶּ  purifies the mother from her ritual כִּ
impurity: “The goal/meaning of the ritual procedure is to remove physical ritual impurity 
from the woman so that she is ritually pure, not to remove moral fault from her in 
preparation for divine forgiveness (contrast 4:20, 26, 31, 35). So her ḥaṭṭaʾt is a 
‘purification offering.’”512 Gane himself stated that the defiled person would reach the 
status of ritual purity before the point he/she comes to the sanctuary to offer the 
sacrifice.513 This claim conflicts with an opening statement in v. 6: “When the days of her 
purification are completed,”514 she is allowed come to the sanctuary. This implies that she 
had fully reached the state of ritual purity as established above. N. H. Snaith and A. 
Noordtzij viewed the sin offering as purificatory, but it is unclear whether they refer to 
the purification of the sanctuary or the mother.515 
Keil suggested that the mother’s burnt and sin offerings purify her from 
“uncleanness in which the sin of nature had manifested itself” in the delivery and 
prevented her from going to the sanctuary and the fellowship of God. In addition, he said 
the main reason for the offerings was the “sin which had been indirectly manifested in 
 
511Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 759–60; Wenham, The Book of Leviticus, 186–87; Walton, Matthews, 
and Chavalas, “Leviticus,” 130.  
512Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 221–22. Followed by Hess, “Leviticus,” 689. 
513“So the contagion of physical ritual impurity is already removed before sacrificial hand leaning 
is performed, which makes it difficult to maintain that this gesture defiles animals by physical contact in 
the same way that people defile objects and other people while their sources of impurity are active (cf. Lev 
15:4–12, 26–27).” Gane, Cult and Character, 55. 
514This phrase refers to the completion of the purificatory process the mother goes through. 
Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 755–56. 
515Snaith, Leviticus and Numbers; Noordtzij, Numbers, 133. 
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her bodily condition.”516 Uncleanness from Keil’s first quotation and sin from the second 
seem to refer to general human sinful condition and its representation, respectively. 
Levine also viewed that this rite handles the sinfulness of the mother since, in his 
opinion, ר פֶּ ר does not purify like (ַעל followed by the indirect object (preposition כִּ פֶּ  כִּ
followed by the direct object marker does, but rather removes sinfulness from the 
offerer.517 A. Noordtzij, J. R. Porter, and Mark Rooker are more particular in their 
understanding that the main concern that ר פֶּ  in vv. 7 and 8 refer to is purity ָטֵהר and כִּ
from “the issuance of blood.”518 
Based on the foundational sinful condition of humans that has been explored on 
pages 400–14, the present study agrees that the most compelling reason for the mother’s 
obligation to offer burnt and sin offering is this severe ritual impurity as a manifestation 
of GHS that is associated with the loss of blood that is associated with death. As argued 
on page 405, death is the underlying idea and significant expression of GHS. As such, it 
interrupted the relationship of the mother with the community and God. Thus, ר פֶּ  כִּ
brought about by the burnt and sin offering is best understood as being comprised of two 
elements. The first element is ransom for two reasons. The first reason is that the mother 
was involved in the event in which GHS was manifested in the most vivid way. During 
the childbirth and period of her ritual impurity, she experienced blood loss and constant   
 
516Keil and Delitzsch, The Pentateuch, 2:376–77. 
517Levine, Leviticus, 74, 24. 
518Noordtzij, Numbers, 131; Porter, Leviticus, 94; Rooker, Leviticus, 184–85. 
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discharge from her body. Both of these are signs of death and decay. Milgrom was 
informative again: 
Moreover, in the Israelite mind, blood was the archsymbol of life (17:10–14; Deut 
12:23; cf. chap. 11, COMMENT C). Its oozing from the body was no longer the work 
of demons, but it was certainly the sign of death. In particular, the loss of seed in 
vaginal blood (see the NOTE on “at childbirth,” v. 2) was associated with the loss of 
life. Thus it was that Israel—alone among the peoples—restricted impurity solely to 
those physical conditions involving the loss of vaginal blood and semen, the forces of 
life, and scale disease, which visually manifested the approach of death.519 
 
The second reason is articulated by Levine’s remark that “in ancient times, 
concern for the welfare of mother and child was most often expressed as the fear of 
destructive, demonic, or antilife forces”520 in ANE texts contemporaneous with biblical 
times,521 which testifies to the fact that childbirth was perceived as a threatening and 
risky time for both mother and child in the ANE. One or even both could die. Both of 
these facts led to the conclusion that the mother was in close contact with death and, 
having survived this experience, she was asked to offer burnt and sin offerings in order to 
redeem herself. 
A second element ר פֶּ  achieved was the mother’s official reinstatement to the כִּ
community and worship to God. Reinstatement was needed due to the fact that the 
mother was, in a way, excluded from society due to her specific experience of child birth 
and severe ritual impurity that was associated with it. This element resembles the 
experience of the healed ָצַרַעת person. 
 
519Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 766. 
520Levine, Leviticus, 249, 282n1. 
521The OT does not present a threat for the mother and child from demons. 
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ר פֶּ  .was achieved by burnt and sin offerings brought by the new mother כִּ
However, the focus of this text was not on the sacrificial procedures and it depends 
greatly on the previously established procedures for sacrificial offering in Lev 1, 4. The 
reason for the set of offerings was “the issuance of blood” that followed childbirth.  
Lev 15:13, 28. These verses stand as conclusions of two passages that deal with 
the abnormal discharges from genital organs in men (15:2–15) and women (15:25–30). 
 person ָזָבה/ָזב is used three times in v. 13522 and two times in v. 28 to convey that the ָטֵהר
achieved the pure state.523 In support of the ownership theory of the sacrificial hand-
leaning, Gane accurately stated that “the contagion of physical ritual impurity is already 
removed before sacrificial hand-leaning is performed, which makes it difficult to 
maintain that this gesture defiles animals by physical contact in the same way that 
persons defile objects and persons while their sources of impurity are active (cf. Lev 
15:4–12, 26–27).”524 Milgrom also argued: “Clearly, physical impurity is removed by 
ablution: ‘he shall launder his clothes [and] bathe in water’ (15:8 inter alia).”525 
The fact that the ָזב/ָזָבה  person achieves the state of purity informs the 
 
522The first ָטֵהר undeniably refers to the physical health of the zāb person. Milgrom, Leviticus 1–
16, 675; Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 260. 
523Levine, Leviticus, 95; Wright, “The Spectrum of Priestly Impurity,” 156; Gorman, The Ideology 
of Ritual, 116, 164; Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 260; Gane, Cult and Character, 55.  
524Gane, Cult and Character, 55. 
525Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 329–30, 756. And again: “That this severe “menstrual” impurity is 
terminated by immersion is nowhere stated either for the parturient or for the menstruant. But as all 
statements regarding the duration of impurity automatically imply, if they do not explicitly affirm, that it 
must terminate with ablutions (see the NOTE on “he shall be impure until evening,” 11:24b), the mere 
statement that the period of the parturient’s severer impurity lasts seven (or fourteen, v. 5) days assumes 
that this period is terminated by ablutions. The same holds true for the menstruant (see the NOTE on 
bĕniddātāh, 15:19). Besides, if a minor impurity such as seminal discharge requires ablution (15:16), all the 
more so the major genital discharges.” Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 746. 
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understanding of ר פֶּ ר in vv. 14 and 28. That is, the כִּ פֶּ  ritual chronologically takes place כִּ
on the eighth day after the ָזב/ָזָבה  person achieved ָטֵהר. Consequently, ר פֶּ  does not כִּ
purify the  ָָזב/הבָ ז  person from ritual impurity since they are already ritually pure at this 
point of the ritual. Rather, ר פֶּ ָזב/ָזָבה has a different role. It atoned for the כִּ  person’s GHS 
and ransoms his/her life. Experiencing constant genital discharge from the body was 
perceived as a severe ritual impurity; the ָזב/ָזָבה  person, in a way, experienced death and 
decay in a similar way as the new mother. 
ר פֶּ ָזב/ ָזָבה was achieved by burnt and sin offerings brought by the healed כִּ  person. 
Here, also, the focus was not on sacrificial procedures and this text depends greatly on 
previously established procedures for sacrificial offering in Lev 1, 4. The priest officiated 
the sacrificial offering and the reason for the set of offerings was the ָזב/ָזָבה  person’s 
abnormal genital discharge. 
 
ר פֶּ  Numbers 6:11 :ָקַדׁש and כִּ
In this context, ר פֶּ  as it has been the case in the ָקַדׁש is a prerequisite of the כִּ
previous cases analyzed above. The text clearly state that the Nazirite has sinned (v. 11, 
verb ָחָטא). However, the Nazirite is not responsible for his defilement since it was 
obtained unintentionally through a person who suddenly died in the Nazirite’s proximity. 
Through such incident, the Nazirite becomes ritually defiled (v. 9, ָטֵמא) and needs the 
usual ritual purification from the corpse defilement of sprinkling by the purification 
waters on the third and the seventh days as prescribed in Num 19:11–12, 17–19. On the 
same day, the Nazirite also had to shave off his hair (v. 9) as an outward sign of the 
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removal of his Nazirite status.526 After being purified from the ritual impurity through the 
lustrations on the third and seventh days, on the eighth day, the Nazirite had (1) to offer 
the sin and burn offerings, (2) reconsecrate his hair for a new term, and (3) to offer the 
reparation offering. 
The fact that the Nazirite had to go through these rituals on the eighth day makes 
Milgrom’s inference that “the Nazirite’s contamination is sinful and is to be avoided”527 
accurate. The Nazirite’s defilement is sinful for two reasons. First, based on his current 
state “he [the Nazirite] is holy (Num 6:5, 8) and contamination of holiness is a serious 
sin.”528 Second, his exceptional holy nature stems from the vow by which the Nazirite 
entered this temporary state of holiness (vv. 2–8). Through the corpse defilement, this 
vow was broken, thus annulling their previous days of Nazirite status (vv. 6–10). 
ר פֶּ  in this case atones for the Nazirite’s sin as a preparation for his new term of כִּ
Nazirite status. The ritual impurity has been removed by the regular sprinkling of the 
water of purification on the third and seventh days in addition to shaving the Nazirite’s 
head. ר פֶּ  is achieved by the offering of the sin offering first, and followed next by the כִּ
burnt offering (v. 11). It is then followed by the Nazirite’s reconsecration for the new 
term. 
ר פֶּ  was achieved by burnt and sin offerings brought by the Nazirite. The text כִּ
does not focus on the sacrificial procedure; thus, it wholly depends on previously 
 
526Gane, Cult and Character, 278. 
527Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 357–58. 
528Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 254–55, 357–58. 
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established procedures for sacrificial offering in Lev 1, 4. The priest officiated the 
sacrificial offering and ר פֶּ  .in this context, deals with the moral impurity of the Nazirite ,כִּ
 
ר פֶּ   ,Leviticus 4:20, 26, 31, 35; 5:10, 13, 16, 18 :ָסַלח and כִּ
26 [6:7]; 19:22; Numbers 15:25, 26, 28 
The pattern that ר פֶּ  ,is evident in all these texts ָסַלח  chronologically precedes כִּ
except in Lev 5:6 where ר פֶּ  .but rather, stands on its own ,ָסַלח is not followed by כִּ
However, the regulations applying to the same cases in vv. 10 and 13 maintain the usual 
order of ר פֶּ  .thus making this inconsistency insignificant ,ָסַלח chronologically preceding כִּ
In order to arrive at a sound understanding of the  ֶּפ רכִּ  relationship, the context of all ָסַלח-
these texts has to be taken into consideration and the context is coherent and clear; the 
human party has sinned and is required to offer a sin or reparation offering. 
The most elaborate text of those in the Pentateuch is Lev 4, since it contains the 
most detailed description of the sin offering ritual. In the event of moral impurity, the one 
who commits it is required to offer a sin offering. This consists of the offerer’s bringing 
the sacrificial animal to the doorway of the tent of meeting, laying his/her hand on its 
head, and slaughtering it. 
Subsequently, the priest would dip his finger in the blood obtained from the 
sacrificial animal and apply the blood on various objects of the sanctuary, depending on 
the social status of the offerer. In cases 1 (high priest/priest) and 2 (a whole community) 
in Lev 4, he would sprinkle some of the blood seven times in front of the veil that 
separates the two compartments inside of the tent and apply some of it to the horns of the 
altar of incense, located in the first compartment of the tent, and pour out the rest of it at 
the base of the sacrificial altar (vv. 6–7, 16–18). The remainder of the sacrificial animal 
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that is not burned on the sacrificial altar (hide, flesh, legs and entrails, vv. 11, 20)529 is 
taken out of the camp to a clean place and incinerated (vv. 12, 21).530 
The steps are slightly different in cases 3 (a leader) and 4 (a commoner). The 
activities are identical up to the point of the blood application, but in these two cases, the 
priest applies some of the blood on the horns of the sacrificial altar and pours the rest of it 
at the base of the same altar (vv. 25, 30, 34).531 Besides a different location of the blood 
application, the regulations for cases 3 and 4 miss stating that the remainder of the 
sacrificial animal is incinerated outside the camp. However, further regulations for the sin 
offering in Lev 6:19 [26], 22 [29] state that the officiating priest is obliged to eat the 
remaining flesh of sin offering. 
The stipulations of the sin offering differ in the types of the required animal532 and 
that is properly explained by the social status of the offerer.533 Offerings of both types of 
sacrificial animal bring about the same effect, ר פֶּ  for the offerer. However, the ,ָסַלח and כִּ
location of the blood application is more substantial difference between the two sets of 
instructions. That is, the blood is applied inside the tent in cases 1 and 2 with certain parts 
of the animal being incinerated outside the camp, while the blood in cases 3 and 4 is   
 
529All the fat that covers the entrails along with kidneys is offered on the sacrificial altar (vv. 8–10, 
19). 
530For a more complete list of activities related to cases 1 and 2 in Lev 4, see Gane, Leviticus, 
Numbers, 99. 
531For a more complete list of activities related to cases 3 and 4 in Lev 4, see Gane, Leviticus, 
Numbers, 101–2. 
532A bull for cases 1 and 2, and a male goat and a female goat or a lamb in cases 3 and 4, 
respectively. 
533Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 307–8. 
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applied only outside the tent, on the sacrificial altar, with the priest being required to eat 
the meat of the sacrificial animal. Again, the different activities bring about the same 
effect, ר פֶּ  .for the offerer ָסַלח and כִּ
The texts from Lev 5:10, 13, 16, 18, 26 [6:7] belong to four distinct pericopes: 
5:1–13, 14–16, 17–19 and 5:20–26. Schwartz accurately claimed that “the cases [Lev 
5:1–4] aim to counter the notion that duties weaken with time and eventually cease to 
exist (“forget it and it will simply go away”).”534 Gane has plausibly proved that 5:1–13 
is a continuation of the sin offering regulations, with special emphasis on the sin 
offering’s having the function of ָאַׁשם, some sort of reparation for the sin committed.535 
This pericope assumes the offering of a sin offering as prescribed in Lev 4:27–35.536 The 
sins in Lev 4:27–35 are expiable/forgivable, regardless of the fact that they were 
intentional. 
As it was established in the present study, Lev 5:14–16 envisions two alternative 
ways of sinning, intentional non-brazen and unintentional, based on the two distinct 
classes included in the protasis of this case. In terms of the nature of sin, it envisions sin 
against sancta and its sacrificial procedure depends on the ones laid out in Lev 7:1–7, in 
addition to the possibility embedded in this pericope, v. 15, to use monetary payment 
instead of an actual sacrificial animal.537 The pericope in Lev 7:1–7 introduces a set of 
regulations for a reparation offering that was offered in cases when an individual 
 
534Schwartz, “Leviticus,” (JSB), 215. 
535Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 118–19. 
536Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 408–9, 438; Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 121, 132.  
537Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 408–9, 438; Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 132–33.  
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committed a sin that would involve some sort of literal, measureable debt that could be 
restituted to another party.538 The procedure for the reparation offering in great part 
resembles the one for a sin offering with a notable difference in treating the sacrificial 
blood that was dashed on the sides of the outer altar, instead of applying it on its horns, 
thus resembling the treatment of the blood in burnt or well-being offering.539 Certain 
procedural differences are affected by the fact that this set of instructions is placed in the 
section of sacrificial procedures that are meant for priests (Lev 6:1 [6:8]–7:7), rather than 
the laity (Lev 1–5). Milgrom reasoned plausibly: 
If it is indeed the case that the one liable for a reparation offering was expected to 
bring its monetary equivalent to the sanctuary, it should occasion no surprise that the 
procedure for the sacrifice of the reparation offering should be given here in the 
administrative unit addressed to the priests (chaps. 6–7) rather than in the didactic 
order addressed to the laity … Once the lay offerer purchases the requisite ʾāšām 
animal from the priest, the latter makes certain that the proper sacrificial procedure is 
followed.540 
 
Milgrom noted that the expiatory value of this sacrifice does not resemble the one 
of the sin offering, “to purge,” but rather refers to general expiation.541 However, 
regardless of the different procedures for the two offerings,542 they bring about the same   
 
538Rooker, Leviticus, 122; Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 132. 
539See Milgrom endorsing Rodríguez’s suggestion that the phrase “ם  ”ַכַחָּטאת ָכָאָׁשם ּתֹוָרה ַאַחת ָלהֶּ
can refer to the entire procedure with the difference in blood application stated in this pericope. Milgrom, 
Leviticus 1–16, 409–10; Rodríguez, “Substitution in the Hebrew Cultus,” 160; Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 
132. 
540Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 409. 
541Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 410. 
542Milgrom’s view on Lev 7:7 allows for both interpretations of the phrase “the reparation offering 
is like the sin offering,” that is (1) the phrase refers to the specific regulation of eating of sacrificial meat 
that is the immediate context of this text, and (2) the phrase refers to the entire ritual except of blood 
application. Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 408–9. Rodríguez proposed a strong support for the latter view. 
Rodríguez, “Substitution in the Hebrew Cultus,” 160. 
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result, ר פֶּ  .that leads to one’s forgiveness כִּ
It is established in the present study that Lev 5:17–19 involves unintentional sin 
either out of ignorance or by accident. Besides certain linguistic differences, especially in 
the protasis of the two subcases, 5:17–19 resembles 5:14–16. Accordingly, it depends for 
its sacrificial procedure on the ones laid out in Lev 7:1–7.543 In addition, there is the 
possibility embedded in this pericope in v. 18, and in the additional clarification in v. 15, 
of using a monetary payment instead of an actual sacrificial animal. 
Contrary to the previous three pericopes, Lev 5:20–26 implies only intentional, 
non-brazen sins. However, since these sins were committed under oath before God,544 
they depend for their sacrificial procedure on the ones laid out in Lev 7:1–7.545 Here also, 
there is the possibility embedded in this pericope in v. 25, and in the additional 
clarification in v. 15, of using a monetary payment instead of an actual sacrificial animal.  
The sexual misconduct in Lev 19:22 is undoubtedly intentional, but regardless of 
being abhorrent, it is a non-brazen sin. The sinner is allowed to received ר פֶּ  .ָסַלח and כִּ
The sinner who commits such a sin of adultery would be penalized by the capital 
punishment and the same punishment would be implemented to the girl if she consented 
rather than was raped (Lev 22:23–27). However, the girl in this law is a slave546 and 
because of her non-free status, this sin is not punishable by capital punishment. Gane 
 
543Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 408–9, 438; Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 132.  
544Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 438; Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 134.  
545Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 408–9, 438; Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 132.  
546Baruch J. Schwartz, “A Literary Study of the Slave-Girl Pericope: Leviticus 19:20–22,” in 




captured the plausible rationale of this sin: 
 
Although violation of a designated slave woman is not a capital offense, it is immoral 
activity offensive to God, violating the spirit of the seventh commandment of the 
Decalogue, which prohibits adultery (Ex. 20:14). Thus, a man who commits this 
wrong must sacrifice a reparation offering (ʾašam, the so-called “guilt offering”) to 
the Lord.547 
 
Milgrom’s understanding that the reparation offering was always offered for the 
cases of sacrilege either through illicit contact with sancta in 5:14–19 and/or 
misappropriation of other’s property under misuse of God’s name in a false oath in   
5:20–26548 adds even more gravity to this sin. The requirement for the reparation offering 
upholds the sanctity of the marriage covenant and as such, it constitutes a sacrilege even 
under the two disrupting conditions which, in this case, are the facts that (1) this is a 
marriage of a slave woman, and (2) it is not consummated.549 
The pericope in Num 15:22–29 modifies the sin offering procedure in Lev 4:5–
13,550 but the two points are unchanged: (1) the protasis encompasses two alternative 
ways of sinning, and (2) the sinner first receives ר פֶּ  and is forgiven, implying that they כִּ
follow the sacrificial procedure (5:16, 18, 29 [6:7]). 
As established under the subheading “Moral Impurity/Sin in the Pentateuch” of 
this study, punishments for sin are always included in the contexts when the sinner breaks 
 
547Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 338–39.  
548Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 345–46, 365–73. 
549Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1672–75; Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 339. 
550The relationship and differences between the procedures regarding the sin offering in Lev 4–
5:13 and Num 15:22–31 are not the concern of the present study. For potential resolutions see Milgrom, 
Leviticus 1–16, 264–68; Roy E. Gane, “Loyalty and Scope of Expiation in Numbers 15,” ZABR/JANEBL 
16 (2010): 249–50. 
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God’s commandments. The punishment for various sins cannot be related to certain 
Hebrew terms for sin since they are frequently used as equivalents in the Pentateuch and 
OT. Authors of biblical books did not use them in a strict, technical manner, but rather, in 
a general one referring to a broad-spectrum of breaking the commandments. It is the 
context which often contains punishment that suggests whether a certain sin is 
expiable/forgivable or inexpiable/unforgivable. Punishment also cannot be established 
based on the sinner’s intention, since both basic types of sin, intentional, but not brazen 
sins, and unintentional sins, are expiable/forgivable. I have suggested that 
inexpiable/unforgivable sins are those for which the texts stipulate capital punishment in 
various forms, death (מּות), kārēt, kill (ָהַרג), stoning (ָסַקל ,ָרַגם), burning with fire (ָׂשַרף), 
striking (ָנָכה), and pierce through (ָיָרה). These sins are brazen sins that express the 
sinner’s attitude of breaking with God and are defined as ָיד ָרָמה ב   sins. All the other sins 
are expiable/forgivable. No capital punishment is associated with the sins enumerated in 
Lev 4–5 and Num 15:22–29. In addition, all these texts portray that forgiveness is 
available to the sinner. The meaning of ר פֶּ  that was established through the analysis of כִּ
Lev 17:11 fits these contexts perfectly since the sinner is guilty before God and yet, 
receives forgiveness.  ר פֶּ  encompasses ransom and substitution in these contexts. Also כִּ




ר פֶּ  Leviticus 1:4 :ָרָצה and כִּ
The verb 551 ָרָצה is used in vv. 3 and 4, but is syntactically related to ר פֶּ  only in כִּ
the latter verse. Milgrom correctly noted a difference between the two uses of ָרָצה: 
Whereas the latter is dependent on the unblemished condition of the animal, the 
“acceptance” in this verse [v. 4] relates to the hand-leaning rite. The two dative 
suffixes attached to this and the following verb, ר פֶּ  ”,both mean “for, on behalf of ,כִּ
thereby emphasizing the indispensability of the hand-leaning by the offerer himself in 
his quest for “acceptance” and “expiation” (see below).552 
 
Verse 4 presents the benefit of ָרָצה as a precondition for ר פֶּ  that is conditioned כִּ
by the laying on of hands, while v. 3 requires that the sacrifice be a male, without defect, 
and offered in the sanctuary (vv. 3, 10). ָרָצה thus connects four prerequisites in vv. 3 and 
4 that the offerer was required to do in order to receive ר פֶּ  the unblemished (2) male (1) ,כִּ
sacrifice (3) offered in the sanctuary and (4) the offerer’s laying on of hands on the head 
of the sacrificial animal. Chapter 1 does not relate ritual nor moral impurity to the 
offerer.553 However, Levine correctly noticed: “Proximity to God was inherently 
dangerous for both the worshiper and the priests, even if there had been no particular 
ofference to anger Him. The favorable acceptance of the ʿolah signaled God’s 
willingness to be approached and served as a kind of ransom, or redemption, from divine 
wrath.”554 It is not clear from Levine’s quotation what would create this danger from God 
 
551The root ָרָצה has two verbal and corresponding nominal meanings: “to be accepted” and “an 
acceptance” and “to desire” and “a desire.” However, only the former meaning is found in the Pentateuch. 
Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 150; Rooker, Leviticus, 86. 
552Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 153–54.  
553Levine, Leviticus, 6; Porter, Leviticus, 19; Balentine, Leviticus, 23. 
554Levine, Leviticus, 7. 
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for the offerer in the latter’s approach to God. As has been suggested multiple times in 
the current study, it is the GHS that generates this danger for the offerer in God’s 
presence and thus, ר פֶּ  is needed to atone for it and make the relationship between an כִּ
inherently sinful human and a holy God possible and safe.555 The foundational principle 
behind atonement brought by the ר פֶּ  is ransom.556 Some commentators have כִּ
misunderstood the meaning of the ר פֶּ  in this context since they ascribed to it the role of כִּ
purifying from both ritual and moral impurity557 which is not supported by the text. These 
scholars have considered, explicitly or implicitly, the two radically different contexts of 
Lev 1 and 4 as the same and suggested the same meaning for ר פֶּ  The texts simply do .כִּ
not provide grounds for such inference. 
ר פֶּ  in this context is achieved by the blood of the burnt offering which was כִּ
offered by the priest on behalf of the offerer. The blood was applied around the altar. 
There is no specific reason why this sacrifice was offered. Ritual or moral impurity 
terminology is not found in the chapter suggestive of the absence of either of the two 
possible impurities. The only element that ר פֶּ  could atone for is GHS. Ransom remains כִּ
the foundation based on which atoning is possible. 
 
555Wenham, The Book of Leviticus, 57; Bellinger, Leviticus and Numbers, 20. 
556Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 163; Kiuchi, Leviticus, 56–57.  
557Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 65–66; Gerstenberger, Leviticus, 27–28; Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 
67–68; Tidball, The Message of Leviticus, 39–40; Kenneth A. Mathews, Leviticus: Holy God, Holy People, 
Preaching the Word series (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2009), 30–31; Sklar, Leviticus, 90; Wenham, 
The Book of Leviticus, 57. Wenham’s interpretation is the most contradicting since he explicitly stated in 
one spot that “this is the clearest clue to the purpose of the burnt offering to be found in the Levitical law. It 
atones for the worshipper’s sins,” and in other spot that “the burnt offering does not remove sin or change 
man’s sinful nature, but it makes fellowship between sinful man and a holy God possible.” Wenham, The 
Book of Leviticus, 57, 58. 
 
536 
Milgrom’s translation of these texts accurately reflects what has been 
communicated in the Hebrew: “3If his offering is a burnt offering from the herd, he shall 
offer a male without blemish. He shall bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, for 
acceptance on his behalf before the Lord. 4He shall lean his hand on the head of the burnt 
offering, that it may be acceptable [accepted] on his behalf, to expiate [atone] for him.”558 
 
Milgrom’s and Gane’s Understanding of Atonement and 
Its Relation to the Hebrew Preposition ן  מִּ
The most updated debate on the nature of atonement is the one between Milgrom 
and Gane.559 Citing just these two studies in a limited way does not intend to disregard 
several more theories such as those of Rodríguez,560 Kiuchi,561 and other scholars who 
contributed greatly to the understanding of atonement.562 This debate contains elements 
that the present study agrees and disagrees with, so for that reason, both are presented and 
critiqued in a limited way in order to highlight the differences and similarities between 
them. This process portrayed the theory suggested in this study. The preposition ן  is מִּ
included here because it emphasizes one of the crucial differences between these two   
 
558Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 133. 
559Christian A. Eberhart, “Cult and Character: Purification Offerings, Day of Atonement, and 
Theodicy: A Review,” JBL 125 (2006): 573–76; Baruch H. Schwartz, “Cult and Character: Purification 
Offerings, Day of Atonement, and Theodicy: A Review,” AUSS 45.2 (2007): 267–72; William K. Gilders, 
“Cult and Character: Purification Offering, Day of Atonement, and Theodicy: A Review,” CBQ 69 (2007): 
116–18. 
560Rodríguez, “Substitution in the Hebrew Cultus.” 
561Kiuchi, Purification Offering; Kiuchi, Leviticus. 
562Levine, In the Presence of the Lord, 63–67; Philip P. Jenson, Graded Holiness: A Key to the 
Priestly Conception of the World, JSOTSup 106 (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1992), 155–60; Sklar, Sin, 
Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement; Hartley, Leviticus; Rendtorff, Leviticus, vol. 3. 
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theories and helps inform the concept of atonement presented in this study. Milgrom’s 
and Gane’s treatments of the preposition ן  are analyzed in a separate subheading after מִּ
the basic components of their atonement theories are presented and evaluated. 
 
Milgrom’s Theory of Atonement 
Milgrom innovatively suggested that it is not the offerer who benefits from ר פֶּ  , כִּ
but rather, the sanctuary.563 This claim rests on five assumptions. First, ר פֶּ  in ritual texts כִּ
means “to cleanse, purge.”564 Second, impurity is always removed from sinners before 
they offer a sin offering. Ritual impurity is removed by ablutions, whereas moral 
impurity is removed by repentance.565 Third, the sanctuary is defiled aerially. A major 
impurity defiles the sacrificial altar, while a forgivable moral impurity, depending on the 
socio-religious status of the offerer, defiles the holy and the most holy places. 
Unforgivable sin, regardless of who commits it, defiles the most holy place and is 
cleansed on the Day of Atonement.566 Fourth, the blood of the sin offering was never 
applied directly to human beings and therefore, the sin offering never purges the offerers 
from their sins, but rather, the sanctuary to which it is applied.567 Fifth, when the object of 
ר פֶּ  is inanimate, it is accompanied by a direct object marker, and when the object is כִּ
 
563Milgrom, “Atonement in the OT,” 78–79; Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 255–56. 
564Milgrom, “Atonement in the OT,” 78–79; Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 255–56. 
565Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 255. 
566Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 257. 
567Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 255. 
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human, then it is modified by the prepositions ַעל or 568.ַבַעד 
All these claims are erroneous. The general error of Milgrom’s theory is a/the 
mechanistic view of atonement expressed through ר פֶּ  which, in cultic contexts, is כִּ
achieved within the limits of physical activities. In other words, ר פֶּ  is possible only if כִּ
the blood of the sin offering touches entities that need it. A detailed study of the 
atonement in the present study demonstrated that Milgrom’s understanding of ר פֶּ  was כִּ
not supported by biblical texts and worldview. It also blurs the lines between magic and 
biblical faith within which God directly acts to bring change rather than the performance 
of certain ritual activities. The benefits of ritual is not achieved by the performance of the 
ritual itself, but by God’s involvement and acting based on his commitment/promise that 
he will act if the human party follows his guidelines to perform a given ritual. 
First, the understanding of the concept of sin, the semantics of ר פֶּ  established in כִּ
the present study, and other inferences derived from biblical texts led to the conclusion 
that atonement expressed through ר פֶּ  points to atonement for the offerers based on the כִּ
ransom of sacrificial blood/life and not on cleansing. Second, ritual impurity was usually 
remedied by the passage of time and it vanished with no sin offering needed, but in some 
cases, a sin offering was needed after the passage of time, which in this case, does not 
cleanse the offerers, but rather, atones for them. Moral impurity remained on the offerers 
until they received atonement and were forgiven. Forgiveness for sin takes place after the   
 
568For a thorough analysis of ר פֶּ ר constructions, including כִּ פֶּ  see chapter four of the ,ַעל or ַבַעד + כִּ
present study. The last construction is used frequently to refer to the sanctuary, and the preposition ַעל acts 
as a direct object marker. See subheading ר פֶּ  .in the present study ַעל with כִּ
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ר פֶּ  .ritual was performed, signaling that the offerers were still affected with their sin כִּ
Repentance is needed in the process of forgiveness, but it is never said to remove sin 
from the sinner. Third, the ADH is extensively disproved in chapter five of the present 
study. A part of this hypothesis is disproved by the understanding of sin presented in 
chapter two of the present study, while other parts are disproved by a close study of the 
grammatical, semantical, and syntactical peculiarities of the passages upon which this 
theory rests. Fourth, the blood of the sin offering is infected by the offerers’ sin and 
therefore, is not applied onto them, but rather, to the sanctuary where the sin is stored 
until the Day of Atonement. It is on this day when the sanctuary, in its totality, would be 
cleansed, not at the time when the offerers offer their sacrifice.569 Milgrom’s fifth point is 
partially right. That is, ר פֶּ  marker, while it is ֵאת with inanimate is accompanied by a כִּ
accompanied by the prepositions  ַלע  or ַבַעד when the direct object is human. However, to 
claim that the offerers do not directly receive the benefits of ר פֶּ  because of this כִּ
overemphasizes the role of the prepositions in the process of forming an understanding 
on such a comprehensive concept as atonement. In addition, it opposes the outcome of 
the rest of the sin offering ritual where the offerers are forgiven only after they offer a sin 
offering and receive atonement. Gane correctly concluded that the benefit of ר פֶּ  is direct כִּ
in the case of inanimate objects, and indirect in case of human objects.570 Building on 
Gane’s point, the present study proposes that the essential difference between the two   
 
569Gane convincingly argued for a two-phase atonement, contrary to Milgrom’s one-phase 
atonement. Gane, Cult and Character, 267–84. 
570Gane, Cult and Character, 108. 
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constructions of ר פֶּ  has to do with the nature of the respective objects. Inanimate objects כִּ
receive cleansing due to their inanimate nature and therefore, are marked with ֵאת. 
Human objects, on the other hand, receive atonement that is based on ransom due to the 
constant disadvantage of GHS and sin (understood as a violation of God’s laws). Many 
scholars of cult have successfully criticized Milgrom’s theory lately,571 so this study 
refrains from analyzing all the points of his theory. 
 
Gane’s Theory of Atonement and Understanding of ן  מִּ
The critical point of concern of Gane’s theory is the identity of the object who 
received ר פֶּ  Hasel,572 Rodríguez,573 and Zohar574 already responded to this question in .כִּ
the same way as Gane, claiming that it is the offerer who was cleansed in the sin offering 
ritual, but Gane supplied additional arguments to strengthen this position. 
First, Gane adopted the concept that the blood applications in Lev 4 and 16 are 
different because they were performed on different occasions and the former cleanses the 
offerer, while the latter cleanses the sanctuary, thus forming two phases of atonement,   
 
571Levine, In the Presence of the Lord, 63–67; Jenson, Graded Holiness, 155–60. Also see entire 
works of Rodríguez, “Substitution in the Hebrew Cultus”; Rodríguez, “Transfer of Sin in Leviticus,” 132–
33, 137; Kiuchi, Purification Offering; Kiuchi, Leviticus; Zohar, “Repentance and Purification”; Roy E. 
Gane, Ritual Dynamic Structure, GD 14 (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2004); Gane, Cult and Character. 
572Hasel, “Studies in Biblical Atonement-I,” 99. 
573Rodríguez, “Transfer of Sin in Leviticus,” 132–33, 137. 
574Zohar, “Repentance and Purification,” 612–13. 
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daily and yearly.575 In this, Gane’s theory resembles that of Rodríguez576 which was also 
accepted by Zohar577 and Hasel.578 Second, Gane adopted limited automatic defilement 
only for cases of Molech worship and wanton neglect to purify oneself from corpse 
contamination.579 Third, Gane suggested a unique but yet not clearly articulated 
defilement of the sanctuary, while Rodríguez, Zohar, and Hasel clearly stated that the 
transfer of sin from the offerer to the sin offering happens via laying on of hands.580 
Gane’s understanding of this ritual gesture is multifaceted. His basic interpretation of the 
laying on of hands is as follows: “When hand-leaning is performed, it identifies the 
offerer/owner of the victim, to whom the benefits of the sacrifice accrue, within the 
context of transferring the offering material from the offerer to the deity.”581 
Gane’s hybrid theory encompasses the meanings of several theories. First, the 
ritual gesture expresses ownership of the offerer over the animal. Based on the following 
quotation by Gane that both types of laying on of hand/s “signifies a (different) kind of 
identification that is involved in transfer,”582 so that two more elements can be derived.   
 
575Gane, Cult and Character, xx, 6, 123–25, 127, 154, 160, 241, 274–84. 
576Rodríguez, “Substitution in the Hebrew Cultus,” 125–26; Rodríguez, “Transfer of Sin in 
Leviticus,” 189–91. 
577Zohar, “Repentance and Purification,” 613. 
578Hasel, “Studies in Biblical Atonement-I,” 97–100; Gerhard Hasel, “Studies in Biblical 
Atonement-II: The Day of Atonement,” in The Sanctuary and the Atonement: Theological and Historical 
Studies, ed. Frank B. Holbrook (Silver Spring, MD: Biblical Research Institute, 1989), 120. 
579Gane, Cult and Character, 156, 157, 296, 299. 
580Rodríguez, “Transfer of Sin in Leviticus,” 180–88; Hasel, “Studies in Biblical Atonement-I,” 
94–96; Zohar, “Repentance and Purification,” 612–13; Rodríguez, “Transfer of Sin in Leviticus,” 126–31. 
581Gane, Cult and Character, 56. 
582Gane, Cult and Character, 245. 
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Second, it represents identification of the offerer and the sacrificial animal. Third, it 
contributes to the transfer. However, it is not clear whether the transfer refers to the 
transfer of sin to the sacrificial animal or transfer of the animal to the Lord. Thus, the use 
of one hand signifies transfer of the animal from the offerer to God, while use of two 
hands as, in the case of the scapegoat (with simultaneous confession), transfers moral sins 
to the goat.583 However, as stated in the introduction of the present study, Gane’s 
understanding of the ritual gesture seems to be identical to the position of Bähr,584 but his 
application of the OT offerings to the sacrifice of Jesus Christ in the NT reveals that he 
goes beyond Bähr’s position by including the idea of transfer of sin and substitution.585 
First, as mentioned previously, this study agrees with the claim that the offerer 
receives the benefits of ר פֶּ ר as well as the sanctuary. The former benefits from ,כִּ פֶּ  כִּ
achieved by daily sacrifices (Lev 4–5), while the latter, through yearly sacrifices (Lev 
16). Consequently, this study accepts a two-phase atonement, daily and yearly. Second, 
based on the study in chapter five of the present study, ADH in is not supported by 
biblical texts. Third, the meaning/function of the laying on of hand/s as transfer of sin and 
substitution, suggested by Rodríguez, Hasel, Zohar and others,586 deserves to be explored 
further. The new idea that the present study suggests is that GHS could have also been 
transferred so the ever sinful offerer can be atoned for in the presence of the holy God.  
 
583Gane, Cult and Character, 245. 
584Page 3–4 in this study. Also, Knierim, Text and Concept in Leviticus 1:1–9, 37–40. 
585Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 68–69. 
586See introduction of the present study, p. 3 fn. 7. 
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Milgrom’s and Gane’s Debate on the 
Understanding of the Preposition  ן  מִּ
The understanding of the preposition ן  in this debate is important because it is מִּ
used by both Milgrom and Gane to confirm their understanding of who receives the 
benefits of ר פֶּ ן Milgrom expressed his understanding of .כִּ  :in an article, “Critical Notes מִּ
The Preposition ן  Pericopes,”587 as response to Gane’s which he expressed חטאת in the מִּ
in Cult and Character: Purification Offerings, Day of Atonement, and Theodicy and a 
subsequent article, “Privative Preposition min in Purification Offering Pericopes and the 
Changing Face of ‘Dorian Gray.’”588 This study agrees and disagrees with both theories, 
but basically accepts Milgrom’s causative meaning of ן  and consequently, disagrees מִּ
with Gane’s privative, but yet, as stated earlier, disagrees with Milgrom’s claim that this 
understanding of ן ר along with his understanding of ,מִּ פֶּ  is insufficient to claim that the ,כִּ
offerer never receives the benefits of ר פֶּ  The main question is whether the preposition is .כִּ
to be taken to have privative, “from, of,” or causative “because of, on account of, for” 
meaning. 
That is, both Milgrom and Gane held that the role of prepositions in the formation 
of their atonement theories was decisive.589 As demonstrated in the study of the ר פֶּ    כִּ
 
587Jacob Milgrom, “Critical Notes: The Preposition ן  :(Pericopes,” JBL 126 (2007 חטאת in the מִּ
161–63. 
588Roy E. Gane, “Privative Preposition ןמ in Purification Offering Pericopes and the Changing 
Face of ‘Dorian Gray,’” JBL 127 (2008): 209–22. 




construction in the present study, Milgrom’s understanding of prepositions is erroneous 
on several grounds.590 Milgrom did not include the preposition ן  in his emphasis of מִּ
prepositions. Gane, on the other hand, focusing particularly on ן  overemphasized and ,מִּ
overlooked some basic assertions regarding it which he considered decisive in a pursuit 
of his question as to who was the object of ר פֶּ  .כִּ
The present study affirms that Milgrom correctly claimed that the preposition ן  מִּ
should be understood as causative and thus translated “because of, on account of, for.” 
Against Gane’s privative meaning, “from, of,” Milgrom listed 4 arguments. First, he 
rightfully stated that ן  cannot be understood as privative in the cases of individuals of מִּ
Lev 12, 13–14, and 15 because they are ritually pure when they come to sanctuary. This 
argument represents Milgrom’s partly inaccurate reading of Gane, since Gane himself 
understood that the ritual impurity is not on them, but rather, that “the sacrificial process 
removes residual impurity from her.”591 Because some sort of ritual impurity is on them, 
Milgrom’s argument is on point since ר פֶּ  removes it, as Gane proposed. Indeed, the כִּ
texts do not mention the concept of residual ritual impurity. Milgrom claimed that Gane’s 
privative meaning is not supported by these texts. Second, Milgrom rightfully criticized 
Gane’s privative interpretation of ן  is not (כפר) in Lev 15:15b because “purgation מִּ
offered “from,” but “for, because of”—“his flow” (15:15); “her impure flow” (15:30); 
 
590See evaluation of Milgrom’s claims on the use of prepositions under the subheading ר פֶּ  with כִּ
 .in the present study ַעל
591Gane, Cult and Character, 113. Even though this quotation refers to the parturient, Gane applies 




“his impurity” (14:19a), which contaminated the altar.” Third, the preposition ן  ַעל and מִּ
are interchangeable, synonyms which subsequently mean that ן  receives a causative מִּ
meaning from ַעל since ַעל is never partitive.592 Fourth, Milgrom criticized Gane for the 
claim that “the חטאת brought by the bodily impure or the inadvertent sinner absorbs the 
impurity; the priest brings the impure blood of the חטאת to the altar, and the holiness of 
the altar wipes out the impurity.593 Milgrom dismissed Gane’s claim for two reasons. 
First, the impure blood of the sin offering was not allowed on the altar. This is incorrect 
since the high priest in Lev 16:18 applies that same blood by which he cleanses the 
sanctuary to the sacrificial altar to cleanse it. Thus, the impurity is on the altar as it is in 
the sanctuary, and the high priest cleanses it from both places, Lev 16:16–19. Second, 
Milgrom criticized Gane because of the claim that the sin offering blood in Lev 6:27–28 
is impure. The fact that the holy is immune to impurity within the sanctuary confines is a 
biblically informed conclusion.594 Milgrom himself held that the priests are immune to 
impurity, and their immunity to impurity stems from their holiness.595 However, 
contradicting himself, Milgrom stated that “the sanctuary itself is not immune to 
impurity.”596 It is unknown why he stated that the priesthood is immune to impurity 
based on the fact that they are sanctified and the sanctuary is not even though it was 
 
592An oppositional sense context related to this preposition does not fit this context. Waltke and 
O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 216–19. 
593Milgrom, “Critical Notes,” 162; Gane, Cult and Character, 176–81. 
594Rodríguez, “Substitution in the Hebrew Cultus,” 217–18. Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 162. 
595Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 1050–51.  
596Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 1050–51. 
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sanctified before the priests and served as the environment where the priests were 
sanctified. Contradicting himself even more, Milgrom stated: “On the contrary, it is the 
continuous pollution of the sanctuary by Israel’s moral and physical impurity that 
mandates its indispensable purgation by means of the חטאת offering.”597 The present 
study totally agrees with this quotation of Milgrom. However, the claim that the 
sanctuary is not immune to impurities is totally disproved by the Pentateuchal texts since 
the impurities are stored in the sanctuary during the entire year. This makes his critique of 
Gane contradictory and unacceptable. It has to be added that this immunity of the 
sanctuary and priesthood to impurity is temporary and not permanent, since both entities 
have to be cleansed of it once a year, on the Day of Atonement. This is exactly assumed 
in Milgrom’s last quotation. Thus, this argument is incorrect since the holy objects inside 
the sanctuary confines, including sanctuary itself, were immune to impurity, and Gane’s 
claim remains valid. Milgrom was right in his claim that super-sanctity cannot eradicate 
impurity, so the altar’s sanctity cannot wipe out impurity. Rather, it stays on the altar 
until the Day of Atonement when the altar, along with the sanctuary, is cleansed. 
Based on his fourth critique, Milgrom’s fifth critique of Gane is incorrect: “Gane 
engages in two paradoxes: In his view, not only is the .... blood that is daubed on the most 
sacred altar impure (above), but on Yom Kippur the .... blood changes its nature from a 
pollutant to a purifier; erstwhile impure blood now purifies the entire sanctuary and its 
sancta.”598 As affirmed in the present study, this phenomenon is paradoxical but firmly   
 
597Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 622–23, 840–41, 1042–43, 1048–49.  
598Gane, Cult and Character, 230–33. 
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rooted in an all-inclusive and comprehensive reading of the Pentateuchal texts. A slight 
correction should be supplied to this quotation that the blood that purifies was not 
impure, but rather, pure blood. No hands were laid on the animals from which this blood 
was obtained inasmuch as not laying on of hand/s was performed over those sacrificial 
animals. Thus, the blood used on the Day of Atonement was pure and thus, able to 
cleanse the sanctuary. 
The present study proposes that ן  should always be translated with a causative מִּ
sense in the texts where Gane identified a privative sense (Lev 4:26; 5:6, 10; 14:19; 
15:15, 30). The most convincing argument for such a proposal is the fact that the offerer, 
especially the offerers previously affected by ritual impurity, do not need to be cleansed 
from anything. They are ritually clean and do not need removal of ritual impurity or 
residual impurity that remain after the ritual impurity is healed. The residual impurity 
assumption is never mentioned or discussed in Pentateuchal texts. The offerers loaded 
with moral impurity cannot receive cleansing from it since moral impurity is a 
conceptual, rather than physical or quasi-physical entity. Such offerers need atonement 
based on ransom because they broke God’s law and are in the state of guilt before God 
with the punishment lingering. The only potential exception where the present study 
would agree with the partitive sense is 16:16, 34 because the object receiving ר פֶּ  is כִּ
inanimate, the sanctuary. The inanimate entity, being ontologically different than human 
entity, can receive cleansing. The human entity needs atonement based on ransom. 
An additional reason against a privative sense of the preposition ן  is the fact that מִּ
this sense of ן  is related to separation in terms of physical space, temporal, or partitive מִּ
uses. Separation is determined by space or time. These two concepts of space and time 
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are unrelated to ן  in the contexts Gane studied. The only major Hebrew Grammar that מִּ
defines the privative sense of ן  is Waltke and O’Connor’s grammar, but that definition מִּ
does not fit contexts that Gane referred to. They proposed: “The preposition is a privative 
marker, that is, it marks what is missing or unavailable (## 22–23).”599 This is not to say 
that the privative sense cannot be related to the texts dealing with impurity, but the 
privative sense of ן  has to be established on another basis such as the preposition’s מִּ
syntactical relationship with the verb and its meaning.600 The meaning of כִּ פֶּ ר presented 
in the present study does not give grounds that the privative meaning would be assigned 
to ן  The fact that prepositions are usually semantically multifaceted words necessitates .מִּ
input from the immediate and broader context for a proper meaning. The causative sense, 
on the contrary, is well explained in major Hebrew grammars,601 and it correlates with the 
meaning of ר פֶּ  .presented in the current study כִּ
Milgrom is right to say that atonement is not “from” impurity, the privative sense 
of ן  .but rather “because of, on account of, for” impurity, the causative sense of it ,מִּ
Gane’s privative sense can be maintained if atonement is understood as being cleansing, 
an idea of ר פֶּ  that is not supported by the research presented in this study. The offerers כִּ
do not need cleansing, but rather atonement for their impurity based on ransom. 
As Gane’s tables demonstrate, ן ן are interchangeable. The use of ַעל and מִּ  is not מִּ
 
599Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 214. 
600Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 411. 
601Joüon and Muraoka, A Grammar of Biblical Hebrew, 460; Gesenius, Gesenius' Hebrew 
Grammar, 382–83; Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 212–15. 
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consistent as Gane’s tables demonstrate.602 Overall, it is missing in 16/44 formulas that 
he identified. 5/8 contexts are related to ritual impurity, 10/17 are related to moral 
impurity, and 1/19 contexts is related to both impurities.603 It is also critical to note, as 
Gane’s tables604 show that in Lev 4–5, the preposition is consistently interchangeable 
with the preposition ַעל. The fact that it is missing so many times is not to say that the text 
did not assume it, but that it says that the text did not place emphasis on it. These reasons 
make it unsafe to rely on one of the multiple meanings of ן  that are inconsistently and מִּ
interchangeably used in critical atonement texts such as Lev 4–5. 
 
Conclusion:  ר פֶּ  כִּ
ר פֶּ  (was etymologically traced to two cognate roots, the Akkadian D (intensive כִּ
stem from the verb kapāru, kuppuru and Arabic intensive kaffara from the verb kafara. 
The meanings established by this comparison are “to cleanse, remove” or “to cover.” 
Another frequent meaning of ר פֶּ  is “to ransom.” However, a sharp distinction between  כִּ
meanings established on the comparative evidence is not solid since the Arabic kafara, I 
stem, does not correspond to the Hebrew ר פֶּ  .piel, or the Akkadian kuppuru, D stem ,כִּ
The Akkadian D stem means “to wipe” and always in the sense “to wipe off, wipe away,” 
not “wipe on or smear on.” In addition, the Arabic kafara has the same meaning of “to 
expiate” that corresponds to the Akkadian D stem, “to remove, to erase.” This semantic 
 
602Gane, Cult and Character, 110–11, 113, 124. 
603The remaining four contexts are sanctification (Exod 29:36–37, Lev 8:15) and one with 
reparation offering (Lev 19:22). Gane, Cult and Character, 110–11, 121. 
604Gane, Cult and Character, 124. 
 
550 
overlap of cognate alternatives makes this evidence unsound. 
Regardless of the fact that relying on the comparison with Akkadian and Arabic 
cognates is unsound, some theologians still believe that “to cover” is the correct meaning 
of the Hebrew ר פֶּ  while others favor the “to cleanse” meaning. Also, a frequent ,כִּ
meaning is “to ransom.” The key problem related to the "to cover" sin meaning is the fact 
that in some contexts, sin is not included at all, but ר פֶּ  .refers more to the cleansing  כִּ
Proponents of the “to cleanse” meaning realize that this meaning is not applicable to all 
contexts and thus, accept the “to atone, expiate” meaning for some contexts. However, 
the predominant meaning for the latter group of scholars is “to cleanse.” Baruch A. 
Levine, Jacob Milgrom, Jay Sklar, Roy E. Gane, and Yitzhaq Feder have expanded the 
research on the meaning of ר פֶּ  and all suggested their own proposals for the meaning of  כִּ
this verb. This study partially agrees with all of them on the point that ר פֶּ  encompasses  כִּ
multiple meanings, but yet differs with all of them in what its meaning is in particular 
contexts. The present study, unlike any of the studies mentioned, took into consideration 
the fact that the underlying condition of human beings is GHS and the fact that ר פֶּ  deals  כִּ
with it. The uniqueness of this study is also found in the fact that it suggested the 
meaning of ר פֶּ  .based on its occurrence in the Pentateuch  כִּ
Before analyzing ר פֶּ  constructions, the present study examined the concept of  כִּ
the GHS of human nature and demonstrated that, surprisingly, this concept is neglected in 
the studies of atonement. The present study demonstrated that GHS is a critical human 
characteristic in the biblical understanding of human nature. It originated from the fall of 
humanity in the Garden of Eden when the first couple disobeyed God’s commandment 
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and, since then, affects every human being. Influential scholars have recognized and 
accepted the concept of GHS as being inseparably related to human beings in the Bible. It 
affects all aspect of human life, including those related to humans’ cognitive, as well as 
those related to their physical existence. Surprisingly, critical scholars of ancient Israel 
cult did not include this concept in their study of atonement. They simply ignored it and it 
does not affect the process of atonement. The present study demonstrates that GHS, like 
ritual and moral impurity, is real but at the same time, in the majority of cases, an abstract 
entity. General human sinfulness is foundational for both impurities, ritual and moral. 
Both of them stem from GHS and ritual impurity in a small number of cases, and is 
represented in terms of physical appearance. However, ritual impurity is atoned for only 
after the physical aspects of it have disappeared (healed, certain amount of time 
elapsed…). 
Grammatical and syntactical variations associated with the Hebrew verb ָכַפר in 
the Pentateuch reflect the semantic complexity of the term. There are several points of 
difference of ָכַפר usage in the Pentateuch which were noted in the present study that were 
referred to in the study of the occurrences where ר פֶּ  is syntactically associated with כִּ
various prepositions or where it is not accompanied by any complement. This study also 
agreed that Lev 17:11 is a foundational text for the meaning of ר פֶּ  ,and that, in this text כִּ
it means “to ransom,” which is based on the sacrificial blood that is applied onto the altar. 
Sacrificial blood represented the life of animal that was terminated on behalf of the 
offerers as a ransom for the sin they committed or sinfulness they were affected with as 
they relate to God. The inevitable consequence of such an understanding of ר פֶּ  in Lev כִּ
17:11 is that sacrifice also serves as the offerers’ substitute. Thus, ר פֶּ  encompasses these כִּ
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two foundational functions; it ransoms the offerers and substitutes for them. In addition, 
the present study adopts the concept related to Lev 10:17 that eating of the sin offering 
flesh does contribute to the ר פֶּ  process. Moral impurity is transferred from the offerers  כִּ
to the priest via the sin offering sacrifice to the priest. ָעֹון ָנָׂשא , in this context, refers to 
the priests’ bearing the leader’s or commoner’s moral impurity instead of them. The sin 
offering sacrifice has the unique feature of being holy and impure at the same time. 
The first construction analyzed in this study is  ר + ֵאת פֶּ  .a direct object marker ,כִּ
There are two contexts within which this construction is found. The verb is used only 
once in basic qal stem in the non-cultic context in the Pentateuch and then it conveys the 
concrete meaning of ָכַפר (Gen 6:14), where it refers to the literal, concrete applying, 
rubbing of the bitumen onto the wood of the ark to make it watertight. This is the only 
qal and only concrete use of the term. All the other occurrences are in piel and they 
always refer to the abstract effects that ר פֶּ  conveys. This construction also occurs in one כִּ
cultic context, in Lev 16:20, 32, and it means “to remove,” in the sense of cleansing. 
Impurity is involved in these texts, and ר פֶּ  conveys removal of it from an inanimate כִּ
object, that is, sanctuary. 
The constructions where ר פֶּ  is not accompanied with a preposition or direct כִּ
object marker also appears in cultic and non-cultic contexts. Of the former, two 
occurrences convey different meanings. Genesis 32:20 [21] carries the meaning “to 
appease,” while Deut 32:43 is best understood as “to atone for, expiate.” The cultic 
occurrence in Lev 16:33, due to its syntactical relationship with Lev 16:20, 32, also 
conveys the meaning of “to remove,” in the sense of cleansing. Impurity is involved in 
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this text, and ר פֶּ  .expresses its removal from an inanimate object, that is, the sanctuary כִּ
When ר פֶּ  in non-cultic contexts, it refers ַבַעד is accompanied by the preposition כִּ
to atonement, but it was of a temporary nature (Gen 32:30). Impurity is heavily integrated 
into this context. In cultic contexts, ר פֶּ  conveys two different meanings. In Lev 9:7 and כִּ
Lev 16:34, the term is best translated as “to atone for.” Impurity is not involved in these 
two texts, but ר פֶּ ר ,atones for GHS. In Lev 16:6, 11, 17 כִּ פֶּ  means “to remove,” in the כִּ
sense of cleansing. Impurity is involved in these texts and ר פֶּ  conveys its removal from כִּ
an inanimate object, that is, the sanctuary. 
The construction   ר  + ל פֶּ  is found two times, and always in non-cultic texts, Num כִּ
35:33 and Deut 21:8. In both of these texts, ר פֶּ  means “to atone for.” The second text כִּ
incorporates the idea of ransom. 
Two meanings are detected with   ר + ב פֶּ  constructions and they are both found in כִּ
cultic contexts (Exod 29:33, Lev 5:16; 6:23[30]; 7:7; 16:17, 27; 17:11; 19:22; Num 5:8). 
All the texts include impurity, either from context or implied, but the function of this 
construction is either to communicate instrumental usage, indicating the agent by which 
the ר פֶּ  was achieved in Exod 29:33; Lev 5:16; 7:7; 17:11; 19:22; Num 5:8, or indicating כִּ
the location where the ר פֶּ  .was accomplished in Lev 6:23[30]; 7:7; 16:17, 27 כִּ
The most frequent construction is ר + ַעל פֶּ  and it occurs in cultic and non-cultic כִּ
contexts. In 47/56 of occurrences, the preposition ַעל carries the meaning of advantage in 
Exod 30:15–16; Lev 1:4; 4:20, 26, 31, 35; 5:6, 10, 13, 16, 18, 26 [6:7]; 8:34; 10:17; 12:7–
8; 14:18–21, 29, 31; 15:15, 30; 16:30, 33–34; 17:11; 19:22; 23:28; Num. 5:8; 6:11; 8:12, 
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19, 21; 15:25, 28; 17:10–11[16:46–47]; 25:13[the only non-cultic context]; 28:22, 30; 
29:5; 31:50. In the other 9 occurrences, the preposition ַעל mark either the location of ר פֶּ  כִּ
accomplishment in Exod 29:36; 30:10; Lev 8:15, or the instrument in Lev 16:10, or as a 
direct object marker in Exod 29:27; Lev 14:53; 16:16, 18. In Exod 29:36, ַעל carries a 
double function of direct object marker and location. Of the last 9 occurrences, only Lev 
14:53 is a non-cultic context. 
ר פֶּ ) also appears in context with other concepts such as to cleanse כִּ ָטאחָ  ), sanctify 
ר When .(ָרָצה) and accept ,(ָסַלח) forgive ,(ָטֵהר) clean ,( ָקַדׁש) פֶּ  appears in the rituals כִּ
whose goal is to reach these outcomes, ר פֶּ  is a part of a bigger, major ritual. It has כִּ
limited function within the major ritual to assist the accomplishment of the major ritual. 
Thus, when it appears along with ָחָטא and ָקַדׁש in Exod 29:33, 36, it atones for 
the priests’ GHS in v. 33, and cleanses the altar in v. 36. When it appears in ָחָטא contexts 
in Lev 8:15, it also atones for the priests’ GHS. Ritual or moral impurity is not included 
in these texts. The basis for this atonement is ransom. 
When it appears in the contexts of ָחָטא and ר, ָטֵהר פֶּ כִּ  is uniquely accomplished by 
the reparation offering in Lev 14:20 and refers to the reinstatement of the healed ָצַרַעת 
person into the community and the sin offering which atones for the healed ָצַרַעת 
person’s GHS. Potentially moral impurity might have been included here, but no ritual 
impurity. In Lev 14:53, it refers to the removal of ritual impurity in the sense of cleansing 
it from the infected house. 




definitely included in these contexts and ר פֶּ  refers to its removal in the sense of כִּ
cleansing. 
When ר פֶּ  in Num 8:21, which does not ָחָטא and ָטֵהר shares the context with כִּ
include impurity, it refers to the atonement of the Levites’ GHS. In the context with ָקַדׁש 
in Num 6:11, ר פֶּ  refers to atonement for the Nazirite’s sin to prepare him for the new כִּ
term of Nazirite status. Ransom is again the basis upon which atonement is possible in 
this context. 
The most frequent contexts in which ר פֶּ  is related to some other concepts is כִּ
when it is related to ָסַלח in Lev 4:20, 26, 31, 35; 5:10, 13, 16, 18, 26 [6:7];19:22; and 
Num 15:25, 26, 28. All these are cultic contexts and all of them involve moral impurity. 
ר פֶּ  These contexts, better than all .ָסַלח It always precedes .ָסַלח is a prerequisite of כִּ
others, show that ר פֶּ  conveys atonement and is based on the ransom. The offerer כִּ
receives ָסַלח based on the sacrifice he/she offers. 
Finally, ר פֶּ  appears in the contexts where the offerer receives acceptance before כִּ
God in Lev 1:4. No impurity is involved in this context, so ר פֶּ  atones for GHS. Again כִּ
the basis of this atonement is ransom in the form of sacrifice. 
The context of the atonement of which ר פֶּ  is a part, as was implied by the כִּ
discussion on ר פֶּ  ,above, consists of two elements. The first element is reconciliation כִּ
which implies that a relationship between God and a human party was broken. The 
reconciling act is actually a bestowing of God’s grace toward humans, followed by their 
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willingness to return to God.605 The second element is expiation, which implies that the 
human party feels guilt in the face of the law because of his/her sin and God’s wrath that 
follows the act of sin. The human party needs to overcome these. Removal of the feelings 
of guilt and God’s wrath is what expiation does. The human party gives up his/her sin 
while God gives up his wrath.606 In the actualization of both of these elements, 
reconciliation and expiation, God’s initiative is crucial and always precedes the response 
of the human party.607 In other words, ר פֶּ  .removes this obstacle, whatever that might be כִּ
However, God is never subject nor object of the verb,608 even though the process 
involving ר פֶּ  is prescribed by God. Completion of the atonement process is sealed by כִּ
God’s direct involvement in this process by granting forgiveness,609 or other benefits 
such as acceptance, sanctification. 
Both cultic and non-cultic contexts in the Pentateuch confirm that ר פֶּ  should be כִּ
understood as achieving abstract effects on both human and inanimate entities. Milgrom 
allowed for ransom to be foundational for ר פֶּ  but only in a limited number of texts that ,כִּ
include averting God’s wrath. ר פֶּ  as such, encompasses the substitution, as well. This ,כִּ
study understands that ר פֶּ  always has this function, either in the contexts of moral כִּ
impurity, some cases of severe ritual impurity, and in the cases of GHS. The analysis of   
 
605Hills, “A Semantic and Conceptual Study,” 9–10. 
606Hills, “A Semantic and Conceptual Study,” 11–14. 
607Hills, “A Semantic and Conceptual Study,” 14. 
608Garnet, “Atonement Constructions,” 148. 
609Gane, Cult and Character, 195. 
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ר פֶּ פֶּ  contexts showed that some contexts give certain guidelines as to what meaning כִּ רכִּ  
could convey, but some contexts do not provide any guidelines, but only rely on the 
already-elaborated meaning. This study agrees that the foundational text that informs 
almost all ר פֶּ  contexts is Lev 17:11. There the verb is presented to ransom on the basis כִּ
of the sacrificial blood that is applied onto the altar. In addition, based on Lev 10:17, the 
present study adopted the fact that eating of the sin offering flesh does contribute to the 
ר פֶּ  process. The moral impurity is transferred from the offerer to the priest via the sin כִּ
offering sacrifice. ָעֹון ָנָׂשא  in this context refers to the priest’s bearing of the leader’s or 
commoner’s moral impurity instead of them. The sin offering sacrifice has the unique 
feature of being holy and impure at the same time. 
There is no English word that encompasses the complex semantic and conceptual 
range of the Hebrew ר פֶּ ר Based on the basic understanding of .כִּ פֶּ  of ransom established כִּ
in the present study with the presence of the constant disadvantage of GHS related to 
human beings as they interact with the divine, the English verb to atone and the noun 
atonement are proposed in the present study as the best, though far from perfect, choice 
to represent the Hebrew ר פֶּ  This choice of “atonement” is driven by the fact that the .כִּ
strict sense of at-one-ment is always present in ר פֶּ -as it mends obstructions in the divine כִּ
human relationship due to human sin (ritual and moral) and GHS. The word atonement, 
in its conceptual rather than strict sense, is used to include both meanings, atonement and 
substitute, of the verb ר פֶּ  and also, all its related conceptual outcomes or results, such as ,כִּ




Based on the evaluation of limited parts of Milgrom’s and Gane’s atonement 
theories, the present study concludes that both theories are informed by the incorrect 
understanding of ר פֶּ  which they interpreted as referring to cleansing in ritual texts. This  כִּ
understanding reflects a literal sense of the verb which is impossible in the contexts of 
impurity that is strictly an abstract conception when it is dealt with in ר פֶּ  contexts. The  כִּ
present study demonstrated that ר פֶּ  is best understood to refer to atonement based on  כִּ
ransom and to be translated as “to atone for” when the direct/indirect object is human or 
“to remove” when the direct/indirect object is inanimate. This understanding of ר פֶּ  is in כִּ
sharp contrast to the meaning proposed by Milgrom and Gane. The inaccurate and 
inappropriate translation of “to cleanse,” but not the understanding behind this 
terminology, is also adopted by Rodríguez,610 and occasionally, Hasel.611 Contrary to 
both Milgrom and Gane, who held that ר  פֶּ  refers to cleansing, the present study כִּ
proposes that ר פֶּ  refers to atonement based on ransom. In agreement with Gane and  כִּ
contrary to Milgrom, the present study affirms that the offerers were atoned for during 
the daily offering, while the sanctuary was cleansed during the Day of Atonement by 
yearly offerings. Atonement that the offerer received included a transfer of his/her sin 
from himself/herself to the sacrificial animal and through the blood application to the 
sanctuary. Milgrom’s claim that the offerers are cleansed from their impurity prior their   
 
610Ángel Manuel Rodríguez, “Sacrificial Substitution and the Old Testament Sacrifices,” in The 
Sanctuary and the Atonement: Theological and Historical Studies, ed. Frank B. Holbrook (Silver Springs, 
MD: Biblical Research Institute, 1989), 132–33, 137. 




coming to the sanctuary is just partially correct. That is, ritual impurity for which one was 
required to offer a sacrifice was healed, but the moral impurity, which was also 
potentially present with the offerers and demanded offering a sacrifice. This moral 
impurity was still on them and needed to be dealt with. Milgrom’s argument that the 
blood of the sin offering was never directly applied on human beings, thus affirming that 
the sanctuary, rather than the offerer, was cleansed during the offering of the sin offering 
does not mean that they were never direct beneficiaries of ר פֶּ  This inference is .כִּ
informed by a certain understanding of ר פֶּ  rather than being derived from the texts. Lev , כִּ
4–5 explicitly states that the offerers are freed from their sin after they offer their 
sacrifice and receive  ר פֶּ  Thus, most of Milgrom's claim is not biblically based, and .כִּ
therefore, invalid. Consequently, with Gane and contrary to Milgrom, the present study 
affirms the understanding that atonement consists of two phases. In the first phase, 
impurity is transferred to the sanctuary via the blood of the offering as stated in Lev 4, 
while on the Day of Atonement, the impurity was removed from the sanctuary by the 
blood of the sacrifice, as stated in Lev 16. Contrary to both Milgrom and Gane, the 
present study demonstrated that the ADH is not defensible in the light of Pentateuchal 
texts. In opposition to Milgrom and clarifying Gane, this study affirms that the transfer of 
impurity into the sanctuary takes place during the daily sacrifice via the laying on of 
hand/s on the head of the sacrificial animal. The animal receives the offerer’s impurity, 
and the priest, by applying its blood in the sanctuary, in the case of the priest or the entire 
community, transfers it to the most holy place. In the case of a leader or a commoner, the 




receiving it in this way on (in) himself. This direction of impurity transfer is explicitly 
stated in Lev 4, where impurity via blood application is stored in the sanctuary, and in 
Lev 16, where it is taken outside of the sanctuary. The impurity is on the offerers as they 
come to offer sacrifice in Lev 4. They thereby get rid of it and it is present in the 













AUTOMATIC DEFILEMENT OF THE SANCTUARY 
 
 
The second part of the second section of the present study examines the theory 
closely related to atonement, that is, ADH. This part consists of the analysis of the piel 
stem, the infinitive construct, the perfect, the semantics of ָטֵמא, along with the literary 
structure of related texts. The findings on all these concepts suggest that this theory is not 
supported by Pentateuchal texts.  
 
Automatic Defilement: The Hypothesis 
The ADH of the sanctuary is based on the interpretation of 3 Pentateuchal texts: 
Lev 15:31; 20:3, and Num 19:13, 20. Jacob Milgrom was the first one to introduce it into 
main-stream scholarship and since then, this hypothesis has encountered valid opposition 
both in his time,1 and afterwards.2 However, it is still, in a slightly refined form, accepted 
 
1Maccoby, Ritual and Morality, 165–81; Hartley, Leviticus, 213; Wenham, The Book of Leviticus, 
221; Wenham, Numbers, 145; Rodríguez, “Substitution in the Hebrew Cultus”; André and Ringgren, 
 TDOT, 5:337. It must be noted that Baruch A. Levine claimed that ritual defilement of the ”,טמא“
sanctuary happened via direct contact of an impure person with the holy entities, based on his interpretation 
of Lev 12:4 and 15:31. However, he also believed, based on Lev 15:31, that one can morally defile the 
sanctuary by neglecting to follow the purification procedures listed in Lev 15:1–30. In addition, in his 
interpretation of Lev 20:3, he was not clear as to whether the installment of the pagan cult objects or 
objects within or near the sanctuary defile it ritually or morally, but his pointing to the very act of 
disobedience of God’s commands most likely points to the moral defilement of the sanctuary. Levine’s 
interpretation of Num 19:13, 20 shows that he principally held that ritual defilement of the sanctuary takes 
place via direct contact, but allows for automatic defilement by moral sins by not following the purifying 
procedures given by God. Thus, it can be said that Levine differentiated between ritual defilement of the 
sanctuary, which takes place via direct contact of the contaminated person and holy entities, and moral 




and advocated by some of his students3 and other scholars.4 Gane’s defense of a modified 
form of this hypothesis is the most recent one.5 The following portion of this study 
examines the validity of grammatical, syntactical, and semantical choices utilized by the 
proponents of this hypothesis to establish it or still consider it valid. 
Each text is peculiar in its own way. Thus, Lev 15:31 utilizes the preposition   ב) ב) 
followed by the piel infinitive construct (ָטֵמא) to express defilement of the sanctuary as 
the Hebrew texts demonstrates: 
 
“ ם ֹ֥ ּתֶּ ַּזר  הִּ ל ו  ָרֵאָ֖ ׂש  ֵני־יִּ ת־ב  ם אֶּ ָאָתָ֑ ֻּטמ  א מִּ ֶֹ֤ ל תּו   ו  ם ָיֻמ  ָאָת֔ ֻטמ  ָאֹ֥ם ב  ַטּמ  י ב  ָ֖ ָכנִּ ׁש  ת־מִּ ר אֶּ ֹ֥ ם ֲאׁשֶּ תֹוָכִֽ ב  ” 
 
 
Lev 20:3, employs the preposition (למען) followed by the piel infinitive construct 
of the verb ָטֵמא to express defilement that affects the sanctuary (ָּדׁש ק   It is seen in the .(מִּ
following Hebrew text: 
 
“ י ן ַוֲאנִִּ֞ ֵּתֶ֤ ת־ָפַני   אֶּ יׁש אֶּ ֹ֣ י ַה֔הּוא ָבאִּ ֹ֥ ַרּתִּ כ  הִּ ֹו ו  ב ֹאתָ֖ רֶּ ֹ֣ ּקֶּ ֹו מִּ ַעּמָ֑  




249; Levine, Numbers 1–20, 457. Milgrom’s ADH, on the other hand, is more restrictive. His interpretation 
of Lev 15:31; 20:3; and Num 19:13, 20 avoids allowing any sanctuary defilement via direct contact. 
Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 257, 309, 887, 993, 1005; Milgrom, Numbers, 161–62, 445; Jacob Milgrom, 
“Impurity is Miasma: A Response to Hyam Maccoby,” JBL 119 (2000): 729. 
2Tidball, The Message of Leviticus, 167–68; Rooker, Leviticus, 206; Klawans, Purity, Sacrifice, 
and the Temple, 54, 71. 
3Wright, The Disposal of Impurity, 19n10; Gane, Cult and Character, 144–62. Wright, “Unclean 
and Clean,” 6:732. 
4Sklar, Leviticus, 204; Feder, Blood Expiation, 93–96. 
5Gane, Cult and Character, 144–62, especially 156, 160, 162. 
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Num 19:13. 20, utilizes the piel perfect of the verb (ָטֵמא) to express defilement of 
the sanctuary: 
 
עַ  ל־ַהֹּנֵגָ֡ ת ָכִֽ ֵמֹ֣ ׁש   ב  נֶּפֶּ ם ב  ּות ָהָאָד֨ ר־ָימָ֜ א ֲאׁשֶּ ֹֹ֣ ל א ו  ַחָּטֶ֗ ת  ן יִּ ַכֶ֤ ׁש  ת־מִּ הָוה   אֶּ ּמֵ֔  י  אטִּ ” 
“ ה ָת֛ ר  כ  נִּ ֹ֥פֶּׁש ו  וא ַהּנֶּ ָ֖ ל ַההִּ ָרֵאָ֑ ׂש  ּיִּ י   מִּ י כִּ ה ֵמ֨ ָּדָ֜ ק נִּ א ָעָליו   לֹא־ֹזַרֶ֤ ה ָטֵמֹ֣ יֶּ֔ ה  ֹוד יִּ ֹו עָ֖ ָאתֹ֥ ֹו  ֻטמ  בִֽ  
 
 
However, regardless of their peculiarities, these texts share common features. In 
order to analyze the grammatical/syntactical choices that led certain scholars to interpret 
these texts to refer to automatic defilement, it is necessary to present relevant particulars 
regarding the stem, aspect, and verb (ָטֵמא) used in these texts. The following section is 
relevant for all three texts since all of them use the same stem, piel and the same verb, 
 ָטֵמא The only difference is the use of a different aspect. The infinitive construct of .ָטֵמא
is used in Lev 15:31 and 20:3, while Num 19:13, 20 use the perfect. I first explore the 
stem, aspect, and the semantic range of the verb ָטֵמא. With the conclusions on these three 
points, I address additional specific peculiar issues of each text that will be mentioned as 
they are analyzed. These two steps of analysis provide an extensive spectrum of evidence 
that all these texts imply defilement of the sanctuary through direct contact, rather than 
automatic defilement. 
 
Piel Stem and  ָטֵמא 
The research of the piel stem shows that Hebrew linguists greatly debated over 
the its meaning/s. Piel Hebrew verbs can fit into a number of legitimately distinct 
semantic categories, resulting in the claim that no single notion or semantic category 
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underlies all of them.6 Prior to Albercht Goetze’s groundbreaking study on the Akkadian 
D stem,7 Hebrew linguists thought that the piel stem principally signified an 
intensification of a meaning of a given root.8 In addition, the use of some Hebrew verbs 
indicated a causative nuance of the stem with two sub-nuances: (1) declarative, and (2) 
estimative. A denominative meaning was also detected with other verbal roots.9 Thus, 
key Hebrew grammars list a total of 5 distinct meanings for the piel: (1) intensive, (2) 
causative, (3) declarative, (4) estimative, and (5) denominative.10 
The most recent influential postulate on the cohesive meaning of the piel has been 
suggested by Bruce Waltke and M. O’Connor. They proposed that “Piel tends to signify 
causation with a patiency nuance, and hiphil causation notion with an agency nuance. 
The two types of causation form differ from one another with reference to the status of 
the subject being acted upon by the main verb, that is, the voice associated with the 
undersubject or secondary subject.”11 John Beckman, who critiqued Waltke’s and 
O’Connor’s proposal, simplified this statement in the following way: 
The D stem describes an action with a passive undersubject, meaning that the focus is 
on the undersubject (the direct object) being put into a new state, without regard to 
the process that the subject is doing to bring about that new state. The undersubject is 
 
6Joüon and Muraoka, A Grammar of Biblical Hebrew, 143–44. 
7Albrecht Goetze, “The So-called Intensive of the Semitic Languages,” JAOS 62 (1942): 1–8. 
8Gesenius, Gesenius' Hebrew Grammar, 141. 
9Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 396; Joüon and Muraoka, A 
Grammar of Biblical Hebrew, 144–45. 
10Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 396–97; Gesenius, Gesenius' 
Hebrew Grammar, 141–43; Joüon and Muraoka, A Grammar of Biblical Hebrew, 144–45; Carl 
Brockelmann, Hebräische Syntax (Neukirchen: Kreis Moers, 1956), 35–36; Carl Brockelmann, Grundriss 
der Vergleichenden Grammatik der Semitischen Sprachen, 2 vols. (Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1961), 508–10. 
11Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 355. 
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passive because it is not described as doing anything; instead, it is passively entering 
a new state as a result of the action of the subject.12 
 
Waltke’s and O’Connor’s proposal is built upon the work of Ernst Jenni who 
claimed that piel is always factitive or resultative, never intensive. If a qal stem of a given 
verb expressed a state (a stative, intransitive verb), then piel of that same verbal root is 
factitive. As such, piel brings a totally passive undersubject, without regard to the 
process, into the state depicted by a given verb.13 As opposed to the hiphil where the 
focus is on causing the progress of an action, piel focuses on causing the change of the 
state.14 Jenni lists about 100 verbs of this type.15 For example, גדל meaning “to be great” 
in qal stem changes to “to cause, declare, or consider to be great” in the piel stem.16 The 
qal verbal form is intransitive, which is an additional feature that separates it from the 
piel form which is.17 
Alternately, if the qal stem of a given verbal root conveys the process (a fientive, 
transitive verb), then piel of the same verb is resultative.18 It conveys the idea of causing 
the object to be in the state that results from the action indicated by the qal verb.19 For 
 
12John Charles Beckman, “Toward the Meaning of the Biblical Hebrew Piel Stem” (PhD diss., 
Harvard University, 2015), 79. 
13Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 398–99, 400–401. 
14Ernst Jenni, Das Hebraische Piʻel: Syntaktisch-Semasiologische Untersuchung einer Verbalform 
in Alten Testament (Zürich: EVZ-Verlag, 1968), 41. 
15Jenni, Das Hebraische Piʻel, 20–21. 
16Jenni, Das Hebraische Piʻel, 41. 
17Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 355–58. 
18Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 398–99, 404. 




instance, חלק means “to divide” in the qal stem and “to cause to be in a divided state” in 
piel.20 Piel’s factitive or resultative meanings are identical, and different labels indicate 
different meanings of qal stem, not piel. Waltke and O’Connor acknowledged that 
detecting the difference between the process meaning of a verb in qal and the 
factitive/resultative meaning in piel is difficult, and they did not set any criteria to detect 
it.21 
Beckman noticed that the main weakness of Waltke’s and O’Connor ‘s theory is 
the fact that most occurrences of qal and piel verbs do not provide evidence for the 
distinction between verbs that convey process and those that express a factitive meaning. 
Also, a process meaning is attached to more piel occurrences than those that are 
factitive/resultative.22 
Beckman himself concluded that a potentially productive way of coming to the 
cohesive meaning of piel stem, along with latest linguistic progresses, may provide the 
needed tools to arrive at a viable solution. These progresses are seen in the works of   
 
20Jenni, Das Hebraische Piʻel, 126–27. 
21Beckman, “Toward the Meaning,” 80. 
22For additional arguments that dispute Waltke’s and O’Connor’s proposal, see Beckman, 
“Toward the Meaning,” 246–48. 
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Golovko,23 Hopper and Thompson,24 Kulikov,25 and Li,26 all of whom noted that the 
same verbal forms are used with multiple meanings such as intensive/pluralic and 
factitive/causative in a variety of languages.27 In other words, they all suggest inclusion 
of the variety of meanings for certain stems since the majority of verbs utilize them. 
Beckman preferred Kouwenberg’s hypothesis28 which is, on one hand, more flexible and 
inclusive of the variety of meanings piel conveys, but on the other hand, less 
systematic.29 Based on this theory, the presence or absence of intensity along with the 
high semantic transitivity laid a foundation for the preferred use of piel over qal for 
 
23Golovko V. Evgeniy, “On Non-Causative Effects of Causativity in Aleut,” in Causatives and 
Transitivity, ed. Bernard Comrie and Maria Polinsky (Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1993), 385–90. 
24Sandra A. Thompson and Paul J. Hopper, “Transitivity in Grammar and Discourse,” Language 
56 (1980), 251–99. 
25Leonid I. Kulikov, “Causatives,” in Language Typology and Language Universals: An 
International Handbook, ed. Martin Haspelmath, et al., 2 vols., Handbooks of Linguistics and 
Communication Science 20 (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2001), 886–98. 
26Fengxiang Li, “An Examination of Causative Morphology from a Cross-Linguistic and 
Diachronic Perspective,” in Papers from the 27th Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society, 
1991, Part 1: The General Session, eds. Lise M. Dobrin, Lynn Nichols, and Rosa M. Rodriguez (Chicago: 
Chicago Linguistic Society, 1993), 344–59. 
27Beckman, “Toward the Meaning,” 35. 
28Kouwenberg argued that the Semitic D stem began in Proto-Semitic with D-stem verbs derived 
from adjectives that indicated intensity (e.g., adjective “very wide” → D “to be/become/make very wide”). 
Over time, this developed into a productive mechanism whereby intensive D-stem verbs were formed from 
G-stem verbs directly, rather than from intensive adjectives. Since intensity is a component of verbal 
plurality, the meaning of the D stem in some verbs broadened to indicate non-intensive types of verbal 
plurality, such as action on multiple objects (e.g., ‘to kiss multiple people’). Since intensity is also a 
component of high semantic transitivity, the meaning of the D stem in other verbs came to be associated 
with high transitivity. Because a factitive meaning connotes high transitivity, the D stem, in particular, 
became preferred over the G stem for factitive meanings, so non-intensive factitive meanings (e.g., “to 
make wide”) were lost by the G stem and gained by the D stem. Due to the lack of a contrast with a non-
intensive factitive G stem, the factitive D-stem lost its original intensive meaning (e.g., D “to make very 
wide” → “to make wide”). Beckman, “Toward the Meaning,” 211. See also N. J. C. Kouwenberg, 
Gemination in the Akkadian Verb, SSN 32 (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1997), 98–100, 445–50; N. J. C. 
Kouwenberg, The Akkadian Verb and Its Semitic Background, LANE 2 (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 
2010), 282–87. 
29Beckman, “Toward the Meaning,” 251. 
 
568 
various types of verbal plurality for some verbs or high semantic transitivity for other 
verbs.30 
Waltke’s and O’Connor’s claim that the stative and process meaning of the verbs 
in qal corresponds to the factitive/resultative of the same verbs in piel is examined below. 
The evaluation of Waltke’s and O’Connor’s claim that if the verb is stative in qal, then it 
is factitive in piel, and Beckman’s claim that this is not accurate follows. 
Beckman’s critique of Waltke’s and O’Connor’s work includes an analysis of 
seven factitive verbs to investigate whether their stative meaning in qal corresponds to 
their factitive meaning in piel.31 Among those seven verbs, the verb ָקַדׁש is closest to 
אָטמֵ  , and thus the following analysis, deals with only these two verbs. 
First, both verbs are metaphorical and abstract in their meaning. They do not refer 
to concrete, material processes, but rather, to those that are conceptual, metaphorical, and 
abstract. 
Second, ָטֵמא is always stative in qal and means “to be/become defiled/unclean” 
(Lev 5:3; 11:24–28, 31–36, 39–40; 12:2, 5; 13:14, 46; 14:36, 46; 15:4–11, 16–24, 27, 32; 
17:15; 18:20, 23, 25, 27; 19:31; 22:5–6, 8; Num 6:12; 19:7–8, 10–11, 14, 16, 20–22). It 
never takes a direct object.32 It either conveys that an entity is already in or has entered 
the defiled state. In this respect, it behaves, according to Beckman, like the qal of ָקַדׁש in 
 
30Beckman, “Toward the Meaning,” 248. 
31Beckman, “Toward the Meaning,” 89. 
32In some ָטֵמא contexts, ֵאת is present, but is never syntactically related to this, but always to some 
other verb (Lev 11:28, 33, 40; 14:36, 46; 15:10, 16; 18:25, 27; Num 6:12; 19:8, 10, 20).  
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its 11 occurrences,33 which correlates with Waltke’s and O’Connor’s theory of piel. It 
always refers to the state. 
Third, in all 25 piel occurrences, ָטֵמא encompasses a factitive meaning, “to make 
defiled/unclean or declare/pronounce somebody/something defiled/unclean” (Gen 34:5, 
13, 27; Lev 11:44; 13:3, 8, 11, 15, 20, 22, 25, 27, 30, 44, 59; 15:31; 18:28; 20:3, 25; Num 
5:3; 6:9; 19:13, 20; 35:34; Deut 21:23). According to Beckman, 68/75 occurrences of the 
piel of ָקַדׁש, do not provide evidence for the distinction between a resultative and a 
process meaning.34 Therefore, these texts are not helpful in determining the accuracy of 
Waltke’s and O’Connor’s theory. Beckman’s claim that the remaining seven occurrences 
(Exod 19:10;35 Jer 17:24, 27;36 Ezek 44:19; Job 1:5;37 2 Chr 29:17[2x]) point to process is 
accurate because the texts he cited do convey the passage of time related to the process of 
sanctification. Ezekiel 44:19 still remains problematic since this text, in contrast to the 
other six, does not include nor point to any temporal complement related to the process of 
sanctification. However, there is a crucial point regarding the verb ָקַדׁש that also applies 
to ָטֵמא in their piel contexts, both verbs are always accompanied by other verb/s by 
which the ָקַדׁש or ָטֵמא condition/activity is actually achieved. That is documented below 
 
33Beckman, “Toward the Meaning,” 91. 
34Beckman, “Toward the Meaning,” 92. 
35“… as Yadin has correctly noted (1983: 1.223), the three-day purification imposed for the 
Temple city is modeled after the Sinaitic purification consisting of ablutions, laundering, and sexual 
abstinence (Exod 19:10–15).” Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 969. 
36The text explicitly mentioned that at least one verbal activity achieves the holiness of the 
Sabbath by not carrying a burden through the gates of Jerusalem on the Sabbath day. 
37Based on this text, Job’s sanctification of his children after their feast days consisted of at least 
one verbal activity, offering burnt offerings. 
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for ָטֵמא and is factual for these 7/75 ָקַדׁש texts that Beckman found to refer to process 
meaning, and for the 68/75 texts that, in Beckman’s assessment, do not provide evidence 
to distinguish between a resultative and process meaning.38 
It is also important to note that these 7 texts that do not follow the pattern 
suggested by Waltke and O’Connor are found outside of the Pentateuch, which also 
points to the current unproductiveness of the effort to diachronically nor synchronically 
come to the unified stem meaning at the level of the entire OT text. The more sound 
method utilized in this study is to be aware of the key theories that attempted to find 
unified stem meaning and test these theories through the study of verbal roots on a case-
by-case study. A potential proposal of a unified stem meaning resembles a root fallacy 
where one root meaning is enforced in to all of its occurrences. 
Thus, this study agrees with Muraoka’s and Joüon’s statement regarding the piel 
stem: 
The question how the function of Piel in relation to other conjugations, notably Qal, 
should be defined still remains one of the major challenges facing Hebrew and 
Semitic linguistics. In the present state of our knowledge, we can only point to a 
number of fairly distinct meaning categories into which some verbs seem to fit. 
Others, an uncomfortably large number, still defy such categorisation. Nor can we 
suggest, without doing violence to all the evidence available, a single notion or 
meaning category which can be said to underlie all those “nuances.”39 
 
Subsequently, the part of Waltke’s and O’Connor’s theory that claims that piel is   
 
38Of the piel texts, 22/40 includes the process of sanctification and all of them contain or are based 
on other texts that deal with the same topics and imply other verbal activities to achieve the process of 
sanctification (Exod 13:2; 20:8, 11; 28:3, 41; 29:1, 27, 33, 36–37, 44; 30:29–30; 40:9–11, 13; Lev 8:10–12, 
15, 30; 16:19; 21:8, 25:10; Num 6:11; 7:1; Deut 5:12). The 18/40 occurrences do not refer to the process 
meanings, but rather, to a declarative one (Gen 2:3; Exod 19:10, 14, 23; 31:13; Lev 20:8; 21:15, 23; 22:9, 
16, 32; Deut 32:51). 
39Joüon and Muraoka, A Grammar of Biblical Hebrew, 143–44. 
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always factitive if qal of the same verb is stative is valid in the case of  ָטֵמא within the 
limits of the Pentateuch, but it is not complete. The study of the uses of ָטֵמא in the 
Pentateuch demonstrated that certain pattern of uses is consistent with this verb. That is, 
it is always accompanied by other verbs through which its meaning onto the direct object 
it modifies is achieved. This second point has not been noted by Waltke and O’Connor 
and Beckman and is presented below. 
 
Aspect: Grammatical Considerations on the Use of the 
Infinitive Construct and the Perfect 
The infinitive construct is used in Lev 15:31 and 20:3 but only in the former text 
is it preceded by the preposition   ב. On the contrary, the perfect is used in Num 19:13, 20. 
 
Infinitive Construct: A Temporal Use 
Hebrew grammarians have discovered that in nominal use the infinitive construct 
either mainly stands alone or is preceded by the preposition   40.ל Even though a 
pronominal suffix is attached to the infinitive construct to express a subject (a nominal 
use) in Lev 15:31, it is preceded by the preposition   ב which is not typical. As stated 
above, when   ל precedes the nominal use the infinitive construct, it is not preceded by any 
complement. The proponents of ADH took the preposition be in this text to be beth 
instrumenti, most likely of human instrument/agent,41 and thus translated with the 
 
40Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 601; C. H. J. van der Merwe, 
Jackie A. Naudé, and Jan H. Kroeze, A Biblical Hebrew Reference Grammar, BLH 3 (Sheffield: Sheffield 
Academic Press, 1999), 151; Joüon and Muraoka, A Grammar of Biblical Hebrew, 401–2. 
41Merwe, Naudé, and Kroeze, A Biblical Hebrew Reference Grammar, 286–87; Waltke and 
O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 197. 
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English preposition “by.” However, a preposition   ב with the meaning of beth instrumenti 
is, by rule, attached to a regular noun and not the verb/verbal noun.42 
In addition, even though the infinitive construct can be preceded by many 
prepositions in BH, it specifically has a temporal sense when it is preceded by   ב or   כ. 
This pattern is frequent and well attested in the BH.43 The difference between the two 
constructions, the infinitive construct with   ב or   כ, has been noted and discussed by 
Hebrew grammarians.44 Margaretha Folmer summarized the meaning of both 
grammatical constructions in the two following quotations: 
Clauses with   כ + cstr. inf. indicate an immediately preceding time (tight when', 'as 
soon as', 'the moment') (instantaneous action; slight anteriority), that is to say the time 
of the event referred to by the cstr. inf. is the same as the time of the event referred to 
by the main verb. The construction with 3 is relatively frequent with verbs of 
perception ('to see', 'to heat' etc.), which often occur in combination with an 
instantaneous action ('the moment she heard her brother, she went to the door' or 'the 
moment he saw the news, he rang his sister'). Clauses with   ב + cstr. inf indicate 
temporal proximity of the event referred to by the cstr. inf to the event referred to by 
the main verb, that is to say the point in time of the event referred to by the main verb 
is included in the time of the event referred to by the cstr. inf ('when they were on 
holiday, their cat had five kittens').45 
 
42Merwe, Naudé, and Kroeze, A Biblical Hebrew Reference Grammar, 286–87; Waltke and 
O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 197. 
43Merwe, Naudé, and Kroeze, A Biblical Hebrew Reference Grammar, 286; Waltke and 
O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 196, 205, 604. Besides, having the temporal be 
attached to the infinitive construct can also have a causal sense. However, a causal sense makes the 
sentence highly awkward and, in this case, the subject is separated from the infinitive construct instead of 
being attached to it as it is in Lev 15:31. Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 
604. 
44Margaretha Folmer, “The Translation of Biblical Hebrew Clauses with   ב   / כ + Construct 
Infinitive in Targum Onqelos,” AS 11 (2013): 114–15. 
45Folmer, “The Translation of Biblical Hebrew Clauses,” 115. Waltke and O’Connor noticed the 
same thing: “The construction occurs with every preposition, but most frequently with ב and כ, especially 
with a temporal sense. With the infinitive construct, ב denotes in general the temporal proximity of one 




Folmer stated that the difference between these two constructions cannot at times 
be discerned.46 While the difference between the two constructions goes beyond the 
scope of, and is not crucial for, this study since only the second one is used in Lev 15:31, 
the fact that both of these constructions, especially the second, convey the temporal 
meaning of the infinitive construct and not the instrumental is critical. It points to the fact 
that Lev 15:31 implies a temporal, rather than an instrumental sense. Analysis of the verb 
 .further disputes the validity of an instrumental translation/interpretation ָטֵמא
 
Infinitive Construct as Finite Verb 
No complement precedes the infinitive construct in Lev 20:3; thus, it functions as 
a finite verb. As any other transitive finite verb, it governs a noun or a pronoun in the 
accusative and the subject of the action conveyed by it is nominative.47 In the majority of 
cases, determining whether an action expressed by the infinitive construct is in the 
nominative or the genitive is impossible.48 Joüon and Muraoka have suggested that “as a 
rule the subject of the action must be considered as being in the nominative: this is the 
construction in primitive Semitic, and in some cases the vocalisation indicates the 
 
Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 604. Temporal character of the Infinitive Construct with be was 
noted by Gesenius. Gesenius, Gesenius' Hebrew Grammar, 347.  
46Folmer, “The Translation of Biblical Hebrew Clauses,” 115. 
47If its subject is in the genitive, the infinitive construct would generally function as a noun in so-
called nominal use. Joüon and Muraoka, A Grammar of Biblical Hebrew, 402. 
48Joüon and Muraoka have criticized Waltke and O’Connor for postulating that the distinction 
between these two uses of the infinitive construct can be attained by the inferences from two texts only: 
“One cannot conclude merely on the strength of two examples (Lv 26.18 ָרה ַיּס  ם ל  כֶּ ת  אֶּ  to chastise you and 
Dt 4.10 ָאה ר  יִּ י ל  ֹאתִּ  to fear me) that “the shape of the feminine endings reinforces the Masoretic conviction 
that such forms are not construct” (WO, Syntax, p. 611, n. 38).” Joüon and Muraoka, A Grammar of 
Biblical Hebrew, 402. 
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nominative.”49 Elisha Qimion has postulated that “in BH, the nouns governed by an 
infinitive follow it, while in Aramaic and in Qumranic Hebrew the opposite order is 
attested for objects.50 This proposal is effective in the Pentateuch (Gen 3:24; 4:2, 11; 
8:21; 13:16; 14:17; 19:19; 21:8; 22:10; 24:48; 25:22; 27:30; 31:19; 34:7, 14; 37:12; 
40:20; 41:9; 42:9; 44:22; 49:33; 50:2, 7, 14; Exod 2:15; 5:2; 6:13, 27; 10:4, 26; 12:23; 
14:12; 16:3; 29:33; 30:15; 33:20; 36:1; 38:27; Lev 7:38; 10:11, 17; 20:3; 21:21; 26:15; 
Num 3:7–8; 4:30; 7:5; 8:11, 15, 19, 22; 9:7; 11:11, 14; 13:17; 16:9, 28, 31; 18:6; 20:21; 
21:4, 32; 22:18; 24:1, 13; 34:29; 36:2; Deut 2:31; 3:24; 4:2; 5:15, 25, 29; 6:2, 19, 24–25; 
8:18; 9:5; 10:8, 12–13; 11:13, 22, 32; 12:5; 13:18; 14:23; 15:5; 17:19; 18:16; 19:9; 21:16; 
25:7, 11; 26:12; 28:1, 12, 15, 58; 29:18, 29; 30:6, 16, 20; 31:12–13, 24; 32:45–46). Thus, 
the infinitive construct of  ֵָמאט  in Lev 20:3 introduced by ַמַען  acts as a finite verb in a ל 
resultative clause. This is typical grammatical construction in BH.51 
 
The Perfect 
The texts in Num 19:13, 20, to the contrary, use the perfect instead of the 
infinitive construct. It is well established by Hebrew grammarians that the perfect 
functions to express events or states that are perceived as complete whether they belong 
to a determinative past, present, or future time.52 It should not be perplexing that both   
 
49Joüon and Muraoka, A Grammar of Biblical Hebrew, 402. 
50Elisha Qimron, The Hebrew of the Dead Sea Scrolls, HSS 29 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986), 
74; Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 610–11. 
51Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 637. 
52Joüon and Muraoka, A Grammar of Biblical Hebrew, 332–37; Gesenius, Gesenius' Hebrew 
Grammar, 309–13; Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 485–91. 
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verses, vv. 13 and 20, use the perfect form since it has been well established that the 
completed action expressed by the perfect of active, fientive verbs53 is frequently used to 
refer “to resulting perfect state in future relative to the speaker.” Waltke and O’Connor 
labeled it the “future perfect.”54 Gesenius compared this perfect with the Latin futurum 
exactum. This perfect represents the action or state “as existing in the future in a 
completed state (futurum exactum)…”55 Joüon and Muraoka reminded us that when the 
perfect is used in this way, the “domain of the future is indicated by the context, usually 
by a previous verb.” They labeled this the perfect “relative preterite.”56 Thus, the defiling 
expressed by the perfect of ָטֵמא in Num 19:13,57 20 is a future event that is projected as if 
it had been completed in the future. 
 
Semantics: The Verb ָטֵמא 
By form and meaning, ָטֵמא is, in most cases, a stative verb and in the same way 
as participles, one of the standard uses of stative verbs in BH is to describe a state.58 
Determining whether a verb is stative or active is a complex task in BH. Some stative 
verbs are ambiguous and could be treated as having both an active, inchoative sense (to   
 
53Piel of ָטֵמא is such type of a verb since, in this text, it takes a direct object. 
54Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 490. 
55Gesenius, Gesenius' Hebrew Grammar, 313. 
56Joüon and Muraoka, A Grammar of Biblical Hebrew, 335. 
57The future tense is introduced in v. 12 with the imperfect of ָחָטא. 
58Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 370–71; Stuart Alan Creason, 
“Semantic Classes of Hebrew Verbs: A Study of Aktionsart in the Hebrew Verbal System” (PhD diss., 
University of Chicago, 1995). 
 
576 
enter into a state), or a stative sense, including when they encompass a stative sense (e.g., 
to maintain the state).59 Aaron Koller stated that “sometimes it is difficult to tell if the 
ambiguity is present because of the participle form or because of foe semantics of the 
verb itself.” However, the third masculine singular for of the verb ָטֵמא has an ā - ē vowel 
pattern, which is a consistent characteristic of the stative verbs in BH.60 As such, it refers 
to a quality or characteristic of an object.61 
The root ָטֵמא is used 200 times in the Pentateuch. The fact that ָטֵמא derivatives 
are found 150/200 times in Leviticus, thus distributing ¼ of occurrences in the rest of the 
Pentateuch, confirms the fact that the book of Leviticus is crucial material for students of 
this concept. The verbal forms of ָטֵמא are analyzed in each book of the Pentateuch 
starting with the book with the least number of occurrences and ending with the book 
with most. The total number of verbal forms in the Pentateuch is 114.62 
The use of ָטֵמא in the Pentateuch demonstrates that it is a binary verb. In other 
words, in terms of syntactic transitivity,63 ָטֵמא appears as transitive and intransitive verb. 
 
59Aaron Koller, “Diachronic Change and Synchronic Readings: Midrashim on Stative Verbs and 
Participles,” JSS 57.2 (2012): 268, 278–80; Creason, “Semantic Classes,” 73.  
60Creason, “Semantic Classes,” 2. 
61Joüon and Muraoka, A Grammar of Biblical Hebrew, 116–20; Waltke and O’Connor, An 
Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 367–71; Creason, “Semantic Classes,” 2; Joüon, “Notes on 
Lexicographie Hébraique.” Paul Joüon, and T. Muraoka claimed that “the transitivity and intransitivity are 
syntactic phenomena, which do not affect the vocalisation of verbs.” Joüon and Muraoka, A Grammar of 
Biblical Hebrew, 115n9. 
62Accordance Bible. 
63“Syntactic transitivity is a binary property of a verb as it is used in a particular clause: a verb is 
either transitive or intransitive, depending on whether or not it has a direct object. A transitive verb has a 
direct object, whereas an intransitive verb does not.” Talmy Givón, Syntax: A Functional-Typological 




In all piel occurrences, ָטֵמא is transitive, and in the majority of the occurrences, it is 
accompanied by ֵאת (Gen 34:5, 13; Lev 11:44; 13:3, 8, 11, 15, 20, 22, 25, 27, 30, 44; 
15:31; 18:28; 20:3; Num 5:3; 19:13, 20; 35:34; Deut 21:23), whereas in four texts, ֵאת is 
missing; however, ָטֵמא in all occurrences modifies a noun in a given clause (Gen 34:27; 
Lev 13:59; 20:25; Num 6:9). In terms of semantic transitivity, ָטֵמא also behaves 
variably,64 but, being mainly a stative verb, ָטֵמא is generally low in semantic 
transitivity.65 
Two characteristics related to the verb ָטֵמא emerged from the analysis of its uses 
in the Pentateuch conducted below: (1) It always depends on the other verb/s (verbal 
actions), mentioned or assumed in the given or surrounding texts in order to achieve the 
meaning it conveys. ָטֵמא is always accompanied by verbs of touching, carrying, sitting, 
eating, etc. in order to show the actual manner of how an entity contracts ָטֵמא status, and 
(2) consequently, contracting the state of ָטֵמא always includes some sort of physical 
contact between the entity transmitting and contracting impurity. 
 
 in Genesis ָטֵמא
In the book of Genesis, all 3 verbal forms of ָטֵמא always refer to Dina’s unclean 
state caused by Shechem’s sexual intercourse with her (34:5, 13, 27). Dina’s defiled state 
 
64“Semantic transitivity refers to the extent to which the subject of the clause affects the direct 
object. Whereas syntactic transitivity is binary, semantic transitivity comes in multiple levels. A clause can 
have high semantic transitivity (greatly affects the object), low semantic transitivity (little or no effect on 
the object), or be somewhere in between.” Beckman, “Toward the Meaning,” 22. 
65Thompson and Hopper, “Transitivity in Grammar and Discourse,” 252. 
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was attained by Shechem’s lying with her, v. 2. Dina’s state expressed by the verb ָטֵמא is 
actually achieved by the other verbal action, that is, to have intercourse.66 Both 
characteristics pointed out above, the use of helping verbs and contact between the two 
entities, are present in the affair of Dina’s defilement. 
 
 in Deuteronomy ָטֵמא
Out of 10 occurrences of the root of ָטֵמא in the book of Deuteronomy, only 2 
verbal forms67 are found in 21:23 and 24:4. The first text discusses leaving the dead body 
on the tree overnight, which consequently defiles the land, while the second discusses the 
sending away of a wife, thus forcing her to defile herself by having an intercourse with 
another man.68 The same pattern is detected. The defiled status in these two instances is 
accomplished by other additional verbal activities which include contact between two 
entities.  
 
66The nature of this defilement is puzzling. Generally, certain moral acts such as various sexual 
behaviors (Lev 18:27), eating impure food (Lev 20:22–26), and practicing idolatry (Deut 12:1–4) form a 
combination of reasons that can make Gentiles both ritually and morally impure. Jonathan Klawans, 
“Notions of Gentile Impurity in Ancient Judaism,” AJSR 20 (1995): 290–91. 
67The 8 remaining adjectival derivatives always refer to the individuals who have/have not 
contracted various sorts of defilement (12:15, 22; 15:22; 26:14) or to the animals that are unclean by their 
nature (14:7, 8, 10, 19). Accordance Bible. 
68For an in-depth analysis of Deut 24:1-4, see Richard M. Davidson, Flame of Yahweh: Sexuality 
in the Old Testament (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2007), 389–405, especially pp. 395–98. 
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 in Numbers ָטֵמא
The term ָטֵמא occurs 37 times in the book of Numbers69 24 of which are verbal 
forms. Three distinct uses emerge out of these occurrences. ָטֵמא refers to: (1) the people 
who obtained a defiled status and can defile other entities by being in close proximity to 
or touching them (5:3; 6:9; 19:7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 20x2, 21, 22x2), (2) people 
being/not being defiled by prohibited acts (5:13, 14x2, 20, 27, 28, 29; 6:7, 12), and (3) 
land defilement by murder/shedding of blood (35:34). 
The first text of Group 1, people who obtained a defiled status and can defile 
other entities by being in close proximity to or touching them, is found in 5:3 which is an 
extension of God’s command initiated in v. 2. That is, to put outside the camp all who are 
leprous, have a discharge, and everyone who is unclean through contact with a corpse so 
that they do not defile the camp because God lives among them. In which manner does 
the defilement of their camp take place? A logical place to find the answer to this 
question is to examine the regulations regarding these 3 potential ways of contracting 
defilement. First, the leprosy regulations found in Lev 13–14 are quite vague in this 
regard. However, there are at least two convincing and instructive sets of clues that help 
to delineate the mode of defilement. The regulations in 13:45–46 would suggest that 
defilement by the leper takes place through the contact. That is, it is prescribed, among 
other things, for lepers to, cry out “unclean, unclean,” most likely when they encounter an   
 
69Adjectival forms occur in eleven texts and they always refer to individuals (5:2; 9:6, 7, 10; 
19:13, 17, 19, 20, 22), or things that have/have not contracted various sorts of defilement (19:15), or to 




undefiled person, clearly to avoid contact with undefiled persons, as understood by noted 
scholars of the Hebrew Cult.70 The continuation of the leprosy regulations found in chap. 
14, for the case of leprosy on the house also contains a clue about how the actual 
defilement takes place. In vv. 46–47, it states that all who enter the house, sleep, or eat in 
it while it is quarantined contract the defilement. Scholars call this defilement “the 
defilement by overhang,” based on Num 19:14–15.71 However, if the house is considered 
as a whole, the floor of the house on which one would undeniably have to step, making 
contact with it in order to enter it, could be seen as the source of the defilement for the 
one entering the house. The same applies to the door of the house as well.72 Indisputably, 
other verbs are present in this way of transmitting defilement, as well as the contact of the 
entity transmitting and receiving defilement. Second, the regulations for various 
genital/bodily discharges found in Lev 15 convey the same idea. Verses 15:4–12, 18–24, 
26–27, through the use of verbs of touching,73 siting upon, spitting by the defiled one on 
a clean person, riding in the saddle, emission of semen, lying with a menstruating 
woman, lying on the bed, demonstrate that the defilement is transmitted through contact 
with the object that was defiled by the impure person. Third, the regulations concerning 
defilement by the human corpse found in Num 19:11, 13, 16 are straightforward, since 
they state that defilement through the human corpse takes place through contact. Potential 
 
70Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 806; Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 238. 
71Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 875; Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 249. 
72This is not a crucial point of this essay and it will not be elaborated on in greater detail. It is 
assumed that defilement could takes place in both ways, by overhang and by contact. 
73The verb ָנַגע is the most frequently used in this chapter, ten times, in all of Leviticus. Chapter 11 




defilement by overhang is found in 19:14–15. The defilement of the sanctuary mentioned 
in vv. 13 and 20 will be analyzed below in a separate subheading. 
The verbal form of ָטֵמא is also found in procedures for the termination of the 
Nazirite vow, v. 6:9. The idea is that his holy status will be interrupted due to contact 
between the Nazirite and a human corpse74 or if they find themselves in a house with a 
person who suddenly dies.75 The adverbial use of the prepositional phrase ַעל + personal 
pronoun (3ms, referring to the Nazirite) suggests the existence of contact between the 
person who suddenly dies and the Nazirite disputing the defilement of overhang. 
The account of the cleansing water which involves slaughtering the red heifer 
includes multiple action verbs to describe the priest’s76 and his assistants’77 involvement 
in the ritual process which defiles all of them (19:7, 8, 10). There are opposite opinions as 
to the subject of the verbs “to deliver,” “to take out,” and “to slaughter.” Some claim that 
the subject of all these verbs is someone else than Eleazar, the officiating priest,78 while 
some consider Eleazar as the subject of the verbs “to deliver” and “to take out,” or the 
subject of the verb “to slaughter” is elliptical.79 However, even if Eleazar is not the 
 
74Levine, Numbers 1–20, 215; Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 534. 
75Levine, Numbers 1–20, 222. 
76The priest, at least, takes the heifer’s blood and sprinkles it (v. 4), throws cedarwood, hyssop, 
and crimson material into the fire in which the heifer is burning (v. 6). 
77The first assistant burns the heifer (v. 8). The second assistant gathers up the ashes of the heifer, 
and deposits them outside the camp in a clean place (v. 9). 
78Ashley, Numbers, 365. 
79Levine, Numbers 1–20, 461. 
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subject of any of these verbs, and even if the priest mentioned in v. 6 is not Eleazar,80 
based on v. 4, he is indisputably the one who takes and sprinkles the red heifer’s blood. In 
other words, taking and sprinkling the red heifer’s blood renders him defiled. Thus, 
regardless of who performs the activities expressed by “to deliver,” “to take out,” and “to 
slaughter,” the text declared the priest and his assistant/s, defiled. The text is also clear 
that all the participants get in touch with in various ways with the red heifer during the 
process of preparing the water of cleansing. 
The rest of the red heifer account, vv. 11, 13, 14, 16, 20x2, 21, 22x2, where ָטֵמא 
occurs, shows that contact between the entities transmitting and receiving defilement 
always exists. The verb ָנַגע, “to touch,” always supplements ָטֵמא in order to show how 
the defilement takes place (vv. 11, 13, 16, 21, 22). The text of v. 22 is very 
straightforward in stating that defilement takes place through contact. The potential 
defilement of overhang is found in v. 14, which was discussed above. Verse 20 is a 
general statement and does not mention the way one contracts defilement, most likely 
because the manners of defilement were explained multiple times before and after it, that 
is, through contact. In two verses of this section, vv. 13 and 20, ָטֵמא affects the sanctuary. 
Those who do not purify themselves after being defiled through contact with the dead 
defile the tabernacle of the Lord. These verses will be analyzed in greater detail later. 
The texts of Group 2, people being/not being defiled by prohibited acts, are found 
in chaps. 5 and 6. Chapter 5 deals with the law of a suspected adulteress, and ָטֵמא in this 
text refers to the potentially defiled condition contracted from intercourse outside 
 
80Milgrom, Numbers, 159. 
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marriage (5:13, 14x2, 20, 27, 28, 29). The nominal derivative of the root ָכָבה ,ָׁשַכב  is ,ׁש 
used in vv. 13, 20, and 29 to indicate the sexual act, in this case outside of marriage 
boundaries, which causes the defilement of the woman. The verbal derivative of the root 
 is also found in v. 13 and in addition, in v. 19. Both nominal and verbal derivatives ָׁשַכב
of the root ָמַעל, which also refers to marital infidelity, appear in v. 12 to introduce the 
issue the law deals with. The root also appears in v. 27 in the conclusion of the law. A 
woman contracts impurity through illicit sexual intercourse which includes contact 
between the two involved in the act. 
The Nazirite vow regulations prohibit individuals who take the vow from going to 
dead members of their family (6:7. 12). Scholars settled that the phrase “go near the 
dead” refers to contact between the Nazirite and his dead family member.81 
The only text in Group 3, the defilement of the land by murder/shedding of blood, 
is found in 35:34. This text is a part of the concluding remarks, vv. 30–34, on the 
homicide law imbedded in the law of the cities of refuge found in Numbers 35:6–34. This 
law states that the presence of the murderer in the land defiles it. A murderer becomes the 
source of defilement by the fact that he kills, sheds the blood of another human being, 
and was in contact with the dead. In addition, v. 33 states that the shedding of blood 
defiles the land. The only way the land could be kept holy is by eliminating, shedding the 
blood of the murderer. If the community is neglectful in not eliminating the murderer (v. 
30) or accepting a ransom for the murderer (v. 31) or approving a manslaughterer who   
 
81Levine, Numbers 1–20, 215; Milgrom, Numbers: 45; Gray, A Critical and Exegetical 
Commentary on Numbers; Vaux, Ancient Israel: Its Life and Institutions, 56. 
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leaves the city of refuge (v. 32), he also is responsible for the defilement of the land by 
allowing the defilement to spread in the land. In addition to mutual contact between the 
murderer, the victim’s blood, and the victim’s dead body and the land, defilement is also 
transmitted by people’s sins in regards to the crime of murder, that is, by not eliminating 
the murderer (v. 30) or accepting a ransom for the murderer (v. 31) or by having a 
manslaughterer leave the city of refuge (v. 32).82 The analysis of the ָטֵמא texts in 
Numbers, including all the 3 categories delineated in this book, confirms the fact that 
defilement is achieved by some other verbal activities which always include some sort of 
contact between the entity which transmits and the entity receiving defilement. 
 
 in Leviticus ָטֵמא
Leviticus uses ָטֵמא the most frequently.83 The verbal forms are used 85 times out 
of 150 occurrences and they refer to various manners by which the defilement is 
contracted. Unlikely to the 3 groups identified in the book of Numbers, the book of 
Leviticus contains the 2 following groups: (1) the entities that obtained a defiled status 
and can defile other entities by being in close proximity to or touching them (5:3; 12:2x2, 
5; 13:3, 8, 11, 14, 15, 20, 22, 25, 27, 30, 44x2, 46, 59; 14:36, 46; 15:4x2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 
10x2, 11, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20x2, 21, 22, 23, 24x2, 27x2, 31, 32;), (2) people being defiled 
by prohibited acts (11:24x2, 25, 26, 27, 28, 31, 32x2, 33, 34x2, 35, 36, 39, 40x2, 43x2, 
44; 17:15; 18:20, 23, 24x2, 25, 27, 28, 30; 19:31; 20:3, 25; 21:1, 3, 4, 11; 22:5x2, 6, 8). 
 
82For a more detailed analysis of the law of homicide see Janković, “The Rationale,” 79–104. 
83Adjectives occur forty-seven times (Lev 5:2; 7:19, 21; 10:10; 11:4–8, 26–29, 31, 35, 38, 47; 
13:11, 15, 36, 44–46, 51, 55; 14:40–41, 44–45, 57; 15:2, 25–26, 33; 20:25; 22:4; 27:11, 27) and nominals 
eighteen times (Lev. 5:3; 7:20–21; 14:19; 15:3, 25–26, 30–31; 16:16, 19; 18:19; 22:3, 5). 
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The pattern attested in the books of Genesis, Deuteronomy, and Numbers is also attested 
in the book of Leviticus. Exceptions do exist, but there is substantial explanation for each 
of them. 
Based on the present research, of all these 85 occurrences of ָטֵמא in Leviticus, 
there are few instances where ָטֵמא is not accompanied by other verb/s to convey the 
manner by which defilement took place. However, the inclusion of other verbs to 
accomplish defilement is implied. 
The text of Lev 11:43, 18:25, 28 do not contain the verb/s which would convey 
the manner of defilement, but it should be remembered that many verbs in the previous 
verses of these two chapters (touch, carry, fall [corpse on some other entity], and eat) 
indisputably convey the manner by which defilement takes place (Lev 11:31–36—
swarming things, 18:6–24, 27, 30—various sexual acts). 
There are two issues in Lev 20:25. First, the verb ָטֵמא refers to the distinction 
which should be kept by the Israelites between clean and unclean animals. A detailed 
explanation of this distinction is found in chap. 11. Second, the verb ָטֵמא is used in this 
text to describe defilement by various unclean animals by which Israelites should not be 
infected. It has been recognized that ָׁשַקץ and ָטֵמא are synonymous in this context,84 and 
the way one gets defiled by these animals is also explained in chap. 11 in details. 
Leviticus 21:1. 3–4 does not state the manner of defilement (i.e., the process of   
 
84Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 684. 
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defiling), but it is anticipated that defilement by the corpse would assume various 
contacts with it.85 
Leviticus 15:31 and 20:3 will also be commented on later in this study under 
separate subheadings. 
 
Semantics of ָטֵמא: Summary 
The foregoing analysis of the uses of ָטֵמא in the Pentateuch demonstrates that the 
two claims proposed regarding this verb are accurate. First, ָטֵמא always depends on the 
other verb/s mentioned or assumed in the given or surrounding texts to achieve the 
condition it conveys. These verbs are verbs of touching, carrying, sitting, eating, etc., in 
order to show the manner by which an entity contracts ָטֵמא status. Second, building on 
the first finding, contracting the state of ָטֵמא always includes some sort of contact 
between the entities transmitting and contracting impurity or a defiling process takes 
place if both the source and recipient of impurity are inside the same, enclosed space. 
The concept of delay is one of the unavoidable concepts to be addressed when one 
studies the ADH. Therefore, this concept will be presented and analyzed below. 
 
The Concept of Ellipsis 
The so-called concept of delay fashioned by Milgrom was another point of debate 
among scholars and rests upon another concept, that is, the concept of ellipsis. Elliptical 
interpretation refers to the absence of essential clauses in the biblical text, in this case 
cultic legislation, which were well established and known within this body of biblical 
 
85Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 372; Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1814. 
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texts. Maccoby’s ellipsis, an essential but yet missing clause in Lev 15:31, 20:2 and Num 
19:13, 20, is “if impure person touches sancta”;86 he claims that this ellipsis streams out 
of texts like Lev 7:20–21, 12:4, and 22:3–7, which undoubtedly convey the fact that the 
defilement of the holy entity takes place through direct contact with the impure entity.87 
Outside of these texts, Maccoby also cited Lev 5:4 as an obvious example of ellipsis, in 
this case, “if he breaks his vow.”88  
Milgrom claimed that this is not a real ellipsis, and his critique of Maccoby on 
this particular text89 is highly controversial due to his claim that the legist (the author) 
was bound by structural constraints, that is, they repeated the phrase ַלם נֶּע  ּנּו ו  ּמֶּ הּוא מִּ ָיַדע ו   
in v. 4 as they did in vv. 2–3. If, as Milgrom agreed with many other scholars, Lev 5:1–4 
is comprised of a unit of 4 cases of apodosis, then the legists’ striving to follow structural 
consistency would lead them to use the same phrase in v. 1 as well, which they did not. In 
addition, it would also have led them to the same phrase in all three verses, 2, 3, and 4, 
which they did not. The phrases are identical in the vv. 3 and 4, ַלם נֶּע  ּנּו  ו  ּמֶּ הּוא מִּ ָיַדע ו  , 
while the verb ָיַדע is left out in v. 2, ַלם נֶּע  ּנּו ו  ּמֶּ הּו מִּ ו  . Milgrom’s claim is even more 
controversial due to the fact that vv. 2 and 3 refer to the similar topic, defilement, in v. 2, 
by carcass, and in v. 3, by human. Thus, it would be natural to have the same phrase in 
vv. 2 and 3 and perhaps allow for a small modification, leaving out ָיַדע, in v. 4 which   
 
86Maccoby, Ritual and Morality, 174. 
87Maccoby, Ritual and Morality, 170, 190n2. 
88Maccoby, Ritual and Morality, 173–74. 
89Milgrom, “Impurity is Miasma,” 729. 
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deals with a new topic, a rush oath. Thus, it seems that the legists were not bound by 
structural constraints when it came to this phrase because they left out the phrase in v. 1 
and used it in vv. 4, which is the structural and thematic counterpart of v. 1, and they used 
different phrases in vv. 2 and 3 which are structural and thematic counterparts. 
In addition, Milgrom’s assertion that the phrase הּוא ָיַדע ו   is “entirely 
superfluous”90 is also not substantial since repetition, even though not desired as much in 
conventional writing, was essential in Ancient Near Eastern written materials in order to 
emphasize certain facts.91 Milgrom made an accurate comment when he stated that the 
phrase הּוא ָיַדע ו  , translated as “though he has known [it],” was self-evident. It was 
therefore eliminated.”92 That is exactly what Maccoby was also pointing out, but referred 
to it as an ellipsis. This study does not deal with the structure of Lev 5:1–4, but rather, 
notes the flaws of Milgrom’s comment on the structure related to the use of the phrase 
mentioned above by the legist. Milgrom’s own suggestions of ellipsis in Lev 11:27–28, 
31, 32, 39, and 40 regarding the ablutions are convincing,93 while those in Lev 9:8, 12, 
15, 18 and 16:11, 15 are a matter of unsettled debate among scholars, and are informed 
by Milgrom’s theory of atonement. It is obvious that although the concept of ellipsis is   
 
90Milgrom, “Impurity is Miasma,” 729. 
91Repetition is a structural element in historical narratives. John Sailhamer, The Pentateuch as 
Narrative: A Biblical-Theological Commentary (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1992), 25. It is considered 
to be the most powerful means in biblical texts. J. P. Fokkelman, “Genesis,” in The Literary Guide to the 
Bible, eds. Robert Alter and Frank Kermode (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
1987), 46. Its task is to emphasize what is important, remind the listener of the previous steps or actions, or 
sometimes, simply to impress. Laurence A. Turner, Genesis, RNBC (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 
2000), 15. 
92Milgrom, “Impurity is Miasma,” 729. 
93Milgrom, “Impurity is Miasma,” 730. 
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common and present in biblical cultic/legal material, the potential elliptical claims have 
to be confirmed by and clearly stated in other biblical texts. In this case, biblical 
cultic/legal material favors Maccoby’s understanding. 
 
The Concept of Delay 
Milgrom assumed that a lapse of time, a delay between the actual moment of 
defilement of a person and the time he/she becomes aware of his/her defiled status makes 
the impurities grow from a non-sinful, minor one into a major, sinful one, thus defiling 
the sanctuary from afar. Normally, simple day ablutions would eliminate non-sinful 
defilements, but since there is a delay in dealing with them, the impurities grow into 
major ones requiring the sacrifice (5:6–13).94 Maccoby already noted that the text which 
would verify this concept of delay as a deciding factor, whether the defilement is sinful or 
not, is nonexistent in biblical cultic legislation.95 I agree with Milgrom that the concept of 
delay is a valid concept, as I agree with Maccoby concerning elliptical interpretation. 
However, the consequence of the delay is different in my understanding, namely, the 
requirement of the sacrifice might be for the unintentionality of the person who initially 
contracted impurity and did not immediately handle it properly. In that way, the 
defilement would have grown, not due to a delay itself, but because it would be 
transmitted and spread in the camp, thus increasing the risk of a defiled person’s, 
unaware of his/her status, entering the sanctuary and defiling it. The transmission of 
impurity could continue uncontrollably until ultimately, the entire camp becomes 
 
94Milgrom, “Impurity is Miasma,” 730. Milgrom cites Lev 11:28, 31–40 to support one day time 
limit to deal with the defilements. Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 298. 
95Maccoby, Ritual and Morality, 174. 
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defiled.96 Thus, delay does not make minor defilements grow from small ones into major 
ones, but gives room for neglected defilement to be transmitted uncontrollably in the 
camp via contact and finally, to defile the sanctuary and the entire camp. In addition, a 
simple neglect to purify constitutes violation of divine commandments. 
In his response to Maccoby’s remarks, Milgrom stated that the concept of delay 
can be derived from other references, but he cited one single text, Lev 17:16, based on 
which he claimed that delay is dangerous, not because the defiled person can enter the 
sanctuary in his/her impure state, but because neglect to purify himself/herself is sinful 
and punishable.97 It is true that disobedience to be purified falls into the domain of moral 
impurity, as Milgrom claimed, but on the other hand, it is also true that during the delay, 
the defiled person could unintentionally, and unaware of his/her defiled state, enter the 
sanctuary and defile it through direct contact. Thus, one could accept both scenarios, 
moral impurity of neglecting to follow God’s procedure for dealing with the defilement 
and entering the sanctuary in a defiled state, since they are both possible and not mutually 
exclusive. Texts where individuals in their defiled state came into the direct contact with 
the holy entities and consequently died do exist in the Pentateuch (Lev 10:1–2; Num 
16:16ff, etc.) or were forbidden to come in contact with holy entities (Lev 7:20; 12:4, 
etc.), while there is not a single text that clearly supports ADH. 
 
Leviticus 15:31 
Leviticus 15:31 is a conclusion to the laws on genital impurities found in Lev 
 
96Wenham, Numbers, 145. 
97Milgrom, “Impurity Is Miasma,” 730. 
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15:1–30 and can be translated/interpreted in two distinct ways as the following translation 
shows: “Thus you shall keep the people of Israel separate from their uncleanness, so that 
they do not die in their uncleanness 1. by defiling my tabernacle that is in their midst or 
2. when they defile my tabernacle that is in their midst.” The interpretational and 
grammatical crux of this verse is the meaning of the infinitive construct preceded by the 
preposition   ב. The first translation assumes an instrumental sense of the infinitive 
construct and is favored by automatic defilement proponents. The second translation 
conveys a temporal one and it disputes this hypothesis. Both options, respectively, will be 
discussed below. 
 
Instrumental Sense: “by Defiling My Tabernacle 
That Is in Their Midst” 
Based on the first possible translation, the proponents of the ADH believe that it 
is the negligence of the Israelites to implement procedures found in Lev 15:1–30 or 
chaps. 11–15,98 prescribed to handle genital (chap. 15) or all impurities listed in chs. 11–
15, which cause defilement of the sanctuary from a distance. In this case, the death 
penalty is triggered by moral fault.99 In other words, the sin represented in this case is 
intentional disobedience to the divine laws for purification listed in chap. 15 or chaps. 
11–15. An individual affected by these impurities does not need to come to the sanctuary, 
in other words to come into a direct contact with it, in order to defile it for they defile it 
from the distance. Their punishment is not based on potentially bringing their ritual 
 
98Balentine, Leviticus, 124; Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 945. 
99Jacob Milgrom, “The Paradox of the Red Cow (Num. XIX),” VT 31 (1981): 71; Kiuchi, 
Purification Offering, 124. Followed by Gane, Cult and Character, 145. 
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impurities into a direct contact with the holy entities, sanctuary in this case, but rather, 
their punishment is initiated by their neglect to undergo divinely prescribed purification 
rituals. 
This interpretation agrees with the first translation of the third clause in 15:31 
mentioned above, where the infinitive construct of the Hebrew verb ָטֵמא, preceded by the 
preposition   ב, is taken to function as a noun in the so-called nominal use of the infinitive 
construct. The logical subject in this grammatical construction is expressed by the 
pronominal suffix attached to a given noun or a personal name.100 
 
Temporal Sense: “When They Defile My 
Tabernacle That Is in Their Midst” 
Based on the second possible translation of the third clause in Lev 15:31, it has 
been argued that the individual comes in their impure state to the sanctuary and via direct 
contact with the holy entities, in this case, the sanctuary, defiles them. The exact source 
of defilement is a matter of an ongoing debate. Some scholars believe that this text warns 
against ritual defilement of the sanctuary,101 while some believe that defilement 
originates out of moral impurity,102 that is, the neglect to follow procedures for ritual 
purification. In any case, this interpretation is based upon the second, temporal translation 
which seems more plausible from the grammatical, syntactical, and semantic standpoint. 
 
100Folmer, “The Translation of Biblical Hebrew Clauses,” 116. 
101Hoffmann, Das Buch Leviticus, 1:430; Maccoby, Ritual and Morality, 170; Rodríguez, 
“Transfer of Sin in Leviticus,” 173–76; Hannah K. Harrington, The Purity Texts, CQS 5 (New York: T & T 
Clark International, 2004), 71–72, 78; Kazen, Issues of Impurity in Early Judaism, 57; Charlotte Elisheva 
Fonrobert, Menstrual Purity: Rabbinic and Christian Reconstructions of Biblical Gender, Contraversions 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 19; Frymer-Kensky, “Pollution, Purification,” 403. 
102Brichto, “On Slaughter and Sacrifice,” 33; Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 61. 
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As noted above, the first translation translates the third clause of this text with “by 
defiling my tabernacle,” indicating an instrumental nuance of the clause, while the second 
as “when they defile my tabernacle” points to the temporal, conditional sense. The 
second translation gives room for the other consequential meaning of this clause, 
entrance of the impure person into the sanctuary and defiling it via direct contact. This 
interpretation is preferred by some theologians.103 As shown above, a number of the 
Pentateuchal texts explicitly confirm the notion that the defilement of the sanctuary 
happens through direct contact (Lev 7:20; 10:1–2; 12:4). 
This claim is further verified by the analysis of all 22 constructions of the 
infinitive construct, preceded by   ב, found in Leviticus (4:27; 10:9; 12:6; 15:23, 31; 16:1, 
17, 23; 18:28; 19:9; 20:4; 22:16; 23:22, 39, 43; 24:16; 26:26, 35, 43, 44; 27:21). That is, 
all of them convey a temporal sense (Lev 4:27; 10:9; 12:6; 15:23, 31; 16:1, 17, 23; 18:28; 
19:9; 20:4; 22:16; 23:22, 39, 43; 24:16; 26:26, 35, 43, 44; 27:21). In addition, all 
occurrences of the infinitive construct preceded by   ב when it is syntactically related to the 
noun that refer to the sanctuary (משכן) retain a temporal sense (Exod 40:36; Lev 15:31; 
Num 1:51; 9:19, 22). To scrutinize this statistics more, the exact same grammatical 
construction as it is in this text,   ב + infinitive construct + ֵאת, is found in 17 texts in 
Leviticus (6:13[20]; 7:16, 36, 38; 15:23[  ב acting as direct object marker], 31; 16:30; 
18:28; 19:9; 20:4; 22:16; 23:12, 22[x2], 39, 43; 24:16[no direct object marker]) and these 
texts express temporal sense, too.  
 
103Maccoby, Ritual and Morality, 173; Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 61, 155; Péter-Contesse and 




A law of Lev 20:1–5 prescribes the procedure for an individual who offers any of 
their children to Moloch as a sacrifice. Verse 3 crucially states that “I myself [God] will 
set my face against them, and will cut them off from the people, because they have given 
of their offspring to Moloch, defiling my sanctuary and profaning my holy name.” 
According to ADH, defilement of the sanctuary in this case also takes place from 
distance, and the mere act of offering one’s offspring to Moloch defiles the sanctuary. 
Again, a practitioner of this prohibited worship does not need to come to the sanctuary, 
that is, come in contact with it, in order to defile it. 
As mentioned above, Lev 20:3 also utilizes the infinitive construct, but preceded 
by the separable preposition למען. With knowledge concerning the piel stem, the 
infinitive construct aspect, and the semantics concerning the verb ָטֵמא, I specifically 
focus on the two particulars of this text: the meaning and function of the preposition ַמַען  ל 
and the structure of the law. These two items are included in the analysis of this text since 
they contribute greatly to its proper understanding. 
 
The Form, Meaning, and Function of ַמַען  ל 
Form: The prepositional phrase ַמַען  and the noun ל   consists of the preposition ל 
 never ַמַען and is considered to be one of the so-called “frozen prepositions”104 since ַמעַ ן
occurs without   270) ל times).105 Meaning: Scholars have reached a consensus on the 
 
104Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 91. 
105HALOT, s.v. “ַמַען”; Harman, “Particles,” NIDOTTE 4:1025–39. 
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meaning of this phrase. It is usually translated as “for the sake of, on account of, to the 
intent or in order that,” conveying both purpose and intention, but without the sense of 
causation.106  
Function: In BH, “the main clause expresses a situation, and the subordinate 
clause either a purpose (final or telic clause) or a consequence (result clause),”107 and 
both of these types of clauses, normally including the infinitive construct, are governed 
by 108.למען H. A. Brongers has done the most detailed study on ַמַען  and suggested that ל 
syntactically, it governs a result clause in a few cases (Lev 20:3; 2 Kgs 22:17; Amos 2:7). 
He noted that the particle is sometimes elliptical in sense and a paraphrase is necessary: 
“the consequence of which will be.”109 It has to be highlighted that the level of certainty 
in classifying purpose and consequence is sometimes low. The context is critical for the 
precise sense of given grammatical constructions and particles.110 
Brongers’ and Joüon and Muraoka’s insights are crucial regarding the function of 
ַמַען  in Lev 20:3. First, commenting on its function in this text, Brongers emphasized that ל 
 
106Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 91, 511, 637–41, 694; Allan 
M. Harman, “ָסַמְך,” NIDOTTE 3:260–70; HALOT, s.v. “ַמַען”; BDB, s.v. “ַמַען.” 
107Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 91, 637. 
108H. A. Brongers, “Die Partikel ַמַען  in der Biblisch-Hebräischen Sprache,” in Syntax and ל 
Meaning: Studies in Hebrew Syntax and Biblical Exegesis, eds. C. J. Labuschagne, et al., OtSt 18 (Leiden: 
Brill, 1973), 84–96; Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 91; Joüon and 
Muraoka, A Grammar of Biblical Hebrew, 357. Via Johannes F. Diehl, Die Fortführung des Imperativs im 
Biblischen Hebräisch, AOAT 286 (Münster: Ugarit-Verlag, 2004), 342–60. 
109Brongers, “Die Partikel ַמַען  Gane has interpreted this phrase in telic, causative, and .89 ”,ל 
resultative senses. He stated: “It is this effect on the sanctuary, which does not depend upon the sinner’s 
direct contact with sacred places or things, for which he/she receives punishment.” Gane, Cult and 
Character, 148. 
110Brongers, “Die Partikel ַמַען  Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical ;89–88 ”,ל 
Hebrew Syntax, 91, 637; Joüon and Muraoka, A Grammar of Biblical Hebrew, 357, 595. 
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es ist klar, dass es sich in diesen Stellen nicht um die Absiht, sonders um di Folge des 
Verfahrens handelt. Es ist z.b. fraglich, ob die Israeliten, als sie darangingen ihre 
Kinder dem Moloch zu opfern, dabei bewusst die Absicht hatten das Heiligtum 
Jahwes zu verunreiningen und seinen Namen zu entweihen. So eit werden sie ihre 
Überlegungen bestimmt nicht getrieben haben. Andererseits ist es auch keine Frage, 
dass infolge dieser Verfehlung Jahwe aufs tiefste gekränkt wurde.111 
 
Second, Joüon and Muraoka have noted that ַמַען  conveys a consequential or ל 
resultative sense in the context that discusses “the effect of a punishable act which is an 
offence against God rather than about its aim.”112 They have cited Lev 20:3; Num 25:4; 
Deut 4:25; 30:12–14 to show consequential or resultative sense.113 Thus, in this particular 
text, the sense of ַמַען  is consequential or resultative, not that of purpose. The causative ל 
sense is never included in the preposition למען. 
 
Literary Structure of the Law 
According to the majority of modern scholars, the law consists of two scenarios. 
The first is contained in vv. 2–3 which implies that the idolater’s act is known and both 
the community and God punish them. This case includes a double punishment, death by 
stoning and divine kārēt. With the fact that the idolater experiences premature death by 
human agency in v. 2, the divine punishment is taken to mean either extinction of the 
 
111“It is clear that these verses are not about intention, but rather, about the results of the process. 
For example, it is questionable whether the Israelites, as they began to sacrifice their own children to 
Moloch, consciously intended to defile the sanctuary of Yahweh and to desecrate his name. They would not 
have driven their considerations so far. On the other hand, there is no question that, as a result of this 
misconduct, Yahweh was deeply offended.” Brongers, “Die Partikel ַמַען  .Author’s translation .89 ” ,ל 
112Joüon and Muraoka, A Grammar of Biblical Hebrew, 598. 
113Joüon and Muraoka, A Grammar of Biblical Hebrew, 405, 596, 598. 
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lineage114 or punishment in the afterlife.115 Otherwise, v. 3 is understood as an 
explanation of v. 2 in the sense that the stoning to death by human agency represents 
God’s opposition to this act.116 In the second scenario, vv. 4–5, the idolater’s act is also 
known, but the community fails to punish him/her so consequently, God punishes them. 
It can be said that this is a standard, scholarly understanding of this law.117 Gane’s 
explanation of divine punishment in a potential double punishment in the first scenario is 
eloquent and profound: 
Divinely administered “cutting off” goes beyond capital punishment. When someone 
deserves more than one death penalty, human justice is stymied. It makes no 
difference whether an individual murders one or six million; the malefactor has but 
one life to give for his crime(s). But God can do plenty more: He can make the 
punishment fit the crime by seeing to it that the sinner’s line of descendants, from 
which he has contributed to another deity, becomes extinct so that he is not even 
history. It is terrifying to face the prospect of being forgotten and unmissed. God can 
also deny the offender a positive afterlife. Either way, he is “cut off from his 
people.”118 
 
This explanation was also accepted by Milgrom119 and is based on Donald Wold’s 
dissertation research which is analyzed in the subheading “Donald Wold on the Kārēt 
Punishment” of this study. This explanation is not accepted here due to numerous 
 
114Wold, “The Meaning of Biblical Penalty Kareth,” 1–45, especially 4–5. Wold’s suggestion was 
followed by the most influential scholars of Ancient Israel cult. Wright, The Disposal of Impurity, 164n2; 
Milgrom, Numbers, 406–7; Gane, Cult and Character, 145. 
115Wenham, The Book of Leviticus, 242. Milgrom found that this understanding of kareth was 
anticipated by earlier exegetes. Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1733; Milgrom, Numbers, 407; Hartley, 
Leviticus, 337–38.  
116Keil and Delitzsch, The Pentateuch, 2:426–27. 
117Wenham, The Book of Leviticus, 278; Levine, Leviticus, 136–37; Hartley, Leviticus, 333–41; 
Budd, Leviticus, 290–92; Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1729; Gane, Cult and Character, 145; Gane, Leviticus, 
Numbers, 362; Kiuchi, Leviticus, 372–73; Sklar, Leviticus, 255. 
118Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 362. 
119Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 459–60.  
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methodological and conceptual fallacies of Wold’s work. 
Alfred Cholewinski has proposed a notable literary structure (see Table 25) which 
reflects the two scenarios type of the law.120 
 
 
Table 25. Literary structure of Lev 20:2–5 
 
A 
Aβ ל ל ּוִמן־ַהּג ר ַהָּגר ְּבִיְׂשָרא   2bִאיׁש ִאיׁש ִמְּבנ י ִיְׂשָרא 
ן ֲאֶׁשר      ַלֹּמֶלְך ִמַּזְרעֹו ִיּת 
     יּוָמת מֹות






Aα ן ֶאת־ָּפַני ָּבִאיׁש ַההּוא  3ַוֲאִני אֶ ּת 




bα ַלֹּמֶלְך  ָנַתן ִמַּזְרעֹו ִּכי  




aα ינ יֶהם ִמן־ָהִאיׁש ַההּוא  4ְוִאם ַהְעל ם ַיְעִלימּו ַעם ָהָאֶרץ ֶאת־ע 
       ַלֹּמֶלְך ִמַּזְרעֹו ְּבִתּתֹו





5a  5ְוַׂשְמִּתי ֲאִני ֶאת־ָּפַני ָּבִאיׁש ַההּוא ּוְבִמְׁשַּפְחּתֹו  
ת ֹאתֹו ְוִהְכַרִּתי ַאֲחָריו  ָּכל־ַהֹּזִנים  ְוא   






However, this understanding of the law runs into internal conceptual 
inconsistencies. First, v. 2 states that the punishment for the act of idolatry is premature 
death. It is administered by the people who stone the idolater. This is well-established 
punishment for idolatry in Pentateuchal narratives (Exod 32:27) and legal texts   
 
120Alfred Cholewinski, Heiligkeitsgesetz und Deuteronomium: Eine Vergleichende Studie, AnBib 
66 (Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1976), 55–56. 
 
599 
(Deut 13:5, 9, 10, 15; 17:5–6). If the punishment for idolatry in v. 2 stipulated by God is 
premature death by stoning, then the same punishment should be imposed in v. 5. The 
only difference in vv. 4–5 and v. 2 is the attitude of the people which affects the mode of 
execution, but the nature of sin remains the same, implying that the nature of punishment 
should be the same as well: a premature death. The copulative   ו that connects the opening 
verb in v. 5 with v. 4 also suggests that the punishment implied in v. 4 coordinates with 
the punishment implied in v. 5.121 Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that the same 
punishment is in view in the people’s punishing the idolater in v. 2, and God’s punishing 
the idolater in v. 5—premature death. 
Second, based on vv. 4–5, God administers punishment himself when people 
refuse to punish the idolater which points to the possibility that in v. 3 people do not 
punish the idolater. Keeping in mind the fact that vv. 4–5 discuss the people’s refusal to 
impose punishment, a valid alternative is that they do not know about the act of idolatry 
in v. 3 and consequently are not able to punish idolater. 
Third, the fact that the idolater is also punished by God himself in v. 3 and 
experiences premature death makes the subcase in vv. 4–5 superfluous. The people 
cannot disregard or fail to punish the idolater, even if they considered it, since they are 
already punished by God in v. 3. 
Fourth, taking v. 3 to be additional punishment to the one in v. 2 makes vv. 4–5 
redundant and superfluous. The punishments in vv. 2 and 3 were also puzzling for Julius 
 
121Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 540. 
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Wellhausen.122 It is very unlikely that God’s punishment for idolatry in v. 3 did not mean 
premature death because this is a standard punishment for this sin. It would also be very 
unlikely that this law focused on punishment that did not affect the idolater immediately, 
premature death, but rather, implied afterlife punishment. 
On the other hand, some scholars have proposed convincingly that this law 
actually consists of three scenarios. In v. 2, the people know about the idolatrous act and 
punish the idolater; in v. 3, they do not know about it and are not able to punish him/her 
so God does it, and in v. 4, the people refuse to punish the idolater and again, God does it. 
Thus, v. 3 is taken to refer to a separate subcase, not as an explanation of v. 2 or 
additional punishment to the one in v. 2. In this case v. 2, is the basic casuistic statement, 
while vv. 3 and 4–5 are the subcases, additional alternatives to the basic law. Thus, in v. 3 
the idolater and his/her act is secret, and since nobody knows it and is thus not able to be 
sanctioned, God himself intervenes to punish him/her. This interpretation is not new since 
it was already known in rabbinic literature,123 as well as among some modern scholars.124 
Ibn Ezra stated already: 
 
 ”ואני אתן את פני באיש ההוא. אם היה בסתר ויש אומרים כי טמאו לחללית זרעו`“125 
 
 
122Julius Wellhausen, Die Composition des Hexateuchs und der Historischen Bücher des Alten 
Testaments, 3rd ed. (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1899), 156.  
123Ibn Ezra, “Ibn Ezra on Leviticus,” Sefaria: Ibn Ezra on the Pentateuch, trans. Jay F. Shachter, 
https://www.sefaria.org/Ibn_Ezra_on_Leviticus.20.3.1-2?lang=bi. 
124Don DeWelt, Leviticus, BSTS (Joplin, MO: College Press, 1975), 333; George Bush, Notes, 
Critical and Practical, on the Book of Leviticus: Designed as a General Help to Biblical Reading and 
Instruction (New York: Dayton & Newman, 1843), 215; Noordtzij, Numbers, 209–10; Rodríguez, 
“Transfer of Sin in Leviticus,” 174–75. 
125Ibn Ezra, “Ibn Ezra on Leviticus,” 20:3. “I will turn My anger against that man if the crime was 
committed in secret. Some people say that this denotes destruction of his progeny (posterity).”  
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This statement implies the ellipsis, “if he does it secretly,” in v. 3 in order to avoid 
the inconsistencies listed above. The alternative sense of v. 3 may be hinted at if the 
opening   ו which can legitimately be understood as a coordinative particle “or,” as 
explained on p. 602 of the present study, thus introducing an alternative to the previously 
stated rule. This alternative reading of   ו is also noted in the works of Yosef Isaak Bekhor 
Shor.126 The assumption that v. 3 addresses that the act of idolatry could have been 
committed secretly is a well-established alternative in other BLs regarding idolatry. The 
same phrase that Ibn Ezra suggested in his reading of v. 3, the preposition   ב followed by 
the noun ר  is explicitly utilized in Deut 13:6 and 27:15, adverbially presenting a 127,ֵסתֶּ
secret act of idolatry. Thus, it is already introduced in the BL that idolatry can be open, 
public, and secret in its nature. 
Wells’ detailed treatment of the law of testimony in Exod 22:6–8 demonstrate that 
not all details of the potential situation are explicitly spelled out in biblical legal texts. 
Sometimes even the crucially important details are not mentioned. For instance, the law 
of testimony in Exod 22:6–8 is missing crucial details that should precede v. 8. Two 
scenarios are implied in the second subcase, v. 7, if the thief is not found: (1) the receiver 
illegally appropriated some of the belongings and perhaps falsely alleged that there were 
stolen, or (2) the receiver claims that the purported owner never deposited his/her 
belongings with the receiver or not in the amount/s claimed. The guilty party in the first 
 
126Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1733.  
127This phrase also introduces other serious sin in Deut 27:24, hitting/killing a neighbor secretly. 
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scenario is the receiver, whereas the purported owner is liable in the second.128 However, 
none of that is spelled out in the law, but the law simply focuses on the first of the two 
scenarios, namely that the receiver misappropriated the belongings of the owner.129 
Keeping in mind the crucial importance of the missing parts in Exod 22:6–8, it is 
not atypical that Lev 20:3 does not contain, but still implies ellipsis “if he does it 
secretly.” Biblical laws do not always provide all the background and sometimes, crucial 
details regarding the particular law, but they are to be assumed in order for the law to 
make sense. 
The next illuminative point is the use and the meaning of the phrase, “from the 
midst of one’s people,” that is used in vv. 3 and 5. As in these two verses, the phrase is 
syntactically related to the punishment of kārēt. This grammatical construct is used 11 
times in the Pentateuch (Exod 31:14; Lev 17:4, 10; 18:29; 20:3, 5, 6, 18; 23:30; Num 
15:30; Deut 2:16). The phrase is syntactically related to the verb ָכַרת in 9 out of 11 
occurrences (Exod 31:14; Lev 17:4, 10; 18:29; 20:3, 5, 6, 18; Num 15:30), whereas in 2 
of them, the verbs ָאַבד (Lev 23:30) and מּות (Deut 2:16) are used. In at least 7 of 11 of 
these texts, the phrase refers to premature death (Exod 31:14; Lev 17:4, 20:3, 5, 6; 23:30; 
Deut 2:16). This claim in relation to Exod 31:14 rests on the fact that breaking the 
Sabbath in Num 15:32–36 is punished by premature death, stoning. Idolatry in Lev 17:4 
is also punishable by death based both on Pentateuchal narratives (Exod 32:27) and legal 
texts (Deut 13:5, 9, 10, 15; 17:5–6). As explained above, based on Lev 20:2, 4, idolatry in   
 
128Wells, The Law of Testimony, 141–42. 
129Wells, The Law of Testimony, 142. 
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20:3, 5 is also punishable by premature death. Necromancy dealt with in Lev 20:6 is also 
punishable by premature death (Exod 22:18; Lev 20:27). Two times the verb ָכַרת is 
replaced by other verbs and combined with the phrase, “from one’s people.” The verb 
 is used in Deut 2:16. Both of these verbs clearly מּות is used in Lev 23:30, while ָאַבד
convey premature death.130 All these texts unanimously present premature death as an 
immediate and primary punishment. All these sins are intentional and epitomize direct 
opposition to God’s will expressed in covenantal laws. In addition, only Exod 31:14 
(Sabbath breaking) and Lev 20:2–5 (Molech worship) may be detectable by the public, 
while all the others are secret. These two are punished by premature death. Thus it is 
reasonable to assume that all texts that use the phrase, “from the midst of one’s people” 
along with verbs מּות ,ָכַרת or ָאַבד imply premature death as punishment for the sins they 
refer to. It would be logical that individuals who committed these sins would be 
eliminated from the covenantal community since doing all these sins negate core values 
and policies that the covenant with God includes.131 Since the sins listed in those 7 texts 
are punishable by premature death, it is reasonable to expect that this punishment is 
envisioned for the sins in the 4 remaining texts for which other texts do not prescribe 
premature death (Lev 17:10; 18:29; 20:18; Num 15:30). 
The analysis of the texts that contain a shorter phrase, “cut off from one’s people” 
(without “the midst”), show the same results (Gen 17:14; Exod 30:33, 38; Lev. 7:20, 21, 
 
130Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27, 2024–25; Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 13–14. 
131Contra Milgrom’s statement: “In contrast to the death penalty inflicted by man (yûmat) or God 
(yāmût), kārēt is not necessarily directed against the person of the sinner. He may live a full life or an 
aborted one.” Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 347. It is very paradoxical that individuals who commit these sins 
would be allowed to reside within a covenantal community. 
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25, 27; 17:9; 19:8; 23:29; Num 9:13). They all utilize the same niphal stem pointing that 
this could be the so-called “divine passive.” In other words, God administers premature 
death in cases like this. All these sins are intentional and secret and negate core values 
and regulations that a covenant with God includes. It is reasonable to expect that those 
who commit them would also be punished by premature death. Keeping in mind the 
gravity of these sins, it is also reasonable to include punishment that goes beyond 
premature death like some scholars suggest,132 but premature death remains the primary 
punishment. 
Finally, kārēt and מּות are presented as equivalents in Exod 31:14=Num 15:32–
36; Lev 20:3=Lev 20:2, 4; Num 4:18=4:19–20, which further confirms the fact that kārēt 
in the first place refers to premature death. Wold, followed by Milgrom, Schwartz, and 
Gane, believed that this law consists of only one case and is interpreted in v. 3 to convey 
punishment that would go beyond mere death, but was referring to annihilation of one’s 
line of descendants.133 Attractive as it is and potentially possible, this interpretation 
cannot be based on this text. 
With this reading of the law, it is logical that only v. 3 expresses fear for 
sanctuary defilement since being undetected, the idolater can freely come to the sanctuary 
and defile it. In that case, the idolater’s death would be immediate. Verses 2 and 4–5 do 
not express such fear since in v. 2, the idolater is punished and subsequently prevented 
 
132Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 346–48. 
133Wold, “The Meaning of Biblical Penalty Kareth,” 251–55; Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 457–60; 
Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 13; Gane, Cult and Character, 145, 201. 
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from defiling the sanctuary, whereas in vv. 4–5, God punishes them and prevents 
defilement. 
Gane has recently proposed that the phrase יׁש ַההּוא ָבאִּ  in v. 3 refers to the same 
person in v. 2, and thus, forms one case, vv. 2–3. However, the same phrase is also used 
in v. 5 and by this logic, the case in vv. 4–5 should also be considered as belonging to the 
case presented in vv. 2–3. That is highly unlikely since v. 4 undeniably introduces a new 
subcase. Thus, the claim that the phrase, יׁש ַההּוא ָבאִּ , ties vv. 2 and 3 into one case is 
unlikely, but rather, the phrase, יׁש ַההּוא  refers to the indefinite person,134 an ,ָבאִּ
impersonal subject,135 any man. This is further confirmed by the prescriptive nature of 
this law136 and the fact that the prescriptive texts are goal-oriented.137 Prescriptive texts 
do not imply any particular individual, but rather, any or every individual of the covenant 
community. The definite article does not modify the nominal phrase, יׁש יׁש אִּ אִּ , that 
introduces an implied subject of this law. In addition, Gesenius stated that the repetition 
of a single word, in this case יׁש יׁש אִּ אִּ , expressed the entirety or the distributive sense, 
 
134Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 664. 
135Gane, Old Testament Law for Christians, 89. 
136Gane, Cult and Character, 22; Baruch A. Levine, “Ugaritic Descriptive Rituals,” JCS 17 
(1963): 105–11; Baruch A. Levine, “The Descriptive Tabernacle Texts of the Pentateuch,” JAOS 85 
(1965): 307–18; William W. Hallo, “Offerings to the Temple Gates at Ur,” HUCA 38 (1967): 17–58; David 
W. Baker, “Leviticus 1–7 and the Punic Tariffs: A Form Critical Comparison,” ZAW 99 (1987): 193; A. 
Rainey, “The Order of Sacrifices in Old Testament Ritual Texts,” Biblica 51 (1970): 485–98. Interestingly, 
Rainey classified Lev 1–7 as descriptive. See Rainey, “The Order of Sacrifices,” 486–87. 
137Knierim, Text and Concept in Leviticus 1:1–9, 64–67, 90; Robert E. Longacre, An Anatomy of 




thus it includes every man138 who offers his children to Moloch as introduced in v. 2. The 
implied person in this law is not a particular man, but rather any or every man, and יׁש  ָהאִּ
 does not convey that the person in vv. 2 and 3 were the same, but rather, points to ַההּוא
any person who offers his/her children to Moloch as introduced in v. 2. Waltke and 
O’Connor noticed that the sameness of a person is expressed in a different way, namely, 
 precedes a personal name only in the post-exilic books and has the force of ‘the הוא“
same’ without special emphasis.”139 
This reading of the law, the inclusion of the implied phrase ר  does not negate ,ַבֵּסתֶּ
Cholewinski’s literary structure. 
 
Numbers 19:13, 20 
These two texts belong to two different pericopes. The first pericope, vv. 1–13, is 
primarily concerned with the preparation of a mixture for purifying human beings and 
other objects defiled by the human corpse, while the second, vv. 14–22, provides more 
details and introduces the specific conditions of defilement through direct contact and 
through the proximity of human beings and other objects to the human corpse.140 Similar 
to Lev 15:31, these texts also point out that the neglect of utilizing the procedures to treat 
ritual impurity causes defilement of the sanctuary based on the stative nature of the root 
   that I suggested above. Num 19:13, 20 do not refer to the action of contracting ritual ָטֵמא
 
138Gesenius, Gesenius' Hebrew Grammar, 395. 
139Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax, 301. 
140Levine, Numbers 1–20, 457; Milgrom, Numbers, 161–62.  
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impurity by the sanctuary, but rather, just state that the sanctuary will be defiled. In other 
words, these texts do not convey the mode or the way in which the sanctuary would be 
defiled, but just conveys that it will be defiled. 
These texts do not contain issues that have not been studied and resolved above. 
That is, the initial study of stem and aspect along with the semantic and usage patterns of 
the verb  ֵאָטמ  suggest that these texts do not support ADH. First, the piel stem of the verb 
 brings a totally passive undersubject, without regard to the process, into a certain ָטֵמא
state. The verb ָטֵמא is always accompanied with other verbs through which its meaning 
in relation to the undersubject/direct object is achieved. 
In addition, the use of the perfect aspect might appear confusing since the perfect 
is used to convey a future event. Still, it is well established by Hebrew grammarians that 
the perfect aspect is frequently utilized to convey a result in a future time as a completed 
event or state. However, it is possible that the qatal form in the flow of other wayiqtol 
forms could refer to the activity that took place before the initial wayiqtol form. The qatal 
form would, in this case, function as a pluperfect tense, referring to an action that took 
place at a time earlier than the time in the past already referred to. In that case, the 
immediate context ultimately assists in arriving at a correct decision on the sense of a 
given qatal form. In the case of Num 19:13, 20, the context favors the former alternative. 
 
Summary: Automatic Defilement Hypothesis 
Based on the findings in the area of stem, aspect, and the semantics and patterns 
of use of the verb ָטֵמא used in Lev 15:31; 20:3 and Num 19:13, 20, this study suggests 
that ADH is not justifiable. 
 
608 
First, the part of Waltke’s and O’Connor’s theory that piel is always factitive if 
qal of the same verb is stative is valid in the case of ָטֵמא within the limits of the 
Pentateuch. In other words, piel brings a totally passive undersubject, without regard to 
the process, into the state depicted by an adjective. By utilizing a method specifically 
developed to examine Waltke’s and O’Connor’s theory of piel, Beckman’s research did 
not provide sufficient evidence to disprove it when applied to the verbs that convey 
abstract, conceptual, or metaphorical meanings like ָטֵמא or ָקַדׁש. However, this postulate 
regarding piel is not complete. Second, building on this, the present study has detected a 
twofold pattern of ָטֵמא uses in the Pentateuch. This verb is always accompanied with 
other verbs through which its meaning onto the undersubject/direct object it modifies is 
achieved, and physical contact between the entity transmitting and contacting impurity is 
always included. Third, the verbal aspects of ָטֵמא in the contexts of Lev 15:31; 20:3 and 
Num 19:13, 20 contain nuances that do not lend support for the ADH. All these three 
points are reinforced as I focus on the issues pertaining to each of these texts and propose 
their interpretation. 
 
Interpretation of Leviticus 15:31 
Building on the arguments just presented, the present study focuses on the more 
subtle grammatical, syntactic, and semantic irregularities. The seriousness of these 
oversights showed that the instrumental sense “by defiling my tabernacle that is in their 
midst” is not justifiable, consequently making ADH unsustainable. 
First, ADH disregards established grammatical rules related to the Infinitive 
construct. It takes the infinitive construct of ָטֵמא preceded by the preposition   ב, to 
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function as a noun which is not typical. Rather, the preposition   ב is attached to the 
infinitive construct when it is used nominally. In addition, the preposition   ב with the 
meaning of beth instrumenti, is by rule attached to a regular noun and not the verb/verbal 
noun. Finally, when used nominally, the infinitive construct either stands alone or is 
preceded by the preposition   ל. 
Second, ADH takes the infinitive construct of the verb ָטֵמא as a finite, active 
verb. Based on the analysis of the ָטֵמא occurrences in the Pentateuch presented in this 
study, this is problematic due to the fact that ָטֵמא is a stative verb when intransitive. 
Statistics on ָטֵמא, as demonstrated above, showed that ָטֵמא is a binary verb in terms of 
syntactic and semantic transitivity. However, it was also established that when 
intransitive,  ֵאָטמ  is stative, not a finite, active verb. 
Third, defilement expressed by ָטֵמא is never an action encapsulated within the 
semantic range of the verb ָטֵמא itself. It conveys a defiled state of a particular entity 
which is achieved by the use of some other verb/s or is its inherited state. It always 
depends on the other verbal actions, found along with ָטֵמא or in the surrounding texts, to 
achieve the meaning it conveys. Some of the verbs, like to touch, to carry, to sit, to eat, 
and so on, are used in order to convey the actual manner of how an entity contracted ָטֵמא 
status. 
Fourth, contracting the state of ָטֵמא always includes some sort of physical contact 
between the defiled and profane entity in order to transmit defilement from the former to 
the latter or both entities, source and recipient of the impurity, are inside a closed space. 
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Fifth, the concept of ellipsis, as a foundational concept for the concept of delay, 
does exist in the biblical cultic and legal texts. This fact is well recognized by both camps 
of the ADH. The same applies to the concept of delay. However, the delay to undergo 
prescribed procedures to handle impurity does not enable it to grow from minor into 
major, but rather causes the defilement of the entire camp and the tent of meeting via an 
uncontrollable transmission within the covenant community. 
In light of these grammatical, syntactical particularities found in Lev 15:31 and 
the semantics along with the patterns of use of the verb ָטֵמא, the instrumental translation 
followed by the proponents of this hypothesis contains significant grammatical 
irregularities. These substantial oversights imbedded in the process of forming the 
instrumental translation of this text make this translation highly unconvincing, which 
subsequently discredits the entire hypothesis. 
In addition, this translation/interpretation is in sharp contrast with the rabbinic 
understanding of these texts. That is, as noted by both camps of modern interpreters, 
rabbis viewed that the defilement of the sanctuary occurs via direct contact between the 
impure and profane entity.141 Interestingly, it was demonstrated that the preference for the 
instrumental142 or the temporal translation/interpretation143 is distributed equally among 
English translations of the Bible. 
On the other hand, the temporal sense “when they defile my tabernacle that is in   
 
141Milgrom, Numbers, 445; Maccoby, Ritual and Morality, 167; Rodríguez, “Transfer of Sin in 
Leviticus,” 173–74n7. 
142ESV, NASB, NET, NRSV. 
143ASV, KJV, NKJV. 
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their midst,” does not conflict with grammatical, syntactic, and semantic rules.  
First, the temporal interpretation considers that the infinitive construct + 
preposition   ב construction conveys temporal sense which is well established by Hebrew 
grammarians. Second, the piel of the verb ָטֵמא is considered as a stative verb in this text 
since it is intransitive. In addition to the factitive understanding of piel with this particular 
verb, the temporal interpretation agrees with the pattern of uses of ָטֵמא established in this 
study. Third, the present study demonstrated that ָטֵמא strictly follows a certain pattern of 
use in the Pentateuch. That is, it is always accompanied with other helping verbs that 
convey the exact mode of how ָטֵמא achieves its meaning. Fourth, achieving a ָטֵמא state 
always includes contact between the defiling and profane entities. Fifth, the concept of 
ellipsis and delay that are part of the debate of defilement transmission do not override 
the temporal sense. These two concepts do exist in the Pentateuch. When they are 
interpreted within the Pentateuchal corpus without imposing preconceived ideas upon the 
texts that imply elliptical statements, they support the temporal sense. Based on the 
patterns of use of ָטֵמא, the ellipsis “if impure person touches sancta” is implied in this 
text. Also, delay does not mean that a minor impurity grows into a major one if there is 
the case of delay in handling them, but rather, makes room for the defilement of the entire 
camp and the tent of meeting via uncontrollable transmission of impurity among the 
covenantal community. Finally, as showed above, the temporal sense is accepted in 
rabbinic literature. 
This study showed that Hebrew grammarians have proposed well-established 
rules in the area of grammar and syntax as well as the semantics of the verb ָטֵמא, which 
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are highly helpful to determine the most plausible meaning of Lev 15:31. The present 
study attempted to incorporate these rules onto Lev 15:31 and arrived at the conclusion 
that the instrumental sense is less plausible than the temporal. It actually results from 
significant grammatical, syntactic, and semantical irregularities. The temporal sense in 
Lev 15:31, on the other hand, does not collide with grammatical or syntactical rules or 
the semantic sense of the verb ָטֵמא. It has to be admitted that the temporal sense in Lev 
15:31 does not provide the way the defilement actually takes place, but just proposes a 
potential defiled state of the sanctuary in the future. However, the manner by which the 
sanctuary gets defiled is very explicitly specified in the Pentateuch (Lev 10:1–2; 12:4). In 
other words, defilement takes place through direct contact as a part of ָטֵמא patterns of use 
in the Pentateuch, as demonstrated in the present study. 
 
Interpretation of Leviticus 20:3 
Besides the understanding of stem, aspect, and semantic features of ָטֵמא, two 
issues challenge ADH in this text: (1) the meaning and function of the preposition ַמַען  ל 
that connects the first two and last clause, and (2) the structural and conceptual 
inconsistencies under the assumption that this law consists of two, instead of three cases. 
First, of two possible senses, purpose and intention, the preposition ַמַען  conveys ל 
the resultative sense in this text. It never conveys the causative sense in order to provide 
grounds for the interpretation that offering one's children to Moloch itself defiles the 
sanctuary, as the proponents of ADH imply. Rather, this preposition conveys the fact that 
offering one's children to Moloch results in defiling the sanctuary. As Brongers 
suggested, the best translation of it would be “the consequence of which will be.” This 
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understanding is in accordance with the understanding of piel stem, the aspect of the 
infinitive construct, and patterns of uses of ָטֵמא in the Pentateuch. As established above, 
piel brings a totally passive undersubject, without regard to the process, into a certain 
state. The infinitive construct acts as a finite verb in this text because it is transitive in a 
resultative clause. The infinitive construct is frequently used in resultative clauses in BH 
and, in that case, it is introduced by the preposition ַמַען  Finally, the well-established .ל 
pattern of ָטֵמא uses in the Pentateuch points to the fact that this verb always requires 
another helping verb to achieve its meaning. All these insights suggest that an additional 
activity is implied between the first two and the third clause of this text as the preposition 
introducing the third clause points to. Based on the established pattern of uses of ָטֵמא in 
the Pentateuch, that additional activity would imply direct contact between the idolater 
and the sanctuary through his/her coming to the sanctuary. 
Second, the structure of the law in Lev 20:1–5 faces significant internal 
conceptual inconsistencies if it is assumed that it consists of two cases, vv. 2–3, and vv. 
4–5. Cholewinski suggested the most detailed structure of this passage that assumes two 
cases. In that case, v. 3 represents the additional punishment to death by stoning in v. 2, 
understood to be either extinction of the lineage or punishment in the afterlife. Staying 
within the limits of this text only, the first inconsistency is the disparity of punishments 
for the same sin. That is, in v. 2, the punishment for idolatry is death by stoning, while in 
v. 4, it is either extinction of the lineage or punishment in the afterlife. Death by stoning 
is standard punishment for idolatry. A second inconsistency is that the people cannot 
disregard the idolater in v. 4–5, if they experience premature death in v. 3 as a part of 
God’s administering punishment upon them. Verses 4–5 are superfluous in this case. 
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Finally, if God punishes the idolater only when the covenant community does not, as was 
evident in vv. 4–5, then this fact points to the claim that God in v. 3, punishes because 
people do not know that the act of idolatry took place amongst them. These 
inconsistencies led scholars to propose that v. 3 represent the separate subcase of the law, 
implying the ellipsis, “if he does it secretly.” In that case,   ו is not used as a conjunctive 
“and,” but coordinative particle “or.” As Wells’ work on the law of testimony shows, in 
some BLs, significant details are left out, but yet assumed. In addition, the use of the 
phrase, “from the midst of one’s people,” as well as “from one’s people,” accompanied 
mainly with the verb  ָכַרת and in one case, the verb ָאַבד and another מּות in the Pentateuch 
convincingly prove that premature death is an implied punishment in those contexts. The 
phrase יׁש ַההּוא ָבאִּ  in vv. 3 does not designate the exact person mentioned in v. 2, thus 
connecting these two verses into one unit, but rather, it refers to any person who commits 
idolatry. This phrase is also mentioned in vv. 4 and 5, and it is impossible that the very 
same person is implied since v. 4 indisputably introduces a new subcase. Thus, יׁש  ַההּוא ָבאִּ
 refers to an impersonal, indefinite individual who commits idolatry. Cholewinski’s 
persuasive literary structure is not affected by the inclusion of the implied elliptical 
phrase ר  .ַבֵּסתֶּ
Accordingly, the understanding of the stem, aspect, and semantic influences of 
ַמַען along with the meaning and function of the preposition ,ָטֵמא  and structural and ל 
conceptual inconsistencies under the assumption that this law consists of two, rather than 
three cases does not support ADH. Verse 3 is a separate case in which implied ellipsis, “if 
he does it secretly,” resolves internal conceptual inconsistencies of a two-subcase, literary 
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structure, thus allowing the idolater to come to the sanctuary and defile it through direct 
contact since the covenant community does not know it and is not able to prevent it. 
 
Interpretation of Numbers 19:13, 20 
Building on the findings regarding the stem, aspect, and semantic of ָטֵמא along 
with established patterns of its use in the Pentateuch, this study suggests that an 
interpretation that more carefully understands the grammatical, syntactical, and semantic 
insights related to the texts in Num 19:13, 20 indicates that ADH is not textually 
supported.  
The piel stem of the verb ָטֵמא is factitive. It brings a totally passive direct object 
into the certain state without regard to the process. The perfect aspect is frequently 
utilized to convey result in future times as a completed state. The verb ָטֵמא is always 
accompanied by other verbs through which its meaning onto the direct object it modifies 
is achieved. Accordingly, these insights regarding stem and aspect utilized in Num 19:13, 
20 along with the semantics and patterns of uses of ָטֵמא in the Pentateuch do not support 
ADH. Rather, these texts speak of the result that will take place in the future. The exact 













LAYING ON OF HAND/S: A CONTEXTUAL APPROACH 
 
 
The third section of the present study explores the ritual theory that would 
correlate with findings on the meaning/function of the ritual activity of laying on of 
hand/s. This theory was primarily needed to offer a vocabulary, and to some extent, a 
conceptual framework that is necessary for interpreting ritual activity such as laying on of 
hands. The second part of the third section and this chapter is an evaluation of the 
arguments against the Transfer and/or Substitution Theory and suggestions of the 
arguments from the present study for its validity. 
 
Ritual Theory 
Establishing a conceptual framework based on approaches of the most often 
consulted scientific disciplines in ritual studies1 in order to apply them to the biblical 
ritual texts is not the goal of the present study. The trend just explained is articulated by 
Wright, currently one of the most influential scholars of biblical ritual texts, who 
 
1Since ritual is imbedded in the larger concept of human existence, the study of ritual is 
interdisciplinary in its nature and often encompasses multiple scientific disciplines such as sociology, 
anthropology, study of religion, literary criticism, study of theatrical performance, and psychology. 
Gorman, The Ideology of Ritual, 8; Frank H. Gorman, “Ritual Studies and Biblical Studies: Assessment of 
the Past, Prospects for the Future,” Semeia 67 (1994): 13, 20. Klingbeil added philosophy, the study of 
intellectual history, history of religion later renamed to comparative religions, and sociobiology. Klingbeil, 
Bridging the Gap, 23; David P. Wright, “The Study of Ritual in the Hebrew Bible,” in The Hebrew Bible: 
New Insights and Scholarship, ed. Frederick E. Greenspahn, JSTFC 4 (New York: New York University 
Press, 2008), 120. 
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correctly described the present trend in biblical studies, including the study of biblical 
ritual texts, in their quest for the conceptual framework: “Biblical studies thrives on the 
application of models and methods developed outside the discipline, especially those 
from the social sciences. This is particularly true in the study of ritual.”2 On the one hand, 
scholars of biblical ritual texts use the scientific disciplines that study ritual which are 
undeniably closely related to the study of human experience of ritual and as such can 
shed light on the topic. On the other hand, these scientific disciplines are established on 
the presuppositions that are opposite to the presuppositions found in biblical texts.3 
Accordingly, the biblical text is a safeguard from incorporating elements that collide with 
the claims found in biblical ritual texts, as well as with their broader literary context into 
the ritual theory of biblical ritual. 
Being totally opposite in its approach, the intention of this study was to identify 
data from the biblical texts that would inform ritual theory and recommend the meaning 
of cultic rituals in the Pentateuch. Biblical scholars usually create a conceptual 
framework based on some combination of multiple disciplines and then apply it to 
biblical texts.4 By establishing a conceptual framework based solely on biblical texts,   
 
2Wright, “Ritual Theory, Ritual Texts,” 195. Wright listed some of the most recent works that 
used the socio-theoretical approach that mainly focuses on the application of this approach to cultic ritual, 
specifically sacrifice. These are Gane, Cult and Character; Gilders, Blood Ritual in the Hebrew Bible; 
Gruenwald, Rituals and Ritual Theory in Ancient Israel; Klawans, Purity, Sacrifice, and the Temple; 
Klingbeil, Bridging the Gap; Sklar, Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement. 
3Klingbeil, Bridging the Gap, 23–44, especially 43. 
4Gorman, The Ideology of Ritual; Gruenwald, Rituals and Ritual Theory in Ancient Israel; Gane, 
Cult and Character; Klingbeil, Bridging the Gap, 23. 
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ritual texts for the particular mechanics of the ritual, and others texts for broader elements 
of a conceptual framework, the possibility of importing conceptual components that are 
foreign to the biblical texts or world view is decreased. 
The two ritual theories that the present research finds to be in concurrence with 
the method utilized here are those of Gorman and Gane. In his quest for the meaning of 
ritual texts in the OT, Gorman placed emphasis on the conceptual, ideological, and 
theological framework of Pentateuchal rituals. The present study also contributed in that 
direction, especially in regard to the concept of sin and atonement. Gane emphasized the 
sufficiency of biblical texts to provide meaning for rituals introduced in the Pentateuch. 
Both theories are based on Gorman’s and Gane’s doctoral research.  
In his doctoral dissertation, Ritual Dynamic Structure, Gane eloquently succeeded 
in preserving the biblical text as ultimate and decisive data for the elements of the 
conceptual framework for his ritual theory, regardless of a considerable inclusion of the 
insights from the comparatives studies5 and systems science.6 Two postulates of Gane’s 
ritual theory are that (1) ritual, as performed by human beings, consists of human activity 
and, as such, should be viewed as a human activity system7 and that (2) the texts, in this 
case biblical ritual texts, are the only and sufficient access to biblical rituals in order to 
retrieve their function/meaning.8 These two points are simple, but yet, foundational for 
 
5Gane, Ritual Dynamic Structure, 13–114, 199–326. 
6Gane adapted the General Systems Theory of Brian Wilson for examining human activity 
systems. B. Wilson, Systems: Concepts, Methodologies, and Applications (Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley, 
1984); Gane, Cult and Character, 7–9. For more details on systems of science, see George E. Mobus and 
Michael C. Kalton, Principles of Systems Science (New York: Springer, 2015). 
7Gane, Ritual Dynamic Structure, 26–35. 
8Gane, Cult and Character, 4. 
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the analysis of biblical ritual texts. The second point generated considerable debate and is 
presented in the following subheading before presenting Gane’s ritual theory.  
Wright, on the other hand, has recently articulated the three main issues that 
prevent the application of socio-theoretical approaches to biblical rituals. All of them are 
based on the fact that biblical ritual is not observable, but rather, can only be examined 
based on their textual representation. It is important to note that the basis for Wright’s 
conclusions regarding the ritual are cultic rituals in the Pentateuch which he clearly 
delineated from non-cultic rituals.9 However, the majority of the general claims that he 
made regarding ritual in the Bible cannot be applied to Pentateuchal cultic ritual which is 
explained below. These three issues are (1) insufficiency of the text to communicate the 
meaning of the ritual, (2) genre of the text, and (3) redactional work of the text.  
 
Insufficiency of Ritual Texts 
Wright claimed that the necessity for the data source for biblical ritual to be a text 
is philosophically and phenomenologically problematic because it includes the equivocal 
use of the term ritual in relation to its source, that is, the text. The term ritual is used to 
refer to both prescriptive and descriptive ritual texts. He pointed out that none of these 
two types of ritual texts is equivalent to the actual performance of the ritual itself, but that 
instead, they describe or prescribe the ritual.10 
 
9Wright stated: “It should be kept in mind that cultic ritual (as found in PH) is a sub-category of 
ritual. The cult includes practices and phenomena associated with temples or sanctuaries, such as sacrifice, 
holiness, purity, priesthood, and festivals. A student interested in ritual in the Bible broadly should look 
beyond the cult and beyond PH.” Wright, “Ritual Theory, Ritual Texts,” 196. However, he significantly 
resorted to the non-cultic ritual to establish his claims, such as Gen 4, 29; Deut 16; Job 29–30; Ezek 44:9–
17, rather than studying cultic rituals. Wright, “Ritual Theory, Ritual Texts,” 199, 213. 
10Wright, “Ritual Theory, Ritual Texts,” 197. 
 
620 
Building on this inference, Wright further postulated that “these texts, even the 
most detailed of them, do not contain enough information for a reconstruction of 
performances.” However, Wright himself responded to the unsustainability of this claim:  
Nonetheless, prescriptions for actual ritual performances (e.g., Hittite, Akkadian, or 
Ugaritic ritual texts) often assume and depend on the background knowledge of 
performers. They prescribe only enough detail to activate this background knowledge. 
But this is exactly the problem with real prescriptive texts. The more they seek to 
prescribe actual practice, the less detail they may contain, rendering them almost 
impenetrable in terms of sociological analysis. 
 
The fact that ritual texts assume a certain acquaintance of the ritual performers to 
the ritual points to the fact that the emphasis of the biblical ritual texts was not on the 
ritual performance, but rather, these texts were designed to carry out certain goal/s as is 
usually stated in biblical cultic ritual texts. Both types of biblical ritual texts, prescriptive 
or descriptive, sometimes lack essential details, but they rarely lack goal formulas. A 
considerable number of performance elements of which the performance act consists, 
beyond the prescribed or described account of them, rest on the participants/performers 
themselves of the performance act. In other words, they are not written down, but rather, 
uniquely involved and played out as properties of the performers/participants themselves. 
However, the prescribed or described account of the performance act conveys and 
contains the basic notion/message/lesson/goal. 
The same issue informed Knierim’s understandable doubt regarding the 
soundness of applying Victor Turner’s ritual theory to the biblical text: “Turner’s 
interpretations are the result of field studies of actually observed ritual performances. His 
text describes and interprets those performances. But while a prescriptive text about a 
ritual [i.e., like a PH text] will probably also reveal its hermeneutical system to a certain 
extent, it must not e silentio be presumed to be descriptive of actual performance, not 
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only because there is-as in our biblical texts-no evidence for it but also because even such 
description represents an interpretive distancing vis-à-vis the performance.”11 Also, … 
“the prescription of a ritual in a text is not identical with the description of an observed 
ritual, let alone with a performed ritual itself.”12 
Thus, Wright’s concern that “the distance of text, phenomenologically and 
practically, from actual performance is almost enough to thwart sociological analysis” is 
totally accurate. However, realization of this fact does not detain one from studying the 
ritual, since biblical cultic ritual texts were ideologically shaped to provide data for a 
theological analysis, rather than a sociological one. Thus, the texts, prescriptive and 
descriptive, remain the primary analytical sources from which a researcher obtains 
insights into the meaning and purposes of a given biblical cultic ritual. Instead of 
realizing this, Wright considered this as an insufficiency for extrapolating a full meaning 
of ritual texts: “In these cases, extracting or modulating aspects of theoretical approaches 
and application to biblical ritual texts becomes more the study of a literary motif in the 
text than of real-world social phenomena.”13 
Constructing his own theory upon B. Wilson’s profound study of human activity 
systems,14 Gane endorsed an apparent fact that ritual is “an activity system.”15 As Wilson 
pointed out, “the goal/raison d'être defining such a system is to accomplish a particular 
 
11Knierim, Text and Concept in Leviticus 1:1–9, 19. 
12Knierim, Text and Concept in Leviticus 1:1–9, 19–20. 
13Wright, “Ritual Theory, Ritual Texts,” 199. 
14Wilson, Systems. 
15Gane, Cult and Character, 12. 
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transformation through an activity process.”16 Thus, it is not the activities themselves that 
define the system, since they themselves are meaningless and prone to various or multiple 
meanings,17 but it is the goal that determines which actions are vital for accomplishing a 
desired change and how are they performed.18 These insights confirm that a sociological 
interpretation of the biblical ritual texts should be taken as a secondary tool in order to 
shed additional light on the meaning of the ritual, since these texts are not written from a 
sociological perspective with emphasis on the performance, but rather, are goal-informed 
and goal-shaped. The primary approach remains the theological one.19 In other words, 
God instituted rituals with certain goal imbedded in their textual representation. 
The claims Wright pointed to disclose that his goal in studying biblical cultic 
ritual texts is a reconstruction of the ritual performance which is a valid enterprise, but 
totally neglects the fact that biblical ritual texts were not written to be a “script” for ritual 
performance. The fact that insight into a given biblical cultic ritual is conveyed by the   
 
16Wilson, Systems, 16, 26; Gane, Cult and Character, 12. Gane found that this claim is in 
agreement with what is found in many biblical ritual texts. He pointed to one of them: “We found earlier 
that Lev 16:16 expresses the goal of special purification offerings: to purge the inner sanctum from ritual 
impurities and moral faults. The goal is to effect transformation (purging) through activities, namely, by 
sprinkling blood (vv. 14–15).” Gane, Cult and Character, 12.  
17Gane made a difference between pure activity, as Staal considered them, and intrinsic activity in 
his quest for the boundaries and meaning of the ritual activity. Gane, Ritual Dynamic Structure, 3–5; Frits 
Staal, Rules Without Meaning: Ritual, Mantras, and the Human Sciences, TSR 4 (New York: P. Lang, 
1989), 131. The first refers to the physical causes and effects only. Staal elevated the rules as a 
determinative factor for ritual boundaries and meaning. Staal, Rules Without Meaning, 132. The second, 
established by Gane, points to the activity that goes beyond the physical causes and effects. In other words, 
it refers to the task that operates at the cognitive level and is a matter of belief. Gane, Ritual Dynamic 
Structure, 3–5. The same principle is also hinted at in Wright’s study of Hittite ritual. Wright, “The Study 
of Ritual in the Hebrew Bible,” 129. 
18Gane, Cult and Character, 12. Interestingly, Wright has found this to be operative factor in 
Hittite ritual texts. Wright, “The Study of Ritual in the Hebrew Bible,” 128. 
19For a totally different emphasis rather than theological, see Lester L. Grabbe, Leviticus, OTG 
(Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1993), 74.  
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text itself is an advantage since it preserves the critical function of a given ritual which is 
its goal, rather than all the absent secondary elements which are prone to modifications. 
Thus, Wright’s point that both prescriptive and descriptive ritual texts in the OT do not 
provide a full explanation of the ritual performance and are not subject to sociological 
analysis is well noted and undeniably accurate. However, this accurate assessment is out 
of context, since none of these two points stands in the ideological fabric of the 
production and the purpose of these texts. 
 
Genre Is an Impediment in Ritual Texts 
Wright also pointed to another issue that makes prescriptive and descriptive 
biblical ritual texts insufficient for sociological analysis: the fact that ritual is featured in 
various genres in the OT. He stated the following regarding the Pentateuchal rituals: 
As for the Priestly-Holiness writings in particular, the corpus has generally been 
understood to encode actual cultic practice at some particular point in Israelite or 
Jewish history or directly prescribe practice that is to be performed. This may 
misapprehend the genre. There are a number of indications that the portrayals of ritual 
in P H are academic abstractions or idealizations that significantly transcend practice. 
 
However, Pentateuchal ritual texts still retain emphasis on the ritual goal in 
various genres, rather than presenting themselves for sociological analysis and 
performance. Historical peculiarities do not necessarily include a significant amount of 
“hermeneutically transforming sources, creatively filling in gaps, and inventing events 
and details. In doing this, the writers no doubt built on the customs prevailing at the time 
of their writing,” as Wright assumed.20 Wright’s quotation raises the question of what 
ritual he had in mind. There is not a single ritual text from the OT he referred to that 
 
20Wright, “Ritual Theory, Ritual Texts,” 200–201. 
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demonstrates this source transformation, gaps filling, or events or details inventing.21 
Lester L. Grabbe correctly noted that the book of Leviticus does not provide full 
prescriptive/descriptive descriptions for a ritual performance in the smallest detail.22 
However, Knierim has proven that biblical ritual prescriptions are composed, in a way as 
to regulate the essential steps of valid performance so that the rituals can accomplish their 
intended purposes/goals.23 
Knierim delineated 4 points that expose the incompleteness of biblical ritual 
texts:24 
1. They do not include all actions that must, of practical necessity, be performed. 
The text’s presentation is selective and serves its interpretation of activities 
according to its perspective. 
2. They control activities at various levels of detail, often sketching flows of 
activities with broad strokes, without providing finer points of performance at 
the lowest hierarchical levels. 
3. The order in which activities are presented in a ritual prescription does not 
always indicate the chronological sequence of their performance. 
4. A ritual activity paradigm may be subject to adaptation in different contexts.25 
 
Gane subsequently importantly concluded the following: 
When the biblical text provides the overall goal of a ritual (e.g., Lev 4:31b), gaps 
in our knowledge regarding details of physical actions, such as the precise manner of 
slaughter or removal of suet, do not pose a serious problem for the interpretation of the 
 
21Wright, “Ritual Theory, Ritual Texts,” 199–202. He did describe Lev 25 and Num 35 as 
examples of “highly idealized, utopian, and impractical practices.”  
22Grabbe, Leviticus, 38, 74. Grabbe himself proposed that which is highly incorrect in the light of 
the fact that the majority of ritual texts contain explanation of ritual. Grabbe, Leviticus, 74. 
23Knierim, Text and Concept in Leviticus 1:1–9, 31, 65, 94–97, 98–106. 
24Knierim, Text and Concept in Leviticus 1:1–9, 89, 64–67, 90. 
25Gane, Cult and Character, 22. 
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overall function/meaning of the ritual, provided that we are content with the meaning 
supplied by the text.26 
Knierim recognized the difference of ritual interpretation when one studies a 
prescriptive text which differs significantly from the descriptive text of the same ritual 
and the fact that both texts differ from the interpretation of a performed ritual.27 Not 
realizing these limitations, modern interpreters of ritual text are prone to the danger of 
importing elements from their own world view into the interpretation of a given ritual 
that are not based on the actual experience of a given ritual.28 
 
Textual Redaction Is an Impediment in Ritual Texts 
This argument rests on two points. First, the presence of redaction strata in the 
Pentateuch presents its own way of how concepts and topics are portrayed. This issue is 
heavily informed by historical-critical presuppositions, and thus, it is more a matter of 
interpretation, than a valid argument. Second, the extent of redactional work in 
Pentateuchal texts is a subject of extensive debate and does not necessarily include a 
conflicting stance or direction on a given concept as Wright assumed.29 
The recent works of Yoel Elitzur, Ian Young, Robert Rezetko, and Martin 
Ehrensvärd have suggested that a sharp distinction between Classical/Standard BH and 
 
26Gane, Cult and Character, 22. 
27Knierim, Text and Concept in Leviticus 1:1–9, 19–20. 
28Gane, Cult and Character, 22. 
29Wright, “Ritual Theory, Ritual Texts,” 209–10.  
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Late BH suggested by Avi Hurvitz30 is not well argued and consequently, cannot be a 
solid basis for dating the biblical books.31 It has to be taken into account that this sharp 
distinction between two language strata within the biblical canon is foundational for 
understanding that the Pentateuch consists of various literary sources,32 and being subject 
to a totally opposite view, it cannot be taken as a valid argument. Young’s overall 
conclusion is that the different language strata suggested by Hurvitz were a coexisting 
style of language.33 Overall, the five pillars of Documentary Hypothesis and the 
hypothesis in totality have been heavily disputed in the past and continue to be disputed 
in the present, as well as.34 Thus, these two issues are rather a matter of interpretation 
affected by certain presuppositions than real textual issues. As soon as one understands 
that biblical ritual texts are created with a specific goal and first lend themselves to 
theological interpretation rather than sociological or any other, these issues vanish.  
 
30Avi Hurvitz, A Linguistic Study of the Relationship between the Priestly Source and the Book of 
Ezekiel: A New Approach to an Old Problem, CahRB 20 (Paris: J. Gabalda, 1982); Avi Hurvitz, “The 
Language of the Priestly Source and Its Historical Setting: The Case for an Early Date” in Proceedings of 
the Eighth World Congress of Jewish Studies, Jerusalem, August 16–21, 1981 (Jerusalem: World Union of 
Jewish Studies, 1983), 5:83–94; Avi Hurvitz, “Dating the Priestly Source in Light of the Historical Study of 
Biblical Hebrew a Century after Wellhausen,” ZAW 100.Suppl. (1988): 88–99. 
31Yoel Elitzur, “Diachrony in Standard Biblical Hebrew: The Pentateuch vis-à-vis the 
Prophets/Writings,” JNSL 44 (2018), 81–101. See also Ian Young, “Biblical Texts Cannot Be Dated 
Linguistically,” HS 46 (2005): 341–51; Ian Young, Robert Rezetko, and Martin Ehrensvärd, Linguistic 
Dating of Biblical Texts: An Introduction to Approaches and Problems, vol. 1 of Linguistic Dating of 
Biblical Texts (London: Equinox, 2008); Ian Young, “Is the Prose Tale of Job in Late Biblical Hebrew?,” 
VT 59 (2009): 606–29. 
32Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 1–13.  
33Young, “Is the Prose Tale of Job in Late Biblical Hebrew?,” 606, 629. 
34Umberto Cassuto, The Documentary Hypothesis and the Composition of the Pentateuch: Eight 
Lectures (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1961); Archer, Survey, 71–138; Moshe Weinfeld, The Place of the Law 




Frank Gorman has accurately noticed the lack of research regarding the 
conceptual, ideological, and theological framework of Pentateuchal ritual texts in earlier 
studies. In the past, these studies focused on the analysis of the texts by employing 
various approaches, such as literary criticism, form criticism, and tradition historical 
criticism, rather than on the meaning of the ritual. Gorman also noticed that these studies 
did not try to reconstruct the ritual system.35 In contrast, the work of Jacob Milgrom, 
Baruch Levine, Menahem Haran, and Gordon Wenham attempted to explicate the larger 
conceptual framework of the ritual system in order to understand it better. Their goal was 
to uncover the meaning of the ritual.36 
With a similar goal in mind and in order to contribute towards a fuller 
understanding of the ritual system as described in the Pentateuch, the present study 
focuses on two neglected yet critical components of the Pentateuchal ritual system: sin 
and atonement. This is not to say that scholars have not researched these two concepts. 
On the contrary, scholars have made significant efforts to understand them, as the present 
work demonstrates, but they often overlooked important nuances in regard to both sin and 
atonement. In addition, the scholars used methods that have been questioned of late, and 
for valid reasons. Therefore, this work attempts to pinpoint the weaknesses of previous 
studies on sin and atonement, especially in relation to method and interpretation, and to 
identify their impact on certain meanings attached to the laying on of hands.  
 
35Gorman, The Ideology of Ritual, 7. 
36Gorman, The Ideology of Ritual, 8–9. 
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In addition to Gane’s ritual theory, which deals with a variety of technical 
elements in an attempt to identify the meaning of ritual that the present work adopts, I 
also find Gorman’s work helpful in decoding biblical ritual. That is, Gorman emphasized 
the importance of the social context of the ritual, and thus attempted to form a system of 
beliefs that are helpful in identifying what the ritual achieves or what it communicates. 
Gorman affirmed that ritual is a form of communication. He stated: 
Ritual is viewed as a symbol system and rituals are viewed as symbolic statements or 
encoded performances that act out or dramatize an already existing social message. 
Ritual symbols have a referential quality that points to a meaning that exists outside 
the rituals themselves. In order to understand rituals, one must break their symbolic 
code and determine their linguistic message. Generally, this means translating the 
non-verbal into the verbal, the irrational into the rational, activity into language.37 
 
He identified four key characteristics of communication in biblical ritual. The 
basic postulate of Gorman’s ritual theory is that ritual “brings about a change in the state 
of being or status of one or more of these areas and/or to make a declaration about the 
state of being or status in one or more of these areas.”38 First, ritual affects the state of 
being or status of an individual involved in it, such as transition from one state of being 
or status to another. Second, rituals affect the entire society, not just an individual, and 
they are performed in order to preserve the well-being of the entire society. This point is 
reflected in the fact that there are two basic types of rituals in the Pentateuch that have the 
role of preserving or maintaining social well-being and reestablishing it when it is 
broken. The ultimate goal of the ritual is to prevent the breakdown of social order and 
 
37Gorman, “Ritual Studies and Biblical Studies,” 23. 
38Gorman, “Ritual Studies and Biblical Studies,” 37. 
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well-being.39 Third, biblical ritual affects the state of the natural world God created and 
its order, or in Gorman’s words, the cosmos. Through ritual, humans participate in 
maintaining the divinely created order. Fourth, ritual communicates how a certain social 
group perceives divine-human interaction. For example, the most developed ritual of 
sacrificial offerings always takes place “before God” or “at the door of the tent of 
meeting.” Therefore, sacrificial ritual processes are performed in the presence of God, in 
relation to deity. Gorman accurately emphasized that all four of these areas are 
interrelated and interdependent.40Moreover, Gorman noticed that sin and defilement are 
crucial in biblical ritual. Rituals are often enacted in order to maintain or restore 
situations disturbed by sin or defilement.41 
According to many scholars, Milgrom has produced the most significant work on 
biblical rituals in the twentieth century.42 In his analysis, he extensively used insights 
from comparative ANE texts, biblical texts, and Judaic sources. In addition, he has made 
significant progress towards a better understanding of the biblical ritual system in both its 
details and its larger conceptual structures and categories. However, his research did not 
focus on theoretical issues involving ritual.43 In contrast, Klawans has demonstrated 
various theoretical and methodological questions in relation to Milgrom’s work on ritual 
 
39Gorman, “Ritual Studies and Biblical Studies,” 37. 
40Gorman, “Ritual Studies and Biblical Studies,” 38. 
41Gorman, The Ideology of Ritual, 42. 
42Jacob Milgrom, Studies in Levitical Terminology: The Encroacher and the Levite (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California, 1970); Milgrom, Cult and Conscience; Milgrom, Studies in Cultic Theology and 
Terminology; Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16. 
43Gorman, “Ritual Studies and Biblical Studies,” 28. 
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and moral purity, and sacrifice.44 Consequently, although Milgrom’s work will continue 
to be valuable, it does not lack possibilities for refinement.  
Regardless of the recent advancements in the study of biblical ritual, no study, 
including Milgrom’s, has conducted a systematic analysis of sin, which is a basic concept 
embedded in ancient Israel’s religion. Furthermore, the topic of atonement has raised 
more interest among scholars but, as stated in chapter five of the present study, their 
research is mostly informed by insights from ANE texts. The present study offers an in-
depth study of both sin and atonement based primarily on biblical texts. 
The present study is essentially attempting to identify the meaning/function of 
laying on of hand/s on the sacrificial animal in the Pentateuch. This ritual gesture is a part 
of a broader religious context of biblical religion. As was established in the introduction, 
the present study focuses on two specific components of this broader religious context of 
biblical religion, sin and/or GHS which is human disadvantage in divine-human 
interaction and atonement. The former precedes the laying on of hands, while the latter 
follows it in the sacrifices defined in Lev 1–5:26 [6:7]. 
Therefore, the Pentateuch portrays human beings as inherently sinful, which this 
study refers to as GHS, and at times ritually and morally impure. All three features that 
the Pentateuch associates with humans are discussed above on pages 400–14 in the 
present work. In contrast, God is holy and dwells in the tabernacle.45 He is the one who 
shaped all aspects of ancient Israel with his laws.46 Consequently, such a disparity 
 
44Klawans, “Ritual Purity.” 
45Gorman, The Ideology of Ritual, 11. 
46Gorman, The Ideology of Ritual, 43. 
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between God and humans necessitates some sort of mediation in order to provide a 
context for safe divine-human interaction. Biblical texts assign this mediatory role to the 
ritual of offering various sacrifices. 
The offerer offers his/her sacrifice for different reasons to provide a context for 
safe divine-human interaction. For example, if a burnt or grain offering is presented, the 
offerer seeks acceptance. A well-being offering was offered for multiple reasons, such as 
thanksgiving (Lev 7:12–15), fulfilment of a vow (Lev 7:16), or freewill/voluntary 
offering (Lev 7:16). In the case of a sin or reparation offering, the offerer seeks 
forgiveness. In any of these cases, the offerer is always in an underprivileged state 
because of his/her GHS; therefore he/she needs to be atoned before God. The offerer's 
underprivileged state becomes even more deteriorated if he/she has violated any of God’s 
commandments. In order to identify the meaning/function of laying on of hands, the 
present study conducted a detailed study of both of these components of biblical religion, 
sin/GHS, and atonement. 
 
Roy Gane 
Gane further singled out 7 basic premises of his theory. He found solid textual 
support for each of these presuppositions. The guiding principle in Gane’s analysis was 
this question: Where does the meaning of a given ritual reside? Two potential domains 
are (1) prescribed or described physical activity or (2) the interpretation of these activities 
as found in the texts.47 The development of Gane’s theory showed that the 
 
47Gane, Cult and Character, 4. 
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function/meaning is to be found in the latter.48 
 
Ritual Actions and Substances Do Not Have Inherent Meaning 
Gane has recognized that Pentateuchal ritual texts confirm the fact that ritual 
actions do not have a fixed, inherent meaning. He relied on Staal’s work where he 
demonstrated that “a given ritual can have more than one meaning.”49 Pentateuchal cultic 
texts confirm this semantic multifacetedness of ritual activities.50 Gane detected multiple 
examples: 
In the outer sanctum of the Israelite sanctuary, the high priest sprinkles blood seven 
times “before the veil” as part of purification (חטאת) offerings on behalf of himself 
and of the community, respectively (Lev 4:6, 17). During the special Day of 
Atonement purification offerings he sprinkles blood seven times in the inner sanctum 
(16:14–15), the outer sanctum (v. 16b—abbreviated), and on the altar in the courtyard 
(v. 19). Although 4:6, 17 does not state the meaning of its sevenfold sprinklings, 
16:16a explains such aspersions in the inner sanctum as effecting purgation (rpk) of 
this area from the impurities and moral faults of the Israelites. Later in the same 
ritual, however, v. 19 attributes another meaning to the sevenfold sprinkling on the 
outer altar: to (re)consecrate (vdq) it. Thus, the same activity carries two related, but 
distinct functions in the same ritual.51 
 
Thus, the same ritual activity in Lev 16:16 and 19 have different meanings. The 
seven-fold sprinkling cleansed the sanctuary and reconsecrated the altar, respectively. 
Gane did not assign any particular meaning in this quotation to the first activity, 
the high priest’s sprinkling before the veil in Lev 4:6, 17, since it is not stated. However,   
 
48Gane, Cult and Character, 24. 
49Staal, Rules Without Meaning, 127–29, 131, 134, 330; Gane, Cult and Character, 4.  
50Rudolph González proved the this premise, also operated in laying on of hands contexts in the 
NT. Rudolph González, “Laying-on of Hands in Luke and Acts: Theology, Ritual, and Interpretation” (PhD 
diss., Baylor University, 1999), 6–7; Gilders, Blood Ritual in the Hebrew Bible, 10, 81–82. 
51Gane, Cult and Character, 4–5. 
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based on the fact that the sinner in both cases left the sanctuary forgiven and that the 
sanctuary in Lev 16:16 is cleansed “from the impurities of the sons of Israel and because 
of their transgressions in regard to all their sins,” ( ֹאת ֻּטמ  ֵני מִּ ָרֵאל ב  ׂש  ם יִּ ֵעיהֶּ ׁש  פִּ ָכל־  ּומִּ ל 
 one can conclude that in Lev 4, the sprinkling had a function of transferring the ,(ַחּטֹאָתם
sins involved in the atonement process to the most holy place. This would expand even 
more the semantic multifacetedness of a single ritual activity. I begin to introduce here 
and highlight later on the fact that the context of ritual activity also plays a role in 
determining the meaning of a given ritual activity which was also emphasized by Gane. 
Gane endorsed Staal’s insight that the meaning of the ritual activity is assigned to 
it from sources like culture or religious authority52 and made a profound statement: 
“Recognizing that ritual actions have no inherent meaning aids ritual analysis by sparing 
us the trouble of searching for some ‘holy grail’ of essential meaning and by keeping us 
from unjustifiably importing meaning from one context to another because we incorrectly 
assume that the function of identical actions must be the same.”53 
 
Ritual Consists of Activity and Attached Meaning 
Gane did not follow Staal completely in his understanding of the ritual activity 
meaning. Gane’s critique of Staal is directed towards Staal’s claim that, based on the fact 
that activities are intrinsically meaningless, rituals are meaningless, too.54 Gane proposed 
that “physical activities alone do not constitute ritual or set it apart from nonritual 
 
52Gane, Cult and Character, 5. 
53Gane, Cult and Character, 6. 
54Staal, Rules Without Meaning, 433. 
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activity.”55 He correctly insisted that there has to be some kind of meaning attached to the 
ritual that sets it apart from other non-ritual activities.  
Even if a ritual is “fossilized” in the sense that its meaning has been lost, the tradition 
of performing it as a ritual is remembered because at some time in the past it was 
believed to do something over and above the physical cause and effect of its 
activities. If an activity system was never believed to have any kind of “efficacy,” 
whether religious, magical, social, or otherwise, I would not regard it as a “ritual,” at 
least not in the full sense of the word.56 
 
Accordingly, physical activities and meaning attached to them are two basic and 
essential components of a ritual57 which necessitates that a ritual be symbolic in its 
nature.58 This symbolic nature of rituals was emphasized already in the first century BC 
by Rabbi Hillel.59 Gane correctly concluded that “in ritual a nonmaterial entity (e.g., sin) 
can be treated as if it belongs to the material domain so that it can be subject to physical 
interaction and manipulation.” 
The attached meaning for Pentateuchal ritual texts where one finds otherwise 
incoherent and meaningless ritual activities is found in the Israelite religious system. 
Gane delineated 3 basic inferences stemming from the Israelite religion as it attaches 
meaning to cultic rituals: (1) “the religious system can assign different meanings to a   
 
55Gane, Cult and Character, 7. 
56Gane, Cult and Character, 7. 
57Gane, Ritual Dynamic Structure, 18–23, 50–60. 
58Gane, Cult and Character, 7. 
59Zeitlin, “The Semikah Controversy,” 244. 
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given activity…,”60 (2) “a given activity can carry more than one meaning at the same 
time…,”61 (3) “different activities can carry the same meaning…,”62 and (4) “we are as 
dependent on a ritual tradition to provide us with meanings at every stage of development 
as we must rely on that tradition for rules governing performance of activities.”63 
In the context of an Ancient Israelite system of rituals, the only asset one can use 
to potentially retrieve a meaning of a given ritual is the biblical text. Pentateuchal cultic 
ritual texts themselves present God as the authority who prescribes ritual activities and 
assigns meanings to them.64 For instance, applying blood to the altar had no inherent 
efficacy and itself could be understood as an incoherent and meaningless activity. 
However, in the context of Pentateuchal cultic ritual texts, this becomes a ritual activity 
and the activity that is said to achieve atonement exclusively prescribed by God.65 In 
Pentateuchal cultic ritual texts, God prescribes various ritual roles to various physical 
objects which otherwise would not necessarily have them. God designated the outer altar 
 
60“For example, aside from the different functions of blood aspersions in Lev 16:14–16, 19 (see 
above), the suet of a well-being offering is presented to YHWH as an ה ּׁשֶּ –food gift” (3:3–5, 9–11, 14“ ,אִּ
16), but the suet of a purification offering is not (e.g. 4:8–10, 19, 26, 31, 35).” Gane, Cult and Character, 8; 
Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 161–62; Rendtorff, Leviticus, BKAT 3/1 (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchen, 1985), 
65; cf. Rendtorff, Leviticus, 3:188. 
61“For example, an officiating priest's privilege and duty of eating purification offering flesh (6:19, 
22; Engl. vv. 26, 29) can simultaneously function as appropriation of his agent's commission for carrying 
out a transaction between YHWH and the offerer (7:7) and contribute in some way to expiation (10:17). It 
is not necessary to argue for one of these functions to the exclusion of the other.” Gane, Cult and 
Character, 8. 
62“Thus a grain offering can function as a sin offering sacrifice (5:11–13) in place of a living 
creature (cf. vv. 6–10).” Gane, Cult and Character, 8. This particular point is based on Kiuchi, Purification 
Offering, 113. 
63Gane, Cult and Character, 8–9. 
64Knierim, Text and Concept in Leviticus 1:1–9, 6. 
65Rodríguez, “Substitution in the Hebrew Cultus,” 242; Gane, Cult and Character, 9. 
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as the place where the priests would apply sacrificial blood (Lev 17:11).66 The same but 
more limited function was assigned to the incense altar (Exod 30:10). 
 
Inadequacy of a Structural Approach in 
Identifying Ritual Meaning 
Two significant approaches of interpreting rituals are dynamistic and structural. 
The former “approach attributes the effectiveness of a ritual to the power of the particular 
symbols and actions of which it is comprised. The symbols themselves are understood to 
convey power and bring about result.”67 This approach does not correlate with the ritual 
ideology presented in the Pentateuchal cultic ritual texts. It tends to isolate the symbols 
from the larger context of a given ritual and diminished variety, richness, and 
ambivalence of many common symbols.68 
The latter is proposed by Jenson who found the dynamistic approach 
unsatisfactory. He stated the strengths of this approach: 
Instead of an atomistic approach, it is preferable to begin with the movement and 
structure of the sacrificial ritual as a whole, since this larger context should determine 
the primary significance of the individual symbols. symbols. The value of a structural 
approach is that it looks for patterns at the level of the complete ritual.69 
 
Gane agreed that “the advantage of such a structural methodology is that it takes 
into account the fact that rituals are hierarchical systems of activity in which individual 
activities are included and shaped by higher level goals to which they are intended to 
 
66Gane, Cult and Character, 9. 
67Jenson, Graded Holiness, 151. For more details on this approach, see A. Bertholet, Das 
Dynamistische im Alten Testament (Tübingen: Mohr, 1926). 
68Jenson, Graded Holiness, 151; Victor W. Turner, The Forest of Symbols: Aspects of Ndembu 
Ritual (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1970), 28–30. 
69Jenson, Graded Holiness, 151; Gane, Cult and Character, 10.  
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contribute.”70 However, the major strength of this structural approach over the dynamic 
one becomes its weakness in light of the fact that activities do not have an inherent 
meaning, as Staal established. Taking the ritual as a whole or certain part of it as a 
starting point for deriving its meaning does not make a difference. Gane provided an 
excellent example to represent this dynamic.71 The activities themselves do possess an 
inherent meaning. As established above, ritual system is an activity system, it is defined 
by its goal. It is the goal that separates a ritual system from other activity systems.72 
Jenson himself recognized that a structural approach cannot provide a full explanation of 
a ritual and a historical approach may be more appropriate when anomalies occur since 
“there is a conservative tendency in the cult to preserve actions and symbols when their 
original function has ceased.”73 In addition, symbols can gain a different meaning in a 
new context or the meaning of the individual symbol may transcendent the specific 
purposes of a ritual.74 
Gane claimed that the historical approach cannot overcome the weaknesses of a 
structural approach since diachronic information does not assist in setting the boundaries 
 
70Gane, Cult and Character, 10. 
71For example, suppose we observe a man washing his feet outside a religious shrine on a hot day. 
Is he (a) cooling himself, whether or not he enters the shrine, (b) making sure that he will not soil the carpet 
in the shrine when he enters, (c) ritually purifying himself preparatory to worship, or (d) engaging in a core 
act of worship? Even if we continue to watch the man's subsequent behavior, without knowing how his 
actions fit into his world view, we will remain unsure whether his actions constitute a complete activity 
system or belong to a larger activity system, let alone whether they are ritual in nature and, if so, what they 
might mean. How can we even begin to employ a structural approach, unless we import one or more a 
priori assumptions that invalidate our analysis from the outset, when we do not know whether we are 
looking at the top or the bottom of a ritual or a nonritual activity hierarchy? Gane, Cult and Character, 11. 
72Gane, Cult and Character, 12.  
73Jenson, Graded Holiness, 152. 
74Jenson, Graded Holiness, 152. 
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of the activity and its symbolic meaning. In other words, a diachronic approach would be 
effective only if the researcher were able to talk to the ritual participants, which in the 
case of ancient rituals, is impossible. The time element itself does not warrant a more 
complete interpretation of the activity system. Another structuralist, Douglas Davis, 
suggested that certain ritual forms provide meaning within a given context. He stated that 
“by contrast we presuppose that the form the rites took, their symbolic patterning, itself 
gives the meaning, though it is necessary to view the rites within the wider context of the 
idea of covenant as already indicated above.”75 Accordingly, the covenant is undeniably a 
conceptual element that provides a worldview of the Ancient Israelites. The covenant 
conditioned God’s presence among Israelites by the observance of his laws, especially 
those related to cult that regulated the ritual system. However, Gane rightfully noted that 
unless functions/meaning of ritual forms are not explained or understood, at least to a 
certain degree, a principal covenant context generally supplies a satisfactory 
interpretation of a ritual that conveys specific meaning.76 
 
The Meaning/Function of a Ritual Is the 
Goal Assigned to Its Activity System 
It is obvious that a ritual is “an activity system.”77 As mentioned in the context of 
Wright’s claim that the textual nature of a biblical ritual reflects its inadequacy as a 
source for sociological analysis, a ritual, as an activity system, is a goal-informed system. 
 
75Douglas Davies, “An Interpretation of Sacrifice in Leviticus,” ZAW 87 (1977): 392. 
76Gane, Cult and Character, 13. 
77Gane, Cult and Character, 12. 
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In other words, it is the goal, rather than the activities themselves,78 that determines the 
meaning of such a system along with the choice of activities needed to accomplish this 
goal. Gane accurately captured this point: “The goal defines the activities that are 
included and the way they are performed.”79 The hierarchical structure that is 
characteristic for any activity system is apparent in ritual, as well. A biblical cultic ritual 
consists of smaller systems that constitute components that compose larger, more 
complex systems.80 The prime importance of the goal is reflected at each hierarchical 
level of ritual activity.  
“In B. Wilson’s study of nonritual human activity systems, he points out that the 
goal/raison d’être defining such a system is to accomplish a particular transformation 
through an activity process. So, it is not the activities that define the system, but rather, 
the goal determines which activities are necessary to achieve the desired change.”81 That 
which sets ritual apart is the fact that it is “action believed to be efficacious” through 
“symbolic relationship” to some supposed transcendental reality. The goal defines the 
 
78Activity is meaningless and prone to various or multiple meanings. Gane made a difference 
between pure activity, as Staal considered them, and intrinsic activity in his quest for the boundaries and 
meaning of the ritual activity. Gane, Ritual Dynamic Structure, 3–5; Staal, Rules Without Meaning, 131. 
The first refers to physical causes and effects only. Staal elevated the rules as a determinative factor for 
ritual boundaries and meaning. Staal, Rules Without Meaning, 132. The second, established by Gane, points 
to the activity that goes beyond the physical causes and effects. In other words, it refers to the task that 
operates at the cognitive level and is a matter of belief. Gane, Ritual Dynamic Structure, 3–5. The same 
principle is also hinted at in Wright’s study of Hittite ritual. Wright, “The Study of Ritual in the Hebrew 
Bible,” 129. 
79Gane, Cult and Character, 13.  
80For instance, the activity of blood application consists of two other, pre-requisite and post-
requisite, activities. “An activity may be pre-requisite to another activity that fulfills the goal, or it may be 
post-requisite. For instance, slaughtering an animal (4:29) is pre-requisite to application of its blood to the 
horns of the altar (v. 30a), following which pouring out the remaining blood at the base of the altar is post-
requisite disposal (v. 30b).” Gane, Cult and Character, 13.  
81Wilson, Systems, 16, 26; Gane, Cult and Character, 12.  
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activities that are included and the way that they are performed.82 
 
A “Ritual” Is an Activity System with a Special Kind of Goal 
Scholars, biblical83 and from other scientific disciplines,84 have offered numerous 
definitions of ritual. The question of if and how a ritual should be separated from other 
human activity is still unsettled.85 The present study, with Gane, accepts that a difference 
between ritual and non-ritual activity does exist. Monica Wilson noticed that non-ritual 
activity, also called ceremony, “is an appropriate and elaborate form of expression of 
feeling, but ritual is believed to be efficacious.”86 Regardless of the fact that ritual is 
situated in a ceremony, the latter is not crucial for ritual’s effectiveness. Wilson also 
emphasized even more on the further difference between ritual and ceremony: “Both 
ritual and ceremonial have a function in rousing and canalizing emotion, but ritual, by 
relating its symbols to some supposed transcendental reality, affects people more deeply 
than a ceremony, which some will describe as ‘mere play-acting.’”87 Turner and E. M. 
Zeusse also affirmed these two characteristics of ritual: (1) belief that it is efficacious 
through (2) symbolic association “to some supposed transcendental reality,” 
 
82Gane, Cult and Character, 14. 
83Gorman, The Ideology of Ritual, 19; Gruenwald, Rituals and Ritual Theory in Ancient Israel, 2; 
Gane, Cult and Character, 15; Klingbeil, Bridging the Gap, 18.  
84Jan Plavoet listed twenty-four different definitions produced since 1909, starting with van 
Gennep, through 1991, with David Parkin. Platvoet, “Ritual in Plural and Pluralistic Societies,” 42–45. 
Klingbeil, Bridging the Gap, 14. Also see Catherine M. Bell, Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2009). 
85Gruenwald, Rituals and Ritual Theory in Ancient Israel, 1–36. 
86Monica Wilson, “Nyakyusa Ritual and Symbolism,” AA 56 (1954): 240. 
87Wilson, “Nyakyusa Ritual and Symbolism,” 240. 
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differentiat[ing] it from non-ritual activity or ceremony.88 Gorman also affirmed that 
ritual consists of symbolic actions and added that ritual symbolism derives its meaning 
from the cultural system of a particular human group or nation.89 Distinguishing ritual 
from a kind of sign language, Gane emphasized another element that separates ritual and 
non-ritual activity. That is, a ritual “is believed to do something that changes reality in a 
way that goes beyond the constraints of cause and effect that operate in activities 
belonging to the mundane physical world that are susceptible to manipulation by the 
performers.”90 Since the ritual dealt with in the present work is religious, as such, it 
includes a belief in a deity. God sought to be reached and communicated with in the 
Pentateuch, and the rest of the Bible is inaccessible unless he chooses to make himself 
accessible. Therefore, M. Douglas emphasized the necessity of incorporating so-called 
“non-Newtonian physics” in the scientific analysis scholars utilize to study biblical cultic 
ritual. This is needed due to the fact that God is presented as spiritual and thus non-
corporeal, which assumes that he is omnipresent, invisible, and possessing the knowledge 
of the future. These powers or attributes are not available to the human creature, but God 
can bestow some of them to certain humans.91 
 
88Victor W. Turner, The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure, LHML (New York: Aldine 
de Gruyter, 1995), 105–6; E. M. Zeusse, “Ritual,” ER 12:7833. For a further debate on the difference 
between ritual and non-ritual activity, see Ronald L. Grimes, Ritual Criticism: Case Studies in Its Practice, 
Essays on Its Theory, SCR 52 (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1990), 12; David P. 
Wright, Ritual in Narrative: The Dynamics of Feasting, Mourning, and Retaliation Rites in the Ugaritic 
Tale of Aqhat (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2001), 12–14; Bell, Ritual Theory, 74, 90–91. 
89Gorman, The Ideology of Ritual, 22–23. 
90Gane, Cult and Character, 15. 




Gane eloquently noticed another dimension of biblical cultic ritual. Regardless of 
the interrelated and complex relationship between biblical ritual texts and their system of 
beliefs articulated in the Bible to the extent that it may be believed that a ritual enactment 
affects states of individual, society, cosmos, and deity, as Gorman proposed,92 Gane 
emphasized that ritual effects result from the interaction with the otherworldly. He stated 
that “not only is its meaning acted out as potent dramatic expression, it is also believed to 
result in transformation that nonritual activity cannot achieve.”93 As an example of this, 
Gane referred to the sin offering that purges the Pentateuchal sanctuary. The ritual goal in 
this context is not achieved by the natural physical result of its activities. More precisely, 
applying the blood to the parts of the sanctuary physically does not cleanse it, but on the 
contrary, makes it physically dirtier. Gane put it as follows: 
Non-physical pollution, consisting of ritual impurities and moral faults, is purged 
from the sanctuary of supramundane YHWH on behalf of the Israelites (vv. 16, 18–
19, 33). While the activities themselves do not produce this goal through physical 
cause and effect as they would be expected to in ordinary life, they serve as a vehicle 
for transformation that takes place on the level of symbolic meaning.94 
 
Thus, the symbolism of these activities that achieved the goal of the sin offering 
was integrated in the conceptual system that required belief. The effectiveness of ritual 
and its rules assumed a belief in God’s existence, the fact that the pollution that needed to 
be removed was real, and that prescribed ritual actions do carry out the desired 
transformation.95 
 
92Gorman, The Ideology of Ritual, 37–38. 
93Gane, Cult and Character, 17. 
94Gane, Cult and Character, 17. 
95Gane, Cult and Character, 17. 
 
643 
The Aid of Systems Theory Concepts in the 
Interpretation of Israelite Rituals 
In his doctoral research, Christopher E. Queen explored the period of the history 
of religious studies when it was believed that the “’science of religion,’ 
Religionwissenschaft, as Max Miller and his early disciples chose to call it,”96 would 
emerge with its own distinctive methodology and establish theoretical principles. He 
noted that these unrealistic expectations started to fade away during the 1970s. The major 
agreement recognized among the scholars of the time was that “the study of religion is an 
interdisciplinary enterprise which cannot afford to exclude contributions from any 
quarter.”97 This agreement originated from the fact that religion itself is a complex 
phenomenon as Ninian Smith accurately described it: 
[T]he study of religions is in principle multi-dimensional — dealing not just with 
doctrines and myths, but also with rituals, experiences, institutions, ethics, 
iconography and so on. Maybe a major focus will be on texts, though this has been an 
exaggerated emphasis in the past. A consequence of all this is the need to study the 
dimensions of religion via various disciplines — history, philology, sociology, 
anthropology, history of ideas, art history, psychology of religion, and so on. Thus the 
study of religion is in principle multi-disciplinary.98 
 
Since then, various methods and theoretical principles were employed in the study 
of religion and always with their own deficiencies. Queen delineated four major methods: 
(1) personalism, (2) functionalism, (3) historicism, and (4) reductionism.99 Queen found 
that the general system theory, which Gane modified to suit his project of studying the 
 
96Christopher Scott Queen, “Systems Theory in Religious Studies: A Methodological Critique” 
(PhD diss., Boston University, 1986), 275. 
97Queen, “Systems Theory in Religious Studies,” 275. 
98Queen, “Systems Theory in Religious Studies,” 275–76. 
99Queen, “Systems Theory in Religious Studies,” 11, 68–237, 247–51. 
 
644 
rituals, transcends disciplinary boundaries via its thematization by the four principles, the 
principle of integration, adaptation, emergence, and hierarchy. He concluded that 
each of these principles — Integration, Adaptation, Emergence, and Hierarchy — has 
been interpreted as an “invariant” characteristic of open systems at all levels of the 
natural-cognitive hierarchy. Each of these principles may be applied, with valuable 
results, we have argued, to the resolution of methodological problems which bedevil 
the social sciences, the humanities, and religious studies: personalism, functionalism, 
historicism, and reductionism. Each of the systems principles may be seen as a 
theoretical foundation or context for certain specialties which constitute the 
interdisciplinary field of religious studies and theology: phenomenology and 
hermeneutics (Integration), the social sciences as they are applied to religion 
(Adaptation), the comparative history of religions (Emergence), and the philosophy of 
religion and systematic theology (Hierarchy).100 
 
However, Queen warned “that each of the systems principles—and by 
implication, each of the respective subdisciplines of religious studies and theology—is 
susceptible to distortion by overemphasis.”101 Thus, grounding one’s methodological 
approach and theoretical principles upon the general systems theory, as Gane did, with 
the awareness of potential distortions caused by overemphasis, should supplement 
understanding of biblical cultic ritual preserved in the limited textual form. Queen’s final 
remark regarding the role of systems theory in religious studies favors its responsible use: 
The contribution of systems theory in religious studies, both in its experiments and 
applications to date, and in its heuristic potential for future development, lies in its 
unique ability to integrate the findings of many disciplines, to respect the worlds of 
meaning which they purvey, and to place all of this in a non-dogmatic, but irreducible 
Context that is the source of religious experience.102 
 
 
100Queen, “Systems Theory in Religious Studies,” 282. 
101Queen, “Systems Theory in Religious Studies,” 282. The overemphasis by each principle is 
reflected in the following way: Integration-solipsism and/or idealism, Adaptation-behaviorism and/or 
determinism, Emergence-optimism and/or utopianism, Hierarchy-totalitarianism and/or mysticism. Queen, 
“Systems Theory in Religious Studies,” 283. For more in-depth explanation of the overemphasis see 
Queen, “Systems Theory in Religious Studies,” 283–94. 
102Queen, “Systems Theory in Religious Studies,” 294. 
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Gane’s extensive use of the general systems theory in his dissertation project 
shows a careful and responsible use of this theory in his quest to understand the biblical 
cultic ritual. Gane delineated 6 prominent properties of ritual activity systems as a result 
of his utilization of the general systems theory in his analysis of ritual: (1) a function or a 
ritual is equal to its meaning and is achieved by carrying out its goal of transformation. 
Both the goal and the function/meaning of the ritual are supplied by the text. This is the 
basic function of biblical cultic ritual, even though others like the social are certainly 
involved. As I emphasized above, this is the key one;103 (2) by being its driving force, the 
goal defines the ritual and its boundaries since the ritual activities contributed to its 
goal;104 (3) ritual brings out a physical transformation which supersedes the natural 
physical results, but rather, is a vehicle for achieving a higher level of transformation;105 
(4) ritual efficacy and rules assume the acceptance of religious belief into which a ritual 
is integrated. The ritual system of Ancient Israel interacts with the wider conceptual and 
cultural environment of Israel’s society. Thus, biblical cultic ritual is a part of Israelite 
religion instituted by God;106 (5) ritual is hierarchically structured, encompassing smaller   
 
103Gane, Cult and Character, 19–20; Gruenwald, Rituals and Ritual Theory in Ancient Israel, 
198–99.  
104Gane, Cult and Character, 19–20; Gane, Ritual Dynamic Structure, 34–5, 60–1, 92–6; Wilson, 
Systems, 26–31. 
105Gane, Cult and Character, 19–20; Wilson, Systems, 15–16, 25–42; Gane, Ritual Dynamic 
Structure, 33–49, 60–61. 
106Gane, Cult and Character, 19–20; Julia M. Norlin and Wayne A. Chess, Human Behavior and 
the Social Environment: Social Systems Theory, 3rd ed. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1997), 31–33.  
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systems that constitute it.107 These smaller systems are distinct108 and the ritual as a 
whole achieves its goal only if performed in its entirety in a proper order:109 and (6) The 
importance of the goal is translated into the smaller systems which also bring about 
transformation.110 
Some of them were identified prior to Gane’s work, while some were introduced 
by him.111 Gane used a potential problematic statement112 in Lev 16:25 to show the 
presence of these properties in one ritual sequence. That is, it states that the high priest is 
to burn the suet of the sin offering, expressed in the singular, regardless of the fact that 
two sin offerings are assumed in this text. The collective nature of the noun “suet” refers 
to the complex of actions consisting of both sacrifices, separate and smaller ritual system 
activities, that are interwoven and subsequently merged when their blood was 
simultaneously applied to the sacrificial altar (vv. 18–19). Thus, “the singular simply 
acknowledges the unity at a higher level of systems hierarchy.”113   
 
107Gane, Cult and Character, 20; Staal, Rules Without Meaning, 101. For a more general 
perspective on ritual hierarchy, see John P. Van Gigch, Applied General Systems Theory, 2nd ed. (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1978), 66. 
108Gane, Cult and Character, 20; Norlin and Chess, Human Behavior and the Social Environment, 
31.  
109Gane, Cult and Character, 20. 
110Gane, Ritual Dynamic Structure, 37–38, 42–48; Wilson, Systems, 31–35. 
111Gane, Cult and Character, 19–20. 
112Gane, Cult and Character, 20; Noth, Leviticus, 126; Ellinger, Leviticus, 216.  
113Gane, Cult and Character, 20. 
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The Biblical Text Provides Instructions for Physical 
Performance and Interpretations of Activities 
Since scholars began studying biblical ritual texts more intensively after the 
1950s, some crucial characteristics of these texts emerged. David W. Baker compared 
Lev 1–7 to the Punic Marseille and Carthage Tariffs114 and suggested that ritual texts in 
general belong to the universal genre of procedural texts previously established by Robert 
E. Longacre.115 Longacre established the fact that the two key characteristics of these 
texts are (1) prescription, and (2) a chronological framework, and as a result, these texts 
are goal-oriented.116 I agree with Gane, who suggested that all biblical ritual texts are 
goal-oriented. Baruch Levine and William W. Hallo have delineated two basic ritual text 
types in the OT, prescriptive and descriptive, the former telling how rituals ought to be 
done, and the latter, how ritual performances were actually performed.117 The prescriptive 
texts generally begin with conditional clause followed by clauses governed by the verbs 
in perfect consecutive or imperfect aspect. The descriptive texts usually begin with the 
verbs in imperfect consecutive or perfect aspect, referring to the sequence of activities 
performed at one point in time.118 
Building on the previous works, Knierim showed a more precise literary 
classification of biblical ritual texts by identifying a subgenre of procedural law, namely   
 
114Baker, “Leviticus 1–7,” 189. 
115Longacre, An Anatomy of Speech Notions, 197–231, especially 199–206. 
116Baker, “Leviticus 1–7,” 192–93. 
117Levine, “Descriptive Tabernacle,” 307–18; Hallo, “Offerings to the Temple Gates at Ur,” 17–
58; Baker, “Leviticus 1–7,” 193; Rainey, “The Order of Sacrifices,” 485–98; Gane, Cult and Character, 21.  
118Rainey, “The Order of Sacrifices,” 495. 
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“case law.” He also suggested that the purpose of the texts that utilized case law genre is 
to standardize the vital steps of ritual performance in order to achieve the intended 
purpose/s.119 Again, Knierim is one more scholar who noticed that the key component of 
biblical ritual text is the goal which is so important that it determines the structure of 
these texts.120 
Gary Anderson affirmed that biblical ritual texts contain the instructions for 
physical performance of activities,121 but also noticed that they also contain the 
interpreted goals of these activities.122 Knierim accurately suggested that “we speak about 
the writers’ transformation of a concept into a text, not into an action, and interpret the 
concept of an observed text, not of an observed performance.”123 He made a difference 
between the textual representation of a prescribed ritual and a description of an observed 
ritual which increases even more as one is involved in a ritual performance.124 Gane’s 
warning that not realizing these limits in a ritual analysis increases the possibility of 
importing “a priori elements from our own world view into our interpretation of ritual 
meaning” is well taken. The interpretation of a given ritual, represented by either 
prescriptive or descriptive text, by a ritual text is crucial in order to determine its 
meaning. 
 
119Knierim, Text and Concept in Leviticus 1:1–9, 31, 65, 94–97, 98–106. Gorman, The Ideology of 
Ritual, 25–27. 
120Knierim, Text and Concept in Leviticus 1:1–9, 89, 64–67, 90. 
121Anderson, “Sacrifice,” 5:884. 
122Anderson, “Sacrifice,” 5:883. 
123Gane, Cult and Character, 23; Knierim, Text and Concept in Leviticus 1:1–9, 17–18. 
124Gane, Cult and Character, 23; Knierim, Text and Concept in Leviticus 1:1–9, 19–20. 
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Gaps: The Peculiarity of Ritual Texts 
Scholars noted that biblical ritual texts contain conceptual “gaps.”125 In the 
context of biblical ritual texts, the conceptual “gaps” refer to the lack/silence of texts 
regarding the meaning of certain ritual activities expressed in them or omission/s of 
certain ritual activities that should be included in certain rituals. Gilders especially 
emphasized and dealt with this peculiarity of biblical ritual texts and suggested a simple, 
but yet not precisely defined solution. He stated that when a reader encounters gaps, “the 
interpreter must fill gaps with information derived from other sources in order to make 
sense of them.”126 
He, being himself a reader-response criticism proponent,127 followed a known 
reader-response literary critic, Wolfgang Iser, who claimed that readers inevitably 
experiences “gaps” in the text they read and variously fill those gaps in order to arrive at 
a coherent understanding of the meaning of the text. Assigning this role to the readers 
assumes that they play a vital role in constituting the meaning of any text.128 The critical 
question is defining the scope of the term “source/s.” Most of the time, the source/s in 
Gilders’ work is limited to the biblical canon, assuming various traditions and sources in 
the biblical text, or even biblical texts in its entirety.129 
 
125Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 816, 983; Gane, Cult and Character, 23; Gilders, Blood Ritual in the 
Hebrew Bible, 19, 22–23, 36, 58, 67, 183. 
126Gilders, Blood Ritual in the Hebrew Bible, 35.  
127Gilders, Blood Ritual in the Hebrew Bible, 9–10. 
128Wolfgang Iser, “The Reading Process: A Phenomenological Approach,” in Reader-Response 
Criticism: From Formalism to Post-Structuralism, ed. Jane P. Tompkins (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1980), 50–69. 
129Gilders, Blood Ritual in the Hebrew Bible, 19, 22–23, 36, 58, 67, 183. 
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This correlates with the approach in this study with two modifications. First, the 
present study does not accept the presence of various and multiple traditions/sources that 
biblical texts are comprised of. Second, this study set limits to the books of the 
Pentateuch in its quest to understand the laying on of hands. However, Gilders’ work 
shows that the term “source/s” also includes text outside the biblical canon, as he laid out 
that the situatedness of the reader of his “interpretative community” which consists of the 
works of biblical scholars who apply modern critical-historical methods to the biblical 
text.130 Rabbinic tradition is clearly one of the sources Gilders used.131 This part of his 
gap-filling methodology does not correlate with the presuppositions of the present study, 
since it attributes the biblical texts greater authority than all other useful sources to 
understand biblical topics. 
 
Laying on of Hands: Texts 
The gesture of laying on of hands was common in the ANE and Mediterranean 
context, including Ancient Israel, as a part of that milieu.132 The study of Egyptian, 
Mesopotamian, Greco-Roman, and post-exilic Jewish and rabbinic sources unanimously 
demonstrates that laying on of hands was used in various contexts with various meanings. 
Egyptian sources use laying on of hands to convey purification, resurrection,   
 
130Gilders, Blood Ritual in the Hebrew Bible, 9–10. 
131Gilders, Blood Ritual in the Hebrew Bible, 127.  
132Mattingly, “The Laying on of Hands on Joshua,” 24–172; Rodríguez, “Substitution in the 
Hebrew Cultus,” 20–74; González, “Laying-on of Hands in Luke and Acts,” 31–101; Clayton David 
Robinson, “The Laying on of Hands, with Special Reference to the Reception of the Holy Spirit in the New 




deification, empowerment, transfer, or sometimes, just as a method to transpose an 
entity.133 Mesopotamian sources contain multiple uses of laying on of hands.134 Ras 
Shamra Texts contain The Legend of King Keret, Plate 7, which points to the transfer 
meaning of this ritual gesture.135 In the myth of Inanna’s Descent, Enlil and Ninlil both 
contain the idea of transfer of sickness or misfortune to another entity.136 Laying on of 
hands is not included in these two texts, but transfer and substitution are. James Moyer’s 
dissertation demonstrated that the Hittite texts also contain multiple references to the idea 
of transfer137 and substitution.138 Some of the texts like the Substitute King rituals, the 
Ritual of Mastigga, and several healing rituals do not include laying on of hands. 
However, some rituals include laying on of hands that convey symbolical transfer, like 
the Ritual of Askhella. Moyer’s and Wright’s dissertation research demonstrated that  
  
 
133González, “Laying-on of Hands in Luke and Acts,” 31–40; Robinson, “The Laying on of 
Hands,” 56–61. 
134González, “Laying-on of Hands in Luke and Acts,” 40–43. 
135D. Winton Thomas, ed., Documents from Old Testament Times, HTB 85 (New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 1961), 118–21; González, “Laying-on of Hands in Luke and Acts,” 42–43. 
136For a more extended treatment of these texts and references, see Rodríguez, “Substitution in the 
Hebrew Cultus,” 21–4.  
137James Carroll Moyer, “The Concept of Ritual Purity among the Hittites” (PhD diss., Brandeis 
University, 1969), 56, 66, 86, 96–97, 127, 129, 133, 136–37, 140, 144. See also Wright, The Disposal of 
Impurity, 32–34. 
138Moyer, “The Concept of Ritual Purity among the Hittites,” 34, 36, 66–67, 86, 119, 135. 
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transfer and substitution were dominant ideas in Hittite and Mesopotamian texts.139 
Ugaritic literature contains examples of the Royal Substitution rituals.140 The concept of 
substitution was also spread in Babylonian and Assyrian religion.141 
In Classical Greco-Roman sources, laying on of hands was employed in healing 
rites, conveying a blessing, giving a charge, or stating a curse, in sacrificial rites, as well 
as in a few other contexts.142 In post-exilic Jewish and rabbinic sources, laying on of 
hands was used to convey ordination, transfer, blessing, and healing.143 
As indicated in the introduction, the focus of the present study is to identify the 
meaning/function of this gesture in the Pentateuch. The phrase ָיד ָסַמְך  appears twenty-
two times in the Pentateuch,144 mainly in cultic contexts. Being performed in the cultic 
context does not imply the same meaning of this gesture. Table 26 shows twenty-two 
occurrences of the laying on of hands. 
It is inevitable that some sort of relationship is envisaged in the gesture of laying 
on of hands. Kiuchi has correctly stated that “it appears natural to assume that the  
 
139Moyer, “The Concept of Ritual Purity among the Hittites”; Wright, The Disposal of Impurity. 
140For a more in-depth analysis of these texts with references, see Rodríguez, “Substitution in the 
Hebrew Cultus,” 21–73; Robinson, “The Laying on of Hands,” 56–61. 
141S. H. Hooke, “The Theory and Practice of Substitution,” VT 2 (1952); Wright, The Disposal of 
Impurity, 37–38. 
142González, “Laying-on of Hands in Luke and Acts,” 43–51. For the contexts outside of these 
categories, see González, “Laying-on of Hands in Luke and Acts,” 51–54; Robinson, “The Laying on of 
Hands,” 43–56. 
143González, “Laying-on of Hands in Luke and Acts,” 73–87; Robinson, “The Laying on of 
Hands,” 61–72. 
144The remaining three occurrences found outside of the Pentateuch are 2 Chron 29:23, Ps 37:24, 






gesture expresses some relationship between the offerer and the sacrificial animal.”145 
However, the specific explanation of its meaning is found only in Lev 1:4 and 16:21. In 
part, Gilder was right when he stated that “the great variety of explanations of the hand-
pressing gesture again indicate the problem of trying to interpret an uninterpreted 
gesture.146 Various interpretations have been associated with Lev 1:4 and the latter was 
often excluded from the discussion due to its irrelevancy with the fact that the Azazel 
goat was not considered a sacrifice.147 
Two issues are embedded in identifying the meaning/function of this gesture. 
First, it seems that laying on of hand/s is missing in at least 5 texts where it is expected to 
be included (Lev 1:10–11; Lev 9, 16, 23; and Num 28–29). The second issue is the form 
of the gesture and its impact on the meaning/function of this gesture. Was it performed 
with one or both hands? Both issues, respectively, are dealt with below. 
 
Leviticus 1:3–4 
This text was analyzed in the context of ר פֶּ  with a different goal. Here this text is כִּ
juxtaposed with the texts that utilize the same topical, syntactical, and grammatical 
constructions in order to identify pointers that assist the meaning laying on of hand/s. 
Kiuchi affirmed Milgrom’s inference concerning the datival sense of the pronominal 
suffix attached to the noun ָרצֹון in v. 3. This is based on the valid analogy with Lev 
22:19–20 where it is stated that the same grammatical construction was used to highlight 
 
145Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 152. See also Gilders, Blood Ritual in the Hebrew Bible, 82.  
146Gilders, Blood Ritual in the Hebrew Bible, 75–76.  
147Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 152. 
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the same points. That is, the burnt offering will be accepted if it is a male and without 
blemish, ם כֶּ ֹצנ  ר  ים לִּ ָזָכר ָּתמִּ , in v. 19, or it should not be offered if it has blemish since it 
will not be accepted on the behalf of the offerer, י־לֹא ָרצֹון כִּ יֶּה ל  ה  ם יִּ ָלכֶּ , in v. 20. The noun 
accompanied with the pronominal suffix refers to the offerer in these texts, as well as in 
Lev 1:3.148 
He also noted that the verbal forms of ָרָצה are used in Lev 22:25 and in Lev 1:4. 
In addition to this, two additional points that connect these two passages are similar. 
First, both of them discuss the acceptance or rejection of the sacrificial animal. Second, 
both utilize the same grammatical pattern. Thus, based on the context of 22:19–25, it can 
be inferred that the meaning of the phrase ם ֵיָרצּו לֹא ָלכֶּ  in v. 25 is the same as the one in 
v. 20, י־לֹא ָרצֹון כִּ יֶּה ל  ה  ם יִּ ָלכֶּ , and due to exactly the similar grammatical construction, 
except that the verbal negation accompanies the verbs in Lev 22:20, 25, Kiuchi correctly 
suggested that the same meaning is implied in Lev 1:4.149 
Based on the contexts of Lev 1:3–4 and 22:19–25, Kiuchi’s proposal that ָרצֹון 
connotes the idea of substitution of the offerer with his/her sacrifice receives substantial 
textual support. The offerer and his/her sacrifice are considered as one. In other words, 
acceptance of the offerer is conditioned by the acceptance of his/her animal. The 
inference is that the animal acts as the offerers substitute. Both Milgrom’s and Kiuchi’s 
translation point to the organic and conceptual unity of Lev 1:3–4 via term ָרָצה/ָרצֹון. In   
 
148Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 158. 
149Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 158–59. 
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v. 3, the emphasis is on the offerer who will be accepted if his/her sacrifice is a male, 
without blemish, and offered in the sanctuary whereas in v. 4, the emphasis is placed on 
the sacrificial animal that will not be accepted if the offerer does not lay his/her hands on 
its head. 
The rejection of the offerer and the sacrifice are perceived as identical in these 
two verses. The substitutionary function of the sacrifice is confirmed by Lev 7:18 which 
states that “if any meat from a peace offering is eaten on the third day, the man who 
offered it will not be accepted (יב ֹאתֹו רִּ ה ַהַּמק   Again, the acceptance of the 150”.(לֹא ֵיָרצֶּ
sacrificial animal is tightly related to the acceptance of the offerer. If the offerer violates 
the rules regarding the well-being offering, he/she will not be accepted and as a result, 
he/she invalidates the sacrifice itself so the sacrifice is not accepted.151 The sacrifice is 
invalidated and consequently, rejected retroactively. 
Consequently, Kiuchi concluded: “Then the fact that the imposition of a hand in 
Lev 1:4a is mentioned between the bringing of the sacrifice (v .3b) for acceptance on 
behalf of the offerer and the declaration that the sacrifice will be accepted on his behalf 
shows that the meaning of the imposition of a hand is implied in ָצה ר  נִּ לֹו ו   ‘it will be 
accepted on his behalf’.”152 
Thus, the laying on of hand/s in regard to the burnt offering consists of two 
foundational components: 1) it facilitates the substitutionary relationship between the   
 
150Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 159. 
151Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 420–21. 
152Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 159. 
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offerer and the sacrificial animal and 2) it is a prerequisite for the offerer’s atonement. 
 
Omission or Abbreviation 
Some biblical ritual texts omit certain ritual activities. In the case of the laying on 
of hands in cultic contexts, it is consistently mentioned in the majority of contexts (Exod 
29:10, 15 ,19; Lev 1:4; 3:2, 8, 13; 4:4, 15, 24, 29, 33; 8:14, 18, 22; 16:21; 24:14; Num 
8:10,12; 27:18, 23; Deut 34:9), but not all (Lev 1:10; 7:1–7; 9:8, 12, 15, 16, 18; 16:6, 9, 
11, 15, 24; 23:8, 12, 18, 19, 27, 36, 37, 38; and Num 28–29). This calls for the 
explanation of its absence from these texts. One explanation would be that these texts 
purposely omitted laying on of hands because it was not needed in those contexts, while 
another would be that the texts rely on the previous established regulations of these ritual 
activities. The present study seeks to find a rationale for the omissions of laying on of 
hand/s in the texts listed above on case-by-case basis, taking into consideration the wider 
religious context of the Ancient Israel faith. 
Grounding his arguments on the understanding that laying on of hands/s has 
different meanings/functions—one hand conveys the ownership of the offerer over their 
animal, and both hands has a different meaning/function—Milgrom proposed that this 
gesture was not prescribed/performed in regards to public/communal calendric sacrifices 
because it was unnecessary. In other words, the owner was obvious, the whole 
community or the offerer holds the offering in their hands.153 The two exceptions are Lev 
4:15 and 16:21.154 In order to provide a rationale for these exceptions, Milgrom stated 
 
153Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 151–52. 
154Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 153; Gane, Cult and Character, 54–55. 
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that the latter is not even an exception since the laying on of hands was included in the 
ritual155 inasmuch as the laying on of both hands on the Azazel, which meant transfer, 
was included.156 The former is not a public/communal sacrifice, but was offered for the 
sins of “individual members of the community.”157 Milgrom’s classification of the sin 
offering in Lev 4:14–21 as not a public/communal one contradicts a realistic reason why 
it could have been offered, which would classify it as public/communal. That is, Milgrom 
himself envisioned that the priest’s sin in Lev 4:3–12 could affect the entire 
community,158 in which case, both the priest as the initiator of sin and the community as 
participants in sin were expected to offer a sin offering. On this matter, Gane rightfully 
questioned Milgrom’s division of sacrifices into private non-calendric sacrifices such as 
Lev 1–5 and public/communal calendric sacrifice such as Lev 16, 23; 16:21, 23, and 
Num 28–29. He suggested a simpler, but yet questionable solution of keeping the 
distinction between non-calendric sacrifices that require laying on of hand/s, in which 
case there would be only one, Lev 4:14–21, and public/communal calendric sacrifices 
that do not require this gesture (Num 28–29). This division compromises the clear 
distinction between private non-calendric and public/communal calendric sacrifices. 
However, Gane’s observations of the flaws of Milgrom’s division of sacrifices into 
private non-calendric and public/communal calendric are also not consistent. The current 
 
155“The hand-leaning rite is also missing from the Yom Kippur ceremonies (see 16:11, 15) and 
must be similarly taken for granted. Perhaps its absence there is to accentuate the special and different 
function of the hand-leaning performed on the live goat (see the NOTE on “he shall slaughter,” 16:11).” 
Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 579. Emphasis mine. 
156Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 638, 1023. 
157Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 153. 
158Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 231–32.  
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study suggests that the laying on of hands was performed in both private and public 
sacrifices which include (Lev 1:10, 9, 23; Num 28–29), but it was not performed in Lev 
16 for specific reasons which are discussed below. 
 
Leviticus 1:10–11 
The absence of the laying on of hands in this text never attracted the attention of 
scholars since it is obvious that Lev 1:10–13 is an abbreviated pericope and included this 
gesture. Milgrom’s reasoning regarding this pericope is in this direction. It is sufficient 
and well taken. 
The sacrificial procedure is repeated, but in an abbreviated form. The omissions are 
expendable or can be otherwise accounted for. The hand-leaning and flaying can be 
omitted because in the bovine pericope their prescriptions contain the word ʿōlâ (vv 
4a, 6a), thereby indicating that these rites apply to all burnt offerings and not just to 
the bull (Abravanel; cf. Sipra, Nedaba 4:6). The priest’s presentation, hiqrîb (v 5), has 
been incorporated into a new clause that has been added to the text (see at v 13). 
Finally, v 7 is deleted in its entirety lest one conclude that each new animal required 
additional wood and stoking.159 
 
 
Lev 1:14; 5:7–10, 14:22, 1 
Laying on of hands is never prescribed when a sacrificial animal was a bird (עֹוף), 
either turtledove (ּתֹור) or pigeon (יֹוָנה), (Lev 1:14, 5:7, 12:6, 8; 14:22, 15:14, 29; Num 
6:10). The question arises whether this is an omission, abbreviation, or something else. A 
bird was an option for offering in case of burnt (Lev 1:14), sin (Lev 12:6, 8, 14:22, 30–
31; 15:14, 29; Num 6:10), and reparation offering (Lev 5:7, 11). The fact that GHS is 
human constant disadvantage in God’s presence which was dealt with by the burnt   
 
159Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 163. 
 
660 
offering, and that sin was the primary problem that was resolved by the sin and reparation 
offering helps clarify whether the absence of laying on of hands in relation to the bird 
sacrifice was an omission, abbreviation, or something else. The most logical explanation 
was offered by Milgrom in his following quotations: 
“Finally, the absence of hand-leaning in the procedure for the ʿōlâ of birds may also 
be due to the same circumstance: the bird is carried in the offerer’s hands, so hand-
leaning occurs automatically (see the COMMENT on vv 14–17). Thus the hand-
leaning rite seems not to be required whenever the offering could be carried by hand, 
as in the cases of the ʾāšām money, the cereal offering, and the burnt offering of 
birds.160 
 
Milgrom’s explanation, also followed by Wright, assumes that the absence of 
laying on of hand/s in relation to a bird offering was not due to an omission or 
abbreviation, but rather, the offerer would hold the animal in his/her hand, thus perform 
laying on of his/her hand on it automatically. The present study accepts such an 
explanation as valid since on all three occasions when a bird offering was allowed, the 
reason was either GHS or sin and the bird sacrifice accomplished the same goal as when 
any other prescribed sacrificial animal was offered. Milgrom also noticed that “if a 
declaration accompanied the hand-leaning to specify the purpose of the sacrifice, it was a 
discrete, independent act (contra Péter 1977).”161 
Some crucial regulations that would normally apply to sin offering are missing if 
a sin offering was a bird, such as (1) requirement of an unblemished shape, (2) animal 
gender regulation,162 (3) the exact place of offering, (4) acceptance statement is missing,   
 
160Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 151.  
161Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 151.  
162Hartley, Leviticus, 23. 
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and (5) atonement statement is missing. Of all of these points, only point 2 requires 
further explanation while all the other points are not questioned. They are assumed to be 
binding in the sacrificial process regardless of the type of sacrificial animal. 
 
Leviticus 9:8, 12, 15, 16, 18 
It is significant to note with Milgrom that the eighth day of priestly consecration 
is not like the previous seven days, which served “as millūʾîm, the investiture of the 
priesthood (chap. 8), and the consecration of the sanctuary (8:10–12) whereas the eighth 
day serves an entirely different purpose—the inauguration of the public cult conducted by 
its newly invested priesthood.”163 
The sacrificial altar had a special place in the ritual of the eighth day. Milgrom’s 
insights are again valid. He noticed that the emphasis in this chapter is on the procedures 
that are directly related to the sacrificial altar: 
The concentration of the entire chapter is upon the altar, as demonstrated by the 
curtailed description of the sacrificial procedure, which omits nearly every rite that is 
unrelated to the altar (e.g., the hand-leaning) but includes every rite involving the 
altar, even the most minute (e.g., the disposition of the suet pieces, vv 19–20), 
climaxed by the unique theophany upon the altar (vv 23–24).164 
 
Based on these insights that are derived from the texts, the present study believes, 
with Milgrom, that the laying on of hands was performed in this ritual. Milgrom 
rightfully ascribed its omission in the text, as well as the omission of all other rites 
unrelated to the altar, to the intention of the writer to stress the sacrificial altar that 
 
163Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 571.  
164Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 571. 
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ultimately culminated in God’s theophany on it.165 Gane’s attempt to find support for the 
absence of laying on of hand/s in the calendric sacrifices in 2 Chr 29:22166 is challenged 
by the fact that this chapter is descriptive, rather than prescriptive text. In addition, like 
Lev 23 and Num 28–29, it is very abbreviated. 
This emphasis in Lev 9 is placed on the altar, which correlates with the 
interpretation of the consecration of the priest in Exod 29 and Lev 8, as seen in the 
present study, where the emphasis was placed on the priests. Like in Exod 29:36–37, the 
verb ר פֶּ  in this context would refer to the cleansing and consecration of the altar and the כִּ
atoning of the priests and people from their GHS (Lev 9:7).167 
 
Leviticus 16:6, 9, 11, 15, 24 
Gane proposed two reasons why the laying on of hands was not performed in the 
Lev 16:6, 9, 11, 15, 24 ritual. First, Gane built upon a valid observation that this text is 
prescriptive and not abbreviated as other passages and yet omits the laying on of hands 
on the burnt and sin offerings offered on the Day of Atonement. Second, Gane claimed 
that the laying on of hand/s is not needed since there is no ambiguity regarding the 
identity of the offerer in public/communal calendric sacrifices. The latter argument is 
based on the division of sacrifices into private non-calendric and public/communal 
calendric ones, placing the ritual of Lev 16 into the latter group. 
The present study agrees with Gane’s first argument and holds it sufficient for the 
 
165Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 571. 
166Gane, Cult and Character, 54n34. 
167Wenham, The Book of Leviticus, 148. 
 
663 
claim that the laying on of hands on the burnt and sin offerings before the sending away 
of the goat for Azazel was not performed nor needed. The second argument is not solid 
since it rests on the division of sacrifices that is unsustainable, as shown above in the 
subheading Omission or Abbreviation and discussed below under the subheading, 
Leviticus 23:8, 12, 18, 19, 27, 36, 37, 38 and Numbers 28–29. 
Milgrom, on the other hand, believed that the laying on of hands was performed 
on the Day of Atonement and “must be similarly taken for granted.” He justifies its 
absence from the text by the intention of the writer to emphasize “special and different 
function of the hand-leaning performed on the live goat.”168 The fact that the regulations 
of Lev 16 are prescriptive and detailed overrules Milgrom’s argument. 
It is important to note that the burnt and sin offering of the priests and people 
before the sending away of the goat for Azazel had a totally different function than 
regular, daily burnt and sin offerings, including the burnt offerings offered right after the 
goat for Azazel was sent away from the camp. It is clearly indicated in Lev 16:16 that this 
combination of offerings was primarily to remove sin from the sanctuary, which is never 
said for any other regular, daily offerings. Thus, having a totally different goal from other 
regular, daily sacrifices, this set of sacrifices on the Day of Atonement did not need 
laying on of hands in contrast to others that did. 
 
Leviticus 23:8, 12, 18, 19, 27, 36, 37, 38 
and Numbers 28–29 
Milgrom and Gane followed Tannaites’ claim (Sipra, Nedaba 4:2; m. Menaḥ.   
 
168Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 579. 
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9:8–9; t. Menaḥ. 10:9–10; b. Menaḥ. 92b) that laying on of hands was not performed on 
the calendric sacrifices offered at communal public feasts such as Lev 23 and Num 28–
29.169 Milgrom stated:  
The Tannaites exempt the public sacrifices from hand-leaning except for the bull 
brought by the ʿēdâ (4:15) and the scapegoat (16:21) (m. Menaḥ. 9:7). The latter, as 
noted above, falls into a different category of hand-leaning, and the former can hardly 
be called public: it is brought for the aggregate sins committed by the individual 
members of the community.170 
 
Gane’s two arguments for the absence of laying on of hands in Lev 16:6, 9, 11, 
15, 24 ritual, as discussed in the previous section, are also applied to the 
public/communal sacrifices of Lev 23: 8, 12, 18, 19, 27, 36, 37, 38 and Num 28–29. 
Regardless of Gane’s remark that laying on of hands could have been performed on 
sacrifices during the public communal feasts,171 he favored the possibility that it was 
not.172 First, Gane based his position on the fact that the gesture was not prescribed in 
relation to burnt and sin offerings offered on the Day of Atonement.173 Gane’s second 
argument stems from the understanding that the laying on of hands conveys ownership. 
The first argument is well taken and valid for the context of Lev 16, but is not 
methodologically sound to be used as an argument for Lev 23 because the Day of 
Atonement had a special and unique role within the sacrificial system. The second 
 
169Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 153; Gane, Cult and Character, 54–55. 
170Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 153. 
171“I have found no evidence that hand-leaning is required in calendric sacrifices. It is true that 
most prescriptions for such sacrifices are severely abbreviated (e.g., Lev 23; Num 28–29), which seems to 
allow for the possibility that hand-leaning was performed, even though it is not mentioned.” Gane, Cult and 
Character, 54. 
172Gane, Cult and Character, 54–55n34. 
173Gane, Cult and Character, 54. 
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argument is based on the interpretation of laying on of hands. 
However, the omission of the laying on of hand/s in the extremely abbreviated 
sacrificial regulations in Lev 23 and Num 28–29 does not necessarily confirm that the 
gesture was omitted. It is actually reasonable that the gesture was performed in both of 
these texts since the priests were the representatives of the people in public communal 
feasts. However, being prescriptive in nature, these texts rely on the previously 
established regulations in Lev 1–7 and thus, would include laying on of hands. 
Gyung-Yul Kim noted that other crucial ritual activities, such as blood 
application, skinning of the animal, and so on were not mentioned in these two texts, but 
it is impossible that they were omitted. In addition, Kim also noted that these texts focus 
on the sacrificial items in a very limited way and omit instructions for the sacrificial 
procedures.174 His arguments correlate with the proposal of this study that these texts 
relied on Lev 1–7 for their sacrificial procedures in regards to both offerer and priest. 
Based on the principles identified in the analysis of these texts in which the laying 
on of hand/s is omitted, I suggest that the laying on of hand/s was also implied in Lev 5:6, 
15–16, 18, 25 [6:6], 12: 6–7, 14; 15:13, 19, 25; 19:20–22; Num 6:16; 15:24, 27.  
 
Leviticus 7:1–7—Reparation Offering 
One would also expect that the laying on of hand/s would be included in the 
prescription for the reparation offering in Lev 7:1–7, but it is not. The exclusion of the 
laying on of hand/s in this sacrifice is because the reparation offering of a ram could be 
converted into a money payment (5:15, 18, 25 [Engl. 6:6]), which would be further 
 
174Kim, “The Hattat Ritual,” 107. 
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handed directly to the priest.175 In addition, the absence of the laying on of hands in this 
text is justified by the point of view. That is, the regulations in Lev 1–5 are written from 
the point of view of the donor, while the regulations in Lev 6–7 are written from the point 
of view of the priest.176 The laying on of hands is not mentioned in any of the regulations 
in Lev 6–7. If, however, a ram were offered, the laying on of hand/s would have been 
performed.177 
 
Form of Laying on of Hands: Singular vs Plural 
vs Dual and Pressure or No Pressure 
Along with the meaning/function, the form of the gesture has been a matter of 
extensive debate. One of the first attempts to establish the form of it is credited to René 
Péter who suggested that there were two forms of this gesture and that the form affected 
the meaning of the gesture.178 Péter understood that laying on of one hand that occurs 
only in sacrificial contexts refers to “identification of the offerer with the animal,” while 
the laying on of two hands appears in non-sacrificial contexts (Lev 16:21; 24:14; Num 
8:10 (?); 27:18 (LXX), 23; Deut 34:9) and signifies transfer.179 Subsequently, Wright 
produced the next significant study of the gesture with the inclusion and support of 
insights from ANE literature. He accepted Péter’s division of the gesture to the two forms 
that imply two different meanings, but he suggested different meanings for both forms: 
 
175Gane, Cult and Character, 54. 
176Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 117. 
177Gane, Cult and Character, 63. 
178Péter, “L'imposition des mains,” 48–55. 
179Péter, “L'imposition des mains,” 52. 
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This one-handed form of the gesture in sacrifices is best explained as ritually 
attributing the animal to the offerer; it indicates that the entire sacrificial rite pertains 
to him or her, even though others (priests and other auxiliaries) participate in making 
the offering later in the rite.180 
 
The gesture performed with only one hand conveys the offerer’s ownership of a 
sacrificial animal. It highlights the offerer’s ownership of the sacrificial animal over the 
other assisting participants.181 The two-hand gesture demonstrates who or what is the 
result of the ritual action.182 
Examining the sacrificial contexts, Péter and Wright noticed that the texts are 
consistent in using the singular, ָידֹו, which led them to conclude that only one hand is 
used in sacrificial contexts. They considered the forms where the subject is plural as a 
distributive plural, which means that each individual included in the subject lays one 
hand on the animal’s head.  
Recently, Calabro has challenged this theory and suggested that “the gesture 
uniformly employed both hands in the period before the Babylonian exile as well as in 
the Second Temple period.”183 Calabro found that this proposal is well confirmed by 
postbiblical sources184 which always used the plural of the noun “hand” in sacrificial 
 
180Wright, “Hands, Laying of,” 3:47. 
181Gane has also articulated the acceptance of this meaning: “In the Israelite sacrificial system, the 
cases in which the biblical text specifies leaning one hand on the head of a victim correspond to those in 
which the identity of the offerer, to whom ownership of the victim is attributed and therefore to whom the 
benefits of the sacrifice accrue, would need to be indicated.” Gane, Cult and Character, 62. 
182Wright, “Hands, Laying of,” 3:47. 
183David Calabro, “A Reexamination of the Ancient Israelite Gesture of Hand Placement,” in 
Sacrifice, Cult, and Atonement in Early Judaism and Christianity: Constituents and Critique, eds. Henrietta 
L. Wiley and Christian Eberhart, RBS 85 (Atlanta: SBL Press, 2017), 100, 111. 
184Calabro, “A Reexamination,” 109–10. 
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contexts.185 In proposing his hypothesis, besides the MT, he took into consideration the 
readings of the DSS and the LXX. The former witness contains texts of Lev 1:4; 3:2; 4:4; 
16:21; 24:14, and Num 8:10; 27:18. Regardless of being fragmentary, the possible 
nominal reconstructions follow the MT reading.186 The latter witness consistently follows 
the MT except in Lev 3:2, 8, 13 and Num 27:18, where instead of the singular, the LXX 
utilizes the plural of the noun “hands.” 
Based on this difference between the LXX and the MT in Lev 3:2, 8, 13 and Num 
27:18, Calabro suggested that the LXX variant reflects an earlier plural reading. This is 
how he explained this divergence of the LXX witness: “This textual variant in the LXX is 
not consistently carried through, and it could be explained as a sporadic attempt to 
harmonize the text with such passages as Lev 16:21; Num 27:23; and Deut 34:9, where 
the gesture is definitely two-handed. But it is also possible that the LXX variant reflects 
 
185Philo Judaeus’ De specialis legibus states: “Then the person bringing the offering must wash his 
hands and lay (them) on the victim's head. After this, one of the priests must take (it) and slaughter (it), 
while another holds a vessel underneath, and after catching some of the blood, he must go in a circle around 
the altar and sprinkle (it) thereon .... In the hands laid on the animal's head there happens to be the clearest 
pattern of blameless actions, and of a life not burdened by things that incur accusation, but rather (a life) in 
harmony with the laws and ordinances of nature ... so that as soon as he does the laying on of hands, he can 
speak boldly out of a pure conscience and say thus: "These hands have neither taken a gift to do injustice, 
nor (taken) the proceeds of robbery and greediness, nor have they meddled with innocent blood.” (Spec. 
1.198–204) 
Philo agrees with Mishnah: “All may perform hand placement, except for deaf-mute people, 
insane people, minors, blind people, foreigners, slaves, agents, and women. Hand placement is a 
secondary commandment, (performed) on the head and with both hands. (The animal) is slaughtered on 
the spot where hand placement is performed, and the slaughtering follows the hand placement in immediate 
succession.” (m. Menah. 9:8) 
The Tosefta and Talmud Bavli also state that two hands are included: “How does one lay (his 
hands on the sacrificial animal)? The sacrificial animal stands to the north, its face to the west, and he lays 
(his hands on the animal) to the west, his face to the west. He rests his two hands on the ridge of the horns 
of the sacrificial animal. He does not rest his hands on the sacrificial animal's back, nor does he rest his 
hands one on top of the other, nor does anything intervene between the (two) hands and the horns.” (t. 
Menah. 10:12"' b. Yoma 36a). 




an earlier plural reading.”187 Textual critics agree that the Pentateuch was the first portion 
of the OT that was translated into Greek sometime between the middle of the third and 
second centuries BCE. As such, it predates the Masoretic vocalization on the MT which 
took place roughly in 7th century CE. Accordingly, Calabro arrived at the conclusion that 
the LXX variant of Lev 3 which used plural hands represents the faithful transmission of 
the original reading. 
However, he dismissed the fact that all the other texts, 6/10 plus the LXX’s 
addition of “καὶ ἐπιθήσει τὴν χεῖρα ἐπὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν αὐτοῦ” in Lev 1:10 (Lev 1:4; 4:4, 24, 
29, 33; Num 27:18), use the singular by arguing that “the fact that other portions of the 
Pentateuch have the singular ‘hand’ does not represent a challenge to this theory, since 
our current LXX text is most likely a composite of the efforts of many translators, even 
within individual books.”188 However, a potential of the presence of multiple translators 
calls for equal treatment of all of them. In that case, there are more LXX translators who 
consistently followed the MT in using the singular of the noun “hand” than those who did 
not: 6+1/11. This includes instances that are distributed in the same chapter, like Lev 4, in 
the same manner as the instances where the LXX translator/s changed the singular into 
the plural are distributed within one chapter, Lev 3. The equation of 7/11 instances where 
the LXX translator/s consistently and exactly followed the MT nominal number strongly 
opposes Calabro’s suggestion. If all 24 texts that contain the laying on of hands are 
considered, the LXX’s consistency in following the MT number of the noun “hand” is   
 
187Calabro, “A Reexamination,” 108–9. 
188Calabro, “A Reexamination,” 109n19. 
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even greater. Accordingly, this argument is self-contradictory since even with the 
acceptance of multiple translators, within one book, the LXX translators still followed the 
MT in 20/24 places. In other words, the LXX translators followed the MT pointing in 
83.3% and did not follow it in 17.7%. The weight of the argument seems obvious in this 
case. Consequently, arguments to support Calabro’s theory that the LXX in Lev 3:2, 8, 13 
and Num 27:18 reflects original reading are insufficient. 
In 12 other texts where the verb with a plural subject refers to “hand” in dual (Gen 
27:23; 49:24;189 Exod 15:17; 17:12;190 30:19,191 21; 35:25; 40:31;192 7:30; Deut 21:6, 
7;193 34:9), the two readings never differ in the number of the noun, that is, hand is 
always plural/dual. There is a disagreement with the number of subjects in the verbal 
forms in 3 texts (Gen 49:24; Exod 17:12; 30:19) and in Deut 21:7, ketiv of the MT has a 
singular verbal subject, but qere has the plural subject. The difference in the number of 
the verbal subject gives room for further research, as some rationale was suggested in the 
footnote of the listed texts but the nominal number is always consistent. In analyzing the 
nominal forms of “hand,” when they are syntactically related to the verb 13) ָסַמְך texts) as 
 
189There is a disagreement in the verb’s subject number, but not the noun. Namely, LXX has a 
singular verb and dual noun, whereas the MT has plurals/dual in both words.  
190There are two syntactically related combinations of a verb and the noun “hand” in this text. In 
the first one, the LXX and the MT agree. They both have the verbal subject in the plural, and the noun 
“hand” in the plural/dual. For the second, the LXX has a plural for the verb’s subject, contrary to the MT’s 
singular, but “hands” are plural/dual in both variants. It is possible that the MT’s singular was not meant to 
refer to “hands” as its subject, but rather, to introduce a verbless clause, ׁש ַעד־בֹא ֱאמּוָנה ָיָדיו ַהָּׁשמֶּ , that 
states what happened after Aaron and Hur supported Moses’s hands.  
191The LXX used the singular for the verb’s subject, whereas the MT used the plural, but “hands” 
is plural/dual in both variants. 
192The LXX is missing the translation of this text. 
193The LXX used the plural for the verb’s subject, whereas the MT used the singular (q're suggests 
a plural reading), but the hands are plural/dual in both variants. 
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well as other verbs (12 texts), it becomes obvious that the LXX is meticulously consistent 
with the MT. 
Emanuel Tov noticed that number inconsistencies in the LXX can hardly be 
considered as the sign of an original reading because they can be explained as the 
presence of a variant or a non-variant.194 He added that distinguishing between the two is 
uncertain even if the retroversion is possible. A correct retroversion should not be 
confused with the originality of the readings themselves.195 Tov also concluded: 
Many of the changes in number in the translation derived from adaptations to the 
rules of the Greek language. Greek does not like combinations of a (collective) noun 
in singular with a plural verb nor, in fact, any incongruity of plural and singular 
forms. However, many harmonizations which were made in the LXX were also found 
in Hebrew manuscripts.196 
 
However, the comparison of the LXX and the MT in 53 other texts (Table 27), 
ranging from Exodus to Numbers, that contain the singular of the noun “hand” shows 
deviations by the LXX that does not fit into Tov’s description of LXX translational 
tendencies. 
As the table above demonstrates, the LXX totally omitted 11/53 instances where 
the MT used the noun “hand.” In the majority of those texts, the MT used “hand” 
idiomatically, as part of a phrase, so the LXX’s omissions in those texts are not a concern 
(Exod 2:5, 16; 10:25; 16:3; 24:11; 35:29; 38:21; Lev 25:14; Num 2:17; 31:49; 35:25). Of 
the remaining 42 texts, the LXX changed the singular into the plural 16 times, including  
 
194Emanuel Tov, The Text-Critical Use of the Septuagint in Biblical Research, 3rd ed. (Winona 
Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2015), 169–78, especially 169–70. 
195Tov, The Text-Critical Use of the Septuagint in Biblical Research, 170. 
196Tov, The Text-Critical Use of the Septuagint in Biblical Research, 174. 
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Table 27. LXX and MT singular agreement of 
 the noun “hand” 
 
 Reference MT LXX 
verb hand pron. 
suff. 
verb hand pron. 
suff. 
1 Exod 2:5 x S x x omitted omitted 
2 Exod 2:19 x S p x omitted omitted 
3 Exod 3:20 s s s s S omitted 
4 Exod 5:21 p s p p P P 
5 Exod 7:5 s s s s S omitted 
6 Exod 7:17 x s s s S S 
7 Exod 7:19 s s s s S S 
8 Exod 8:17 s s s s S omitted 
9 Exod 10:25 s s p s omitted omitted 
10 Exod 12:11 x s p x P P 
11 Exod 13:3 s s x s S omitted 
12 Exod 14:8 x s x x S omitted 
13 Exod 14:16 s s s s S S 
14 Exod 14:21 s s s s S omitted 
15 Exod 14:26 s s s s S S 
16 Exod 14:27 s s s s S S 
17 Exod 14:31 x s x x S X 
18 Exod 15:20 s s s s S S 
19 Exod 16:3 x s x x omitted omitted 
20 Exod 19:13 s s x s S omitted 
21 Exod 23:31 s s p s P P 
22 Exod 24:11 s s s s omitted omitted 
23 Exod 28:41 s s p s P P 
24 Exod 29:29 s s p s P P 
25 Exod 29:33 s s p s P P 
26 Exod 32:4 s s p s P P 
27 Exod 32:15 x s s x P S 
28 Exod 32:29 p s p p P P 
29 Exod 35:29 x s s x omitted omitted 
30 Exod 38:21 x s x x omitted omitted 
31 Lev 3:2 s s s s P omitted 
32 Lev 3:8 s s s s P omitted 
33 Lev 3:13 s s s s P omitted 
34 Lev 8:33 s s p s P P 
35 Lev 22:25 x s x x S X 
36 Lev 25:14 p s x s omitted X 
37 Lev 26:25 x s x x P X 
38 Num 2:17 p s s p omitted omitted 
39 Num 3:3 s s p p P P 
40 Num 4:37 x s s x S S 
41 Num 4:45 x s s x S S 
42 Num 4:49 x s s x S S 
43 Num 5:18 p s s s S S 
44 Num 9:23 x s s x S S 
45 Num 10:13 x s s x S S 
46 Num 14:30 s s s s S S 





48 Num 22:7 x s p x P P 
49 Num 24:24 x s p x S P 
50 Num 31:49 x s p  omitted P 
51 Num 33:1 x s p x S P 
52 Num 33:3 p s x p S X 




Lev 3 texts (Exod 5:21; 12:11; 23:31; 28:41; 29:29, 33; 32:4, 15, 29; Lev 3:2, 8, 13; 8:33; 
26:25; Num 3:3; 22:7). This is 38% of the occurrences. The LXX precisely follows the 
MT in the rest of 26 texts, 62%. The verbal subject changed along with the noun in Exod 
5:21 and 32:29, 2/42 or 4.7%. Contrary to the Tov’s description, the LXX followed the 
MT once in Num 33:3 even though the “Greek does not like combinations of a 
(collective) noun in singular with a plural verb.”197 Having proven that the incongruity of 
plural and singular forms in the LXX is even bigger than Tov presented, this adds even 
more: “As a result of these uncertainties, it is almost impossible to evaluate deviations in 
the LXX in many grammatical categories. Because many aspects of the translation 
techniques cannot be analyzed satisfactorily, no reliable variants can be reconstructed in 
these areas.”198 
Thus, Calabro’s proposal that the LXX reading of Lev 3:2, 8, 13 represents an 
“original reading” is dismissed in the present study for two reasons. First, of 11 singular 
uses of the noun “hand” in texts where this noun is syntactically related to the verb ָסַמְך, 
the LXX and the MT agree in 6/11. In addition, the singular “hand” is used in a clause 
 
197Tov, The Text-Critical Use of the Septuagint in Biblical Research, 174. 
198Tov, The Text-Critical Use of the Septuagint in Biblical Research, 170. 
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included in the LXX and not in the MT (Lev 1:14), which is a total of 7/11 times (i.e., 
63%). 
Second, when the singular of the noun “hand” is analyzed, the LXX follows the 
MT in 26/42 occurrences, 62% (the MT contains 11 more occurrences which are 
excluded, since the LXX omitted the singular of the noun “hand,” in the process of 
translating the phrases). The LXX changed the singular to the plural in 16/42 
occurrences, 38%. 
Third, the LXX and the MT are in total agreement in their use of the plural of the 
noun “hand.” This agreement is present in all 13 texts where the verb ָסַמְך is syntactically 
related to the plural of the noun “hand.” It also translates to 12 more texts where verbs 
other than  are syntactically related to the plural of the noun “hand,” that is, the LXX  ָסַמְך
and the MT agree in all texts. 
Calabro stated that “of course, neither of these observations constitutes proof that 
hand placement in the biblical period always involved two hands and not one.”199 This 
statement is confirmed by the analysis presented in the present study. The three points 
above show that Calabro’s proposal is not sustainable in the present form. Based on the 
nature of its inadequacies the present study reasons that further research will not change 
this. 
Going beyond the textual criticism arguments, Calabro further suggested that 
biblical data provide three further arguments to support his proposal of the “two hands” 
gesture. Calabro’s first argument deals with the defective plural of the noun “hand” and 
 
199Calabro, “A Reexamination,” 111. 
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the second and third arguments deal with the number of the noun “hand” when the 3mp 
pronominal suffix is attached to it. 
First, Calabro pointed out that the only text in which the noun “hand” is plural is 
Lev 16:21 and that it has defective writing of this noun, ידו instead of ידיו. He stated that 
“if it were not for the explicit mention of ‘two hands,’ one would easily read the 
consonantal text’s ידו as a reference to one hand.” That led him to suggest that “this 
raises the possibility that ידו in the other passages is also a defective writing (such 
defective writings are actually quite common in this part of the Pentateuch) and that the 
vocalization as a singular in these passages is simply based on an ad hoc reading of the 
consonantal text.”200 Consequently, this defective writing points to the plural of “hand.” 
To support this, he listed two more texts where the MT has defective writing. The 
first text is Num 27:18, where “hand” is in singular, but in v. 23, the MT changes it to a 
dual. The LXX translated the noun “hand” in both verses with the plural. Calabro might 
well be right on this point. In other words, the LXX’s harmonization might point to the 
MT’s haplography or an accidental mistake,201 and the LXX should be preferred reading. 
The second text is Lev 9:22, where again, the consonantal text points to the 
singular, but the pointing to the dual. In the latter case, one י, either of the nominal plural 
ending or the initial consonant of the pronominal suffix, is missing. Calabro found the 
support for the two hands gesture in blessings to be well established “from the synagogue 
service at the time when the vowel points were added to the Hebrew text (around         
 
200Calabro, “A Reexamination,” 111. 
201J. Harold Greenlee, Introduction to New Testament Textual Criticism (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 1964), 115. 
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700 CE).”202 However, the pointing Calabro referred to is totally different from the 
potential pointing that the MT would have if it used plural. The plural of hands in never 
expressed by addition of masculine plural ending, as the form Calabro referred to used, 
but rather feminine plural ending, ֹות. Again, this disagreement of the MT and the LXX 
might be the MT’s haplography or an accidental mistake, as in the case of Num 27:18. 
Calabro’s arguments are partially correct and they do not lend solid ground for the 
claim that LXX reading points to the MT’s pattern in which its defective writing of the 
singular noun “hand” was its way to express dual of this noun. First, defective writing is 
clearly indicated at the time pointing was introduced and the inclusion of qere for all 
these texts which Calabro cited (Lev 9:22, 16:21 and Num 27:18) suggests dual form of 
the noun. However, all other 18 occurrences of the dual of noun “hand” are properly 
spelled, ידיו. So, this represent 18/21 examples of properly spelled dual of the noun 
“hand,” which is 85.7 %, and 3/21 with defective writing for which Masoretic pointing 
supplies that they should have spelled as dual, which is 14.3 %. It is not impossible to 
claim that defective writing that includes the omission of such small letter like י can be 
the basis for the intent of the translator/s to convey certain pattern or interpretation203 but 
being a very minor and regular deviation204 it requires more thorough analysis and more 
solid arguments. This study totally disagrees with Calabro’s suggestion that the defective   
 
202Calabro, “A Reexamination,” 111. 
203Slaviša Janković, “The Textual Evidence of the Omission Found in the LXX Translation of Lev 
16:14–15” (paper presented at the 2016 Midwest Region Meeting of the SBL, Bourbonnais, IL, 5–7 
February 2016). 
204Ernst Würthwein, The Text of the Old Testament: An Introduction to the Biblia Hebraica, 2nd 
ed., rev. and enl. (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1995), 111. 
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use of plural of the noun “hand” point to the regular expression of the dual in the MT. He 
stated that “the usual method in pointing defectively written examples of the word ָיד 
"hand" in ritual hand gestures was to go with the singular in every case, except in specific 
instances where the dual was obvious.” 
Calabro’s second and third points are well taken. In his second point he noted that 
the form ידיהם definitely presupposes the existence of plural form of “hands” ידים which 
does not exist in OT. BH always used ָידֹות. A probability that the second י in the form 
 might be the MT’s mistake is refuted by Calabro’s third point, namely, the plural ידיהם
form of body parts conflicts with the grammatical expression of the body parts in BH. 
Body parts are usually expressed by dual. Calabro stated: “It is a lesser known, but 
nevertheless firmly established, aspect of Hebrew grammar that the words for body parts 
and other ‘inalienably possessed’ things, when bound to a plural genitive, tend to remain 
grammatically singular or dual, depending on whether the possessor is using one or two 
of them.”205 This practically means that BH makes a reference to one hand of each 
participant, the pattern is to use a singular noun with a plural suffix attached to it, ָיָדם. 
This would literally mean “their hand.” 
This study recognizes the complexity of the LXX and the MT number disparity 
concerning the noun “hand” which is complicated even more by the fact that grammatical 
patterns of uses of only one hand or both are sometimes overruled by the sameness of the 
context. For instance, this study claims that one hand is used in Lev. 1:4; 3:2, 8, 13; 4:4, 
 
205Calabro, “A Reexamination,” 113. For a more detailed explanation of this phenomenon, see 
Alan Henderson Gardiner, Egyptian Grammar: Being an Introduction to the Study of Hieroglyphs, 3rd ed. 
(Oxford: Griffith Institute, 2005). 
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24, 29, 33 based on a consistent and explicit MT reading, and that potentially two hands 
of one person were involved in Exod 29:10, 15, 19; Lev 4:15; 8:14, 18, 22; 16:21; 24:14; 
Num 8:10, 12; 27:18, 23; Deut 34:9 based on the patterns of use of the plural of the noun 
“hand” conducted on pp. 670–71. However, this delineation is potentially overruled in at 
least one text, Lev 4:15, since, based on the grammatical pattern, two hands were 
potentially used in this text, but Lev 4 in all other instances, vv. 4, 24, 29, and 33, used 
only one hand. Grammatical ambiguity related to the last set of texts where potentially 
two hands as well as one could have been used. The conclusion of the present study is 
that the form of gesture is insignificant and does not affect its meaning/function. This 
understanding of the form answers the valid question Kiuchi raised as to whether a 
difference in form implies a difference in symbolic meaning.206 The answer is “no.” The 
biblical text confirms that there were two forms, but no different meanings. At this point, 
the presence of different forms remains a matter of further research in terms of 
discovering new manuscripts that contain the texts in question. 
Calabro’s reliance on post-biblical texts is highly questionable since these texts 
can hardly be used to reconstruct the form of the gesture that was introduced and 
prescribed several centuries before their time. These texts should, rather, be taken as an 
interpretation of Pentateuch material, rather than its equal. The interaction between these 
two materials should also be in the context of a precisely established method that would 
explicitly define interaction between them.  
 
206Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 153; Gane, Cult and Character, 244–45; JoAnn Scurlock, “The 
Techniques of the Sacrifice of Animals in Ancient Israel and Ancient Mesopotamia: New Insights through 
Comparison, Part 1,” AUSS 44 (2006): 25. 
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Pressure or No Pressure 
Rabbis commonly understood that the verb ָסַמְך, when associated with hands, 
referred to the activity that includes pressure on the recipient of the action.207 Daube 
sustained this understanding by comparing the gesture of laying on of hands expressed by 
ים to the one expressed by  ַמְךסָ   to put, place.” He suggested that the former involves“ ׂשִּ
“vigorous leaning,” whereas the latter is gentler in nature.208 However, Wright correctly 
argued that ָסַמְך might be idiomatic, without any indication that pressure is involved. The 
evidence to claim that ָסמַ ְך ָיד implies pressure is insufficient.209 This study also affirms 
this claim. 
 
The Function/Meaning of Laying on of Hand/s 
As presented in the introduction of the current study, there are five major theories 
on the function/meaning of laying on of hand/s in the Pentateuch: (1) transfer/substitution 
theory, (2) identification/substitution theory, (3) consecration/dedication/presentation 
theory, (4) appropriation-ownership/designation theory, and (5) manumission theory. As 
their names disclose and as demonstrated in the introduction, there is a lot of overlap 
among them. 
The quest for the function/meaning of this gesture is severely obscured by the 
fluidity and imprecision of terminology used, along with inaccurate conclusions resulting   
 
207Milgrom, Numbers, 235. 
208Daube, The New Testament and Rabbinic Judaism, 224–26. 
209Wright, “Hands, Laying of,” 3:37. 
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from selective and incomprehensive reading of the texts. Transfer, substitution, and 
identification are often mutually paired and/or related to other theories. Transfer includes 
transmission of various elements such as evil, sin, authority, power, identity, and 
personality. Transfer of personality was associated with several slight modifications.210 
 
Critique of Theories 
This subsection deals with all other theories except the transfer/substitution and 
the appropriation-ownership/designation theory since they, as the most debated ones, are 
discussed separately below. The manumission theory is also not analyzed, since its only 
point of difference with the appropriation-ownership/designation theory is that in the 
former, the offerers renounced the right of property over the sacrifice,211 while in the 
latter, the offerers communicated ownership over their sacrifice. 
 
Identification/Substitution Theory 
Robinson proposed that the laying on of hand/s represents total and ontological 
identification of the offerers and their sacrificial animal. The animal, in a way, literally 
becomes the offerer. This nuance of identification/substitution theory is alien to the OT. 
The meaning/function of this ritual gesture is, rather, found in its symbolic 
interpretation.212 Rowley included symbolism in his interpretation of this gesture and   
 
210Mattingly, “The Laying on of Hands on Joshua,” 149–56; Kurtz, Offerings, 83. 
211Eichrodt, Theology of the Old Testament, 2:165–66; Antonio Charbel, Zevaḥ shelamim: Il 
sacrificio pacifico nei suoi riti e nel suo significato religioso e figurativo (Jerusalem: Commercial Press, 
1967), 38n27; Merwe, “The Laying on of Hands in the Old Testament,” 40; Vriezen, An Outline of Old 
Testament Theology, 263. 
212Mattingly, “The Laying on of Hands on Joshua,” 147. 
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proposed that the offerers identify with their sacrificial animal in order that the death of 
the animal might symbolically remove any obstacle that separate them from God.213 
Milgrom criticized this theory on the basis that it is magical and that a belief that death 
brings one closer to God is embedded in it.214 However, regardless of these non-biblically 
confirmed conceptions related to the identification theory, one can think that the offerers 
could symbolically perceive their offering as their own representative and/or substitute 
before God. The laying on of hand/s on the Levite had that meaning.215 This 
identification should not be understood as “identifying of,” but rather, “identified 
with.”216 However, this meaning/function cannot be the primary one due to the lack of 
explicit support from texts, especially in prevailing sacrificial contexts. It denies a crucial 
element of the sacrificial process which is sin/GHS that needs to be dealt with. No 
transfer is involved. 
 
Consecration-Separation/Dedication/Presentation Theory 
Rodríguez identified a valid weakness of this theory. He claimed that it would be 
more substantial if a priest performed a laying on of hand/s. He noted that the sinners 
come to the sanctuary to obtain forgiveness via their sacrifice and is not in the position to 
 
213Harold Henry Rowley, Worship in Ancient Israel: Its Forms and Meaning (London: S.P.C.K., 
1967), 133. 
214Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 151. 
215Mattingly, “The Laying on of Hands on Joshua,” 150. 
216Péter, “L'imposition des mains,” 53. 
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consecrate/dedicate/present anything to God prior to being forgiven.217 His primary goal 
is to change his unfavorable status before God. 
Mattingly incorrectly criticized Rodríguez on this point, arguing from the non-
biblical theory of sacrifice where a sacrifice is an offering or giving over of something to 
the realm of holy, God in this case. Mattingly argued that consecration had to be 
completed before the ritual ended and was a prerequisite to forgiveness. On this basis, he 
also criticized Rodríguez’s point that the offerer cannot consecrate anything to God 
before obtaining forgiveness.218 
First, Rodríguez’s argument that the offerers first need to obtain forgiveness prior 
to being able to consecrate/dedicate/present something to God might be limiting the 
contexts of sacrificial offering only to those where the offerers make a sin or reparation 
offering. Leviticus 1–3 portrays situations of sacrificial offering in which sin was not 
included, yet all included a laying on of hand/s. However, the offerers would at all times 
bear their GHS that would put them in an unfavorable status before God which needed to 
be altered. This understanding of human nature and its constant unfavorable status before 
God negates the gift theory of sacrifice. If the offerers’ sin was not dealt with by a 
sacrificial offering, then the sacrifice addressed their GHS. The offerer would admit their 
GHS and through the laying on of hand/s, transfer it to the animal that would, through its 
death, enable them to live and freely commune with God. Thus, Mattingly’s critique of   
 
217Rodríguez, “Substitution in the Hebrew Cultus,” 205. 
218Mattingly, “The Laying on of Hands on Joshua,” 147. 
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Rodríguez was based on a partially valid and unsustainable argument if all sacrificial 
contexts are taken into consideration. 
Second, the process of consecration or sanctification is never in the domain of an 
ordinary individual in biblical legislation. It is always priests or Moses who sanctified the 
priests, who are involved in this process and never ordinary individual/s. 
Third, it is God himself who consecrate/sanctifies in the OT. That fact is 
emphasized in any ritual which culminates in consecration/sanctification of an entity. The 
separation nuance of this theory is even less sustainable. Just the fact that a sacrificial 
animal is brought to the sacrificial altar is testament of the fact that it separated/set apart 
from the larger group for a special purpose. Laying on of hand/s would be redundant and 
as such, not needed. 
Finally, Pentateuch legislation never uses the verbs of dedication with the offerer 
as a subject and sacrifice as a direct object in Lev 1–7. The only text where it is explicitly 
stated that sacrifices are dedicated to God is Lev 22:2–3. However, “holy gifts” refer to 
well-being offering219 of which the offerers would keep the most and give a thigh to the 
priest. The dedication theory is unsustainable. 
Henry Preserved Smith argued that sacrifice itself is sacred based on the fact that 
its blood had cleansing power emanating from its sacredness. Thus, the offerers would 
partake of the sanctity of the sacrificial animal.220 The offerers would be purified via 
contact with the animal. Rodríguez noted a significant weakness of this proposal. The   
 
219Hartley, Leviticus, 355. Wenham, The Book of Leviticus, 294. Milgrom, to the contrary, argued 
for the inclusive meaning of “the holy gifts” to include all sacrifices. Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1729. 
220Smith, “The Laying-on of Hands,” 56–57. 
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sacrificial animal is never sacred. It should be without blemish (Lev 1:3) to be 
acceptable,221 but it becomes holy after it is offered, not before. The cleansing power of 
blood does not stem out of the animal’s sacredness, but out of divine regulation (Lev 
17:11). 
 
Key Misconceptions in Laying on of Hand/s Debate 
Calabro identified at least three reasons that prevent a correct interpretation of this 
gesture in scholarly debate concerning the laying on of hands. The current study fully 
agrees on the first, but disagrees with the second and third reasons.  
First, previous researchers shared the assumption that the form of this gesture 
consistently correlate with its meaning/function. Foundational to this assumption is that 
there are two forms, one and two hands gestures, each of which has a distinct meaning. 
The one hand gesture conveyed the ownership or identification of the offerer, whereas the 
two hands gesture meant transfer or identification of its route, designation, partaking of 
sanctity of animal, substitution, designation. However, the emphasis on the two separate 
forms did not prevent overlaps between their meaning/function.222 Thus, the emphasis of 
some scholars on the form of the gesture did not bring clarity to its meaning/function. 
Second, scholars usually assume that meanings/functions are mutually exclusive, 
which might not be the case. This is true since the history of interpretation shows that 
interpreters usually focus only on one or two, as in the case of two forms of gesture or 
interpretations and apply all others to them. However, this study disagrees with the 
 
221Rodríguez, “Substitution in the Hebrew Cultus,” 206. 
222See Calabro’s historical review table on the interpretation of both forms of the gesture. Calabro, 
“A Reexamination,” 118–19. 
 
685 
Calabro’s background of this reason. That is, he followed Propp223 and Robertson 
Smith224 who proposed that there were two different understandings of the laying on of 
hands, the priestly author’s one and the popular one. Calabro went on to state that 
“different people in the society likely held different interpretations of the same gesture. 
Some of those interpretations may have aligned with different social strata, religious 
viewpoints, and locations in space and time.” OT texts do not support such a claim. On 
the contrary, sacrificial regulations in Lev 1–5 in chap. 1–3 do not refer to any specific 
social group within community, but rather, imply anyone in the society. An individual is 
given freedom within his/her financial means to choose the type of sacrificial animal. 
However, sacrifices had the same purpose in any case, acceptance and/or atonement. 
Thus, based on the texts, the presence of societal classes does not imply different 
interpretations of the same ritual. There are certain modifications of the sacrificial animal 
in Lev 4–6:7 based on social status, but the sacrifices always had the same meaning, 
forgiveness. In addition, given the fact that the two sets of sacrificial regulations were 
written for different audiences, Lev 6:8–7 also does not contain any hints that would 
indicate various interpretations of the sacrificial ritual. As stated above, they just clarify 
details that pertain to the priest personnel. Therefore, being unsupported by OT text, this 
background is rejected but the reason proposed based on this background is confirmed by 
the history of interpretation and is valid. 
Third, Calabro stated that “many try to fit ancient practice within a framework of   
 
223Propp, Exodus 19–40, 458. 
224W. Robertson Smith, Lectures on the Religion of the Semites, new ed., Burnett Lectures 
[Aberdeen University] 1888–89 (London: A. & C. Black, 1894), 422. 
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logical relationships that is characteristic of modern Western philosophy.” These logical 
relationships of Western philosophy are concepts like identification, designation, and 
attribution. However, it is questionable whether these concepts are exclusively constructs 
of Western philosophy. As Calabro stated, these constructs naturally emanate out of the 
logic of the sacrificial process. 
The function of designation, for example, arises naturally from the direct contact 
involved in hand placement (which unambiguously points out the recipient) and from 
the fact that the gesture immediately precedes further ritual performance on the 
recipient. Likewise, since the protocol of sacrifice assumes that the animal receiving 
hand placement belongs to the one making the offering and is to be accepted on his 
behalf (Lev 1:2–4), the gesture would tend to carry an attributive function.225 
 
The fact that they were not defined or stated in these texts does not mean that they 
were not present in people’s perception of certain parts of the sacrificial offering process. 
It is true that the English verb “to identify,” the noun “identification,” and the adjective 
“identifiable” emerge in the time of modern Western philosophy in the English  
language, but at least a verb with the identical semantic range with which it is used in 
modern Western philosophy was in use as early as 350 AD.226 The verbs “to   
 
225Calabro, “A Reexamination,” 121. 
226The origin of English verb “to identify” comes from possibly three sources: (1) Old Latin 
identitias plus Latin -ficiare, (2) the medieval Latin identificare, or (3) French identifier, from identité. The 
first English record was detected in 1769 with the meaning to “determine the identity of, recognize as or 
prove to be the same.” The meaning “make one (with), associate (oneself), regard oneself as being the 
essence of” was detected in 1780. The sense of “serve as means of identification” is attested by 1886. 
Etymonline, s.v. “Identify (v.),” released 17 Feb 2019, https://www.etymonline.com/word/ 
identify#etymonline_v_1483. The noun “identification” was detected in the 1640s with the meaning of 
“treating of a thing as the same as another; act of making or proving to be the same,” and it comes from 
French identification, probably from identifier. The psychological sense of “becoming or feeling oneself 
one with another” was detected in 1857. The meaning “act or process of determining the identity of 
something” was found in 1859. The meaning “object or document which marks identity” is from 1947. 
Etymonline, s.v. “Identification (n.),” released 17 Feb 2019, https://www.etymonline.com/word/ 
identification#etymonline_v_34531. Adjective “identifiable” was found 1804. Etymonline, s.v. 
“Identifiable (adj.),” released 17 Feb 2019, https://www.etymonline.com/search?q=Identifiable+. Also see 




designate”227 and “to attribute”228 also originate from Latin or French, languages that 
were in use since the 4th century. This basic data proves that the use of these words 
predates the dialogue of modern Western Philosophy. Calabro’s assessment that terms 
like identification, designation, and attribution are constructs of modern Western 
Philosophy seems not to be correct, perhaps leaving this part of his research without 
relevant references that would confirm this. 
Building on these mainly inaccurate claims, Calabro suggested a methodology 
that this study completely supports. “A close reading of the Hebrew texts, with careful 
attention to words and phrases that are structurally aligned with descriptions of the   
 
227The English verb “to designate” was formed either (1) as a back-formation from the noun 
“designation,” (2) from the adjective “designate, ” or (3) from the Latin designatus. The first record with 
the meaning “to appoint or select for a particular purpose” was noted in 1791, whereas the meaning “to 
mark out or indicate” was noted in 1818. Etymonline, s.v. “Designate (v.),” released 17 Feb 2019, 
https://www.etymonline.com/word/designate#etymonline_v_46758. The English noun “designation” 
originated either from the Old French designacioun or directly from the Latin designationem (nominative 
designatio), “a marking out, specification,” noun of action from past participle stem of designare “mark 
out, devise, choose, designate, appoint,” and was noted in the 16th century and on. Etymonline, s.v. 
“Designation (n.),” released 17 Feb 2019, https://www.etymonline.com/word/designation#etymonline 
_v_29918. The English adjective “marked out, indicated” was formed from the Latin desegnatus, the past 
participle of designare “mark out, device, chose, designate, appoint.” The meaning “appointed or 
nominated but not yet installed” dates from the 1640s. Etymonline, s.v. “Designate (adj.),” released 17 Feb 
2019, https://www.etymonline.com/word/designate#etymonline_v_46758. Also see Oxford English 
Dictionary, s.v. “Designation (n.),” released 17 Feb 2019, https://en.oxforddictionaries 
.com/definition/designation. 
228The English verb “to attribute” comes from the Latin attributus, past participle of attribuere 
“assign to, allot, commit, entrust,” and the first use is dated to 14th century with the figurative meaning “to 
attribute, ascribe, impute.” Etymonline, s.v. “Attribute (v.),” released 17 Feb 2019, https://www.etymonline 
.com/word/attribute#etymonline_v_18918. The English noun “attribute” comes from the Latin attributum, 
“anything attributed,” with the meaning “quality ascribed to someone, distinguishing mark (especially an 
excellent or lofty one)” in the late 14th century. Etymonline, s.v. “Attribute (n.),” released 17 Feb 2019, 
https://www.etymonline.com/word/attribute#etymonline_v_18918. Another English noun, “attribution,” 
originated from the Latin attributionem (nominative attributio) “an assignment, attribution,” and the first 
use was dated to late 15th century, referring to the “action of bestowing or assigning.” Etymonline, s.v. 
“Attribution (n.),” released 17 Feb 2019, https://www.etymonline.com/word/attribution#etymonline 
_v_26708. The English adjective “attributable” was detected in the 1660s with the meaning of “ascribable, 
imputable.” Etymonline, s.v. “Attributive (adj.),” released 17 Feb 2019, https://www.etymonline.com/word/ 
attributive#etymonline_v_41854. Also see Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “Attribute,” released 17 Feb 
2019, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/attribute.  
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gesture, offers the most accurate method for disclosing ancient understandings of hand 
placement.” In addition, taking into careful consideration the micro reading of the texts, I 
broaden the context of this gesture to a macro reading of the texts. In other words, I 
placed the laying on of hands in the context of the most common outcome of the 
sacrificial offering process, the atonement, and related it to the foundational background 
of any sacrificial offering, GHS or/and sin, as a constant human disadvantage before God. 
Calabro fell short in systematically following the methodology he suggested. 
His starting point suggested a totally new meaning of the laying on of hands in 
Lev 1:4, “that it may be accepted for him to make atonement on his behalf.” He stated 
that the way in which the animal mediates for the offerer is not a crucial point in this text. 
In other words, the focus is not on what the gesture does to the animal, but rather, the 
emphasis is on the fact that “the gesture’s form is a similitude of atonement.” He also 
adopted the meaning of “to cover” for the Hebrew verb ר פֶּ  to propose that the laying on כִּ
of hands on the animal’s head is an “iconic symbol of “cover over” the sins of” the 
offerer.229 
This proposal is based on a subjective and selective reading of this verse. First, 
the act of atonement, as suggested in the present study, includes two basic parts which are 
the offerers’ letting go of their sin by placing their hands on the sacrificial animal, and 
God’s acceptance of that sin into his sanctuary and granting forgiveness to the offerers. 
The first part of it is represented by the animal’s “recovering” of the offerers’ sin. In 
other words, contrary to Calabro, the text does emphasize what the gesture does to the   
 
229Calabro, “A Reexamination,” 121–22. 
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sacrificial animal. The transfer of the offerers’ sin onto the animal is crucial and thus, 
becomes an integral part of the atonement process. This does not diminish the emphasis 
on the atonement itself, but rather, explains it even more. Second, scholars rightfully 
refuted and largely abandoned the view that the Hebrew verb ר פֶּ  ”.means “to cover כִּ
Third, the context in Lev 1–3 is completely different from the one in Lev 4–6:7, since in 
the former, no sinful act was involved, whereas in the latter it was. Finally, this phrase is 
not mentioned in relation to any other sacrifice but burnt offering, which requires further 
investigation if it should be applied to all other sacrifices. 
Building on the grammatical and syntactical parallels between “ ּתָ  ָסַמכ  ָך ו  ת־ָיד   אֶּ
“ you shall lay your hands on him)” in v. 18 and) ָעָליו ָנַתָּתה ָך ו  ָעָליו ֵמהֹוד   (you shall put 
some of your power on him)” in v. 20 of Num 27, Calabro noticed that the transfer theory 
fits these contexts the best. He concluded that “the phrase נתן על contributes a distinctive 
nuance to the concept of transfer, indicating that what is transferred becomes like a 
material possession that one can wear (like a crown), rather than something that 
permeates the soul or the blood (the verb אלמ  ‘fill’ in Deut 34:9, of course, carries a 
different nuance).”230 
Calabro, then, proposed the interpretation of laying on of hands that nobody, to 
his knowledge, had previously the following: “On the basis of the passages from 
Numbers mentioned above, one could posit that hand placement is the ‘gesture of פקד,’ a 
way of appointing a person or animal to a particular status or role. This function could   
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apply to all of the biblical attestations of hand placement.” He came to this conclusion by 
noting that in Num 27:16, Moses asked God “to appoint, פקד” a man over the sons of 
Israel. Calabro stated that this sequence suggests that at least one function of the laying 
on of hands ritual was “to appoint” a person or a thing. He also cited Num 1:50; 3:10; 
8:10; and Neh 7:1, where laying on of hands was performed on the Levites who were 
“appointed, פקד” to their offices. Finally, Calabro referred to Creason’s work on the verb 
 where Creason defined its meaning as follows: “The verb’s basic meaning is ‘to ,פקד
assign a person or a thing to what the subject believes is its proper or appropriate status or 
position in an organizational order,’ or more succinctly, ‘to put some thing where it is 
supposed to be in the overall scheme of things.’”231 
First, Calabro’s proposal is not new by any means. It is virtually identical to the 
theory of consecration-separation/dedication/presentation that is presented in the history 
of interpretation in this study (see pp. 9, 11). Second in developing his proposal he 
ignored a basic step of a sound interpretation: root distribution. The verb פקד is found 
144 times in the Pentateuch, plus 237 in the rest of the OT. The most significant use of 
the root occurs in the book of Numbers, 108/144. The occurrences and uses in other 
books are insignificant (Genesis, 11 times; Exodus, 18; Leviticus, 5; and Deuteronomy, 
2) when compared to the one in Numbers. This statistic is not a warrant of any firm 
conclusions about the meaning of the root, but it does indicate that פקד did not play a 
significant role in any other books but Numbers. Since most of the occurrences of the 
 
231Stuart Creason, “PQD Revisited,” in Studies in Semitic and Afroasiatic Linguistics Presented to 




laying on of hands occur in the book of Leviticus (15 times in 6 events), in contrast to 
Numbers (4 times in 2 events), Exodus (3 times in a single event), and Deuteronomy (1 
time), it would be reasonable to examine Leviticus texts, rather than Numbers in order to 
find its meaning. This method is confirmed further by the fact that the only time פקד is 
found in the book of Numbers in the context of the laying on of hands is in 27:16. In this 
context, the verb conveys the result or outcome of the laying on of hand/s, rather than the 
meaning/function of this ritual gesture which Moses will perform over Joshua. The verb 
is not mentioned in relation to the laying on of hands in Exod 29, Num 8, and Deut 34, 
which leave its only relation to this gesture in Num 27. It would be questionable to 
establish the meaning of the laying on of hands based on the connection of the verb פקד, 
and this gesture in one context, and not consider the other 22 contexts. Third, the verb 
 is never used in Exodus and Leviticus with the meaning “to appoint.” The meanings פקד
of פקד implied in Exodus are “to carefully watch over” (3:16), “to be concerned” (4:31), 
“to take care of” (13:19), “to punish” (20:5; 32:34; 34:7, ), and “to count, number” 
(30:12, 13, 14; 38:21, 25).232 The two meanings found in Leviticus are “to entrust” (Lev 
5:23 [6:4])233 and “to bring” (Lev 18:25;234 26:16).235 Thus, the meaning of פקד, “to 
appoint” does not appear at all in the books of Exodus and Leviticus that contain 18/23 
laying-on-of-hands contexts. This statistic strongly demonstrates the flaws of Calabro’s   
 
232Stuart, Exodus, 123, 158, 326, 636, 688–89, 717, 770–71. 
233Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 293, 327.  
234Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1515, 1580.  
235Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27, 2272, 2305.  
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analysis which is considered unsound in this study. 
 
Transfer/Substitution 
For the sake of clarity in the process of examining scholarly arguments on the 
meaning/function of the laying on of hands, I state here that the laying on of hand/s is 
best understood to convey transfer and/or substitution, and name my theory in accordance 
with its meaning/function, transfer, and/or substitution theory. 
This is the most debated236 and the most frequent meaning of the laying on of 
hand/s in the oldest and recent studies.237 It is applicable to all contexts as long as the 
context is taken into consideration to determine what is being transferred to the sacrificial 
animal.238 
 
Evaluation of the Points of Critique of the 
Transfer/Substitution Theory 
The total of 10 arguments against the transfer/substitution theory is presented in 
the introduction of the present study. Paterson recognized 5 at the beginning of the 20th 
century, while Wright collected 5 more at the end of the same century. All of them are 
evaluated below. Regardless of whether these arguments look impressive, they are the 
result of a selective reading of the texts. Scholars place an emphasis on some texts at the 
cost of disregarding others, which caused them to derive partially accurate inferences 
regarding the meaning/function of the gesture. Since some of them supplement each 
 
236Mattingly, “The Laying on of Hands on Joshua,” 148. 
237Hoffmann, Das Buch Leviticus, 1:84; Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 113; Calabro, “A 
Reexamination,” 117. 
238Calabro, “A Reexamination,” 117. 
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other, those collected by Paterson are combined with the ones gathered by Wright in 
order to avoid repetitions as they are critically analyzed. 
 
The Death of the Victim 
Cannot be Vicarious 
The death of the victim could not have been vicarious, since sacrifice was not 
allowed for sins which merited death (Num 15:30), only for venial transgressions. This 
argument reflects a selective reading of texts.239 Scholars widely and rightfully 
recognized that the life of an individual Israelite who experiences sin or impurity and 
disregards the regulations mandated by God himself is terminated (Lev 15:31; Num 
19:13, 20). Other texts also implied this, such as Lev 5:1–4.240 Instead of bearing his/her 
own sin and ultimately suffering its consequence of death, the Ancient Israelite was 
advised to transfer his/her sin/s to the sin and/or reparation offering and receive 
forgiveness. Sins for which biblical legislation prescribes death are unforgivable/ 
inexpiable and the one who commits them is barred from the advantage of sacrificial 
atonement/forgiveness. Individuals liable for such sins would not get a chance to transfer 
their sin to appropriate offerings and receive forgiveness. 
 
Sacrifice Cannot be Holy and Impure 
The assumption that the imposition of hands involved a transmission of guilt is 
inconsistent, not only with other references to this practice, but also with the fact that the 
 
239Paterson, “Sacrifice,” DBDL 4:340. 
240Eichrodt, Theology of the Old Testament, 2:165; Wenham, The Book of Leviticus, 94–95; 
Rodríguez, “Substitution in the Hebrew Cultus,” 149; Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin,” 8–10; Sklar, Sin, 
Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement, 42. 
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sacrificial flesh was treated as most holy, and might be eaten by the priest.241  
J. C. Matthes criticism that this theory on the basis that the imposition of hands 
involved a transmission of guilt is inconsistent, not only with other references to this 
practice, but also with the fact that the sacrificial flesh was treated as most holy, and 
might be eaten by the priest.242 Rodríguez established the fact that holiness and sin, and I 
add GHS, can coexist in the same place at the same time.243 However, the inference that 
coexistence of sanctity and defilement is present in biblical texts was noted before by 
Rodríguez244 and later by Milgrom and Gane.245 Sin offering in Lev 4–5:13 that 
specifically deals with sin is also considered holy.246 Kiuchi’s critique of Rodríguez’s and 
the view of other scholars who believed this is not well taken. That is, he stated that 
“although it may be naturally envisaged that the  ַָּטאתח  has something to do with the guilt, 
it is the priests who bear it, and not the 247”.ַחָּטאת First, based on the regulation 
concerning the sin offering in Lev 6:24–30 which states that the priest is to eat the flesh 
of the sin offering he officiates, it is accurate that the priest bears a sin that the sin 
offering dealt with in the third and fourth subcase in Lev 4, vv. 22–26 and 27–35. Yet, 
the same regulation also specifically states that the priest is not to eat the meat of the sin 
 
241Paterson, “Sacrifice,” DBDL 4:340. 
242J. C. Matthes, “Der Sühnegedanke bei den Sündopfern,” ZAW 23 (1903): 109–13; Vaux, 
Ancient Israel: Its Life and Institutions, 416. 
243Rodríguez, “Substitution in the Hebrew Cultus,” 217–18; Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 162. 
244Feldman, Biblical and Post-Biblical Defilement and Mourning, 63, 70. 
245Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 406; Gane, Cult and Character, 178.  
246Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 115. 
247Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 115. 
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offering that dealt with sin in the case of the first and second subcase in Lev 4, vv. 3–12 
and 13–21. In this case, sin is transferred to the sanctuary directly through the blood.248 
This seems to be a common notion in ANE context.249 Kiuchi totally disregarded the fact 
that sometimes the priest bears the sin, while sometimes the sin is transferred directly 
onto the sanctuary. Second, Kiuchi stated that the priest bore guilt rather than sin, but 
admitted that “the confusion of terms such as ‘sin,’ ‘guilt,’ and ‘uncleanness’ has 
obscured the whole issue of ‘transference of sin/guilt.’”250 As it was established earlier, 
the terms for sin refer to all three stages of a sinful situation, an act, guilt, and its 
punishment. Metaphorical interpretation, which is undeniable in these contexts, would 
confirm that any of the three could be “borne” by the priest and refer to the obstacle 
between the offerer and God. In other words, the priest would carry all three of them. 
None of the two points of critique Kiuchi proposed against Rodríguez’s work is 
substantial. 
This is indeed validated by the texts which unanimously present these two entities 
coexisting in the physical place (sanctuary, Exod 29:44; 40:9–10 = Lev 16:16), human 
(priests/Nazirite, Exod 29:33, 44; 40:13; Lev 8; Num 6 = Lev 10:17), and animal bodies 
(sacrificial animals Lev 6:10 [6:17]; 6:18 [6:25] = 6:20 [6:27]). This point of critique 
seems to reflect selective, rather than careful and comprehensive reading of the texts.   
 
248Rodríguez, “Transfer of Sin in Leviticus,” 190; Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 124. 
249O. R. Gurney, Some Aspects of Hittite Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the British 
Academy, 1977), 29.  
250Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 115. 
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Those three entities could coexist without affecting the holiness of the sanctuary, priests, 
Nazirite, or sacrificial animal. 
Based on Lev 4:12, 6:23 [30], Rodríguez rightfully concluded: “The fact that the 
place where the burning occurred was a ‘clean place’ suggests that the flesh of the animal 
was holy. The flesh was also considered at the same time source of contamination (Lev 
16:18)251 since the person who burned it was ‘to wash his clothes and bathe his body in 
water’ before returning to the camp.”252 He was anticipated by Milgrom who also 
affirmed the paradox that the flesh of a sin offering animal is both holy and impure. 
Namely, it was deposited in a pure, clean place (Lev 4:12), as Rodríguez cited, and it was 
eaten by the priest and because its holy status is explicitly stated (Lev 6:19, 22, 10:17).253 
Thus, the animal was both holy and impure at the same time. 
This perplexing reality presented in biblical texts is possible only because God 
allowed it by delegating regulations that conveyed the coexistence of these three entities. 
Thus, the conclusion emerges that sin/impurity/sinfulness is not a threat or stronger than 
holiness, but rather, is under the control of holiness.254 Thus, transfer of sin/sinfulness to 
the sacrificial animal does not annul the holiness of the sacrifice.  
 
251Rodríguez referred to Lev 16:18 in his dissertation to point to the fact that the flesh of the sin 
offering is impure and defiles entities it touches. This is mostly likely a typo since v. 28 of the same chapter 
actually stated that the sin offering flesh is impure and defiles the person who takes it out of the camp to 
burn it. Verse 18, rather, states that the blood of the sin offering has a cleansing effect on the sacrificial 
altar. See Rodríguez, “Substitution in the Hebrew Cultus,” 218. 
252Rodríguez, “Substitution in the Hebrew Cultus,” 218. 
253Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 239–40.  
254Rodríguez, “Substitution in the Hebrew Cultus,” 218. 
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Blood Manipulation Versus Slaughter 
The essence of this claim is that the central act of the sacrifice was not the act of 
slaughtering, but the manipulation of the blood which was presented to God.255 However, 
accepting this proposal does not diminish the fact that the sacrificial animal symbolically 
and substitutionally represents the offerer. Actually, the laying on of hands facilitates this 
understanding, since the sins were transferred onto the sacrificial animal via this gesture. 
Thus, this argument is an attempt to emphasize one ritual activity over other activities, 
which goes against the ritual theory accepted in the present study. Gane convincingly 
proved that ritual in its totality achieves its purpose.256 The transfer/substitution theory 
actually upholds the critical role of blood application in the sacrificial offering ritual 
since through it, the sin/s that were carried by the offerer are transported to the sanctuary 
from where they are removed on the Day of Atonement (Lev 16:16, 21). The animal is 
symbolically the offerer’s substitute that suffers punishment for his/her sin. Thus, the 
transfer/substitution theory organically correlates with and upholds the importance of 
blood application. It adds more importance and meaning to it. 
 
Substitution Theory Is Untenable 
Wright stated that the transfer/substitution theory as an explanation for the laying 
on of hands is informed by the substitution theory of sacrifice which, in his opinion, is 
untenable.257 This claim echoes the subjective and poorly supported claim. In order to   
 
255Paterson, “Sacrifice,” DBDL 4:340. 
256Gane, Cult and Character, 67. 
257Wright, “The Gesture of Hand Placement,” 437–38. 
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dismiss such an important and widely accepted theory of sacrifice, one would need to 
rely on extensive studies. Wright cited sources that do not provide in-depth research on 
the topic, along with two that do.258 However, scholars have proven and continue to 
prove that substitution was widely present in the ANE and in Ancient Israel.259 Thus, 
Wright’s argument that the laying on of hand/s cannot mean transfer/substitution is 
refuted by the overwhelming amount of research that proved that this concept was firmly 
embedded in Ancient Israel and ANE texts. In addition, the study of the verb ר פֶּ  in the כִּ
present study strongly supports the idea that substitution was an integral part of the 
atonement conveyed via this verb in the Pentateuch.260 
 
Transfer/Substitution Theory 
Is Based on Lev 16:21 
Wright noticed that the main support of the transfer/substitution theory is the 
hand-laying in Lev 16:21. He was anticipated by Janowski who marshaled this argument 
in the second half of the twentieth century based on the three differences between laying 
on of hand in Lev 16:21 and other texts: (1) imposition of both hands on the head of the 
goat, (2) transference of materia peccans to the evil bearer, and (3) sending off of the   
 
258Eichrodt, Theology of the Old Testament, 2:165–66; Milgrom, “Sacrifices and Offerings, OT,” 
764. Adalbert Metzinger and Roland de Vaux are valid sources on the topic, but still, only two out of many 
others with different perspectives. Roland de Vaux, Studies in the Old Testament Sacrifice (Cardiff: 
University of Wales Press, 1964), 29; Metzinger, “Substitutionstheorie und das Alttestamentaliche.” 
259Eichrodt, Theology of the Old Testament, 2:165–66; Médebielle, “Le Symbolisme du Sacrifice 
Expiatoire en Israel”; Médebielle, L'expiation dans l'Ancien et le Nouveau Testament; Médebielle, 
“Expiation,” 3; Smith, “The Laying-on of Hands”; Rodríguez, “Substitution in the Hebrew Cultus,” 20–74; 
Paterson, “Sacrifice,” DBDL 4:340–41. For more recent works that make reference to other older works, 
see Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 440–41; Mattingly, “The Laying on of Hands on Joshua,” 58–63; González, 
“Laying-on of Hands in Luke and Acts,” 31–87; Robinson, “The Laying on of Hands,” 25–26.  
260See pp. 391, 393, 418, 430–32, 435–37 of the present study. 
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goat to the wilderness, are missing in sacrificial contexts. He concluded that the 
Scapegoat is not a sacrifice.261 These points are rightfully critiqued by Kiuchi262 and 
throughout the present work. 
Wright assumed that hand placement in Lev 16:21, performed with two hands, is 
different from hand placement with one hand which is the procedure for other offerings. 
Hence, a difference in form suggests, a priori, a possible different meaning. He also 
claimed that the scapegoat is not a sacrifice; it is merely a rite of elimination and 
therefore, cannot be used to interpret the gesture of hand placement in sacrifices.263 This 
argument is refuted through extensive analysis of the form of this gesture under the 
subheading, “Form of Laying on of Hands: Singular vs Plural vs Dual” and “Pressure or 
No Pressure,” of the present study and is not repeated here.264 
Based on the inadequacy of the argument that the form affects the 
meaning/function of this gesture; this study accepts the proposition that Lev 16:21 can be 
taken as a model for the meaning in sacrifices. In addition, this text is not the only text 
that explicitly supports the transfer of sin via laying on of hands. Lev 4 clearly states that 
the sinner comes to offer his/her sacrifice “loaded” with his/her sin and goes away 
forgiven. It does not state what happens with sin borne by the sinner, but Lev 16:16 
explicitly states that the sins are in the sanctuary, that is, in the most holy place. Having 
demonstrated that ADH is not textually supported, the transfer of sin is the logical 
 
261Janowski, Sühne als Heilsgeschehen, 209–16, especially 215. 
262Kiuchi, Purification Offering, 114–16. 
263Wright, “The Gesture of Hand Placement,” 437–38. 
264See pp. 666–79 of the present study. 
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meaning/function of the laying on of hands in light of Lev 16:16, which attributes the sins 
in the sanctuary as the sins of the sons of Israel. Laying on of hands is the only ritual 
gesture that is performed in the constraints of the sanctuary that may indicate that the 
nature of the contact between the offerer and sacrificial animal is that of a transfer. All 
other contacts that the offerer makes with his/her sacrifice are conditioned by the cause 
and effect principle of the sacrificial process as set forth in the following paragraph. 
Gane provided two slightly different lists of ritual activities related to burnt and 
sin offering, both of which contain two sets of sacrificial procedures: (1) the ones 
explicitly mentioned in the texts, and (2) the implicit ones.265 Regardless of which class a 
ritual activity belongs to, some of them can be viewed as pre-requisite or post-requisite 
activities.266 Gane was anticipated by Hubert and Mauss, and Turner, who termed these 
activities preliminary ones.267 Thus, the offerer’s ritual purity, selecting268 and bringing 
the animal to the sanctuary,269 are necessary prerequisite activities for the sacrificial ritual 
to take place and are performed outside of the sanctuary. These ritual activities precede 
the laying on of hands. The cultic ritual law does not assign symbolic meaning to them, 
and it is unlikely that they had any symbolic meaning because they are necessary   
 
265Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 59; Gane, Cult and Character, 47–48. 
266Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 58. 
267Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss, Sacrifice: Its Nature and Functions, trans. W. D. Halls 
(Chicago: University of Chicago, 1964); Victor W. Turner, “Sacrifice as Quintessential Process: 
Prophylaxis or Abandonment?,” HR (1977). 
268Klawans, Purity, Sacrifice, and the Temple, 53, 56. 
269Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 58. 
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activities for the ritual proper. They are conditioned by the cause and effect principle 
necessary for sacrificial procedure. 
The ritual activities performed that follow the laying on of hands include slaying 
the animal; collecting the blood; presenting the blood to the outer altar; dashing the blood 
against the altar or applying it on the sacrificial altar’s horns; pouring the remaining 
blood at the base of the sacrificial altar; dismembering the carcass; removing, presenting, 
and burning the suet or arranging the body pieces; washing, presenting, and burning the 
entrails and shins; and eating the meat. Gane suggested that of these, only laying on of 
hands and application of blood and suet to the sacrificial altar have no practical function 
in the ritual proper.270 Gane insightfully noted: 
In terms of mere physical cause and effect, the collection of activities just listed is an 
inefficient way to feed a priest: leaning one hand on the head of an animal and 
applying its blood and suet to an altar have no practical function in the mundane 
sphere. Such “impracticality” is common in ritual because the goal of a ritual 
transcends what can be achieved through ordinary physical means alone. There is an 
important sense in which a ritual goal may be regarded as practical, but this involves 
a higher level of practicality, such as reestablishing good relations with a deity in 
order to receive his blessings instead of punishment.271 
 
The principle of higher goals than those conditioned by the mere cause and effect 
principle is certainly true for both of these ritual activities. That is, the two activities 
referred to in the quotation are not necessary in the mundane sphere. They symbolically 
achieve goals that exceed the goals conditioned by the cause and effect principle. 
Therefore, it is expected and unavoidable that they are loaded with symbolic meaning. 
Limiting the laying on of hand/s to the meaning of ownership represents significantly 
 
270Gane, Cult and Character, 48. 
271Gane, Cult and Character, 48–49. See also Gane, Ritual Dynamic Structure, 43–44, 55, 58; 
Staal, Rules Without Meaning, 132. 
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diminishing the symbolic meaning of this activity and undermines the contexts of sin or 
GHS that is associated in an unadvantageous way to sacrificial offering ritual. The 
meaning of transfer encounters well the fact that the sinner leaves the sanctuary free of 
his/her sin, in the case of the sin and reparation offering, and the fact that the sin is stored 
in the sanctuary and removed from there on the Day of Atonement. In the case of other 
sacrifices, laying on of hands symbolically facilitates transfer of GHS, thus enabling safe 
interaction between God and humans. 
Scholars have already recognized that transfer is a valid meaning of this gesture 
regardless of the different contexts in which it was performed, such as the ordination of 
Joshua or the installation of the Levites or the incident of blasphemy (Lev 24:10–16; 
Num 8:10, 12; 27:18, 23; Deut 34:9).272 If transfer is an upheld meaning/function in two 
different contexts such as ordination and sin removal via the goat for Azazel, there is no 
reason that it would not be accepted in sacrificial contexts. The context remains the final 
determinant of what has been transferred and what the ultimate goal of a given ritual is as 
a whole. Rodríguez explained the interconnectedness and distinctiveness of sacrificial 
and goat-for-Azazel contexts in which the laying on of hands was practiced: 
 
272Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 554–55, 1041; Gane, Cult and Character, 59. Wright radically 
changed his interpretation of the laying on of hands in Lev 24:10–16 in his recent paper read at an SBL 
meetings in 2015. Previously, in his article “The Gesture of Hand Placement in the Hebrew Bible and 
Hittite Literature” Wright adamantly rejected any presence of transfer from Moses to Joshua after the 
former laid his hands on the latter. At that time, he wrote that the only correct meaning of this ritual gesture 
is designation of who is the focus of ritual action, that is Joshua. This interpretation is informed by 
Wright’s interpretation of laying on of hands in Lev 24:13–16, the blasphemer account. In his recent paper 
“The Hermeneutics of Ritual Innovation: Hand Placement in Leviticus 24” presented at the SBL meetings 
in Atlanta, GA in 2015, Wright stated that in both accounts, Lev 24:10–16; Num 8:10, 12; 27:18, 23; Deut 
34:9, laying on of hands means transfer based on the interrelatedness of so-called PH (Priestly and Holiness 
codes) source to which these two accounts belong and Covenant Code (CC) and Deuteronomy (D). Wright, 
“The Gesture of Hand Placement,” 435–36; Wright, “The Hermeneutics of Ritual Innovation,” 7–10; 
Mattingly, “The Laying on of Hands on Joshua,” 146–72. 
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The only difference between the two cases [sacrificial and elimination contexts] is to 
be found in the nature of the relation which the laying on of hands produces. In the 
case of the scapegoat the relation is not one of sacrificial substitution in the sense that 
the animal bears the sin and penalty of the sinner. In the latter case we can speak 
about sacrificial substitution. This means that the way the scapegoat bears (ָנָׁשא) the 
sin of the people is essentially different from the way the expiatory sacrifices bear the 
sin of the offerer. This is precisely what Lev 16:22 states: “The goat shall bear all 
their iniquities upon him to a solitary land.” ( ָנָׂשא יר ו  ת־ָכל־ֲעֹוֹנָתם  יוָעלָ  ַהָּׂשעִּ ץ אֶּ רֶּ ל־אֶּ  אֶּ
ֵזָרה  273.(ּג 
 
 
Well-Being Offering Is Not 
an Expiatory Offering 
Wright stated that it is difficult to apply the idea of transfer of guilt in the case of 
the well-being offering since it is not an expiatory offering like sin and reparation 
offerings, and to a certain extent, the burnt offering.274 This inference reflects arguments 
based on selective reading of texts. Regulations in Lev 1 clearly state that the burnt 
offering, besides others, possesses an expiatory function which has been widely 
recognized (Lev 1:4).275 Thus, his argument then rests on the regulations of only well-
being offerings. The expiatory function of the well-being offering was extensively 
analyzed in the current study as a part of the analysis of Lev 17:10–12 and is not repeated 
here.276 Since Lev 17:11 implies all animal sacrifices, they all have an expiatory 
function.277 Some of them are exclusively expiatory (sin and reparation offering), while 
 
273Rodríguez, “Substitution in the Hebrew Cultus,” 220. 
274Wright, “The Gesture of Hand Placement,” 437–38. 
275See subheading, “Burnt Offering: Solution for GHS,” in the current study, pp. 408–11. Also see 
Rodríguez, “Substitution in the Hebrew Cultus,” 225–26. 
276See subheading, “Analysis of Leviticus 17:11: The Role of Blood and ר פֶּ  in the current ”,כִּ
study, pp. 417–18. Also see Rodríguez, “Substitution in the Hebrew Cultus,” 226–31. 
277Vaux, Ancient Israel: Its Life and Institutions, 453; Gane, Cult and Character, 65, 196. 
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others, besides being expiatory, also have other functions (burnt, grain, and well-being 
offerings). In addition, even though cultic legislation never required an offerer 
specifically to offer one of these two sacrifices for committing sin, the rituals that 
included these two sacrifices also represented a way of interaction with God278 and as 
such, these two sacrifices were expiatory as well, in a restricted way, but still expiatory. 
The foundational element that these two sacrifices of restricted expiatory function dealt 
with, besides the fact that they were primarily offered for reasons such as acceptance 
(Lev 1) or thanksgiving, vows, free-will (Lev 7:12, 16), is GHS, which presents a 
constant problem in divine-human interaction, but at the same time, is less complex than 
when an offerer commits sin. 
 
Laying on of Hand/s in Relation to Bird, 
Cereal Offering and the Identity 
of the Slayer 
Wright stated that if the laying on of hands means the transfer of guilt, it is then 
difficult to understand why it was not practiced on the purification or burnt offering 
commuted to a bird (Lev 1:14–17; 5:7–11).279 This claim was augmented by claims that a 
cereal offering also atones (Lev 5:11–13), but the cultic legislation never requires the 
laying on of hand/s on it, which then further implies there could be no idea of a penal 
substitution in this case.280 
Second, in order to strengthen his proposal that the laying on of hand/s means   
 
278Gane, Cult and Character, 49n11. 
279Wright, “The Gesture of Hand Placement,” 437–38. 
280Paterson, “Sacrifice,” DBDL 4:340. 
 
705 
ownership and not transfer, Wright rightfully observed that in some cases, the sacrificial 
process would involve other participants than the offerer. Gane adopted this argument to 
confirm the fact that the laying on of hands means ownership of the offerer over the 
animal.281 This argument is augmented by the claim that the victim was slain by the 
offerer, but in order to support the transfer/substitution theory, the sacrificial animal 
should have been put to death by the priest as God’s representative. 
 
Wright’s First Argument 
These two claims are actually Wright’s first argument for the ownership theory of 
the laying on of hand/s. He stated that “this interpretation is confirmed by the fact that it 
makes sense of the lack of the gesture with birds and cereal offerings (Lev 1:14–17; 2; 
5:7–13).”282 Wright contributed the lack of laying on of hand in relation to the bird and 
cereal offering to the fact that they are small and carried by the offerers only, in their 
hands.283 Wright’s arguments expressed in this quotation are partially correct, since the 
laying on of hands was never prescribed to be performed on the cereal offering in the OT 
and is missing in sacrifices that are reduced to a bird; turtledove, or pigeon. Wright found 
that in other ANE religions, the laying on of hands was performed over sacrifices that are 
not live animals, such as bread, cheese, grain products, wine, and other drinks, 
 
281“The ‘ownership’ view of sacrificial hand-leaning is supported by the wording of Lev 1:4, the 
only place where the text interprets the gesture with one hand: ‘He shall lean his hand’ on the head of the 
burnt offering, that it may be acceptable on his behalf, to expiate for him. Here in the context of the burnt 
offering, acceptance on behalf of the offerer, rather than someone else, depends upon performance of hand-
leaning. Even if another person leads the animal into the sanctuary courtyard, the gesture eliminates any 
possible doubt regarding the identity of the owner/offerer.” Gane, Cult and Character, 63. 
282Wright, “Hands, Laying of,” 3:47. 




slaughtered animals, meats, livers, and tray or baskets with food,284 but this practice is 
alien to the OT sacrificial system. 
It should be emphasized that the absence of the laying on of hands in burnt, sin, 
and reparation offerings is missing only when the sacrificial animal is a bird due to 
practical reasons. Wright observed one reason why birds cannot be handled as 
quadrupeds: they are too small. In addition, it can be assumed that sacrificial birds, 
domesticated or not, would fly away if placed before the sacrificial altar to receive the 
laying on of hands. It could be argued that the offerer could have held a bird by the feet 
with one of his/her hands while performing laying on of hands with the other one. This 
method would leave the bird’s wings free, allowing it to desperately flap. It can be argued 
that the offerer could have held his/her bird sacrifice in one hand and perform laying on 
of hands with the other one. However, cultic legislation does not prescribe that, but 
rather, omits this gesture. 
Another inconsistency is found in Wright’s argument regarding the size of the 
animal. That is, the bird would not be the only animal for which the offerer would not 
need assistance to bring it to the sanctuary. The only animal that the offerer would need 
help to bring it to the sanctuary would be a bull, since any adult should be able to bring a 
lamb or goat to the sanctuary.  
However, Wright rightfully reasoned, similarly to Milgrom, that the same 
meaning is implied for the laying on of hands on sacrificial animals, quadrupeds, or 
carrying of the sacrificial bird. For Wright, this gesture conveys ownership. However, as 
argued in the present study, if the laying on of hands means transfer/substitution of 
 
284Wright, “The Gesture of Hand Placement,” 442–43. 
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sin/s/GHS, then that meaning could be ascribed to the bird offering in whatever capacity 
the bird was offered. 
 
Wright’s Second Argument for Ownership 
Theory and the Role of the Offerer 
The argument that the laying on of hands removes any doubt in identifying the 
owner of the sacrificial animal is highly controversial for two reasons. First, no 
Pentateuch text mentions this scenario so it is an argument from silence. Nevertheless, it 
is totally logical to think that for practical reasons, other person/s besides or instead of the 
offerer could lead and bring the animal to the sanctuary. Yet, this argument is highly 
controversial since it is founded on exceptional cases. For instance, an animal could have 
been big and strong from the herd and an adult not be able to control it. Why would the 
offerer not be able to control it? In this case, it must be assumed that a domestic animal 
would strongly resist to being led by humans, something that is highly improbable. It 
could have happened that the offerer is physically weak, perhaps sick; he/she might not 
be able to lead such a strong animal. In that case, the offerer could wait to get well and 
then lead and bring the sacrifice animal to be offered in the sanctuary. It also could have 
happened that the offerer is physically weak due to age, not sickness. Supposedly, BL 
addressed fully grown, healthy adults in the first place. Contrary to this, an adult should 
be able to lead a young bull to the sanctuary, knowing that priestly personnel would be 
available there to assist further in holding, controlling the animal during the sacrificial 
process. In addition, it is highly improbable that such big animals would often be offered 
by an individual offerer. Also, one could also wonder why the offerer would not simply 
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orally reveal that he/she is the offerer.285 These are just some of the scenarios, but I admit 
that all these arguments like Wright’s, are from silence. The fact is that one could always 
argue in both directions. The gesture of the laying on of hands is not the only potential 
indicator of ownership. Cultic legislation concerning sacrifices provides much stronger 
indications in determining the owner and the beneficiary of the sacrifice. 
Leviticus 1–5 portrays a distinction between the activities which the offerer 
performs and the ones performed by the priest. Leviticus 1:1–9 can be used as an 
example. The subject is clearly the offerer since simple 3ms verbal forms are used in 1:2 
(to bring), 3 (to offer 2x, he might be accepted), 4 (to lay his hand), 5 (to slay), and 6 (to 
skin and cut into pieces) to highlight the involvement of the offerer. The antecedent of 
3ms is introduced in v. 2 and it is ָאָדם, “any man.”286 The priestly roles are also 
expressed by 3ms verbal forms but they are augmented by the nouns “Aaron’s sons” or 
simply “the priest” in is v. 5 (to offer up, to sprinkle), v. 7 (to put fire on altar and arrange 
wood on fire), v. 8 (to arrange pieces of an animal), and v. 9 (to offer up in smoke).287 
Some of the activities that are performed by the offerer still do not provide a clear 
indication as to who the offerer is, to whom the animal belongs, such as “to bring” (1:2) 
or “to offer” (1:3), but other activities besides the laying on of hands (1:4), such as to slay   
 
285LaSor, Hubbard, and Bush, Old Testament Survey, 85. 
286Both sexes are included by this noun. Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 145. 
287The same pattern can be detected in the rest of Lev 1–5. 
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(1:5)288 and to skin and cut into pieces (1:6) certainly denote who the owner was. 
Furthermore, the very next ritual step after the laying on of hands is slitting the sacrificial 
animal’s throat. 
It was claimed that the victim was slain by the offerer, but critiques of the 
transfer/substitution theory proposed that the sacrificial animal should have been put to 
death by the priest as God’s representative.289 However, a much stronger rationale stands 
behind the cultic legislation that requires the offerer to slay his/her sacrificial animal. 
Rooker also stated that “the worshiper had the responsibility of slaughtering the 
animal, apparently by cutting its throat.”290 In addition, he recognized that “the worshiper 
was also responsible for skinning the animal and cutting it into pieces (1:6).291 The laws 
explicitly state that the offerer was to do that292 which would undoubtedly eliminate any 
confusion as to who the offerer was, and would do it in a much more meaningful way, 
especially in contexts that include moral impurity. Rooker’s insights were anticipated by 
Rodríguez, who emphasized that the key reason for the assumption that the offerers were 
 
288The offerer slaughters his/her sacrificial animal. This is indicated in the text of Lev 1–5 and is 
accurately noted by Gane. “The sinner lays one hand on the head of the victim and then slaughters it. The 
priest puts some of its blood on the horns of the altar and pours out the rest of the blood at the base of the 
altar.” Gane, Cult and Character, 21. Milgrom’s belief that anyone could slaughter the animal is 
discredited by the fact that sacrificial regulations never mention anybody else doing this but the offerer. In 
addition, this is also assumed in the light of the regulations in Lev 5:5 and Num 5:7 that state that the 
offerer makes confession, with no hints about implying that another person is the subject of the verb “to 
bring” the sacrifice in Lev 5:6 or “to make restitution” in Num 5:7. Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 156. 
289Paterson, “Sacrifice,” DBDL 4:340. 
290Rooker, Leviticus, 88. The law concerning the sacrifices are consistent and emphatic that the 
offerer would perform the act of slaughter (Lev 1:5, 11; 3:2, 8, 13; 4:4, 15, 24, 29, 33; 6:25; 7:2), and with 
it, began a series of activities where the offerer and the priest alternatively carried out responsibilities. 
LaSor, Hubbard, and Bush, Old Testament Survey, 85. 
291Rooker, Leviticus, 89. 
292Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 159. 
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to slaughter the sacrificial animal is found in the fact that they transferred their sin onto it 
and therefore had to kill it.293 In that case, the sacrificial offering process would include 
at least two ritual activities that have exactly the same meaning and which would be 
highly questionable. Suggesting that the laying-on-of-hands function was to identify the 
owner of the sacrifice is unnecessarily limiting this crucial ritual activity and overlaps 
with other ritual activities included in the ritual process. 
Thus, Wright’s arguments are unsatisfactory because of (1) considering the cereal 
and the bird offering to belong to the same category in order to reason that the laying on 
of hands was not performed on these offerings because of their size, and (2) the sacrificial 
process contains stronger indicators of who the offerer of the sacrifice was other than the 
laying on of hands. 
 
Laying on of Hand/s and Confession 
Wright stated that the view of the transfer of sin or penalty by hand placement is 
usually accompanied by the view that a confession of guilt took place at the time of hand 
placement. There is no evidence, however, that confession took place at that time. The 
few examples of confession with a sacrifice placed the confession before the sacrifice is 
even brought (Lev 5:5; Num 5:7).294 This is an argument from silence. Cultic legislation 
does not include confession of sin in Lev 4 where one would expect it, but it does include 
it in Lev 5:5, which is a type of sin offering. Wright’s suggestion that, in Lev 5:5 and 
 
293Rodríguez, “Transfer of Sin in Leviticus,” 130. 
294Wright, “The Gesture of Hand Placement,” 437–38. 
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Num 5:7, confession did not take place at the time of the laying on of hands is not 
supported by the text.295 
Legislation in Lev 5:5 is significantly abbreviated in comparison to Lev 4, where 
the sacrificial process is explained in a temporal, chronological, and significantly more 
detailed manner. Regulations in Lev 5 perhaps emphasize confession and rely on Lev 4 
for the exact sacrificial order, because the sins in vv. 1 and 4 are public and intentional, 
including certain damage to a fellow man, and as such, require public confession.296 
Leviticus 4 does not contain hints that would point to their public and intentional nature, 
so perhaps they are private and the decision to offer sacrifice and receive forgiveness 
remains in the realm of the sinners’ decision. If they decide to offer the sacrifice, the 
sacrificial process itself is a sort of confession, since they are moved to follow a divinely 
instituted mechanism to solve the problem of sin in their lives. 
Gane suggested that the laying on of hands or handing the bird or grain offering to 
the priest served as an implicit confession. The priest did not need to know the exact 
nature of the offerer’s sin. It is a matter between the offerer and God, so oral confession 
is not needed.297 In this vein, it is also reasonable to understand scholars who claim that 
making a sin offering would also include oral confession.298 Perhaps the confession 
 
295Followed by Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 300–301; Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 124–25. 
296“So it appears that verbal confession, demonstrating repentance and loyalty to the Lord by 
humbly acknowledging accountability to him, is needed to affirm that a deliberate sin is not defiant. With 
an inadvertent fault, there would be no question of possible defiance because the sinner would not even 
know that he or she was violating a divine command.” Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 125. 
297Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 125. 
298Rodríguez, “Substitution in the Hebrew Cultus,” 199–200; Noordtzij, Numbers, 66; Hartley, 
Leviticus, 21, 69.  
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would not take place in the priest’s presence, but would precede the sin and reparation 
offerings. 
The regulation in Num 5:7 is also heavily abbreviated. It does not even mention a 
sacrificial animal,299 so it is logical that it would not mention the laying on of hands. 
Confession is explicitly mentioned for the same reason as it is mentioned in Lev 5:5—the 
public, intentional nature of the sins, including certain damage to a fellow man. 
Any input from Lev 16:21 to rituals that are classified as sacrificial is disputed 
due to the belief that the goat for Azazel is not a sacrifice. However, having proven that 
the number of hands used in the laying on of hand/s gesture or its form essentially does 
not change its meaning/function, the present study points to the fact that the laying on of 
hands in this ritual can lend indications to the meaning of the laying on of hands in other 
contexts, especially those that are expiatory sacrifices. The fact that some scholars made 
a sharp distinction between Lev 16:21 and expiatory sacrifices, which Lev 5:5 and Num 
5:7 definitely are, denying any sameness or correlation of meanings of common ritual 
activities between these two rites, shows their ignorance of the fact that the meaning of 
confession in Lev 16:21, nonsacrificial, and Lev 5:5 and Num 5:7, sacrificial, contexts is 
the same. Therefore, based on the fact that both of these supposedly different contexts 
contain the same ritual activities, the laying on of hand/s and confession, the present 
study accepts that the undisputed association of the confession of sins and the laying on 
of hands over the head of the goat for Azazel should be used a model for all expiatory 
sacrifices. 
 
299Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 326–27, 337–38. 
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Milgrom restricted the confession of sins only to intentional sins.300 However, this 
claim faces serious problems in light of the fact that the high priest makes confession of 
the sins of the sons of Israel over the goat for Azazel on the Day of Atonement, and these 
sins are defined as “all the sins of the sons of Israel” (Lev 16:21, 30, 34). Confession does 
not seem to be limited to public, unintentional sins only, but rather, extends to all sins. 
This claim is strengthened even more by a more explicit presence of the 
confession of sins in the rest of the OT (Ps 32:5; Prov 28:13; Dan 9:4, 20; Ezra 10:1, 11; 
Neh 1:6; 9:2–3). With the majority of scholars, I, believe that confession was an assumed 
element of sin and reparation offering ritual,301 however not in the presence of the priest 
or any other human being except when a human being incurred damage/loss because of 
the sin that the offerer committed. Milgrom, followed by many influential scholars,302 
provided strong evidence from ANE literature and rabbinic texts for the presence of the 
confession of sins.303 Extrabiblical texts convincingly suggest that confession of sins was 
an integral part of the sin and reparation sacrifices.  
 
300Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 300–303, 368–69. 
301Kurtz, Offerings, 83; Merwe, “The Laying on of Hands in the Old Testament,” 37–38; Eichrodt, 
Theology of the Old Testament, 2:161–62; Rodríguez, “Substitution in the Hebrew Cultus,” 198–201; 
Noordtzij, Numbers, 66; LaSor, Hubbard, and Bush, Old Testament Survey, 154; Hartley, Leviticus, lxx–
lxxi, 21, 69; Levine, Leviticus, 28; Rooker, Leviticus, 188–89. This list of scholars is not exhaustive. 
302Schwartz, “Leviticus,” (JSB), 216; Wenham, The Book of Leviticus, 105, 109; Rooker, 
Leviticus, 119.  
303Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 24–25, 298–99. See also Milgrom, Cult and Conscience, 106–14. 
Milgrom excludes confession in the context of inadvertences, that is Lev 4. This study interprets Lev 4 as 
covering both intentional and unintentional sins which consequently led to the conclusion that confession 
was also part of Lev 4 ritual. 
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Arguments from Current Research 
Besides the points raised in the subheading, “Evaluation of the Claims against 
Transfer/Substitution Theory,” that demonstrate that arguments against this theory reflect 
selective and uncomprehensive reading of the text, this study suggests additional 
arguments that support its validity. These arguments stem from the analysis of two 
concepts that are integrated in a broader context of Ancient Israel faith, as expressed in 
the Pentateuchal texts. 
 
Insight from Hamartiology 
The first section of this study demonstrated certain specifics of the concept of sin. 
First, three Hebrew terms for sin, ׁשַ ּפֶ ע ,ָחָטא , and ָעֹון, are not reliable in determining 
whether the sin is intentional or unintentional and expiable or inexpiable. They often 
semantically overlap and are used as synonyms. As such, these terms are not reliable for 
giving much insight into the nature of sin in terms of presence/absence of intent and 
expiability/inexpiability. Thus, context remains the decisive factor to this end.  
Second, the first point is critical because scholars usually consider ַׁשע  as פֶּ
intentional, brazen, and inexpiable sin. However, a terminological analysis of the three 
Hebrew terms for sin, ׁשַ ּפֶ ע ,ָחָטא , and ָעֹון, demonstrated that ַׁשע  cannot be restricted to פֶּ
intentional, brazen, inexpiable/unforgivable sin. The present study demonstrates through 
the terminological/contextual/intertextual approach that ַׁשע  is mainly intentional and פֶּ
potentially also unintentional, but yet always expiable/forgivable sin. 
Third, this point disproves the foundational assumption of ADH that ַׁשע  as ,פֶּ
inexpiable/unforgivable sin, uniquely defiles the sanctuary from a distance through the 
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air. Being expiable, ַׁשע  through the ,ָחָטא and ָעֹון is dealt with as other sins, denoted by פֶּ
sin or reparation offering. Consequently, ַׁשע  sin was transferred into the sanctuary in the פֶּ
same way as other sins via the sacrificial offering process. 
Fourth, in addition to the claim from a terminological study of the term  ַׁשע  that ,פֶּ
it refers to intentional and potentially unintentional sin, the presence or absence of intent 
is not a reliable element to determine whether the sin is expiable or inexpiable. It is 
demonstrated in the present study that some intentional sins are expiable/forgivable as are 
unintentional ones, and expiable sins can invoke punishment if divine regulations to deal 
with a given sin are not followed. However, a terminological study of ַׁשע  itself does not פֶּ
provide grounds for establishing whether it conveys intentional inexpiable sin. Thus, it is 
the context, rather than the use of the term ַׁשע  or any other term for sin, that determines פֶּ
whether the sin is expiable or inexpiable. 
Fifth, the proposed understanding of terms gave room for the unique 
interpretation of Lev 16:16, 21. Shea proposed certain arguments, some of which were 
disproved and some strengthened in the present study that the ַחָּטאֹות, the closing term of 
both lists of sins in these two texts, actually refers to sin offerings rather than to sins. The 
first two terms in the list refers to sins that were dealt with by the sin offerings. 
Consequently, at least four facts invalidate basic and critical assumptions of 
ADH: 1) three Hebrew terms for sin, ֶּפַׁשע ,ָחָטא , and ָעֹון, are interchangeable and 
unreliable in defining sin, 2) ַׁשע  cannot be restricted to intentional brazen and פֶּ
inexpiable/unforgivable sins which consequently challenges the key presumption of ADH 
that ַׁשע  is intentional brazen and inexpiable/unforgivable sin, 3) intent is not a crucial פֶּ
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element in proclaiming a sinful activity inexpiable/unforgivable and ַׁשע  contexts do not פֶּ
provide ground to be classified as such sin, and finally 4) interpretation that nominal ָחָטא 
in Lev 16:16, 21 refers to the sin offering, rather than sin. These insights remove the most 
challenging critiques against transfer/substitution meaning/function of laying on of hands. 
 
Insights from the Concept of Atonement 
First, the understanding that ַׁשע  represents intentional inexpiable sin is a crucial פֶּ
element of the commonly believed atonement theory that assumes AD of the sanctuary. 
The sinner of ַׁשע  ,sin is not allowed to offer sacrifice and obtain forgiveness, but rather פֶּ
experience capital punishment. This is not supported by biblical texts. The claim that 
there are sins for which forgiveness via sacrifice is not possible is correct, but these sins 
are never conveyed via the ַׁשע  term. The intentional brazen sins expressed through the פֶּ
phrase ָיד ָרָמה ב   are related to ָעֹון, but not to ַׁשע  Thus, the ADH, as a part of the classical .פֶּ
atonement theory, was redefined. 
Second, scholars believe that ַׁשע  sin, as some sort of miasma, not dealt with פֶּ
through sacrifice, travels through the air and attaches itself to the sanctuary, particularly 
the most holy place. It is inescapable that ַׁשע  ,sin, supposedly behaves in that way פֶּ
possesses some kind of intelligence in order to land exactly where it is supposed to land, 
the most holy place. The present study understands that the concept of atonement is 
expressed by a highly abstract language that it also includes symbolism, but assigning 
these kinds of abilities to only a certain type of sin would be crossing the limits of the 
definition that biblical faith does not contain magic. In the atonement theory and 
understanding of sin presented in the present study, the movement of sin is highly 
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controlled and limited. That is, the sin was transferred from the offerers to their sin 
offering and then through the blood of the offering into the sanctuary or through the 
blood onto the sacrificial altar in addition to the officiating priest via the eating of the 
sacrificial meat. The ADH assumes that ַׁשע  sin, being unknown to anybody but the פֶּ
offerer, glides through the camp and lands exactly in the sanctuary. If ַׁשע  sin were פֶּ
public, and presumably the sinner is deserving of capital punishment, as the proponent of 
ADH believes, ַׁשע  sin’s entrance into the sanctuary does not make any sense. The sinner פֶּ
of ַׁשע  sin does not receive forgiveness. The incident of a blasphemer does not show any פֶּ
fear of his sin’s being a threat for the sanctuary. 
Upon closer analysis of crucial texts used to support the AD theory, the present 
study demonstrates that this theory is untenable for multiple reasons. These reasons 
pertain to the areas of grammar lapses, the semantics of the verb ָטֵמא, and inconsistencies 
in the literary structure of related texts. 
Third, the present study demonstrates that the foundational meaning of ר פֶּ  is כִּ
ransom, not cleansing. Even though the understanding of ransom defined in this study 
and the common understanding of this concept as defined in English dictionaries304 are 
similar to some extent, it has to be stressed that ransom in this study does not include 
legally negative connotations, but rather, the one that is informed by biblical texts. Thus, 
 
304For instance, a bribe is defined as “a sum of money or something valuable that you give or offer 
to somebody to persuade them to help you, especially by doing something dishonest.” Oxford Advanced 
Learner’s Dictionary, s.v. “bribe,” released 30 July 2015, http://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/ 
us/definition/american_english/bribe_1. For similar definitions see Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “Bribe,” 
released 9 April 2019, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/bribe; BLD, 8th ed., s.v. “Bribe”; A 
Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage, 2nd ed., s.v. “Briber; bribee; bribe-giver; bribe-taker”; Burton, BLT 
(1998), s.v. “Bribe.” 
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ransom refers to a reconciliation of an interrupted relationship between a sinner 
(offending party), who broke God’s law, and God (offended party), whose law has been 
violated. This reconciliation is achieved by God’s acceptance of the ransom in the form 
of the life of the animal, instead of the sinner’s life. In this case, the animal’s life serves 
as a ransom for human life. A metaphor of removal, of sin with its punishment, 
encounters this part of the atonement process better than the metaphor of cleansing 
because the latter refers to total absence of the substance, an item that is being cleansed 
from the object that it resided on/in. This cannot be said of the connection of the sinner 
and their sin. Thus, the biblically informed understanding of ransom resembles the 
common definition of ransom in MLSs in the fact that there is some sort of payment to a 
law jurisdiction entity, which has not necessarily established a law, to help a law-breaker 
mend his/her situation that includes violating established law without considering the 
offended party. It differs in the fact that a biblical ransom fixes the relationship between a 
sinner and God which is defined by (1) laws that are given and enforced by God himself, 
and (2) God as the offended party who accepts a ransom in order for the reconciliation to 
take place. 
The latter is possible in a very limited number of texts that separate themselves 
from other uses by a specific grammatical pattern: ר פֶּ  is followed by the direct object כִּ
marker and the noun is modified by the direct object marker. 
Fourth, the meaning of ר פֶּ  as “to ransom” and the choice of English “to atone כִּ
for” or “atonement” for it removes misleading connotations or senses of the two most 
common scholarly suggestions, “to cover” or “to cleanse,” for ר פֶּ  that stems from כִּ
concrete meaning of this verb which is not supported by biblical texts. In light of the 
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ever-present and underlying GHS and a particular sin, the meaning, “to ransom,” is 
supported in some context by rigorous examination of ר פֶּ  uses in the Pentateuch and by כִּ
the overall interpretative framework found in the Pentateuch, which places emphasis on 
the symbolic, abstract meaning of atonement. 
Fifth, the fact that ר פֶּ  is often a subprocess or prerequisite of a broader process כִּ
such as acceptance, forgiveness, sanctification, or cleansing it always ransoms either the 
offerer’s GHS or a particular sin that is transferred to the animal. The laying on of hand/s 
is a distinct ritual activity that facilitates this transfer to the sacrificial animal that 
eventually dies in the offerer’s place. 
In summary, the following facts established through the study of ר פֶּ  form an כִּ
interpretative framework in which transfers/substitution is necessary and constitutes the 
logical meaning/function of laying on of hand/s: 1) ַׁשע  sin can be expiated/forgiven via פֶּ
sacrifice; 2) ַׁשע  sin is dealt with via sacrifice just like any other sin and it does not פֶּ
possess faculties of an intelligent being such as traveling from the spot where it was 
generated to another specific spot; 3) ר פֶּ ר (refers to ransom and not cleansing; 4 כִּ פֶּ  is כִּ
portrayed as a symbolic, abstract process for which the English word “atonement” is the 
most appropriate; and 5) ר פֶּ  is often a prerequisite for broader processes that regulate כִּ
divine-human relationships. 
The arguments from hamartiology and atonement do not eliminate the fact that 
secondary functions of the laying on of hands could have been to express identification or 
convey the ownership of the animal. However, in light of the arguments mentioned 
above, the transfer/substitution remains the primary meaning/function for the laying on of 
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hand/s. Transfer remains unspecified, since the element transferred is determined by a 
given context. However, the interpretative framework and a given context should also be 
taken into consideration to control the elements that are transferred, since in light of some 












SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
 
The foundation of this study was the interrelatedness of the concepts of sin and 
atonement with the ritual gesture of the laying on of hands as presented in the sacrificial 
offering regulations. Regardless of the long history of opposition to transfer/substitution 
as a suggested meaning/function of the laying on of hand/s, the research presented in the 
present study suggests that this theory still possesses valid—and overwhelming—biblical 
support. The present research consisted of three major parts. 
 
The First Part 
The first part of the study included chapters two and three. Chapter two includes a 
general study of impurity in the OT including its key approach and weaknesses and 
ending in a more focused study of moral impurity, including specific Hebrew terms. 
Chapter three offers terminological definitions based on the MLS in order to examine the 
role of intent in the event of sin in the Pentateuch. 
 
Chapter 2 
Approaches and Obstacles in the 
Study of Impurity 
I demonstrated in this chapter that OT hamartiology is perplexed with the fact that 
sin is often presented through (1) multiple metaphors, (2) an extensive plethora of 
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Hebrew terms, and (3) the tendency of the OT to present it as a conceptual representation. 
A major weakness of all key approaches developed in OT hamartiology is root fallacy, a 
belief that the original, etymological meaning, which rests on the earliest use of the 
term/s, is a normative meaning for subsequent uses. The terminological approach is the 
most basic and needed element in OT hamartiology, but if it suffers from limiting sin to 
some terms, and all or the majority are included, then the study becomes superficial and 
literary insensitive. In addition, the contexts are usually insufficiently considered. The 
biblical-theological approach is also valuable since it tends to consider the historical-
literal element of biblical texts and organize the findings into a systematic/topical 
teaching. The key weakness of this approach is the immense number of imbalance 
definitions and text selectiveness. The metaphorical approach views impurity as just one 
term to denote the concept of sin and the meaning of “metaphor/metaphorical” is never 
defined by scholars. It does not seek to define the concept of sin, but rather, to find the 
metaphors by which impurity/sin is expressed. As such, it is the least utilized approach in 
scholarly debate. All these key approaches are not mutually exclusive and do overlap to 
some extent.  
The approach utilized in the present study is named the 
terminological/contextual/intertextual approach and represents the way to avoid root 
fallacy and the weaknesses of key approaches and to incorporate their strengths. It 
attempts to collect statements on sin in the Pentateuchal texts paying attention to the 
context and literary particulars of the texts analyzed. In order to perform a thorough 





Impurity in Scholarly Debates 
This first part of the second chapter demonstrated that the division of impurity in 
the OT into ritual and moral is understood from the early beginnings of the study of this 
concept. Key scholars on the topic such as David Hoffmann, Alfred Büchler, Mary 
Douglas, Hyam Maccoby, Jacob Milgrom, Tikva Frymer-Kensky, David P. Wright, and 
Jonathan Klawans all confirmed the division into these two impurities. This bipartite 
division was articulated in early Jewish sources, spanning Talmudic and medieval 
rabbinic literature, Philo, and the early rabbinic sages. The two key proponents who 
viewed impurity as a single nature concept are Jacob Neusner and Thomas Kazen. 
However, Neusner was unsuccessful in preserving the two ways (metaphorical elsewhere 
in the Bible and literal in relation to Cult) of interpreting texts that speak of impurity, 
while Kazen’s application of the bio-psychological approach onto moral and ritual texts 
is highly questionable. The history of research showed that moral impurity originates 
from sinful behavior, while ritual impurity originates from human corpses, certain animal 
carcasses, bodily flows, and leprosy, and as such, it symbolizes sin. It is unknown why 
they symbolize sin from the scholarly debate. The present study connects ritual impurities 
to sin via the potential of death that ritual impurities carry in themselves. The work of 
Frymer-Kensky, Wright, and Klawans are the most detailed and educational. Building on 
the bipartite division of impurity to ritual and moral impurity, Kensky-Frymer divided 
ritual impurity into minor and major, and concluded that these impurities are contagious, 
but yet, not sinful. Major impurities are caused by death, leprosy, bodily discharges and 
childbirth, while minor impurities result in contact with impure things, things that are 
defiled by persons under major impurity and persons under major impurity. Moral 
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impurity refers to activities forbidden by God. She also believed that pollution of the 
sanctuary takes place in two ways, via direct contact and aerially. Wright’s work is 
imbedded in Frymer-Kensky’s study. He introduced a new terminology, tolerated for 
ritual and prohibited for moral impurity, which is heavily but yet, rightly criticized by 
Klawans. Finally, Klawans’ work is the most up-to-date work on the topic and upholds 
the classical bipartite division. Along with the previous scholarly research, Klawans 
agreed that ritual impurity (1) arises from natural and unavoidable conditions, (2) is not 
sin, and (3) conveys impermanent contagion via direct contact. Moral impurity, on the 
other hand, (1) arises from grave sin, (2) is not defiled by direct contact, (3) leads to long-
lasting, if not permanent, contagion, and (4) unlike ritual impurity which can be 
addressed and remedied via purification ritual, is rectified by atonement, punishment, or 
refraining from committing it. He highlighted the fact that purity/impurity terminology 
also confirms the traditional division into ritual and moral impurity since ָטֵמא is used for 
both impurities, but ּתֹוֵעָבה and ָחֵנף are used exclusively for moral impurity. Moral 
impurity defiles the one who performs it, the sanctuary, and the land. Ritual impurity 
never defiles the land, nor is derived from the land, but defiles the sanctuary and humans. 
Klawans innovatively introduced the fact that both impurities, ritual and moral, are real. 
In addition, he endorsed the metaphorical use of purity/impurity language in biblical 
texts, but not to the extent that scholars usually think of, claiming that use of 
metaphorical or figurative interpretation of certain texts brings more confusion than 





Further Insights on Impurity 
from the Present Study 
In expanding the works of these scholars, some other insights are present in the 
Pentateuch that further confirm the bipartite division between the two impurities. 
Removal of negative effects of ritual impurity never results in forgiveness (ָסַלח), but 
predominantly, in 24/25 contexts, it does result in purification (ָטֵהר). In the Pentateuch, 
in 3/4 contexts, in Lev 12:7–8 and 14:20, purification is just potentially present, while in 
Lev 16:19, ָטֵהר deals with the ritual impurity. Thus, Lev 16:30 remains the only 
exception. The purity verb ָחֵנף never refers to ritual impurity, but always, to moral. ָטֵמא 
expresses both impurities and predominantly expresses defilement of humans and 
insignificantly, of the sanctuary and the entire camp. ָחַלל is even more flexible than ָטֵמא 
in its preference to transfer both ritual and moral defilement to humans and the sanctuary. 
Based on the results of the search of all three verbs, ָחֵנף ,ָטֵמא, and ָחַלל, the land never 
contracts ritual defilement, but always, moral. ּתֹוֵעָבה never refers to ritual, but always to 
moral impurity. Thus, a terminological analysis of purity verbs favors the bipartite 
division of impurity more than a single impurity approach. 
Having established the division between ritual and moral impurity, the present 
study focuses on moral impurity expressed by ֶּפַׁשע ,ָחָטא , and ָעֹון as the key reason for 
atonement, especially in Lev 4–5; 16:16, 21. The present study established that 
Schwartz's proposal that the phrase or , ָחָטא ַׁשע ָעֹון ָנָׂשא , פֶּ  refers to the state of guilt, thus 
representing consequential bearing of sin, is an eloquent attempt to suggest a fresh 
meaning to the phrase. However, weaknesses embedded in it make it incapable of 
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replacing the traditional understanding of the phrase consisting of two meanings, “to 
forgive” and “punishment.” 
By applying the terminological/contextual/intertextual method in studying the 
terms  ֶָּפַׁשע ,ָטאח , and ָעֹון, the present study establishes that all of them, in terms of intent, 
refer to unintentional and intentional sins. In terms of expiability, they all refer to 
expiable and inexpiable sins. The uses of these terms reveal that the emphasis of each 
term’s preference to denote intentional or unintentional and expiable or inexpiable sin 
vary, but all of them at least sometimes refer to all these types of sin. Finally, these three 




In chapter three, this study consults MLS terminology in order to clarify its use in 
biblical studies. Consequently, it is demonstrated that biblical scholars usually 
misunderstood essential meaning of the terminology. The prime example is Jacob 
Milgrom who was followed by other biblical scholars. Contrary to Milgrom, it is 
negligence that encompasses wrongs done inadvertently or ignorantly, and not 
inadvertence that encompasses wrongs done negligently or ignorantly. Besides 
similarities to ANE law collections and certain unique characteristics of BL, its key 
uniqueness is crucial for the present study. That is, BL has its origin in God himself and 
consequently, breaking any regulation of BL assumes liability of the one doing it and 





Intent in Legal and Cultic Texts 
Establishing intent, though difficult, is possible in legal texts, as well as in cultic 
texts. Homicide laws are an example of the most comprehensive display of various levels 
of intent in the former, while the latter is portrayed in Lev 4–5 and Num 15. Milgrom, in 
a way, determined how scholars perceive intent in cultic laws. He proposed that ָאַׁשם has 
consequential meanings like other terms that deal with sin, such as ָעֹון and ָחָטא, that 
express both, sin and its punishment. ָאַׁשם, being an intransitive verb, is best understood 
if translated as “to feel guilty,” which Milgrom supported by the use of the noun ָגָגה  ,ׁש 
which he understood to mean “inadvertence.” A closer reading of his work reveals that 
ָגָגה  is limited to accident only, which is only partially true, and is applied to all cases of ׁש 
ָגָגה  Thus, unconsciousness of the sin and consciousness of the act is common for any .ׁש 
breaking of the law in Milgrom’s opinion and it impacted the role of intent in the process 
of breaking the law. Such an understanding of sin excludes the major class of sin which is 
sin committed out of GHS and weakness. 
By examining the uses of ָאַׁשם, it is established that both aspects, subjective-
physiological-consequential and objective, are contained in the verb ָאַׁשם. The context is 
the determining factor if both or one particular sense is to be a preferred meaning. The 
inclusion of both these factors, subjective-psychological-consequential and objective 
senses of the verb ָאַׁשם is expressed in the four ways of translating it, and the literary and 
grammatical flow of the texts provide the most satisfactory and consistent reading of Lev 
4–5. “To be/become guilty” remains the least misleading translation since it embodies all 
 
728 
the others and remains the most basic meaning of the term in the context of legal/moral 
standing.  
This understanding,  ָאַׁשם, reconciles all conceptual and literary difficulties if just 
one of the suggested understanding/translations of ָאַׁשם is accepted. First, it 
chronologically places the sinners’ recognition of the sinfulness of their sin before they 
offer a sacrifice or make confession in Lev 5:1–5, 17 which is obvious in Lev 4:3, 13–14, 
23–24, and 27–28. Sinners are always fully aware of their sin before offering a sacrifice. 
Second, it provides the rationale of how the sinners, who are aware of their sin, are 
motivated to rectify their sin in Lev 5:23. Besides being objectively and subjectively 
aware of their sin, the sinners also experience the consequential aspect of ָאַׁשם (pangs of 
their consciousness), and their objective and subjective experience of guilt is placed in 
the right context, and they fully understand their sin. Third, this chronology of activities 
where sinners’ awareness of their sin before they begin to rectify it is preserved and 
upheld by the recognition of the temporal sequence of activities in Lev 4–5 expressed by 
wayiqtol and weqatal verbs, and of the pluperfect sense of qatal verbs. Fourth, it 
recognizes two different ways by which sinners become aware of their sin which is 
obvious in Lev 4:23–24, 27–28 and in all other transitions in Lev 4:3, 13–14 by 
understanding that the Hebrew particle אֹו in the most natural way as “or” and 
understanding the Hebrew conjunction   ו to mean “or,” as one of its frequent meanings in 
the Pentateuch and the Hebrew Bible. Fifth, the presence of two different ways of the 
sinners’ recognition of their sin also explains why both מּו ָאֵׁשִֽ ָעה and ו  ֹוד  נִֽ –in, Lev 4:12 ו 
13, 22–23, 27–28, are accompanied by additional clauses that basically communicate that 
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the sinner has committed sin. This is not the case in Lev 5:5, 17, 23, where only ָאַׁשם 
occurs, with no additional clauses to communicate the act of sinning. The only exception 
is a short reference, ָהָיה א ו  י־יֱֶּחָטֹ֣ ִֽ כִּ , in v. 23. 
The study of ָגָגה ׁש   revealed that this term refers to the non-brazen nature of the בִּ
sin (Num 15:22–29) and activities committed accidentally, with no intentionality 
included on the sinner’s part. If the immediate context of the phrase does not provide 
arguments for a different nuance of meaning, this is the one that should be assumed. 
The use of the verbs ָיַדע and ָעַלם in Lev 5:1–4 suggests that the person involved 
had knowledge of his sin, was aware of it, but consequently lost knowledge of it. Still, 
this understanding of sin in Lev 5:1–4 rests on the grammar utilized in the passage. These 
verbs are used in Lev 4:13, but the grammar does not support the understanding that is 
conveyed in Lev 5:1–4. 
The verb ָׁשָגה/ָׁשַגג, like the verb ָחָטא, with the exception of brazen sinning, 
expresses all types of sinning in the OT. The immediate and wider context of each use 
clarifies whether the verb is used as a generic way, or whether it conveys some specific 
way of sinning.  
 
Leviticus 4–5: A Fresh Proposal 
The four subcases in Lev 4 all assume two alternative ways of sinning, 
unintentional accidental and potentially out of ignorance, and intentional, but non-brazen. 
The next four subcases in Lev 5:1–4 are intentional but non-brazen sins that were 
forgotten and eventually remembered. The pericope of Lev 5:14–16 is unique, and for 
that reason, is separated from the subcases in Lev 4 because it deals with the sins against 
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the sancta. However, in terms of the nature of sinning, due to the use of a general verb 
 and a theoretical potential, the pericope assumes the same types of sins as are in Lev ָחָטא
4, unintentional accidental or out of ignorance, and intentional but non-brazen. Leviticus 
5:17–19 is another unique type of sinning that is only well established here, and that is 
the sin of ignorance. The final pericope in Leviticus, 5:20–26 [6:1–7], encompasses the 
exclusively intentional, but non-brazen sins. Numbers 15:22–31 deals with two types of 
sinning. The first is described in vv. 22–29 and are non-brazen sins which may include all 
types of non-brazen sins defined in Lev 4–5. The second, vv. 30–31, is brazen sin that 
includes the full intention of the sinner along with the attitude of rejecting God’s 
personality and authority. 
 
Fresh Sin Classification 
As a result of such an understanding of terms and crucial texts concerning the 
intent related to sinful activities, the present study suggests that the death/capital 
punishment prescribed for sin makes it intentional, brazen sin, while all other sins to 
which other non-capital punishments are associated is unintentional or intentional, non-
brazen, and possibly, expiable. The former one is defined in the Pentateuch as “ ָיד ָרָמה ב  ” 
sin and it is always done in the sinner’s full awareness of the activity and consciousness 
of the activity’s being sinful. The latter can be done unintentionally and intentionally. 
The unintentional one is by accident or through ignorance, which implies awareness of 
the activity, but unconsciousness of the activity’s being sinful. Intentional, non-brazen sin 
stems from GHS/weakness, where the sinner is fully aware of the activity of sinning and 
conscious of the activity’s being sinful. 
The research on moral impurity provides the following three points: First, Hebrew 
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terms for moral impurity semantically overlap. Second, all of them, in terms of intent, 
refer to unintentional and intentional sins and in terms of expiability, refer to expiable 
and inexpiable sins. Third, these three terms are often used as synonyms. Fourth, Hebrew 
terms are consequently not helpful in determining the nature of sins but the context is. 
These points enable a plausible interpretation of Lev 16:16, 21. Some scholars have 
interpreted ׁשַ ּפֶ ע ,ָחָטא , and ָעֹון as a triad that represents sin in a comprehensive way. 
Others assigned specific meaning to each term. Gane produced the most comprehensive 
work concerning the two interpretative cruxes in these two texts in following the latter 
method. However, this study demonstrates that Gane's interpretation is not sound. In 
regard to the first crux, lekol does not introduce a new item in the list, but rather, 
encompasses the first two terms. Regarding the second crux, Hebrew terms cannot be 
taken as referring to specific sins for the above-mentioned reasons, that is, their semantic 
overlap and synonymous uses. Thus, besides conveying a comprehensiveness of sin 
which is confirmed by the present study, these terms could be understood to refer to the 
sins that could potentially be found in the sanctuary and are atoned for by the sin 
offerings which are always taken to be the meaning of the last term in the list, ַחָּטאֹות. 
 
The Second Part 
This part also consisted of two chapters, four and five. A detailed and extensive 
study of the Hebrew verb ר פֶּ  as a crucial component of the sacrificial process that ,כִּ
includes the laying on of hand/s, is dealt with in chapter 4. An evaluation of the ADH, 
including critical grammatical issues involved in the text upon which this theory rests, is 




ר פֶּ  in Scholarly Debates כִּ
It has been established that widespread insight from comparative studies on the 
origin and meaning of the Hebrew verb ר פֶּ  such as the Arabic kaffara or the Akkadian ,כִּ
kuppuru, proved to be misleading, contrary to what was believed in the mid-20th century. 
First, stems in various languages do not correspond, but also overlap. The Hebrew ר פֶּ  כִּ
and Arabic kaffara or Akkadian kuppuru have different meanings in the base and 
intensive stem. Yet, some uses show that sometimes they do semantically overlap. 
Second, scholars have proposed at least 4 ways ר פֶּ  ,should be understood: (1) to cover כִּ
(2) to ransom, (3) to purify, purge, and (4) to atone, expiate. Confronted with the variety 
of uses, Levine proposed that there are two separate ָכַפר roots in BH, ָכַפר I, “to purify,” 
and ָכַפר II, “to expiate,” but his work reflected that he himself was not able to preserve 
this distinction as he interpreted texts. Milgrom was firm that ר פֶּ  predominantly means כִּ
“to effect purgation” in a sin offering context. Less prominent meanings are “to cover,” 
“to ransom,” and “to atone, expiate.” Sklar proposed that the verb encompasses both 
ideas, purging and ransom. Following previous scholarship, such as Driver, Gane moved 
the debate of ר פֶּ ר onto more solid ground. He emphasized that כִּ פֶּ  does not focus on the כִּ
physical activity such as purging, which is emphasized in the Akkadian kuppuru context, 
but rather its goal, since the former is rare in biblical texts. He also insightfully noted that 
ר פֶּ  .takes place before forgiveness, which is the very final goal of offering a sin offering כִּ
Thus, ר פֶּ  ,has something to do with the obstacle in divine-human relationships. Finally כִּ
he proposed that the nature of ר פֶּ  in a given sacrifice is identified by the goal of that כִּ
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ritual. Feder’s work is the most recent on the topic, and he proved that favored 
comparative input on the meaning of ר פֶּ  is wrong for (1) concrete and abstract meanings כִּ
of the verb, and (2) ר פֶּ  has a wide range of semantic meanings in BH. He proposed, like כִּ
Gane, that the meaning of ר פֶּ  .should be determined based on the context כִּ
 
Foundational Meaning of  ר פֶּ  כִּ
The present study shows that major scholars of ר פֶּ  showed little or no כִּ
consideration for the fact of GHS of human beings in their formation of the meaning of 
this verb. GHS is a constant disadvantage of human beings when they interact with the 
divine, whether actual sin is involved or not, and as such, should be included in the 
formation of the understanding of  ר פֶּ  the present study does exactly that. The ;כִּ
foundational text for the meaning of ר פֶּ  is the only text that explicitly explains it by כִּ
detailing the role of blood in the sacrificial process, Lev 17:11. 
First, examining the meaning of ר פֶּ  the present study realizes that animal’s ,כִּ
blood serves as a ר ר of human life and that the foundation of the ֹכפֶּ פֶּ  is the concept of כִּ
ר  ransom. The broken relationship between God, as an injured party, and the sinner, as ,ֹכפֶּ
a wrong party, is resolved by God’s acceptance of the animal’s blood-life as ransom for 
the offerer’s blood-life. The decision of whether to accept the ransom or not rests solely 
on the wronged party, God. It is inescapable that the sacrificial animal serves as a 
substitute in the place of the offerer. 
Second, asking to which sacrifices the regulations in Lev 17 refer in the present 
study affirmed that a general prohibition against blood eating in v. 10 is not limited to 
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well-being offering but refers to burnt, sin and reparation sacrifice that all have atoning 
function.  
Third, although all three alternatives, beth pretii, beth essentiae, or beth 
instrumentii, are valid for the meaning of the second   ב preposition attached to the noun 
ר by which נֶּפֶּׁש פֶּ  is accomplished, beth essentiae and beth instrumentii are favored since כִּ
they agree with the understanding that the referent of  in 11b is the life of the  נֶּפֶּׁש
sacrificial animal and has stronger grammatical and intertextual support. Fourth, the fact 
that ר פֶּ  in itself includes the idea of substitution and because the sacrificial animal is כִּ
slaughtered at the altar in the sanctuary instead of the offerer, the idea of substitution is 
implied in Lev 17:11. This analysis and understanding of ר פֶּ  greatly helped in כִּ
identifying the meaning of ר פֶּ  .in some vague contexts below כִּ
 
Insights on ר פֶּ  from the Present Research כִּ
The comprehensive analysis of the uses of ר פֶּ  along with modifiers or no כִּ
modifiers in the present study brought the following results. 
First, ר פֶּ  has a concrete, literal meaning “to rub on, apply” only once in Gen כִּ
6:14, and then it is preceded by the direct object marker. This is also the only qal use of 
 and non-cultic context in the Pentateuch. The same meaning is reflected in cultic ָכַפר
contexts, even though ר פֶּ  .appears in piel, Lev 16:20, 32 כִּ
Second, when ר פֶּ  appears with no modifiers in cultic and non-cultic contexts, it כִּ




Third, when ר פֶּ  in non-cultic contexts, it ַבַעד is accompanied by the preposition כִּ
refers to atonement, but it was of a temporary nature (Gen 32:30). In cultic contexts, ר פֶּ  כִּ
conveys two different meanings of “to atone for” and “to remove,” in the sense of 
cleansing. 
Fourth,   ר + ל פֶּ  is found two times and always in non-cultic texts with the כִּ
meaning of “to atone for” and with the idea of ransom included. 
Fifth, two meanings are detected with   ר + ב פֶּ  constructions, and they are all כִּ
found in cultic contexts. All texts include impurity, either from context or implied, but 
the function of this construction is either to communicate the instrumental in the sense by 
which the ר פֶּ ר was achieved or the location where the כִּ פֶּ  .was accomplished כִּ
Sixth, the most frequent construction is ר + ַעל פֶּ -and it occurs in cultic and non כִּ
cultic contexts. In 47/56 of occurrences, the preposition ַעל carries the meaning of 
advantage, with only one non-cultic text. In the other 9 occurrences, the preposition ַעל 
marks either the location of ר פֶּ  accomplishment, instrument, or direct object marker. In כִּ
Exod 29:36, ַעל carries double function of marking the direct object marker and the 
location. Of the last 9 occurrences, only Lev 14:53 is a non-cultic context. 
The present study also analyzed the use of ר פֶּ  in context with related concepts כִּ
such as to cleanse (ָחָטא), to sanctify ( ָקַדׁש ), to clean (ָטֵהר), to forgive (ָסַלח), and to 
accept (ָרָצה). When ר פֶּ ר ,appears in the rituals whose goal is to reach these outcomes כִּ פֶּ  כִּ
is a part of a bigger, major ritual. It has a limited function within the major ritual of 
assisting in the accomplishment of the major ritual. 
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First, when it appears along with ָחָטא and ָקַדׁש in Exod 29:33, 36, it atones for the 
priests’ GHS in v. 33, and cleanses the altar in v. 36. When it appears in ָחָטא contexts in 
Lev 8:15, it also atones for the priests’ GHS. Ritual or moral impurity is not included in 
these texts. The basis for this atonement is ransom. 
Second, when it appears in the contexts of ָטֵהר ,ָחָטא and ,ר פֶּ כִּ  is uniquely 
accomplished by the reparation offering in Lev 14:20 and refers to the reinstatement of 
the healed ָצַרַעת person into the community and to the sin offering which atones for the 
healed ָצַרַעת person’s GHS. It is possible that moral impurity might have been included 
here, but not ritual impurity. In Lev 14:53, it refers to the removal of ritual impurity in the 
sense of cleansing it from the infected house. 
Third, when ר פֶּ  ,in Lev 16:19, 30 ָקַדׁש and ָטֵהר appears in the context with כִּ
moral impurity is definitely included, and  ִּרכ פֶּ  refers to its removal in the sense of 
cleansing. 
Fourth, ר פֶּ  in Num 8:21, which does not ָחָטא and ָטֵהר shares the context with כִּ
include impurity, and then refers to the atonement of the Levites’ GHS. In the context 
with ָקַדׁש in Num 6:11, ר פֶּ  refers to atonement for the Nazirite’s sin to prepare him for כִּ
the new term of Nazirite status. Ransom is again the basis upon which atonement is 
possible in this context. 
Fifth, the most frequent contexts in which ר פֶּ  ,in Lev 4:20, 26, 31 ָסַלח appears is כִּ
35; 5:10, 13, 16, 18, 26 [6:7]; 19:22; and Num 15:25, 26, 28. All these are cultic contexts 
and they all involve moral impurity. ר פֶּ  It always precedes .ָסַלח is a prerequisite for כִּ
ר These contexts, better than all others, show that .ָסַלח פֶּ  conveys atonement and is כִּ
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based on the ransom. The offerer receives ָסַלח based on the sacrifice he/she offers. 
Sixth, ר פֶּ  appears in the contexts where the offerer receives acceptance before כִּ
God in Lev 1:4. This context implies the presence of GHS. Again, the basis of this 
atonement is ransom in the form of sacrifice. 
Based on the contexts of the atonement of which ר פֶּ  is a part, it consists of two כִּ
elements. The first element is reconciliation which implies that a relationship between 
God and a human party was broken. The reconciling act is actually an encounter of God’s 
grace toward humans, followed by their willingness to return to God. The second element 
is expiation which implies that the human party feels guilt in the face of law because of 
his/her sin, and God’s wrath that follows the act of sin. The human party needs to 
overcome these. Removal of the feelings of guilt and God’s wrath is what expiation does. 
The human party gives up his/her sin while God gives up his wrath. In the actualization 
of both of these elements, reconciliation and expiation, God’s initiative is crucial and 
always precedes the response of the human party. In other words, ר פֶּ  removes this כִּ
obstacle, whatever that might be. 
However, God is never the subject or object of ר פֶּ  even though the process ,כִּ
involving ר פֶּ  is prescribed by God. Completion of the atonement process is sealed by כִּ
God’s direct involvement in this process by granting forgiveness.  
Both cultic and non-cultic contexts in the Pentateuch confirm that ר פֶּ  should be כִּ
understood as achieving abstract effects on both human and inanimate entities. Milgrom 
allowed for ransom to be foundational for ר פֶּ  but only in a limited number of texts that ,כִּ
include averting God’s wrath. ר פֶּ  as such encompasses substitution as well. This study כִּ
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understands that ר פֶּ  ,always has this function, either in the contexts of moral impurity כִּ
some cases of severe ritual impurity, and in the cases of GHS. The analysis of ר פֶּ  כִּ
contexts showed that some contexts give certain guidelines as to what the meaning ר פֶּ  כִּ
could convey, but some contexts do not provide any guidelines, but solely rely on the 
already elaborated meaning. This study agrees that the foundational text that informs of 
almost all ר פֶּ  contexts is Lev 17:11. There, the verb is presented as “ransom” on the כִּ
basis of the sacrificial blood that is applied on the altar. The choice of a precise English 
word to translate the complex semantic range of the Hebrew ר פֶּ  does not exist. The כִּ
present study proposed the English “to atone for” as the closest representation of what 




Automatic Defilement Hypothesis 
The second part of the second section of the present study dealt with ADH. Based 
on the findings in the area of stem, aspect, and the semantics and patterns of use of the 
verb ָטֵמא used in Lev 15:31; 20:3; and Num 19:13, 20, this study suggests that ADH is 
not supported by the Pentateuchal texts. 
First, the part of Waltke’s and O’Connor’s theory that piel is always factitive if 
qal of the same verb is stative is valid in the case of ָטֵמא within the limits of the 
Pentateuch. In other words, piel brings a totally passive undersubject, without regard to 
the process, into the state depicted by an adjective. By utilizing the method specifically 
developed to examine Waltke’s and O’Connor’s theory of piel, Beckman’s research did 
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not provide sufficient evidence for disproving it when applied to the verbs that convey 
abstract, conceptual, or metaphorical meanings like ָקַדׁש ,ָטֵמא and so on. However, this 
postulate regarding piel is not complete. Second, building on this, the present study 
detected a twofold pattern of  uses in the Pentateuch. This verb is always  ָטֵמא
accompanied with other verbs, through which its meaning onto the undersubject/direct 
object it modifies is achieved, and physical contact between the entities transmitting and 
contacting impurity is always included. Third, the verbal aspects of ָטֵמא in the contexts 
of Lev 15:31; 20:3; and Num 19:13, 20 contain nuances that do not lend support for the 
ADH. All these three points are reinforced as I focus on the issues pertaining to each of 
these texts and propose their interpretation. 
 
Leviticus 15:31 
Building on these three arguments just presented, the present study focuses on the 
more subtle grammatical, syntactic, and semantic irregularities found in Lev 15:31. It 
was demonstrated that the instrumental sense, “by defiling my tabernacle that is in their 
midst,” is not justifiable, which consequently, makes ADH unsustainable. 
First, the temporal interpretation considers that the infinitive construct + 
preposition   ב construction conveys a temporal sense, which is well established by 
Hebrew grammarians. Second, the piel of the verb ָטֵמא is considered as a stative verb in 
this text since it is intransitive. In addition to the factitive understanding of piel with this 
particular verb, the temporal interpretation agrees with the pattern of uses of ָטֵמא 
established in this study. Third, the present study demonstrates that ָטֵמא strictly follows a 
certain pattern of uses in the Pentateuch. That is, it is always accompanied with other 
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helping verbs that convey the exact mode of how ָטֵמא achieves its meaning. Fourth, 
achieving ָטֵמא state always includes contact between the defiling and profane entity. 
Fifth, the concept of ellipsis and delay that are part of the debate of defilement 
transmission do not override the temporal sense. These two concepts do exist in the 
Pentateuch. When they are interpreted within the Pentateuchal corpus without imposing 
preconceived ideas upon the texts that imply elliptical statements, they support a 
temporal sense. Based on the patterns of use of ָטֵמא, the ellipsis, “if an impure person 
touches sancta,” is implied in this text. Also, a delay does not mean that a minor impurity 
grows into a major one if there in a case of delay to handle them, but rather, gives room 
for the defilement of the entire camp and the tent of meeting via the uncontrollable 
transmission of impurity among the covenantal community. Finally, as shown above, the 
temporal sense is accepted in rabbinic literature. 
This study shows that Hebrew grammarians have proposed well-established rules 
in the area of grammar and syntax, as well as the semantics of the verb ָטֵמא which are 
very helpful in determining the most plausible meaning of Lev 15:31. The present study 
attempts to incorporate these rules into Lev 15:31 and arrives at the conclusion that the 
instrumental sense is less plausible than the temporal. It actually results out of significant 
grammatical, syntactic, and semantical irregularities. The temporal sense in Lev 15:31, 
on the other hand, does not collide with grammatical, syntactical rules or the semantic 
sense of the verb  It has to be admitted that the temporal sense in Lev 15:31 does not . ָטֵמא
provide the way defilement actually takes place, but just proposes a potentially defiled 
state of the sanctuary in the future. However, the manner of how the sanctuary gets 
defiled is very explicitly specified in the Pentateuch (Lev 10:1–2; 12:4). In other words, 
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defilement takes place through direct contact as a part of ָטֵמא patterns of use in the 
Pentateuch as demonstrated in the present study. 
 
Leviticus 20:3 
An analysis of Lev 20:3 gave insights into an additional argument against the 
ADH. First, the meaning and function of the preposition ַמַען  that connects the first two ל 
and the last clause. Through two possible senses, purpose and intention, the preposition 
ַמַען  conveys a resultative sense in this text. It never conveys the causative sense in order ל 
to provide grounds for the interpretation that offering one’s children to Moloch itself 
defiles the sanctuary, as the proponents of ADH imply. Rather, this preposition conveys 
that offering one's children to Moloch results in defiling the sanctuary. The translation, 
“the consequence of which will be,” rightfully conveys its meaning. This understanding 
is in accordance with the understanding of the piel stem, the aspect of the infinitive 
construct, and the patterns of use of ָטֵמא in the Pentateuch. As established above, piel 
brings a totally passive undersubject, without regard to the process, into a certain state. 
The infinitive construct acts as a finite verb in this text because it is transitive in a 
resultative clause. Infinitive Construct is frequently used in resultative clauses in BH and, 
in that case, it is introduced by the preposition ַמַען  Finally, the well-established pattern .ל 
of ָטֵמא uses in the Pentateuch points to the fact that this verb always requires another 
helping verb to achieve its meaning. All these insights suggest that an additional activity 
is implied between the first two and the third clause of this text as the preposition 
introducing the third clause indicates. Based on the established pattern of the uses of ָטֵמא 
in the Pentateuch, that additional activity would imply direct contact between the idolater 
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and the sanctuary through his/her coming to the sanctuary. 
Second, Lev 20:1–5 faces significant internal structural and conceptual 
inconsistencies if it is assumed that it consists of two cases, vv. 2–3, and vv. 4–5. Staying 
within the limits of this text, the first inconsistency is a disparity of punishments for the 
same sin. That is, in v. 2, the punishment for idolatry is death by stoning, while in v. 4, it 
is either annihilation of the lineage or punishment in the afterlife. Death by stoning is 
standard punishment for idolatry. The second inconsistency is that the people cannot 
disregard the idolater in vv. 4–5 if they experience premature death in v. 3 as part of 
God’s administering punishment upon them. Verses 4–5 are superfluous in this case. 
Third, if God punishes the idolater only when the covenant community does not, as it was 
evident in vv. 4–5, then this fact points to the claim that God, in v. 3, punishes because 
people do not know that the act of idolatry took place among them. These inconsistencies 
led scholars to propose that v. 3 represents the separate subcase of the law implying the 
ellipsis, “if he does it secretly.” In that case,   ו is not used as a conjunctive “and,” but a 
coordinative particle “or.” In addition, the use of the phrase, “from the midst of one’s 
people,” as well as “from one’s people,” accompanied mainly with the verb ָכַרת and in 
one case verb ָאַבד and another מּות in the Pentateuch, convincingly prove that premature 
death is implied punishment in those contexts. The phrase יׁש ַההּוא ָבאִּ  in v. 3 does not 
designate the exact person mentioned in v. 2, thus connecting these two verses into one 
unit, but rather, it refers to any person who commits idolatry. This phrase is also 
mentioned in vv. 4 and 5, and it is impossible that the very same person is implied, since 
v. 4 indisputably introduces a new subcase. Thus, יׁש ַההּוא ָבאִּ  refers to an impersonal, 
indefinite individual who commits idolatry. Cholewinski’s persuasive literary structure is 
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not affected by the inclusion of the implied elliptical phrase, ר  .ַבֵּסתֶּ
Accordingly, the understanding of stem, aspect, and semantic sense of ָטֵמא, along 
with the meaning and function of the preposition ַמַען  and structural and conceptual ,ל 
inconsistencies under the assumption that this law consists of two, rather than three cases 
does not support ADH. Verse 3 is a separate case in which the implied ellipsis, “if he 
does it secretly,” resolves the internal conceptual inconsistencies of a two-subcase literary 
structure, thus allowing the idolater to come to the sanctuary and defile it through direct 
contact with it, since the covenant community does not know and is not able to prevent it. 
Again, arguments upon which ADH is proposed in regards to this text vanished. 
 
Numbers 19:13, 20 
Besides the already mentioned arguments, Num 19:13, 20 adds more arguments 
against the ADH. First, the piel stem of the verb ָטֵמא is factitive. It brings a totally 
passive direct object into the certain state without regard to the process. Second, the 
perfect aspect is frequently utilized to convey a result in the future as a completed state. 
Third, the verb ָטֵמא is always accompanied by other verbs through which its meaning on 
the direct object it modifies is achieved. Accordingly, these insights regarding the stem 
and aspect utilized in Num 19:13, 20, along with the semantics and patterns of use of ָטֵמא 
in the Pentateuch, do not support ADH. Rather, these texts speak of the result that will 
take place in the future. The exact mode of how this result is achieved is indicated by the 





The Third Part 
The last part of the present study is presented in chapter 6. This chapter 
encompasses the presentation of the ritual theory that would respect the data about the 
concept of sin and atonement suggested in the present study. In addition, it includes the 
evaluation of the critiques of transfer/substitution theory of the laying on of hand/s, along 




The present study has not focused on developing a ritual theory that would be 
based on the methods established by other disciplines such as sociology, anthropology, 
study of religion, literary criticism, study of theatrical performance, and psychology. 
Instead, this study looked for the ritual theory that correlates with the findings in the 
present study that were derived from biblical texts in order to provide a framework for 
the interpretation of the laying on of hand/s. The intention was to learn what the biblical 
texts have to offer about the laying on of hand/s. Such a ritual theory was found in the 
work of Roy Gane, who focused on the biblical text as the final and decisive factor in 
forming a conceptual and interpretative framework. Even though, Gane's and my 
interpretations on certain biblical texts, and ultimately the meaning of laying on of hands, 
significantly differ, the majority of my findings agree with his ritual theory and method 
he used to form it. 
Led by sociological and anthropological methods, David P. Wright focused on the 
questions concerning ritual that are not dealt with in biblical texts. None of the three 
points he proposed are fully accurate. First, the claim that the texts do not lend sufficient 
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data for proper interpretation assumes that ritual has to be observed in order to be 
interpreted properly. The point that both prescriptive and descriptive ritual texts in the OT 
do not provide a full explanation of the ritual performance and are not subject to 
sociological analysis is well noted and undeniably accurate, but still, his accurate 
assessment is out of context, since none of these two points stands in the ideological 
fabric of the production and purpose of these texts. Second, his point that the variety of 
genres enables a proper ritual interpretation is also misleading since the Pentateuchal 
ritual texts still retain emphasis on the ritual goal in various genres, rather than presenting 
themselves for a sociological analysis and performance. Third, a sharp conceptual 
distinction in the Pentateuch is not solidly established. Furthermore, recent research 
points to the unsustainability of establishing various literary strata within the Pentateuch 
based on literary features. Thus, Wright's arguments are not sustainable. Gane's ritual 
theory that also negates Wright's assumptions regarding the ritual interpretation was 
found to be in better agreement with biblical texts and therefore accepted in this study. 
The main postulates of Gane's ritual theory are the following: (1) ritual actions 
and substances do not have an inherent meaning, but their meaning is established from 
sources like culture, religion, and immediate context; (2) ritual consists of activity and 
meaning that is attached to them in the text; (3) based on the second point, Gane was able 
to avoid weaknesses of structural, dynamistic, or historical approach, and focus on the 
meaning provided in the texts themselves, since these approaches are inadequate for 
identifying ritual meaning; (4) the meaning/function corresponding to the goal of a ritual 
is the goal, assigned to it by the activity system, that is, broader religious context of 
Ancient Israel; (5) a “ritual” is an activity system with a special kind of goal that is not 
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subject to a physical cause and effect reaction, but rather, is symbolic, conveying that 
God intervenes through certain ritual physical processes; (6) systems theory concepts can 
aid in the interpretation of Israelite rituals because ritual in the Pentateuch, like in system 
theory, consists of sub-rituals; and (7) the biblical text, prescriptive or descriptive, 
provides instructions for physical performance and interpretations of activities, and 
remains foundational for determining a ritual's meaning/function. All these points of 
Gane's ritual theory are well supported by biblical texts, as demonstrated. 
Conceptual gaps in the biblical ritual text are real. Some tried to solved by giving 
the reader freedom to fill them in based on other sources which, in the mind of the 
proponents of this approach, are even extra-biblical sources that are not affirmed by the 
present study. However, limiting the sources to biblical texts only, in this case, especially 
the Pentateuchal texts, provides a sound approach. 
 
Biblical Data Regarding Laying on of Hands 
Data from comparative studies confirms the fact that laying on of hand/s is found 
in a variety of contexts and meanings. The laying on of hand/s is recorded in 22 texts in 
the Pentateuch (Exod 29:10, 15 ,19; Lev 1:4; 3:2, 8, 13; 4: 4, 15, 24, 29, 33; 8:14, 18, 22; 
16:21; 24:14; Num 8:10,12; 27:18, 23; Deut 34:9) and 21 of them are performed in a 
cultic setting. It is widely accepted that this ritual gesture conveys the fact that some kind 
of relationship is established between the offerer and his/her sacrifice. 
Besides these 22 texts where the laying on of hand/s is mentioned, there are at 
least 6 texts (Lev 1:10; 7:1–7; 9:8, 12, 15, 16, 18; 16:6, 9, 11, 15, 24; 23:8, 12, 18, 19, 27, 
36, 37, 38, and Num 28–29) where it is missing. The present study suggests that in Lev 
1:10; 7:1–7; 9:8, 12, 15, 16, 18; 23:8, 12, 18, 19, 27, 36, 37, 38, and Num 28–29) the 
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ritual gesture was performed and was omitted for valid reasons. An abbreviation is the 
reason for its absence in Lev 1:10 and 23:8, 12, 18, 19, 27, 36, 37, 38, and Num 28–29, 
where the focus is on the sacrificial altar, instead of on the priests in Lev 9:8, 12, 15, 16, 
18, or because of the point of view of the text, and allowance for converting the sacrifice 
into money that was handed to the priest. On the other hand, the present study recognizes 
that some texts contain hints that the laying on of hand/s was not performed in some 
contexts such as Lev 16:6, 9, 11, 15, 24 because Lev 16 is prescriptive and detailed text 
and as such, does not mention the laying on of hands on the burnt and sin offerings. In 
addition, the uniqueness of the sin and burnt sacrifices' function also points to the fact 
that the laying on of hand/s was not needed in this context. 
Calabro correctly dismissed the presence of two forms of laying on of hand/s and 
proposed that the laying on of hand/s was always performed with both hands. However, 
his proposal was proven to be unsustainable upon closer study of his arguments and 
biblical texts. His argument relied on the partial and one-sided reading of other and later 
readings such as the LXX and the DSS. However, the review of his arguments shows 
multiple lapses at the level of statistics on the agreement and disagreement of the number 
of the noun “hand” in the MT, on one the hand, and the LXX and the DSS, on the other. 
In the context of unconvincing statistics, the claim of textual criticism that number 
disagreement can hardly be considered as a sign of an original reading does not stand. 
Except for some random cases within which hand disagreement is found in Lev 3:2, 8, 
13, there is no pattern that could be established to support Calabro’s proposal when the 
number of the noun hand is compared in the MT and the LXX. The two readings are 
more consistent than not. 
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The present study fully recognizes the complexity of the number of the noun 
“hand” in the context of the laying on of hand/s and proposes that one hand is used in Lev 
1:4; 3:2, 8, 13; 4:4, 24, 29, 33 based on consistent the MT readings, and that two hands of 
one person were involved in Exod 29:10, 15, 19; Lev 4:15; 8:14, 18, 22; 16:21; 24:14; 
Num 8:10, 12; 27:18, 23; and Deut 34:9 based on the patterns of use of the plural of the 
noun “hand.” This delineation is overruled in at least one text, Lev 4:15, since based on 
the grammatical pattern, two hands were used in this text, but in Lev 4, in all other 
instances, vv. 4, 24, 29, and 33, only one hand was used. Consequently, the conclusion of 
the present study is that the form of gesture is insignificant and does not affect its 
meaning/function since the texts do not provide enough evidence for a solid conclusion 
of the number of hands used. The same applies to the question of the presence of pressure 
during the hand leaning or not. 
Calabro proposed that the laying on of hand/s appoints a person or animal to a 
particular status or role. However, his arguments were not solid. That is, the claim that 
the focus of the phrase “that it may be accepted for him to make atonement on his behalf" 
in Lev 1:4 is not on what the gesture does to the animal, but rather, the emphasis on the 
fact that “the gesture’s form is a similitude of atonement” is supported by abandoned 
understanding of ר פֶּ  as a cover. It is demonstrated in the present study that this is not a כִּ
valid meaning of ר פֶּ  Second, he confused contexts, since the set of sacrifices in Lev 1–3 .כִּ
is different from those in Lev 4–6:7. Finally, this phrase is related to the burnt offering 
only, and never to sin or reparation offerings. Building on the grammatical and 
syntactical parallels between ּתָ  ָסַמכ  ָך ו  ת־ָיד   .you shall lay your hands on him) in v) ” “ָעָליו אֶּ
18 and ָנַתָּתה ָך ו   you shall put some of your power on him) in v. 20 of Num) ” “ ָעָליו ֵמהֹוד 
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27, Calabro noticed that the transfer theory fits these contexts best, and then the material 
being transferred becomes the possession of the person to whom it was transferred. His 
reference point is the use of the verb ָּפַקד in Num 27:16. However, Calabro disregarded 
the basic step in biblical interpretation, the use of the root. This root is used 
insignificantly outside of the book of Numbers. The only time ָּפַקד is related to the laying 
on of hand/s is in Num 27:16. The verb never means “to appoint” in Exodus and 
Leviticus. These points demonstrate that Calabro's proposal is not sustainable. 
A closer analysis of theories scholars have suggested showed that some of them 
are possible and some are not against the totality of the biblical text. Thus, identification 
is acknowledged that it does not happen at the ontological, but rather, the symbolic level 
is a possible meaning/function of this gesture. The consecration-
separation/dedication/presentation theory is not possible for several reasons. First, the 
offerers in most cases needed forgiveness in the first place or are ransomed before God 
because of their GHS. Second, common individuals cannot consecrate anything since this 
is in the domain of the priesthood. The separation nuance of this theory is even less 
sustainable because the fact that a sacrificial animal is brought to the sacrificial altar is 
testament of the fact that it is separated/set apart from the larger group for a special 
purpose. The laying on of hand/s was not needed for that purpose. Third, it is ultimately 
God himself who sanctifies in the OT. Finally, the Pentateuch legislation never uses the 
verbs of dedication with the offerer as a subject and sacrifice as a direct object in Lev 1–
7. The only text where it is explicitly stated that sacrifices are dedicated to God is Lev 
22:2–3. However, “holy gifts” refer to a well-being offering of which the offerer would 
keep the larger part and give a thigh to the priest. The consecration-
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separation/dedication/presentation theory does not provide enough evidence to be 
included as a viable meaning/function for the laying on of hand/s. 
The possibility that the laying on of hand/s could encompass primary and 
secondary meanings/functions is possible. Identification does not seem to be a concept 
that emerged out of modern Western philosophy since it was noticed at the beginning of 
the Middle Ages and even in the times of the Church Fathers. 
 
Critique of Arguments against the 
Transfer/Substitution Theory 
Scholars have suggested ten arguments that invalidate the transfer/substitution 
theory, and each of them was analyzed in the present study. A general critique that 
applies to all of these arguments is that they are based on selective reading of texts. First, 
the fact that ignoring the divinely instituted regulations that deal with ritual or moral 
impurity results in capital punishment invalidates the claim that the death of the animal 
cannot have been vicarious, since a sacrifice was not allowed for sins which merited 
death (Num 15:30), only for venial transgressions. Instead of bearing their own sin and 
ultimately suffering the consequence of death, offerers could transfer their sin/s to the sin 
and/or reparation offering and receive forgiveness. Second, biblical texts undeniably 
claim that the sin offering is holy, even though it receives the offerers’ sins, which negate 
the critique that the sin cannot be transferred to a sacrificial animal since it was described 
as holy. Third, the fact that blood application was a critical ritual activity in the sacrificial 
offering process does not undermine the importance that the sacrificial animal 
symbolically and substitutionarily represents the offer. The transfer that takes place from 
the offerer to the sacrificial animal gives more importance to blood application, since the 
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sin is transferred to the sanctuary in that way. Fourth, the substitution theory of sacrifice 
is a well-established phenomenon in ANE context and a part of the atonement theory 
proposed in the present study which refutes the claim that the transfer and/or substitution 
theory is based on a substitution theory of sacrifice that is untenable. Fifth, the claim that 
the transfer and/or substitution theory is based on Lev 16:21 assumes that (1) the form of 
ritual is different, and (2) the scapegoat is not a sacrifice. It was established that form 
does not affect the meaning/form of the gesture. In addition, transfer is implied in Lev 4, 
where offerers come to the sanctuary loaded with their sin and leave from it forgiven. 
Leviticus 16:16 explicitly states that the sins are in the sanctuary. Sixth, Lev 17:10–12 
describes the well-being offering as an expiatory sacrifice that eliminates the critique that 
the well-being offering is not expiatory. Seventh, the fact that a bird would fly away if let 
go nullifies the argument that transfer is not possible, since the laying on of hand/s was 
not performed in relation to the bird offering. In addition, the laying on of hand/s was 
never prescribed for cereal offering, even though it has expiatory function. Regardless of 
this, it is expiatory, but at the same time, it is the last possible choice for atonement. 
Eighth, there are multiple activities within the ritual process that undeniably reveal the 
identity of the offerer, making the understanding that that was the role of this gesture 
redundant. Ninth, confessions are a well-established ritual activity imbedded in the 
sacrificial offering ritual, and it is reasonable to assume that confession was performed on 
the sacrifices that would deal with sin. 
The ten arguments identified in the scholarly debate regarding the 
meaning/function of this ritual gesture reflect a selective, subjective, and non-
comprehensive reading of the Pentateuch texts and the present study demonstrates their 
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weaknesses. Not being solid, these arguments cannot discredit the transfer/substitution 
theory, but were the chance to refine and strengthen this theory. After identifying 
weaknesses of these arguments, the present study pointed to certain additional arguments 
coming from the research done here. 
 
Further Arguments Supporting the 
Transfer/Substitution Theory 
First, the three Hebrew terms for sin, ׁשַ ּפֶ ע ,ָחָטא , and ָעֹון, are not reliable in 
determining whether the sin is intentional or unintentional and expiable or inexpiable 
because they often semantically overlap and are used as synonyms. Second, ַׁשע  cannot פֶּ
be restricted to intentional inexpiable/unforgivable sin as most scholars understand this 
term. It is mainly intentional and potentially, also unintentional, but still, always expiable 
sin. Third, ַׁשע  sin was consequently transferred into the sanctuary in the same way as פֶּ
other sins that were there, via the sacrificial offering process. Fourth, the presence or 
absence of intent is not a reliable element to determine whether the sin is expiable or 
inexpiable. Some intentional sins are expiable/forgivable, as unintentional and expiable 
sins can invoke punishment if divine regulations to deal with that sin are not followed. 
Fifth, ַחָּטאֹות, the closing term of both lists of sins in Lev 16:16, 21 actually refers to sin 
offerings rather than sins. Such an understanding of ַחָּטאֹות disagrees with the 
understanding that ַׁשע  represents intentional inexpiable sin which is a crucial element of פֶּ
the commonly believed atonement theory that assumes ADH of the sanctuary. The sinner 
of ַׁשע  sin is not allowed to offer sacrifice and obtain forgiveness, but rather, experience פֶּ
capital punishment. The modification to this is that the Pentateuch does not provide the 
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evidence that  ֶּעׁשַ פ  refers to such sin, which negates the ADH. In addition, acceptance of 
the ADH assumes that ַׁשע  sin possesses some kind of intelligence that enables it to land פֶּ
exactly where it is supposed to land, the most holy place. Closer analysis of crucial texts 
used to support the ADH shows multiple grammatical and semantic lapses of the verb 
 and inconsistencies in the literary structure of related texts. Also, the foundational ָטֵמא
meaning of ר פֶּ  .is ransom, not cleansing כִּ
Fourth, the meaning of ר פֶּ  as “to ransom” and the choice of the English “to atone כִּ
for” or “atonement” to translate ר פֶּ  removes misleading connotations or senses from the כִּ
two most common scholarly suggestions, “to cover” or “to cleanse” for ר פֶּ  that comes כִּ
from the concrete meaning of this verb which is not supported by biblical texts. 
Finally, because ר פֶּ  is often a subprocess or prerequisite of a broader process כִּ
such as acceptance, forgiveness, sanctification, and cleansing, it always ransoms either 
GHS or a particular sin that is transferred to the animal. The laying on of hand/s is a 
distinct ritual activity that facilitates this transfer to the sacrificial animal that eventually 
dies in the offerer’s place. 
 
Final Synthesis 
Because it is part of the sacrificial process, the laying on of hands is organically 
related to human sin or sinfulness and atonement as a prerequisite for broader concepts 
such as acceptance, forgiveness, sanctification, and cleansing. Identifying the 
meaning/function of laying on of hands depends directly on the understanding of sin and 
atonement. 
First, sin is represented as a concept in the Pentateuch. It is ontologically 
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perceived as an abstract reality in the cultic context. In the initial phases of some ritual 
impurity, it is portrayed as a physical entity to some extent, while moral impurity never 
possesses physical qualities. It is purely an abstract entity. Determining the 
presence/absence of intent related to an act of sinning cannot be established on the basis 
of the three Hebrew terms for sin ׁשַ ּפֶ ע ,ָחָטא , and ָעֹון; since they often semantically 
overlap, they are often used as synonyms. Thus, these terms refer to sin, in general, 
without conveying the presence or absence of intent on the part of the sinner, nor do they 
convey whether the sin they refer to is expiable or inexpiable. Thus, whether an act of 
committing sin was performed intentionally (brazen or non-brazen sin) or unintentionally 
(non-brazen sin) solely depends on the sinful activity itself or the immediate context of a 
given situation that includes that act of sinning. Some contexts provide insights 
concerning these elements; others do not. The corollary of such an understanding of sin is 
that in many cases, if one is not involved directly in the situation that includes the sin, 
he/she is not able to determine whether the sin was intentional/unintentional and 
expiable/inexpiable. This is also confirmed by the reading of Lev 4–6 suggested in the 
present study. It is the sinner, without anyone's involvement, who decides and chooses to 
offer a sacrifice and select an appropriate type of sacrifice. The priest is informed to assist 
in offering the sacrifice, but it is the sinner who decides to bring the sacrifice and which 
type of sacrifice in his/her interaction with God. The priest was never said to investigate 
or interrogate the offerer concerning the reason that made him/her offer the sacrifice. 
That remained within the limits of the interaction with the offerer and God himself. 
The Pentateuch uses a variety of metaphors to express sin and presents it in terms 
of physical appearance. This, however, does not ontologically or intrinsically change the 
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abstract nature of sin into a physical/quasi-physical or material in a cultic context, but 
rather, just aids in human comprehension. Sin remains an ontologically and intrinsically 
abstract entity in the cultic context. The sin itself and its context are decisive factors 
concerning the presence/absence of intent related to a given act of sinning or its 
expiability/inexpiability. These two points aid in identifying the meaning/function of the 
laying on of hands. Leviticus 16:16, 21 state that all three terms for moral impurity, ָחָטא, 
 are present in the sanctuary, not physically, but in ,ָטֵמא ,and ritual impurity ,ָעֹון and ,ֶּפַׁשע
a real and yet abstract way. The offerer affected by these impurities brings them 
symbolically to the sanctuary (in the case of ritual impurity that requires sacrifice, the 
offerer needs to wait for a certain time elapse) and offer his/her sacrifice to deal with 
them as God prescribed in the cultic law texts. The conceptual understanding of sin and 
the recognition that ֶּפַׁשע ,ָחָטא , and ָעֹון are synonyms allow that the laying on of hand/s, 
as the only activity in the ritual of animal sacrifice that is not necessary for the execution 
(performance) of the sacrificial offering, actually facilitates the transfer of both impurities 
into the sanctuary or on the priesthood. Identification can be implied as a secondary 
meanings of this ritual, but transfer is the only meaning/function that explains the two 
facts explicitly stated in the cultic legislation: (1) the fact that the offerer comes to the 
sanctuary with his/her impurity and leaves without it (forgiven, accepted, sanctified) and 
(2) the fact that the impurity is in the sanctuary on the Day of Atonement, because the 
offerer had brought such impurities to the sanctuary on a daily basis and obtained 
atonement concerning them. In this understanding of the defilement of the sanctuary the 
critical term ַׁשע  is equated with two other terms, thus avoiding an unsound and  פֶּ
biblically unsupported understanding that sins expressed through it cannot be 
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expiated/forgiven through cult. It also eliminates an unsound understanding of ַׁשע  that it  פֶּ
behaves like a living and intelligent entity. ַׁשע   is never portrayed as having such פֶּ
qualities in the metaphor and, even less so, conceptually or intrinsically. As such, the 
laying on of hands is a theologically crucial ritual gesture in the process of atonement 
because it serves to transfer impurity symbolically from the offerer to the sanctuary. 
This interpretation of impurity negates the belief that an inevitable and 
unavoidable reaction of contact between the holy, such as God, sanctuary, or holy things, 
and the impurity, the human being, is death of the latter as a source and/or carrier of 
impurity. Embedded in this belief is the postulate that God is not able to cope with the 
effects of impurity, but rather, is subjected to them. He is forced to leave the sanctuary 
because of the high accumulation of impurity in the sanctuary. Instead, Pentateuchal texts 
prove that God chooses to tolerate impurity by storing it in the sanctuary or on the 
priesthood until the Day of Atonement when it is removed from both. This is conditioned 
by following procedures which Good revealed for dealing with impurity by human party. 
Both impurities are in the sanctuary and on the priests, but that does not disqualify these 
two entities from retaining their holiness or residing safely in the realm of the holy. God 
chooses to leave his sanctuary at the time when he realizes that the sacrificial procedures 
do not fulfill the purpose for which they had been established: to atone for sinners. 
Second, the analysis of ר פֶּ ר constructions led to the conclusion that כִּ פֶּ  always כִּ
refers to abstract processes. A literal, concrete meaning of ר פֶּ  appears only in one כִּ
instance and that is at the same time as the only qal stem of the verb, Gen 6:14. All the 
other occurrences, whether in cultic or non-cultic contexts, are in piel and have an 
abstract meaning. In a few texts where the direct object of ר פֶּ  is an inanimate object, that כִּ
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is, the sanctuary or its parts, the text uses the metaphor of “carrying away” or “removing” 
sin, which results in cleansing those objects. Nevertheless, the use of the metaphor does 
not make the sin or the process of ר פֶּ  ontologically material and/or concrete. It remains כִּ
an abstract process that includes real, yet abstract, elements, such as sin and removal that 
results in cleansing. This study affirms that the foundational meaning of ר פֶּ  should be כִּ
sought in Lev 17:11 and that it is “to ransom,” which consequently encompasses the idea 
of substitution, that is, the sacrificial animal functions as the offerer’s substitute. Both of 
these two elements, ransom and substitute, are foundational for atonement. In this, the 
concept of atonement follows the conceptual and abstract understanding of sin that has 
been suggested in the present study. 
The abstract understanding of  ִּרכ פֶּ  is further supported by the concept of GHS that 
is embedded in the biblical portrayal of human nature, but still neglected in the study of 
atonement. The present study demonstrates that GHS is a critical and ever-present human 
characteristic and, as such, made atonement in divine-human interactions necessary. It 
originated from the fall of humanity in the Garden of Eden when the first couple 
disobeyed God's commandment and since then, affects every human being. Influential 
scholars have recognized and accepted GHS as inseparably related to human beings. 
Disciplines outside of biblical studies, such as classical philosophy, moral philosophy, 
and philosophy of action, have also noted that human beings exercise weakness of will, 
that is, intentionally doing something that is known to be wrong. General human 
sinfulness affects all aspects of human life, including those related to human cognition, as 
well as those related to physical existence. Surprisingly, critical scholars of the cult of 
Ancient Israel cult have not included this concept in their study of atonement. They 
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simply ignored it and it did not play a part in their studies of atonement. The present 
study demonstrates that GHS, like ritual and moral impurity, is a real, but at the same 
time, an abstract entity. General human sinfulness is foundational for both impurities, 
ritual and moral. Both of them come from GHS, and ritual impurity, in a small number of 
cases, is related to physical appearance. However, ritual impurity is atoned for only after 
the physical aspects of it have disappeared (healed and/or a certain amount of time has 
elapsed, etc.). Impurity, be it ritual or moral, or GHS were atoned for as abstract entities. 
ר פֶּ  deals with physical impurity, the only one that is associated with physical כִּ
representation, but only after physical stage of it has disappeared. 
This abstract understanding of ר פֶּ  based on ransom, that is constantly needed in כִּ
divine-human interactions when a human being experiences any possible source of 
disruptions such as sinfulness, ritual, or moral impurity, is in stark contrast with the 
understanding “to cleanse, purify” the sanctuary suggested by Milgrom, or “to cleanse 
from” proposed by Gane. Milgrom's and Gane's understandings of atonement are 
informed by the biblically unsupported notion of ר פֶּ  as cleansing. In Milgrom’s case, it כִּ
is not the offerer who is cleansed, but rather, the sanctuary, while in Gane's case, it is the 
offerer who is cleansed from these impurities. To the contrary, God chooses to accept 
human beings such as they are through atonement based on ransom. However, in order to 
control impurity, God prescribed the sacrificial system that would enable human beings 
to commune with him regardless of the disruptions inherent in them. The goal of such a 
system was to control and deal with the experiences of impurity in human life and to 
stress the significance of a holy life that is totally opposite to any experience of impurity. 
Within such an understanding of atonement, the laying on of hands symbolically serves 
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to transfer those impurities from the offerer to the sanctuary at the time when human 
beings experience them. They are stored there until the Day of Atonement, when they are 
removed and taken away from the camp into the wilderness. 
These arguments do not eliminate the fact that secondary meanings/functions of 
the laying on of hands could have been used to express identification or convey the 
ownership of the animal. However, in the light of the arguments mentioned above, the 
transfer/substitution remains the primary meaning/function for the laying on of hand/s. 
Transfer remains unspecified since the element transferred is determined by a given 
context. However, the interpretative framework and a given context should also be taken 
into consideration to control the elements that are transferred since in light of some 
contexts, some transfers are superfluous and redundant. 
As it became obvious from the literature review presented in the introduction of 
the present study, the transfer/substitution has been the primary interpretation of laying 
on of hands with the longest history, but scholars began to challenge it since the end of 
the nineteenth century until now. The challenges posed by scholars during this time 
period are not textually defensible. They stream out of imposed assumptions about 
concepts from ANE contexts; adoption of methodologies foreign to biblical texts; and 
discriminatory, selective, rather than inclusive, comprehensive reading of biblical texts. 
Thus, the meaning/function of the laying on of hand/s is best understood to 
convey a symbolic transfer of various qualities to the sacrificial animal which further 
serves as the offerer’s substitute due to the human’s constant unfavorable state that is 
described in the present study as GHS before God, even if no sin is committed. 
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This meaning is never explicitly stated in biblical texts. The present research 
attempted to provide a biblically-informed interpretative context that helped identify the 
meaning/function of the laying on of hands. In the process of researching this ritual 
gesture, the present research noticed three tendencies imbedded in scholarly dialogue as it 
addresses the meaning/function of laying on of hands. First, scholarly proposals on the 
meaning/function of laying on of hands are laden with certain preconceived 
interpretations of selected texts. Second, they import these interpretations from a broad 
ANE context and relate them to biblical texts without the use of a consistent, comparative 
method. Third, these studies adopt ritual theories that do not arise from the biblical text, 
but rather, from social, philosophical, and literary disciplines, such as sociology, 
philosophy, anthropology, literary criticism, and the study of religion. Unfortunately, 
none of these disciplines is founded upon biblical postulates. Consequently, the results of 
these studies regarding this ritual gesture have been inordinately influenced by such 
disciplines. Therefore, the present research sought to base its conclusions on biblical texts 
alone and eliminate elements and interpretations informed by these disciplines that do not 
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Sigvartsen, Jan Åge. “The Afterlife Views and the Use of the Tanakh in Support of the 
Resurrection Concept in the Literature of Second Temple Period Judaism: The 
Apocrypha and the Pseudepigrapha.” PhD diss., Andrews University, 2016. 
 
Silva, Moisés. Biblical Words and Their Meaning: An Introduction to Lexical Semantics. 
Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1983. 
 
Simons, Kenneth W. “The Crime/Tort Distinction: Legal Doctrine and Normative 
Perspectives.” WLJ 17 (2008): 719–32. 
 
793 
———. “Deontology, Negligence, Tort, and Crime.” BULR 273 (1996): 273–99. 
 
———. “When is Negligent Inadvertence Culpable?: Introduction to Symposium, 
Negligence in Criminal Law and Morality.” CLP 5.2 (2011): 97–114. 
 
Sklar, Jay. Leviticus: An Introduction and Commentary. TOTC 3. Downers Grove, IL: 
Inter-Varsity Press, 2014. 
 
———. “Sin.” OEBT 2:297–308. 
 
———. “Sin and Atonement: Lessons from the Pentateuch.” BBR 22 (2012): 467–92. 
 
———. “Sin and Impurity: Atoned or Purified? Yes!” Pages 18–31 in Perspectives on 
Purity and Purification in the Bible. Edited by Baruch J. Schwartz, David P. 
Wright, Jeffrey Stackert, and Naphtali S. Meshel. LHB/OTS 474. New York: 
T&T Clark, 2008. 
 
———. Sin, Impurity, Sacrifice, Atonement: The Priestly Conceptions. HBM 2. 
Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2005. 
 
Smith, Charles Ryder. The Bible Doctrine of Sin and of the Ways of God with Sinners. 
London: Epworth Press, 1953. 
 
Smith, Henry Preserved. “The Laying-on of Hands.” AJT 17 (1913): 47–62. 
 
Smith, Holly M. “Non-Tracing Cases of Culpable Ignorance.” CLP 5 (2011): 115–46. 
 
Smith, Jonathan Z. To Take Place: Toward Theory in Ritual. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1987. 
 
Smith, W. Robertson. Lectures on the Religion of the Semites. New ed. Burnett Lectures 
[Aberdeen University] 1888–89. London: A. & C. Black, 1894. 
 
Snaith, Norman H. Leviticus and Numbers. CB 3. London: Nelson, 1967. 
 
Sørensen, J. P. “Ritualistics: A New Discipline in the History of Religion.” Pages 9–25 in 
The Problem of Ritual: Based on Papers Read at the Symposium on Religious 
Rites held at Åbo, Finland, on the 13th–16th of August 1991. Edited by Tore 
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